The Century Foundation takes your data security and privacy seriously. That's why we want you to know that, when you visit our website, we use technologies like cookies to collect anonymized data so that we can better understand and serve our audience. For more information, see our full Privacy Policy.
Roundtable: War on Iran Was Easy to Start. It Won’t Be Easy to End.
President Donald Trump decided to join Israel and attack Iran early on Saturday, February 28—a reckless move that positions the United States as a rogue power.
America embarked on a costly war without any compelling national interest at stake—and clearly, without a plan. Enduring instability, disorder, and needless death will be the predictable consequences. American leaders have no good choices, but ought to focus single-mindedly on stopping the war.
Already just a few days into the conflict, the law of unintended consequences has kicked in. This Century International roundtable spotlights some of the most dangerous hinge points of the war, and the long tail of strategic harm that will flow from this historic error, and includes:
Topline: It will be game-changing if the Houthis join the war on Iran’s side and attack global shipping. So far, a combination of diplomacy and Houthi interest calculations have kept them out of the war.
Unlike Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis—the breakout stars of the Axis of Resistance’s otherwise abortive 2023–25 campaign against Israel due to their missile and drone campaign against Israel and Red Sea shipping—have thus far stayed out of the fight. In a speech this weekend, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the group’s leader, called for mass protests in support of Iran, but not military action.
The decision to join or stay out of the fray is not straightforward. The Houthis have good reason to be cautious.
Over the past two years they have become increasingly financially constrained, particularly since the U.S. designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. Since the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from Yemen at the start of 2026 and Saudi Arabia’s forced consolidation of rival Yemeni security forces under a single chain of command, the Houthis have also faced an opposition that is arguably more coherent than at any point in recent years. The group wants to continue negotiations with Riyadh, particularly over salary payments that could ease the economic crisis in areas under Houthi control. And the Houthis probably also want to keep their powder dry—and their armaments—for an internal war with rival Yemeni forces, which could become more likely if an extended regional conflict severs Iranian support.
But staying out of things and letting Iran descend into chaos would also hurt the Houthis’ interests. A significant proportion of the group’s income comes from free and subsidized fuel shipped to Houthi ports indirectly from Iran. If the Iranian regime collapses or is severely weakened, this lifeline is at risk. The Houthis can import components and build some of the weapons systems they have used over the course of the conflict, but not all of them.
For now, the Houthis are likely to limit any attacks, and conserve military power for a future in which their Iranian patrons are far weaker.
Israel is also likely part of the Houthis’ calculations. Israel has repeatedly penetrated the inner circles of Hezbollah and Iranian leadership, deepening paranoia within the Houthi movement, with senior Houthi political and military figures killed by Israeli strikes in 2025. The group’s leadership has dispersed and gone underground, limiting its ability to coordinate.
Put together, this creates a catch-22 for the Houthis: if they stay out of the fight and Iran implodes, Israel is likely to target them next. But entering a conflict in which both Israel and the United States have taken the gloves off risks the very stockpiles and infrastructure the group needs to survive.
Entering the conflict may also lead to overreach from the group’s rivals, who are already crowing that the Houthis’ demise is imminent. The Houthis still control most of Yemen’s populated territory, run a functioning war economy, and have spent a decade building an arsenal and a governance apparatus that will not simply evaporate. A military campaign to oust the Houthis from Sana’a would still be enormously costly for Saudi Arabia, which is currently absorbing Iranian missile and drone strikes; for global trade, given what the Houthis did to Red Sea shipping between 2023 and 2025; and for rival forces that have struggled to string wins together against the group.
The most likely near-term outcome is a Houthi movement that carefully calibrates, signaling solidarity with Iran and the Axis while conserving its arms stockpile and keeping its options open. If the threat becomes existential for the Houthis, escalation is possible. But for now at least, the Houthis are more likely to save their resources and prepare for a range of scenarios in which Iran may no longer be the patron it has been for so long.
Iraq Is About to Become a Battleground
Sajad Jiyad
Topline: Maximum pressure from the United States on Iraq could soon break Iraq’s fragile entente, unleashing well-armed militias against American interests.
Iraq is on the brink of being fully dragged into the Iran–U.S.–Israel war. It is trying to avoid becoming a primary battlefield, while enduring pressure from Tehran, Washington, and their local allies. This pressure appears as cross-border strikes and militia activity are on the increase while there is a fragile domestic political and economic situation. The caretaker government in Iraq is struggling to shield Iraq from regional instability, and appears close to losing control.
U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran have already spread into Iraq. Attacks have been reported against armed groups such as Kata’eb Hezbollah in Jurf al-Sakhar and in Diyala. In response, militias have launched rockets and drones at U.S. personnel in Baghdad airport and at the U.S. consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan. For several days, protestors have been trying to surround the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Drone strikes have also hit around Erbil International Airport. These incidents are turning Iraqi territory into part of the wider theater of war.
Baghdad has publicly condemned the “unjustified aggression” against Iran. It insists that Iraqi territory will not be used as a corridor or launchpad for attacks. This stance signals neutrality and aims to defend sovereignty. But in reality, the Iraqi government is not in control of its airspace, as Israel uses it to attack Iran and Iran responds by targeting U.S. interests and anti-Iran groups in Iraq. Meanwhile, American officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, press Iraq to keep its distance from Iran as tensions increase. These actions are tightening the diplomatic squeeze on Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s caretaker government.
Powerful Shia factions such as Kata’eb Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, along with the broader Islamic Resistance in Iraq (a pro-Iranian network of armed groups), have threatened or carried out attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and the region. These actions are a direct response to the bombing of Iran. Some groups are cautious, striving to avoid devastating retaliation. But many others have gone on the offensive, conducting dozens of drone operations. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is threatening to expand the conflict by sustained targeting of U.S. forces in Bahrain, the Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Even non-U.S. assets in these countries could be targeted if the Islamic Resistance in Iraq perceives the hosts as supporting the United States and Israel against Iran.
Many of these groups are members of the Popular Mobilization Units, or PMU—the diverse array of armed groups that rose up to fight the Islamic State years ago. The Iraqi government officially made the PMU part of the national military in 2016. But now, the groups’ attacks are showing that Baghdad has limited control over them, despite their officialized status.
Because shipping in the Gulf has ground to a halt, Iraq’s oil exports have taken a sizable hit. This is having a direct impact on government revenues, compounded with the halt of exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. These developments could be dangerous for an Iraqi economy that is already in a precarious position. Baghdad has been facing a financial squeeze in recent months as it struggles to avoid increased domestic debts while trying to meet payroll. Food prices are on the rise and consumer fears are driving stockpiling, which is leading to shortages in goods such as fuel. Should the war last months, Iraq will face considerable economic pressure—which could lead to civil unrest.
Iraq has several urgent priorities: forming a new government (it hasn’t been able to form one since elections in November); ensuring Shia armed groups do not escalate their involvement in the conflict in or outside Iraq; preventing Israel, the United States, and Iran from undertaking attacks inside or through Iraq; and finding a way to maintain oil exports. These are all significant challenges in the current environment, but Iraq’s political elite should know that failure is not an option. Iraq simply cannot afford to once again become a battleground.
Hezbollah Enters the Fray
Sam Heller
Topline: Hezbollah escalated a war with Israel that had never ended, despite a nominal ceasefire. Renewed fighting will be punishing for Lebanese civilians, but is likely to further weaken Hezbollah.
Lebanon’s Hezbollah formally entered this war late on Sunday, March 1, when it carried out a missile and drone strike on an Israeli missile defense facility outside the northern city of Haifa. Hezbollah justified its attack both as vengeance for Israel’s killing of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei and as a defensive response to Israel’s “repeated aggression” against Lebanon. Israel retaliated with a wave of airstrikes hitting Beirut’s southern suburbs and other targets nationwide. Israel has since continued to bomb Lebanon, at a pace seemingly comparable to the height of Lebanon and Israel’s 2023–24 war.
It remains to be seen whether Israel further escalates its air campaign—if, for example, it targets the Beirut airport and other civilian infrastructure it had previously avoided. Israeli officials have also said the Israeli military will seize new positions in Lebanon’s south, beyond the sections of Lebanese territory Israel has occupied since the conclusion of the last war. Hezbollah, for its part, was slow to follow up its initial attack but has since announced several additional strikes on Israeli military targets in northern Israel.
Hezbollah may have inaugurated this latest phase of conflict between Lebanon and Israel with its March 1 attack, but the war has been ongoing, in one form or another, since Hezbollah attacked Israeli positions on October 8, 2023, and Israel opened a new Lebanese front. Even after a ceasefire agreement was announced in November 2024, Israel continued to bomb Lebanon on a near-daily basis in response to alleged violations of the ceasefire’s terms. Hezbollah’s March 1 attack, in fact, broke a calm that had lasted less than forty-eight hours. Israel had bombed areas across Lebanon in the days before it launched its war on Iran, including a wave of strikes on south Lebanon just hours before Israel struck Iran. Israel subsequently communicated to Lebanese leaders, through the United States, that it would not escalate in Lebanon unless it was attacked from Lebanese territory. Some Israeli sources, however, have said that Israel had already prepared a major Lebanon offensive and was only waiting for an opportunity to launch it; Hezbollah, then, may have just preempted an attack that was coming anyway.
For Hezbollah, the status quo prior to this latest escalation was not tenable. Israel had continued to occupy sections of southern Lebanon, prevent the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and kill Hezbollah members and Lebanese civilians daily. The Lebanese government’s attempts to constrain Israel through diplomatic means had, predictably, proved futile. At some point, Hezbollah was going to have to challenge this extreme political–military imbalance, to try to force some new, more favorable dispensation; that likely would have meant another war, either now or in future.
Hezbollah has reportedly been working to reorganize itself and rebuild its capabilities since 2024. No one outside the organization knows, really, how effectively it has reconstituted itself. Now, we’re going to find out. We will also see how much Hezbollah has been disadvantaged, in practice, by the Lebanese army’s efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of Lebanon’s Litani River.
Many observers dismissed Hezbollah’s initial March 1 attack as feeble and likely suicidal. It remains to be seen, though, how much Hezbollah can now ramp up its operations, particularly once most civilians have evacuated southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is also now fighting in concert with Iran, whose theory of victory seems to entail a protracted test of endurance. If Hezbollah is operating on that longer timeframe, then, it may be premature to discount its early moves as pointless or foolish.
Still, Hezbollah will have to contend with real anger among many Lebanese, who blame the group for starting another destructive war on Iran’s behalf. On Monday, the Lebanese government condemned Hezbollah’s actions and took the unprecedented step of banning the group’s military and security activities. So far it is unclear whether the Lebanese army and security services can actually implement that government decision. Yet even among Hezbollah’s popular base, support for the group now seems uncertain. Many of Hezbollah’s civilian constituents are exhausted. It’s been barely a year since the last war, after which they received very limited assistance to rebuild their lives; now they have been displaced and dispossessed again.
Caption: A bedroom in a damaged residential building, struck during the U.S.–Israeli military campaign, as seen on March 4, 2026, in Tehran, Iran. Source: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images
Israel Pushes for a War to “Burn the Lawn”
Yaël Mizrahi-Arnaud
Topline: Israel is pursuing regime change in Iran without a coherent endgame. The broader gamble risks regional destabilization, a prolonged war of attrition, and the erosion of American public and political support, a crucial strategic asset. Israel’s new doctrine will produce chaos and power vacuums, not a new regional order.
“Mowing the lawn” is a longstanding Israeli military doctrine—the idea of periodic, contained operations against adversaries like Hamas or Hezbollah to degrade their capabilities without seeking total defeat. The latest war looks more like “burning the lawn,” and signals a fundamental departure from that logic. (The name of the doctrine is perhaps intentionally dehumanizing, describing wars that kill thousands of civilians with the language of landscaping.) Israel has shifted from managed containment to comprehensive destruction, with no intention of returning to the status quo.
Historians will determine the extent to which Israel pulled the United States into this war versus how much Trump was looking to jump. What matters now is the Trump administration’s interest in continuing what is likely to be a long conflict that will drain blood and treasure. Israel intends to press the assault as long as conditions allow, seeking governmental collapse in Tehran while degrading its military capabilities and internal security apparatus in the interim.
Regime change in Iran has been Israel’s stated policy goal for more than three decades, but never has produced a coherent long-term strategy. Possible outcomes range from full regional destabilization triggered by Iranian state collapse, to an authoritarian equilibrium that Western powers may find tolerable. The middle path—a Venezuela-like scenario in which a weakened Islamic Republic persists—could leave Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps networks intact, embolden Iran to strike at Israel, and accelerate a nuclear program. For Israel, such an outcome is a nonstarter, so it is committed to a prolonged war of attrition with no defined endpoint.
Israel cannot insulate itself from the consequences of the destruction it has unleashed across the region.
Benjamin Netanyahu has clear domestic incentives to extend this war: it keeps October 7 off the front pages and Netanyahu’s corruption trial suspended, and allows Israel to continue attacking Gaza and ethnically cleansing the West Bank without international pushback. With elections approaching, a security-first posture is likely to consolidate his electoral position—after the “twelve-day war” with Iran last June, Likud increased its margin by six seats. Yet Israel cannot insulate itself from the consequences of the destruction it has unleashed across the region. What is striking is the ideological convergence across Israel’s ostensible political divide: the governing coalition and opposition alike support the war, and operate within a shared grammar of coercion and dominance, both domestically and regionally.
The ultimate economic impact of the war on Israel is a bit unclear, but it’s obvious that the short-term costs are significant. The June war alone is estimated to have cost Israel $6.5 billion—but may be partially offset by surging demand for Israeli military exports, since regional instability reliably drives arms procurement. Israeli defense exports rose from $12.5 billion in 2022 to $14.7 billion in 2024. But while wars reliably depress GDP, consumption, investment, and confidence well beyond the duration of active combat, Israel has consistently demonstrated a rapid postwar rebound.
Israel’s gamble could also erode its standing in the United States, which has already been badly damaged by the Gaza war. This standing is one of the central pillars of Israel’s foreign policy. Accusations that Israel is the tail wagging the dog will intensify as American casualties mount and politicians grow anxious about potential fallout. The polling numbers tell the story: for the first time on record, Americans no longer sympathize more with Israelis than Palestinians—41 percent now side with Palestinians versus 36 percent with Israelis, a dramatic reversal from consistent double-digit Israeli leads over the prior two decades. And that polling was done before this unpopular war, opposed by a majority of Americans—there’s a good chance the spread is growing bigger by the day.
Washington Goes Rogue
Thanassis Cambanis
Topline: America won’t be able to control when the war ends, but leaders should use all means to block funding and stop America’s participation. Meanwhile the most vulnerable—in the United States and worldwide—will suffer from eroded security and spiking energy prices.
At no time since its last experiment with colonial wars in the early twentieth century has the United States played such a toxic role in global affairs. Washington long aimed to attract people around the world to a prosperous, just and free American way of life—a shining city on a hill—but today operates more as an arsonist in the global order.
President Donald J. Trump initiated a major war on February 28 with no public debate, input, or support. The United States made its choice when it began the war. Others, entirely beyond American control, will decide when that war ends.
The United States made its choice when it began the war. Others, entirely beyond American control, will decide when that war ends.
There was no critical American security interest at stake when Trump ordered the attack. Now, however, critical American interests are being harmed—not least, America’s reputation as a leader of global order, along with the web of alliances that had undergirded America security and prosperity since 1945.
America already has learned from its Iraq fiasco how much damage foreign wars inflict on the homefront as well, in funds diverted and lives lost and damaged. Wars carry a wasteful direct cost too. Even before this war Trump had turbo-charged the Pentagon budget to nearly $1 trillion, while decimating funding for health care, education, and food assistance at home. Now he’s planning to ask Congress for a reported $50 billion supplemental for the Iran war. Trump promised he would make life more affordable for Americans, but this war does the opposite. Just days after the war began their quickest spike in decades; with 20 percent of the world’s oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, consumers across the world will assume an outsized share of the war’s burden.
It’s very likely that this war of choice will create a global economic shock. Iran has closed traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran probably cannot sink an American aircraft carrier, but with its cheap-to-build aerial and naval drones it can indefinitely disrupt global energy markets and pummel airports, offices, and military bases. The world is now going to see what asymmetrical warfare looks like on a global scale.
Thanks to a completely unnecessary and avoidable war, the world is less safe, and more expensive, especially for the most vulnerable and poorest people all over the world, including in the United States.
The world will spend decades recovering and rebuilding from the legacy of mess this war will leave. Americans and their leaders for now should focus on the first order of business: stopping the war by any means necessary. That means no legislation until the war stops; no funding for the war; and Congressional action to impose war powers over the executive branch and withhold authorization for military force.
Not a “Forever War”—Something Worse
Sam Heller
Topline: Washington has committed the crime of initiating an illegal war of aggression, further fueling the steady flow of forever wars but causing even greater harm.
I have seen some well-meaningmembers ofCongress protest this U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran as another “forever war,” but I don’t think that’s quite right.
I appreciate these members’ opposition, obviously—it’s much preferable to some other elected officials’ open or tacit support for this war. But in this instance, it seems like progressive members of Congress may be reverting to political muscle memory, or reciting canned “forever war” talking points.
Because this assault on Iran is not a “forever war,” along the lines of the protracted, lower-intensity conflicts from which the United States has struggled to extract itself in recent decades. No, this U.S.–Israeli attack is something more acute, and immediate—this is a war of aggression. It is a crime, in progress.
And I don’t know how this region-spanning, steadily escalating war is being received by a U.S. audience, but in the region, things feel chaotic and wild. American progressives’ opposition to the war ought to reflect that urgency.
Header Image: In this handout released by the U.S. Navy, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of Operation Epic Fury, on February 28, 2026, at sea. Source: U.S. Navy via Getty Images
Thanassis Cambanis is an author, journalist, and director of Century International. His work focuses on U.S. foreign policy, Arab politics, and social movements in the Middle East.
Sam Heller is a Beirut-based researcher, analyst, and fellow at Century International. Sam’s work focuses on politics and security in Lebanon, Syria, and their regional neighborhood. He has published extensively with International Crisis Group and The Century Foundation and for outlets including Foreign Affairs, War on the Rocks and The Daily Beast.
Sajad Jiyad is a fellow at Century International and director of the Shia Politics Working Group. An Iraqi political analyst based in Baghdad, he is the managing director of Bridge, an Iraqi nongovernmental organization and consultancy focused on development projects for young people.
Yael is a fellow at Century International, and a PhD Candidate in history at New York University. Her research focuses on the history of settlement in Palestine/Israel and ethnic politics. Her writing has been published in WarOnTheRocks, Lawfare, Jewish Currents, and the Palestine/Israel Review.
Roundtable: War on Iran Was Easy to Start. It Won’t Be Easy to End.
President Donald Trump decided to join Israel and attack Iran early on Saturday, February 28—a reckless move that positions the United States as a rogue power.
America embarked on a costly war without any compelling national interest at stake—and clearly, without a plan. Enduring instability, disorder, and needless death will be the predictable consequences. American leaders have no good choices, but ought to focus single-mindedly on stopping the war.
Already just a few days into the conflict, the law of unintended consequences has kicked in. This Century International roundtable spotlights some of the most dangerous hinge points of the war, and the long tail of strategic harm that will flow from this historic error, and includes:
Peter Salisbury
Topline: It will be game-changing if the Houthis join the war on Iran’s side and attack global shipping. So far, a combination of diplomacy and Houthi interest calculations have kept them out of the war.
Unlike Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis—the breakout stars of the Axis of Resistance’s otherwise abortive 2023–25 campaign against Israel due to their missile and drone campaign against Israel and Red Sea shipping—have thus far stayed out of the fight. In a speech this weekend, Abdulmalik al-Houthi, the group’s leader, called for mass protests in support of Iran, but not military action.
The decision to join or stay out of the fray is not straightforward. The Houthis have good reason to be cautious.
Over the past two years they have become increasingly financially constrained, particularly since the U.S. designation of the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization. Since the United Arab Emirates’ withdrawal from Yemen at the start of 2026 and Saudi Arabia’s forced consolidation of rival Yemeni security forces under a single chain of command, the Houthis have also faced an opposition that is arguably more coherent than at any point in recent years. The group wants to continue negotiations with Riyadh, particularly over salary payments that could ease the economic crisis in areas under Houthi control. And the Houthis probably also want to keep their powder dry—and their armaments—for an internal war with rival Yemeni forces, which could become more likely if an extended regional conflict severs Iranian support.
But staying out of things and letting Iran descend into chaos would also hurt the Houthis’ interests. A significant proportion of the group’s income comes from free and subsidized fuel shipped to Houthi ports indirectly from Iran. If the Iranian regime collapses or is severely weakened, this lifeline is at risk. The Houthis can import components and build some of the weapons systems they have used over the course of the conflict, but not all of them.
Israel is also likely part of the Houthis’ calculations. Israel has repeatedly penetrated the inner circles of Hezbollah and Iranian leadership, deepening paranoia within the Houthi movement, with senior Houthi political and military figures killed by Israeli strikes in 2025. The group’s leadership has dispersed and gone underground, limiting its ability to coordinate.
Put together, this creates a catch-22 for the Houthis: if they stay out of the fight and Iran implodes, Israel is likely to target them next. But entering a conflict in which both Israel and the United States have taken the gloves off risks the very stockpiles and infrastructure the group needs to survive.
Entering the conflict may also lead to overreach from the group’s rivals, who are already crowing that the Houthis’ demise is imminent. The Houthis still control most of Yemen’s populated territory, run a functioning war economy, and have spent a decade building an arsenal and a governance apparatus that will not simply evaporate. A military campaign to oust the Houthis from Sana’a would still be enormously costly for Saudi Arabia, which is currently absorbing Iranian missile and drone strikes; for global trade, given what the Houthis did to Red Sea shipping between 2023 and 2025; and for rival forces that have struggled to string wins together against the group.
The most likely near-term outcome is a Houthi movement that carefully calibrates, signaling solidarity with Iran and the Axis while conserving its arms stockpile and keeping its options open. If the threat becomes existential for the Houthis, escalation is possible. But for now at least, the Houthis are more likely to save their resources and prepare for a range of scenarios in which Iran may no longer be the patron it has been for so long.
Sajad Jiyad
Topline: Maximum pressure from the United States on Iraq could soon break Iraq’s fragile entente, unleashing well-armed militias against American interests.
Iraq is on the brink of being fully dragged into the Iran–U.S.–Israel war. It is trying to avoid becoming a primary battlefield, while enduring pressure from Tehran, Washington, and their local allies. This pressure appears as cross-border strikes and militia activity are on the increase while there is a fragile domestic political and economic situation. The caretaker government in Iraq is struggling to shield Iraq from regional instability, and appears close to losing control.
U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran have already spread into Iraq. Attacks have been reported against armed groups such as Kata’eb Hezbollah in Jurf al-Sakhar and in Diyala. In response, militias have launched rockets and drones at U.S. personnel in Baghdad airport and at the U.S. consulate in Iraqi Kurdistan. For several days, protestors have been trying to surround the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad’s Green Zone. Drone strikes have also hit around Erbil International Airport. These incidents are turning Iraqi territory into part of the wider theater of war.
Baghdad has publicly condemned the “unjustified aggression” against Iran. It insists that Iraqi territory will not be used as a corridor or launchpad for attacks. This stance signals neutrality and aims to defend sovereignty. But in reality, the Iraqi government is not in control of its airspace, as Israel uses it to attack Iran and Iran responds by targeting U.S. interests and anti-Iran groups in Iraq. Meanwhile, American officials, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, press Iraq to keep its distance from Iran as tensions increase. These actions are tightening the diplomatic squeeze on Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani’s caretaker government.
Powerful Shia factions such as Kata’eb Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, along with the broader Islamic Resistance in Iraq (a pro-Iranian network of armed groups), have threatened or carried out attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and the region. These actions are a direct response to the bombing of Iran. Some groups are cautious, striving to avoid devastating retaliation. But many others have gone on the offensive, conducting dozens of drone operations. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is threatening to expand the conflict by sustained targeting of U.S. forces in Bahrain, the Emirates, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Even non-U.S. assets in these countries could be targeted if the Islamic Resistance in Iraq perceives the hosts as supporting the United States and Israel against Iran.
Many of these groups are members of the Popular Mobilization Units, or PMU—the diverse array of armed groups that rose up to fight the Islamic State years ago. The Iraqi government officially made the PMU part of the national military in 2016. But now, the groups’ attacks are showing that Baghdad has limited control over them, despite their officialized status.
Because shipping in the Gulf has ground to a halt, Iraq’s oil exports have taken a sizable hit. This is having a direct impact on government revenues, compounded with the halt of exports from Iraqi Kurdistan. These developments could be dangerous for an Iraqi economy that is already in a precarious position. Baghdad has been facing a financial squeeze in recent months as it struggles to avoid increased domestic debts while trying to meet payroll. Food prices are on the rise and consumer fears are driving stockpiling, which is leading to shortages in goods such as fuel. Should the war last months, Iraq will face considerable economic pressure—which could lead to civil unrest.
Iraq has several urgent priorities: forming a new government (it hasn’t been able to form one since elections in November); ensuring Shia armed groups do not escalate their involvement in the conflict in or outside Iraq; preventing Israel, the United States, and Iran from undertaking attacks inside or through Iraq; and finding a way to maintain oil exports. These are all significant challenges in the current environment, but Iraq’s political elite should know that failure is not an option. Iraq simply cannot afford to once again become a battleground.
Sam Heller
Topline: Hezbollah escalated a war with Israel that had never ended, despite a nominal ceasefire. Renewed fighting will be punishing for Lebanese civilians, but is likely to further weaken Hezbollah.
Lebanon’s Hezbollah formally entered this war late on Sunday, March 1, when it carried out a missile and drone strike on an Israeli missile defense facility outside the northern city of Haifa. Hezbollah justified its attack both as vengeance for Israel’s killing of Iranian supreme leader Ali Khamenei and as a defensive response to Israel’s “repeated aggression” against Lebanon. Israel retaliated with a wave of airstrikes hitting Beirut’s southern suburbs and other targets nationwide. Israel has since continued to bomb Lebanon, at a pace seemingly comparable to the height of Lebanon and Israel’s 2023–24 war.
It remains to be seen whether Israel further escalates its air campaign—if, for example, it targets the Beirut airport and other civilian infrastructure it had previously avoided. Israeli officials have also said the Israeli military will seize new positions in Lebanon’s south, beyond the sections of Lebanese territory Israel has occupied since the conclusion of the last war. Hezbollah, for its part, was slow to follow up its initial attack but has since announced several additional strikes on Israeli military targets in northern Israel.
Hezbollah may have inaugurated this latest phase of conflict between Lebanon and Israel with its March 1 attack, but the war has been ongoing, in one form or another, since Hezbollah attacked Israeli positions on October 8, 2023, and Israel opened a new Lebanese front. Even after a ceasefire agreement was announced in November 2024, Israel continued to bomb Lebanon on a near-daily basis in response to alleged violations of the ceasefire’s terms. Hezbollah’s March 1 attack, in fact, broke a calm that had lasted less than forty-eight hours. Israel had bombed areas across Lebanon in the days before it launched its war on Iran, including a wave of strikes on south Lebanon just hours before Israel struck Iran. Israel subsequently communicated to Lebanese leaders, through the United States, that it would not escalate in Lebanon unless it was attacked from Lebanese territory. Some Israeli sources, however, have said that Israel had already prepared a major Lebanon offensive and was only waiting for an opportunity to launch it; Hezbollah, then, may have just preempted an attack that was coming anyway.
For Hezbollah, the status quo prior to this latest escalation was not tenable. Israel had continued to occupy sections of southern Lebanon, prevent the reconstruction of war-damaged areas, and kill Hezbollah members and Lebanese civilians daily. The Lebanese government’s attempts to constrain Israel through diplomatic means had, predictably, proved futile. At some point, Hezbollah was going to have to challenge this extreme political–military imbalance, to try to force some new, more favorable dispensation; that likely would have meant another war, either now or in future.
Hezbollah has reportedly been working to reorganize itself and rebuild its capabilities since 2024. No one outside the organization knows, really, how effectively it has reconstituted itself. Now, we’re going to find out. We will also see how much Hezbollah has been disadvantaged, in practice, by the Lebanese army’s efforts to dismantle Hezbollah’s military infrastructure south of Lebanon’s Litani River.
Many observers dismissed Hezbollah’s initial March 1 attack as feeble and likely suicidal. It remains to be seen, though, how much Hezbollah can now ramp up its operations, particularly once most civilians have evacuated southern Lebanon. Hezbollah is also now fighting in concert with Iran, whose theory of victory seems to entail a protracted test of endurance. If Hezbollah is operating on that longer timeframe, then, it may be premature to discount its early moves as pointless or foolish.
Still, Hezbollah will have to contend with real anger among many Lebanese, who blame the group for starting another destructive war on Iran’s behalf. On Monday, the Lebanese government condemned Hezbollah’s actions and took the unprecedented step of banning the group’s military and security activities. So far it is unclear whether the Lebanese army and security services can actually implement that government decision. Yet even among Hezbollah’s popular base, support for the group now seems uncertain. Many of Hezbollah’s civilian constituents are exhausted. It’s been barely a year since the last war, after which they received very limited assistance to rebuild their lives; now they have been displaced and dispossessed again.
Yaël Mizrahi-Arnaud
Topline: Israel is pursuing regime change in Iran without a coherent endgame. The broader gamble risks regional destabilization, a prolonged war of attrition, and the erosion of American public and political support, a crucial strategic asset. Israel’s new doctrine will produce chaos and power vacuums, not a new regional order.
“Mowing the lawn” is a longstanding Israeli military doctrine—the idea of periodic, contained operations against adversaries like Hamas or Hezbollah to degrade their capabilities without seeking total defeat. The latest war looks more like “burning the lawn,” and signals a fundamental departure from that logic. (The name of the doctrine is perhaps intentionally dehumanizing, describing wars that kill thousands of civilians with the language of landscaping.) Israel has shifted from managed containment to comprehensive destruction, with no intention of returning to the status quo.
Historians will determine the extent to which Israel pulled the United States into this war versus how much Trump was looking to jump. What matters now is the Trump administration’s interest in continuing what is likely to be a long conflict that will drain blood and treasure. Israel intends to press the assault as long as conditions allow, seeking governmental collapse in Tehran while degrading its military capabilities and internal security apparatus in the interim.
Regime change in Iran has been Israel’s stated policy goal for more than three decades, but never has produced a coherent long-term strategy. Possible outcomes range from full regional destabilization triggered by Iranian state collapse, to an authoritarian equilibrium that Western powers may find tolerable. The middle path—a Venezuela-like scenario in which a weakened Islamic Republic persists—could leave Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps networks intact, embolden Iran to strike at Israel, and accelerate a nuclear program. For Israel, such an outcome is a nonstarter, so it is committed to a prolonged war of attrition with no defined endpoint.
Benjamin Netanyahu has clear domestic incentives to extend this war: it keeps October 7 off the front pages and Netanyahu’s corruption trial suspended, and allows Israel to continue attacking Gaza and ethnically cleansing the West Bank without international pushback. With elections approaching, a security-first posture is likely to consolidate his electoral position—after the “twelve-day war” with Iran last June, Likud increased its margin by six seats. Yet Israel cannot insulate itself from the consequences of the destruction it has unleashed across the region. What is striking is the ideological convergence across Israel’s ostensible political divide: the governing coalition and opposition alike support the war, and operate within a shared grammar of coercion and dominance, both domestically and regionally.
The ultimate economic impact of the war on Israel is a bit unclear, but it’s obvious that the short-term costs are significant. The June war alone is estimated to have cost Israel $6.5 billion—but may be partially offset by surging demand for Israeli military exports, since regional instability reliably drives arms procurement. Israeli defense exports rose from $12.5 billion in 2022 to $14.7 billion in 2024. But while wars reliably depress GDP, consumption, investment, and confidence well beyond the duration of active combat, Israel has consistently demonstrated a rapid postwar rebound.
Israel’s gamble could also erode its standing in the United States, which has already been badly damaged by the Gaza war. This standing is one of the central pillars of Israel’s foreign policy. Accusations that Israel is the tail wagging the dog will intensify as American casualties mount and politicians grow anxious about potential fallout. The polling numbers tell the story: for the first time on record, Americans no longer sympathize more with Israelis than Palestinians—41 percent now side with Palestinians versus 36 percent with Israelis, a dramatic reversal from consistent double-digit Israeli leads over the prior two decades. And that polling was done before this unpopular war, opposed by a majority of Americans—there’s a good chance the spread is growing bigger by the day.
Thanassis Cambanis
Topline: America won’t be able to control when the war ends, but leaders should use all means to block funding and stop America’s participation. Meanwhile the most vulnerable—in the United States and worldwide—will suffer from eroded security and spiking energy prices.
At no time since its last experiment with colonial wars in the early twentieth century has the United States played such a toxic role in global affairs. Washington long aimed to attract people around the world to a prosperous, just and free American way of life—a shining city on a hill—but today operates more as an arsonist in the global order.
President Donald J. Trump initiated a major war on February 28 with no public debate, input, or support. The United States made its choice when it began the war. Others, entirely beyond American control, will decide when that war ends.
American leaders have been quite open about their carelessness and likely criminality. Trump himself has speculated about worst-case scenarios that leave Iran under the control of an even worse regime. Secretary of State Marco Rubio unapologetically explained that America went to war preemptively against Iran, in violation of international law and American doctrine, because Israel was going to start a war anyway. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth bragged about reckless aggression and a war with “no stupid rules of engagement,” a posture that encourages the commission of war crimes.
There was no critical American security interest at stake when Trump ordered the attack. Now, however, critical American interests are being harmed—not least, America’s reputation as a leader of global order, along with the web of alliances that had undergirded America security and prosperity since 1945.
America already has learned from its Iraq fiasco how much damage foreign wars inflict on the homefront as well, in funds diverted and lives lost and damaged. Wars carry a wasteful direct cost too. Even before this war Trump had turbo-charged the Pentagon budget to nearly $1 trillion, while decimating funding for health care, education, and food assistance at home. Now he’s planning to ask Congress for a reported $50 billion supplemental for the Iran war. Trump promised he would make life more affordable for Americans, but this war does the opposite. Just days after the war began their quickest spike in decades; with 20 percent of the world’s oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz, consumers across the world will assume an outsized share of the war’s burden.
It’s very likely that this war of choice will create a global economic shock. Iran has closed traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran probably cannot sink an American aircraft carrier, but with its cheap-to-build aerial and naval drones it can indefinitely disrupt global energy markets and pummel airports, offices, and military bases. The world is now going to see what asymmetrical warfare looks like on a global scale.
Thanks to a completely unnecessary and avoidable war, the world is less safe, and more expensive, especially for the most vulnerable and poorest people all over the world, including in the United States.
The world will spend decades recovering and rebuilding from the legacy of mess this war will leave. Americans and their leaders for now should focus on the first order of business: stopping the war by any means necessary. That means no legislation until the war stops; no funding for the war; and Congressional action to impose war powers over the executive branch and withhold authorization for military force.
Sam Heller
Topline: Washington has committed the crime of initiating an illegal war of aggression, further fueling the steady flow of forever wars but causing even greater harm.
I have seen some well-meaning members of Congress protest this U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran as another “forever war,” but I don’t think that’s quite right.
I appreciate these members’ opposition, obviously—it’s much preferable to some other elected officials’ open or tacit support for this war. But in this instance, it seems like progressive members of Congress may be reverting to political muscle memory, or reciting canned “forever war” talking points.
Because this assault on Iran is not a “forever war,” along the lines of the protracted, lower-intensity conflicts from which the United States has struggled to extract itself in recent decades. No, this U.S.–Israeli attack is something more acute, and immediate—this is a war of aggression. It is a crime, in progress.
And I don’t know how this region-spanning, steadily escalating war is being received by a U.S. audience, but in the region, things feel chaotic and wild. American progressives’ opposition to the war ought to reflect that urgency.
Header Image: In this handout released by the U.S. Navy, Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyer USS Frank E. Petersen Jr. fires a Tomahawk Land Attack Missile during operations in support of Operation Epic Fury, on February 28, 2026, at sea. Source: U.S. Navy via Getty Images
Tags: iran, War