The Iran-aligned “Axis of Resistance” has suffered a year and a half of withering setbacks. Now, its future is more uncertain than ever before.

Faced with the most serious threat in its history, the alliance’s core groups—Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the Houthis in Yemen—are turning back to basics: local power. 

The Axis of Resistance spans a wide variety of states and sub-state groups that share some common enemies. But not all members are equally aligned. The Iranian state has especially invested in its relationship with the two most powerful allied groups: Hezbollah and the Houthis, which share a deep devotion to Shia Islamist politics, a structural commitment to armed resistance against Israel and the United States, and deep ties to dedicated domestic constituencies.

As Iran, Hezbollah, and the Houthis countenance serious direct attacks by Israel, the United States, and others, they are prioritizing power on their home turf over the regional warfare that has preoccupied them for decades. As they pivot to a more local focus, these groups are likely to consider, although not necessarily consummate, political deals with local competitors and governments, and possibly even with Israel, the United States, or Gulf powers. 

Negotiations and a return to local roots do not mean that the core Axis groups have abandoned their commitment to a wider regional conflict. Instead, the new approach represents a tactical retreat as Iran and its most dependable and influential partners buttress the sources of their hard power: dedicated constituents, money, and weapons smuggled through illicit networks. 

As the Axis retrenches, its most significant groups will be tempted to preserve existing sources of power by locally escalating in order to restore dominance lost during regional defeats. All three of the core Axis members are also still fighting external threats, which they are trying to manage in different ways. Israel is a common enemy; the Houthis are also fighting the United States, and Iran faces the threat of U.S. military action alongside the prospect of negotiations for a grand bargain. 

But critically, all three core Axis members face internal challenges from local rivals and possibly from disaffected constituents. These internal challenges are, at the moment, more existential threats for Axis members, and they will likely prioritize them. Even when Axis groups continue to push external conflicts, as in the case of the Houthis, they will increasingly do so to shore up their local positions. Military victory over Israel and the United States is becoming a far-fetched proposition, but international conflict can still foster unity in local constituencies—as long as it doesn’t provoke heavy retaliation. Taken together, these factors create the conditions for violent domestic competition within Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Another priority will be reconstituting economic networks and supply lines. Israel’s military campaign, along with the fall of the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, has shrunk the ability of the Axis to use open, state-sponsored channels to move money, weapons, and fighters around the Middle East. Iran and the Axis groups are already working to rebuild and reinforce smuggling networks. In parallel, due to supply chain constraints and overstretch, some of the Axis groups may choose to move away from state-style regional warfare, instead reengaging in spoiler tactics and asymmetrical warfare, as they did earlier in their respective trajectories to power.

This report builds on Century International’s earlier companion report, “Down but Not Out: Reassessing the Axis of Resistance,” which argued that the Axis, for now, has lost the ability to deter its most powerful enemies, but can still cause disruption. It assesses Tehran’s shifting strategies, the ideological foundations of the Axis going forward, and the evolving local contexts in Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen. The report draws on dozens of interviews with officials, regional experts, and, in some cases, partisans of Axis groups, many of whom asked to remain anonymous out of concern for their security.

Tehran’s Shifting Calculus

Tehran’s threat perception has significantly shifted over the last eighteen months. The Islamic Republic is scrambling to determine its next steps, or at the very least send a unified message. Iranian officials are sending mixed signals, according to which faction of their government they represent—ranging from the less ideological wing that tends to advocate more pragmatic policies centered on economic growth, to the more radical and Islamist approach exemplified by the adventurist Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). All of these factions now agree that negotiating with the United States is the best way forward—at least, if they are not forced to do so under threat of attack. But beyond that, the strategies of Iranian political factions diverge. 

Willing to Negotiate

President Donald Trump has recently shown a surprising appetite for restarting such negotiations.1 Meanwhile, Iran’s leaders have acknowledged the collapse of Iran’s regional “unity of fronts” strategy, in which any attack on an Axis member was considered an attack on all, and retaliation was coordinated. Now Tehran has to decide—with incomplete information, in a shifting kinetic environment—under what conditions to begin talks with the Trump administration, and how to respond to further Israeli military campaigns targeting Iranian allies and in all likelihood, in the near future, targeting Iran itself.2

For years, Iran had used its Axis proxies as part of a “forward defense” strategy that sought to fend off external threats to Tehran, primarily from the United States and Israel. Iran shaped the Axis of Resistance this way to compensate for the inability of the IRGC to provide conventional military deterrence. But that loose alliance structure can no longer project the unity Iran once boasted. Also, Tehran’s missile and drone capabilities have failed to deter Israeli strikes. Assad’s fall, and the weakening of allies like Hamas and Hezbollah, have shown that the power of Tehran’s regional network has limits. 

Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei has held a position that negotiations with the United States are pointless, and has described overtures from Trump this year as a “deception,” pointing to Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw from the original Iran–U.S. nuclear deal.3

Tehran’s actions often contradict the supreme leader’s disavowal of negotiations. It’s clear that the door is now open to negotiations in a new way.

But Iran’s actions have often contradicted its rhetoric on negotiations. Iranian leaders understand they cannot choose their negotiating partner, so even as the supreme leader claims not to want any negotiators at all, his diplomats are trying to shape the terms of future talks that will bring about sanctions relief. On the same day in March that Khamenei denounced the prospect of negotiations, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi accepted a letter from Trump, sent through Emirati officials, that reportedly gives Tehran a two-month window to negotiate a new nuclear deal, and includes a threat to strike Iran’s nuclear program if no deal is reached.4 (In the same letter, Trump reportedly also requested that Tehran stop sending weapons to the Houthis and financially supporting Hezbollah, and that it dismantle the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Units, which comprise paramilitary groups that banded together in 2014 to fight the Islamic State.) At the time of writing, Iran and the United States hadn’t agreed on the terms of negotiations—Tehran has indicated it wants indirect talks, with Omani mediation, while Trump wants direct talks and a quick resolution.5 But it’s clear that the door is now open to negotiations in a new way. 

Across the political spectrum, Iranians recognize that negotiations with Washington could bring much-needed economic relief, but could also require concessions that are politically untenable, such as demands for Iran to cut its relations with the Axis of Resistance or fully dismantle its nuclear program. However, if negotiations are centered on reaching a verification-grounded deal that prevents an Iranian bomb, upcoming talks could yield some type of progress.

A big obstacle to negotiations is that Iranian officials, with reason, do not trust Washington. Trump appears to be intent on torpedoing the Iranian economy with a refreshed “maximum pressure” campaign and by strangling Iranian oil exports.6 Washington has also doubled down on military pressure even as it has begun its diplomatic push. The Pentagon is expanding the U.S. military presence in the Middle East, deploying two carrier strike groups in the region, along with F-35 combat jets, B-2 bombers, and Patriot air defense systems.

Considering that Israel is trying to dictate the next series of events—urging Trump to do a Libya-style complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear facilities—the risk of war still looms. The risk is especially high because Tehran is weaker than at any other time in recent years.7

But for a variety of reasons, the threat of war appears less serious in the short term.8 Israel and the United States are, of course, still going to consider the risks of Iran retaliating in key arenas like Iraq, Yemen, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz. And Trump’s strategy, for now, seems to prioritize dialogue to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, rather than dismantling its capabilities. This approach aligns closely with the stance of Trump’s special envoy to the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, who will lead the U.S. delegation in talks with Iran.

A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the American willingness to negotiate, however. The administration’s hawks are skeptical about the effectiveness of any deal with Tehran. Analysts and Iranian officials—and, probably, other members of the Trump administration—cannot be sure how Trump plans to appease prominent hawks like national security advisor Mike Waltz.

Strategic Options

One thing is certain: the Axis’s unity of fronts has largely collapsed. Although individual groups remain active within their domestic spheres, Iran’s influence over them has waned, and Tehran recognizes that it needs to assess what went wrong before rethinking how to change the Axis’s operational structure. Iran and its allies will need time to recover from the setbacks inflicted by Israel in the past few years, which creates even more opportunity for Israel to benefit from striking Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran’s forward defense strategy is no match for a direct Israeli military campaign and far superior intelligence capabilities. Iran’s regional influence is dramatically eroded—but it’s still considerable. 

For now, Tehran’s pragmatic options are limited to the path set under Qassem Soleimani, the late commander of the IRGC Quds Force, and accelerated by his successor, Esmail Qaani. This path includes the gradual decentralization and bureaucratization of the Axis of Resistance. Iran has invested heavily in these forces as a cornerstone of its defensive policy, and will not abandon them outright. But the current disarray of Axis groups demands a recalibration of expectations. 

The new strategy revolves around granting greater autonomy to Axis members while tightening bureaucratic structures and expanding illicit financial networks. This creates a web of forces that operate semi-independently of Iran’s direct command, but still receive funding and broadly align with Tehran’s regional agendas: chiefly, opposition to Israel and the United States. Iranian media outlets have begun shifting their portrayal of the Axis, emphasizing its role not just as a military alliance but as a tool to advance Iran’s long-term economic interests. IRGC-affiliated think tanks advocate to further institutionalize the relationship between Iran and the rest of the Axis to reap more economic dividends from the alliance.9

This approach carries risks and opportunities for Iran. Actors like the Houthis can undertake bold and even reckless actions—like escalating their attacks on crucial shipping lines—that could play in Iran’s favor. With little more than a nudge, these groups can wreak havoc, allowing Iran to influence events without any direct involvement. The Houthis’ growing military expertise and weapon manufacturing capabilities—which Israeli and American strikes in the last year don’t seem to have significantly damaged—allow them to train and integrate new recruits, expanding their reach without Tehran’s micromanagement. All of that is to Iran’s advantage. On the other hand, the hands-off approach also means that rogue acts, such as uncoordinated strikes, could spiral out of control, provoking severe retaliation that might land squarely on Iranian soil. 

Since the Iranian revolution of 1979, Tehran’s military doctrine has centered on two principal aims: strengthening domestic defense capabilities and exporting the revolution by supporting ideologically aligned actors. But during the current period of retrenchment, Tehran’s ideological quest will be a secondary priority.

Faced with severe sanctions and international isolation, Axis groups have little choice but to remain within Iran’s orbit. What could emerge is a survival-driven Axis—pragmatic but lacking the ideological cohesion Tehran once prized. Axis members’ long-term survival will increasingly hinge on their own ability to sustain operations by themselves. 

Image Caption: Female members of Iran’s Basij paramilitary force march in a parade of troops during military exercises on January 10, 2025 in Tehran, Iran. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, a paramilitary group that has played a prominent role in suppressing protests, held military exercises in the Iranian capital. Source: Majid Saeedi/Getty Images

Domestic Turmoil

As it goes local, Tehran’s main concern will be domestic stability. The economy is in turmoil, despite efforts to create a “resistance economy.” Inflation ran at 32 percent in 2024 and shows no signs of cooling. The exchange rate reached an all-time low of 940,000 rial per U.S. dollar in February, compared to less than 600,000 rials in October last year.10 Almost a quarter of Iranian young people are unemployed.11 With the economy ailing, broad swaths of the Iranian public are frustrated over the costs of regional interventions. Pro-intervention Iranian propaganda, such as that framing the Hamas–Israel ceasefire as a victory, rings hollow for many Iranians, especially with Syria lost. Thus, Iran is likely seeking a quieter, less visible relationship with the Axis of Resistance. 

Still, the IRGC holds the Axis file close, and the Guard is undoubtedly the most ideological organ of the Islamic Republic. Although President Masoud Pezeshkian will be more amenable to negotiating Tehran’s ties with these groups, he would encounter much resistance from the IRGC, which wields the most influence over the supreme leader. Many hardliners still cling to their triumphalist narratives, maintaining that the Axis is as strong as ever; Khamenei insisted in January that neither Iran nor the groups it supports have been weakened.12

But even some figures deeply entrenched in Iran’s military establishment are beginning to acknowledge defeat. “We were defeated, and defeated very badly. We took a very big blow and it’s been very difficult,” said Iranian brigadier general Behrouz Esbati in January, according to an audio recording of a speech he gave at a mosque that surfaced in Iranian media.13

Nuclear Calculations

Importantly, the weakening of the Axis of Resistance has reignited a debate within Iran about revising its nuclear doctrine. While there is no concrete evidence that Iran’s leadership has decided to pursue nuclear weapons, an increasing number of senior officials are calling for a review of the country’s defense doctrine and to consider developing a nuclear weapon.14

For now, Iran is likely to edge closer to nuclearization without crossing the threshold. For one, Khamenei issued an edict banning nuclear weapons in 2003, and Iran is unlikely to make a decisive shift toward going nuclear during his lifetime (the supreme leader just turned age 86). Producing a nuke has too much short-term risk—it could trigger a preemptive strike from the United States, Israel, or both. But Tehran is increasingly nervous that more Israeli attacks, both direct and indirect, are imminent. And Israel has deeply penetrated the Iranian nuclear program.

Iran’s strategy may be to push its enrichment capabilities to the threshold of weaponization to ready itself for a rapid acceleration in the future if, say, the country faced an existential threat, or if Hezbollah completely collapsed. Indeed, this approach appears to be Tehran’s current hedging strategy: in February, the UN nuclear watchdog released two reports stating that Iran’s stock of uranium, now close to weapons grade, had significantly increased since it announced a sharp acceleration in enrichment last December.15 The Iranians received a glimmer of hope upon observing that certain elements within the U.S. establishment are strongly in favor of dialogue. Araghchi wrote a social media post this month pushing for “diplomatic engagement” and emphasizing the absence of a military solution. (In response, Witkoff posted “Great,” only to subsequently delete his comment.)16 Ultimately, whether Iran decides to dash for a bomb or slowly enrich while still prioritizing dialogue will depend on its assessment of the risks of getting caught, and on whether the Trump administration chooses to use force to completely dismantle its nuclear program.

What’s Next for Yemen?

Some of the Resistance actors, long known for their transnational agendas, are starting to rethink their individual strategies. Facing growing local criticism over their involvement in regional conflict, some groups may pivot toward a domestic agenda, recalibrating their ties to Iran and shedding internationally focused slogans of the past. 

Yemen’s Houthis have moved in the opposite direction. Having launched attacks in the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean, and at Israel, and having weathered U.S. and intermittent Israeli air strikes since October 2023—not to mention two decades of expanding war within Yemen—the group’s ambition is growing. The Houthis are slowly beginning to view themselves as the new Hezbollah—the new vanguard of the Axis—and even more so since Israel killed Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah.

Rather than turning inward, like the other Axis groups, the Houthis appear ready to escalate with the United States, Israel, and their local adversaries. The group now stands out as Iran’s most daring ally. The Houthis’ escalatory stance might reflect a maximalist strategy or might simply be a case of the Houthis having yet to update their approach to reflect their new circumstances. 

The group faces renewed, serious challenges on various levels. The Emiratis are lobbying for a new offensive in Hodeida. Israel and the United States have targeted and killed Houthi leaders and exhibited a new willingness to see the Houthis weakened and to boost Houthi rivals. And there is a mounting risk of public discontent in Yemen as Houthi constituents begin to feel the costs of sustained strikes from the steady barrage of U.S. missiles, the U.S. designation of the group as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), and aid cuts.17In March, the rebels were gearing up for an offensive in Marib, which now seems to be paused.18 The reason for this pause is not exactly clear. Iran could be using the Houthis as leverage for future talks with the United States, and calculating that, in order to stay in Washington’s good graces, this moment is not ideal for an offensive. Mounting a domestic offensive right now would be difficult, as the Houthis grapple with the ongoing U.S. military campaign. 

Trump’s New Offensive

The risks to the Houthis of their continuing aggressive stance toward international powers is clear. In March, days after the group renewed attacks on Israeli ships, the Trump administration unleashed a wave of air strikes. The scope and scale of Trump’s military campaign is notably much broader than that of Joe Biden’s administration, which began in January 2024 and mainly targeted Houthi military infrastructure. Trump has expanded the list of Yemeni targets to also include Houthi leaders, potentially dealing a serious blow to the rebel group’s chain of command. The Trump administration has declared that the primary intention of the strikes is to decimate the Houthis and fully reopen Red Sea shipping routes; undoubtedly, the American attacks are also designed to scare Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, and showing Tehran that military action is still on the table if Washington’s push for negotiations is rebuffed. 

So far, it is difficult to assess the real impacts of the strikes. It is unlikely that they have dented the Houthis’ extensive, largely underground arsenal of missiles, drones, and launchers, but the rebels are now having a harder time getting missiles and drones up and out. The Houthis still have a lot of equipment, but any material that goes overground is getting bombed. If targeted assassinations of senior Houthi officials continue, they could—at least temporarily—disrupt the group’s chain of command and slow decision-making within its bureaucracy. 

In many ways, the moment for the Houthis to perform a strategic pivot has passed. The group could have preserved more of its internal military capacity had it more accurately assessed its own limitations, the evolving dynamics within the Axis of Resistance, and the growing likelihood that the United States would cross lines it had previously been nervous to breach. But emboldened by the perceived leverage gained during the Gaza conflict, the Houthis instead adopted a bold, disruptive, and maximalist strategy against Israel and the United States—at a time when the group had the resources to act and believed it had little to lose.

Now, the Houthis appear poised to fall back on a familiar tactic: tightening their grip on power in Sana’a, especially on internal dissent. Already, new directives warn against documenting or sharing information about U.S. airstrikes—a sign that repression, not adaptation, may define the group’s next move. Away from the Red Sea, the Houthis are grappling with growing domestic unrest. In recent months, the movement has carried out mass arrests of opposition figures, civil society groups, influencers, and humanitarian workers on charges of conspiring with Western countries.19

Image Caption: A handout photo released by Yemen’s Houthis-run Saba News Agency shows the Omani and Saudi delegations in meeting Houthi officials, on April 09, 2023 in Sana’a, Yemen. Source: Photo handout/Saba News Agency via Getty Images

Strategic Advantages

The Houthis still hold several long-term strategic advantages, though these have become significantly weaker. Prior to the U.S. strikes, fears of a new war were growing in Sana’a, with swirling rumours about Houthi plans to reignite the frontline in Marib—a key oil- and gas-rich governorate that the Houthis have long sought to control, but which is currently controlled by the Yemeni government. By tightening their grip on Marib, the Houthis could alleviate the financial impact of the FTO designation and sever a critical artery connecting Marib to the government-held city of Ataq in Shabwah governorate, disrupting a major governmental weapons supply line. Should Houthi finances significantly suffer, the incentive to offset these losses through Marib’s oil and gas revenues would only strengthen. Now, with the group’s chain of command in peril and no end in sight to the U.S. military campaign—Trump has warned that “the real pain is yet to come”—opening a domestic front is no longer an attractive option. 

Alternatively, the Houthis might opt for a multi-pronged campaign across the major frontlines: Mokha, Aden, Hodeida, and Marib. This would take the Presidential Leadership Council (or PLC, the executive body that has led Yemen since April 2022) by surprise and exploit its existing fractures. But nobody really knows how unified the PLC would be on the battlefield. PLC military leaders say that they are ready to work together to militarily confront the Houthis, but this is easier said than done. Since the inception of the PLC in 2022, in a Saudi-led initiative, it has faced numerous roadblocks vis a vis military unification within the anti-Houthi bloc.20

The timing of the Houthis’ next moves will largely depend on how the group adapts and recalibrates in response to the U.S. strikes and the FTO designation.

The Red Sea remains a bargaining chip the group is not willing to give up. The Houthis have a clear incentive to continue controlling navigation in Yemeni waters, and will continue to seek justifications for their strikes. This is part of a broader agenda to fully monetize their blockade of the Red Sea. The group has a highly profitable operation in the strategic waterway—extracting covert payments from shipowners in exchange for the right to safely pass. The rebels are now even less incentivized to halt maritime attacks, aiming to demonstrate to their domestic base that American strikes have not been effective.

According to regional intelligence sources, the United Arab Emirates is advocating for a limited offensive along the West Coast of Yemen to leverage its ground-supported factions and push the Houthis back from their positions in the Red Sea. However, Abu Dhabi faces a significant hurdle in securing U.S. political support. And the United States is unwilling to proceed without full Saudi buy-in, which remains elusive. The Kingdom remains cautious about getting directly involved in military operations in Yemen, which could certainly provoke Houthi strikes along the Saudi border. With no commitment from any party to provide the necessary airpower that could decisively shift the balance against the Houthis—leaving the Yemeni factions and the Emiratis without the support they need to confidently execute the plan at a military level.

The Long Play

The Houthis’ readiness to escalate, as risky as it is, may actually serve a longer-term strategy. The group’s aggressive posture gives Iran’s position a backbone, and might keep the PLC in check by showing that the Houthis remain strong. And while the Houthis still retain the option of striking Saudi Arabia or the Emirates, doing so would bring them little strategic gain. 

On the other hand, there is a certain amount of bluster to some of the Houthis’ threats. The group’s media channels are once again brimming with threats directed at their “Saudi and Emirati enemies,” warning them against any involvement—direct or indirect—in the U.S.-led campaign. Despite their rhetoric, however, the Houthis have kept their threats to strike Gulf countries close to their chest. And at the moment, the Houthis need the Kingdom more than ever. If the Houthis struck across Saudi Arabia’s borders, Riyadh would throw its weight behind the U.S. campaign in Yemen. That is a scenario even the Houthis are likely to think twice about provoking. Further, the Kingdom’s role as the primary obstacle to any offensive in Yemen suggests that the rebels have little incentive to act on these threats.

Riyadh is also working behind the scenes to facilitate negotiations between Yemeni banks and Houthi officials in Muscat.21 And if economic conditions in Sana’a deteriorate further, the Kingdom is likely to fall back on cash infusions—channelled through Hodeida port or overland—to temporarily pacify the Houthis. Slow-moving Saudi–Houthi negotiations, initiated in 2022, have hit an impasse due to the Houthis’ demands that Saudi Arabia fund both civil and military salaries in regions under their control, utilizing oil revenue—a crucial economic lifeline. Despite both sides almost reaching a deal in 2023, the conflict in Gaza, coupled with the ensuing Houthi assaults on Red Sea shipping lanes and Israel, froze progress. The United States has explicitly prevented Riyadh from forging any economic deals with the Houthis that would enhance their fiscal stability without securing maritime security—conditions Riyadh is not willing to accept. In the meantime, analysts speculate that the Kingdom has been sending fuel and sporadic cash injections to the Houthis to keep them economically afloat. For the rebels, then, it makes little sense to alienate a key actor capable of softening the blow of new sanctions related to the FTO designation. 

Closer to Tehran

Iran’s vulnerabilities mean that it benefits from Houthi escalation; even if the Houthis cannot win a direct conflict with the West, the more Western military bandwidth tied up in the Red Sea, the less bandwidth for a Western assault on Iran. The Houthis are more than ready to play this role and, according to Houthi statements, imagine their movement is gaining importance within the Axis of Resistance but as a power player capable of reshaping global dynamics. According to this logic, they see themselves as not just distinct from Hezbollah but superior to it. A hallmark of both Iran and its allied Axis of Resistance groups has been bluster, confrontation, and a strategy of high-risk escalations that sometimes pay off with sudden leaps in influence. Abdul Malek al-Houthi stressed in a speech in January that the Houthis are always prepared to confront the United States, “with God’s help,” and stand against any threat, regardless of its magnitude. “Our advice to you is to watch,” he warned. Houthi leaders have survived assassination attempts and international efforts to eradicate the group. Their statements showcase their assessment that they can survive any force inflicted on them, and a commitment to maximizing their leverage.  

A hallmark of both Iran and its allied Axis of Resistance groups has been bluster, confrontation, and a strategy of high-risk escalations that sometimes pay off with sudden leaps in influence.

The Houthis pride themselves on their autonomy, a trait their supporters highlight as setting them apart. Unlike Hezbollah, whose decision-making is closely intertwined with Tehran’s—Houthi followers argue—the Houthis operate without direct Iranian command and control. These self-assessments are impossible to independently confirm, and in any case evolve over time. Hezbollah, for instance, exaggerated its autonomy from Tehran in the 1990s and then later, after 2010, observably moved more tightly into Iran’s command-and-control orbit. The Houthis, in a similar journey, rose to power with considerable autonomy but have since grown much more intertwined with Tehran. The group could, in the future, take a step back from Tehran, but might also lose resources in the process. 

In any case, the Houthis see themselves as more independent, and as leaders rather than Iranian proxies. “Independence in [Houthi] decision-making is clear, even as it benefits from alliances,” said a Houthi journalist based in Sana’a, who argued that the Houthis, with undisputed control over Sana’a, possess more local autonomy than Hezbollah does in Lebanon.22

The Levant in Flux

The Levant operated under a limited Axis hegemony from May 2000, when Hezbollah pushed Israel out of southern Lebanon, until the November 2024 ceasefire agreement that codified Hezbollah’s defeat in the current war. During that period, Hezbollah adopted an expansionist regional position, openly fighting on behalf of status quo powers in Syria and Iraq. Hezbollah’s increasingly interventionist role in regional wars reflected the organization’s apparent confidence in its dominant position within Lebanon and in the deterrent balance along the Lebanon–Israel frontier. 

The swift reduction in Hezbollah’s regional strategic position since October 2023 has also invited renewed challenges to Hezbollah’s previously untouchable position in Lebanon. Its rhetoric remains shrill and ambitious, positioning the group as near-peer to Israel. But Hezbollah knows it can no longer live up to its talk. Threatened and cornered, the group is likely to use both force and political tactics to seek to preserve a prime role in Lebanese politics, or at least to preserve its veto power over national decisions. Hezbollah will presumably fall back on the same techniques that brought it to dominance in Lebanon in an earlier era: brute force against domestic rivals, shrewd maneuvering in traditional politics, and an embrace of the spoiler, warlord, and crime boss techniques common to all factional movements in Lebanon. 

Hezbollah is also likely to attempt, at least in the short term, to maintain some kind of military deterrence against Israel. But Hezbollah’s fortunes are weaker than at any point since the year 2000. The group’s many enemies—within and beyond Lebanon’s frontiers—will seek further advantage, to negotiate new national policies and weaken the militaristic movement that has monopolized Lebanese national security policy and domestic politics for a quarter century. This contest will take place in multiple spheres: electoral politics, disputes over economic rackets, and violent conflict—domestic as well as regional. 

The Period of Resistance Primacy

Bashar al-Assad took over Syria after his father’s death in 2000, the same year that Hezbollah began its decisive shift from insurgency to status quo power player. During the nearly twenty-five years until the assassination of Nasrallah and the fall of the Assad regime, the Syria–Hezbollah alliance dominated but never wholly controlled Syria and Lebanon. Its fortunes waxed and waned in response to regional maneuvers and military interventions by Israel, Iran, Russia, the United States, and others.

Syria and Lebanon function symbiotically, sharing financial networks, labor forces, and a common geography. Syria and Hezbollah violently enforced their dominant position in Lebanon through a series of political assassinations, including the murder of former Lebanese prime minister (and Saudi Arabia ally) Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Hezbollah won a multi-year civil conflict, besting a rival coalition that enjoyed U.S. and Saudi backing, with an agreement in 2008 that gave Hezbollah and its allies veto power over all Lebanese government decisions, locally referred to as “the blocking third”—a power Hezbollah lost only in February 2025.

Hezbollah’s competitors often highlighted Iran’s support—the money that enabled Hezbollah to rebuild after the 2006 war, the weapons and training that extended Hezbollah’s hard power, and the shared Shia millenarian ideology—but it was Syria’s support that made possible Hezbollah’s dominance and regional power. Hezbollah transited troops and weapons through Syrian territory. Syria was Hezbollah’s strategic depth, and while it was somewhat insulated from U.S. and Israeli interdiction, it was always contested. Israel, with reported U.S. support, assassinated Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in February 2008. When Assad faced a popular uprising in 2011, he called on Hezbollah infantry to defend him, since his own demoralized and hollowed-out army wouldn’t, for the most part, fight for the regime. By April 2013, Hezbollah was openly fighting in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime, against a popular uprising whose Islamic and resistance pedigree would have, in a vacuum, made it a natural ally rather than enemy of Hezbollah. For a time, Hamas broke with the Assad regime over the Syrian revolution, although Hamas and Hezbollah maintained cordial ties in Beirut during the time of the Hamas–Assad rift.

Hezbollah enjoyed a level of military and cultural credibility in the Arab region never fully shared by Iran. Nasrallah was considered militarily capable, daring, and not corrupt—a rare combination among leaders in the region. And Hezbollah’s military and governance record before October 7 suggested credible grounds for Hezbollah’s deterrent power. Hezbollah defeated Israeli occupying forces in South Lebanon, expelling them in May 2000. In 2006, Hezbollah started a war by capturing three Israeli soldiers on Israeli territory, and then fought Israel to a standstill in thirty-four days. Israel was unable to hold any new Lebanese territory, nor could it stop Hezbollah from returning right to the Israeli border after the ceasefire. In the seventeen years that followed, from August 2006 until October 2023, Hezbollah and Israel maintained postures of mutual deterrence. Border skirmishes followed predictable patterns and both sides took care to avoid escalation, resolving friction points through interdirect talks managed by UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese Army, which passed messages between the Israeli military and Hezbollah.

In Lebanon, Hezbollah had been a nationalist actor fighting on Lebanese soil against an aggressive foreign power. In Syria, the group became a foreign aggressor fighting against local Syrian nationalists.

During the decade from 2013 to 2023, bedrock conditions changed unnoticed. The drumbeat of war in Syria, and regular Israeli strikes on Hezbollah and Iranian targets inside Syria, obscured significant cumulative change. Hezbollah, previously a nationalist actor fighting on Lebanese soil against an aggressive foreign power, was now itself an aggressive foreign power fighting with other third-country forces on foreign soil against local Syrian nationalists. “Today we are facing a kind of danger that is unprecedented in history, which targets humanity itself,” Nasrallah said in 2015, when he first acknowledged Hezbollah fighting in Syria. “This is not a threat to the resistance in Lebanon or to one sector of the regime in Syria or the government in Iraq or a group in Yemen. . . . This is a danger to everyone.”

Extended on multiple foreign fronts (Hezbollah had military forces deployed in Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Yemen), Hezbollah lost its famous operational secrecy and discipline. As a result of its role in Syria, it also lost much of its credibility with non-Shia Arabs. Syria’s regime appeared to have eked out a partial victory and enduring stalemate by 2018, but never restored the basic functions of state institutions and the national economy. Axis of Resistance leaders seemed to believe their own propaganda and political messaging—that Iran’s network had cowed and contained a weak Israel, a decadent “spider’s web” whose military had lost the will to fight. Iran’s allies had prevailed in domestic power struggles in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. Iranian proxies had boxed in American troops in Iraq and even threatened to overrun the U.S. embassy in Baghdad. Iran’s Houthi allies had edged out Gulf powers Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. With a weak spoiler’s hand but a willingness to make bold military moves, Iran and its Axis partners believed, all the way up until October 2023, that they had bested the United States, Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates.

Image Caption: A car covered with a photo of former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah passes by a Lebanese army post in the ruins of the Lebanese village of Odaisseh, as seen from a position in the Israeli kibbutz on the northern border with Southern Lebanon on February 18, 2025 in Misgav Am, Israel. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images

Hezbollah After Nasrallah

The Levantine front quickly revealed that Hezbollah and Iran had greatly oversold their deterrent power.23 Supposedly, Hezbollah’s hardened infantry, supported by precision long-range rockets and drones, meant that Israel could not effectively fight on the Lebanese front. The war that unfolded proved otherwise. Hezbollah’s missile arsenal was either compromised by Israeli intelligence, or never really included the ability to strike significant Israeli targets. By the end of the war in Lebanon on November 27, 2024, Hezbollah had not managed a single strategically significant strike on Israel’s military or infrastructure. On the other hand, Israel had waged a maximalist total war against Hezbollah that continues at the time of this writing, violating the ceasefire without facing any effective resistance. During the war, Israel destroyed entire communities and infrastructure in areas where Hezbollah members lived or occasionally operated. Israel penetrated the organization’s military hierarchy from top to bottom, assassinating most of its top leaders. Since the ceasefire, Israel has occupied five strategic hilltops in Lebanon and has continued to destroy infrastructure and kill Lebanese from afar. It has forced Iranian airlines to suspend flights to Lebanon, under threat of being shot down by Israel. (Israel alleges that Iran was using civilian flights to send cash and supplies to Hezbollah.)

Hezbollah has tried to follow the same script as it did in 2006, claiming victory because the organization survived.24 At Nasrallah’s funeral, his successor, Naim Qassem, promised that resistance, “written in blood, not ink on paper,” would end Israeli occupation: “Writhe in your anger,” Qassem said in a speech delivered not in person but by video link from a secure location. “The resistance stands strong and unwavering.”25 In the bombed streets of the Dahieh (the Beirut suburb that Hezbollah dominates), the Beqaa Valley, and southern Lebanon, Hezbollah partisans express frustration. “Any time they want, the Israelis can resume the war,” one Hezbollah member in a border village said in early February. “In fact, we expect this any day.”26 Even Hezbollah followers admit in private conversations that they feel defeated; even if they’re unwilling to blame the apparent hubris, incompetence, and miscalculation by Hezbollah’s leadership, they understand that in 2025, unlike in 2006, Israel won the war and will continue to strike Lebanon—and that no Lebanese force, neither Hezbollah nor the sovereign military, can deter Israel for now.

The United States and Israel are pushing for a complete disarmament of Hezbollah, and while they might be unable to produce such a radical change to the status quo, both states appear willing to continue bombing Lebanon and occupying Lebanese territory in an effort to conclusively shift dynamics.27

Syria in Transition

In the months before the Assad regime fell, Israel assassinated Hezbollah leaders one by one, setting the stage for an unencumbered rebel advance in Syria. By early October 2024, Nasrallah, his preferred successor Hashim Safieddine, and most of Hezbollah’s veteran leadership were dead. In retrospect, Hezbollah’s downfall created the conditions for Assad’s. Without Hezbollah’s command and control and skilled infantry, Assad stood little chance of defending his regime against a new rebel advance. Russia had grown frustrated with Assad as a client and was also overextended in Ukraine. Iran, similarly, faced an assault on its proxies and allies across the region and had traded direct airstrikes with Israel. Neither sponsor state had the resources for a full-fledged defense of the Assad regime, and even had they wanted to, they would not have been able to match their earlier interventions on short notice and without Hezbollah’s ranks. Israel and the United States were also more willing or able than in the past to actively intervene to prevent Iran and its Iraqi proxies from sending fighters or resources to Syria. 

This cascading shift—Israeli total war, Hezbollah’s collapse, and a Western military campaign against Iranian channels for distribution of weapons, fighters, and money—swept over Syria with breathtaking speed. In one week, mere thousands of fighters from Idlib governorate were able to conquer Aleppo, the largest city in Syria, and then seize Damascus. The regime collapsed without a fight. Syria remains fragmented and contested, but the Axis of Resistance appears almost completely vanquished from the power landscape. Former members of the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (which has since been disbanded, at least officially) consolidated control over state institutions and built a provisional coalition of mostly Sunni or Islamist rebels (though the new cabinet also includes some minorities and bureaucrats from the Assad era). Some significant factions and areas remain outside the new government’s umbrella: the Kurds who control the northeast (and Syria’s oil fields) with U.S. backing; at least one major aligned but autonomous Turkish-backed Sunni Arab rebel group in the north, the Syrian National Army (not to be confused with the actual national military of Syria, which is controlled by the new government’s Ministry of Defense); former regime elements from the Alawite minority; Hezbollah-allied members of the Shia minority; the Southern Front rebels with ties to Jordan and the Emirates; and local Druze leaders who operate with limited autonomy in an area where Israel has occupied Syrian territory.28

Syria’s transition is still in its early phases. Loyalists to Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaam, along with all the other Syrian and foreign players listed above, will contest power until they reach a stable equilibrium. This process could take years and could end in a new variation on the late-Assad status quo, in which Syria was effectively divided into a patchwork of spheres of influence. On the other hand, it could end with the establishment of a more effective Syrian state. Iran and Hezbollah, while at this writing decisively pushed out of Syria’s power competition, will have ample opportunity to get involved, indirectly or as advisers, with Syrian factions in the ongoing fight for power (as demonstrated in the brief but ferocious clashes along the Lebanon–Syria border in March).29

Global Aspirations, Local Actions

Iran and its key partners are navigating a new regional order. Their power is precipitously diminished but still considerable—especially if the Axis of Resistance returns to its historical roots and focuses once again on spoiler tactics and asymmetric warfare. In the lead-up to October 7, Iran and its closest, most powerful partners wielded the resources of states and the strategic confidence of victors who believed they had checked or even defeated superpower adversaries. The Axis of Resistance pursued a regional, potentially global strategy, competing against a loose but powerful coalition that included Israel, the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. For now, that contest appears to have ended with a defeat for the Axis powers, which will now look to preserve or reestablish their military and political power on the home turfs where they first rose to prominence. These renewed contests are unlikely to cause the international strategic crises that the Axis of Resistance provoked at the apex of its power during the last decades, but promises to be hard fought and potentially bloody and destabilizing in Iran, Lebanon, and Yemen.

Century International’s first report in this reappraisal project, “Down but Not Out: Reassessing the Axis of Resistance,” argued that the regional war since October 7 has called into question long-standing assumptions about the power and influence of Iran’s network. This report delves deeper into the responses of the most powerful and closely aligned actors: Iran, the Houthis in Yemen, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah. Future reports will explore the trajectory of other Axis forces, including the Axis militias in Iraq, especially Kata’eb Hezbollah and Hezbollah Nujaba; the strategic equities of Gulf powers; and Iran’s evolving dynamics. Other future research will explore illicit financial and smuggling networks that support the Axis of Resistance and other state, hybrid, and nonstate actors. 

War and negotiations are proceeding across the Middle East at a dizzying pace. Axis of Resistance powers once issued smug pronouncements about the region’s future. Now, their adversaries and new regional powers are pursuing dominance and proclaiming triumph. The only sure outcome is that a wide array of fronts that were previously settled—or at the least static—are now being contested with force. 

Iran and its most stalwart allies have not given up their strategic goals of exporting Islamic revolution, confronting Israel, and fighting the United States and its allies. For that matter, nor have the rivals of the Axis given up their most extreme strategic goals of dominating the Middle East and replacing hostile regimes with friendly ones. Neither side is likely to achieve anything close to its maximal goals but, after the speedy collapse of the Assad regime and the Hezbollah leadership, rivals of the Axis far and wide are emboldened to pursue old plans or new advantages. For the Axis of Resistance, that contest will produce a focus on the home front, where Iran and its allies built the networks that created their regional power. This dynamic, still-unfolding regional landscape creates the conditions for a new wave of escalations, big and small, that will continue until the main combatants establish a new equilibrium.

This report is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.

Header Image Caption: An illustration of former Hezbollah leaders, Hassan Nasrallah, left, and Hashem Safieddine, are seen at the stage for their funerals at the Sports City Stadium on February 23 in Beirut. Source: Daniel Carde/Getty Images

Notes

  1. Luke Broadwater and David E. Sanger, “Trump Wants an Iran Nuclear Deal, but It Must Be Better than Obama’s”, New York Times, April 9, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/09/us/politics/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.
  2. “Trump Threatens Iran with Bombs Unless Nuclear Deal Reached,” Axios, March 30, 2025, https://www.axios.com/2025/03/30/trump-iran-nuclear-deal-bombing.
  3. Parisa Hafezi and Elwely Elwelly, “Iran Says an Arab Country Will Deliver Trump’s Letter to Tehran,” Reuters, March 12, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-says-an-arab-country-will-deliver-trumps-letter-tehran-2025-03-12.
  4. “Iran Confirms Trump Sent Letter as Tensions Simmer,” Associated Press, https://apnews.com/article/iran-us-trump-letter-nuclear-program-tensions-ccc9dcf3919a94fe15d24c6e201455d5.
  5. Farnaz Fassihi “Iran Negotiations: Trump Letter Sends Mixed Messages,” New York Times, March 28, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/28/world/middleeast/iran-negotiations-trump-letter.html.
  6. “Trump Restores ‘Maximum Pressure’ Campaign, Says He Is Willing to Talk to Iranian President,” Middle East Eye, February 4, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/trump-restores-maximum-pressure-willing-talk-iranian-president.
  7. Nancy A. Youssef et al., “U.S. Sends Warplanes, Ships to the Middle East in Warning to Iran,” Wall Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-sends-warplanes-ships-to-the-middle-east-in-warning-to-iran-f72fcaff?mod=article_inline.
  8. Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran’s Policy and Its Relations with China and Russia,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 14, 2023, https://mecouncil.org/publication/irans-policy-and-its-relations-with-china-and-russia-me-council/; Amir Daftari, “Iran Makes Threat over Key World Oil Supply Route,” Newsweek, February 10, 2025, https://www.newsweek.com/iran-threat-world-oil-persian-gulf-united-states-inflation-2028635.
  9. Area of Economic Cooperation Between Iran and the Countries of the Resistance Zone” (in Persian), Supreme National Defence University, January 15, 2021, https://www.sndu.ac.ir/fa/news/5537/زمینه-های-همکاری-اقتصادی-ایران-و-کشورهای-حوزۀ-مقاومت.
  10. IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2024, https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/weo-database/2024/October/weo-report?c=429,&s=NGDP_RPCH,PCPI,PCPIPCH,LUR,&sy=2019&ey=2025&ssm=0&scsm=1&scc=0&ssd=1&ssc=0&sic=0&sort=country&ds=.&br=1; Mazia Motamedi, “Iran’s Government Hits Out at Crypto Again as Currency Freefalls,” Al Jazeera, February 27, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/2/27/irans-government-hits-out-at-crypto-again-as-currency-freefalls.
  11. “Youth Unemployment Rate for the Islamic Republic of Iran,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, accessed April 10, 2025, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/SLUEM1524ZSIRN.
  12. “Analysis of the Revolutionary Leader’s Statements/ Resistance to Power Continues” (in Persian), Tasnim News, December 12, 2024, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1403/09/22/3217940.
  13. Farnaz Fassihi, “Iran Was ‘Defeated Very Badly’ in Syria, a Top General Admits,” New York Times, January 8, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/01/08/world/middleeast/iran-general-syria-defeat.html.
  14. “Senior Iranian Official Threatens Change in Nuclear Doctrine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 10, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-change-nuclear-doctrine-bombs-israel/32940976.html.
  15. Francois Murphy, “Iran’s Stock of Near Bomb-Grade Uranium Grows Sharply, IAEA Report Shows,” Reuters, February 26, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-stock-near-bomb-grade-uranium-grows-sharply-iaea-report-shows-2025-02-26.
  16. Laura Rozen, “‘Great.’ U.S. Envoy Appears to Respond to Iran FM Tweet Iran Will Never Pursue Nukes,” April 2, 2025, https://diplomatic.substack.com/p/great-us-envoy-appears-to-respond.
  17. “Designation of Ansarallah as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/designation-of-ansarallah-as-a-foreign-terrorist-organization/.
  18. A Houthi journalist in Sana’a and a former Yemeni government official in Cairo, interviews with the author by phone, March 2025.
  19. “A Barometer of Houthi Repression, Governance, and Infighting in Ibb Governorate,” ACLED, March 4, 2025, https://acleddata.com/2025/03/04/a-barometer-of-houthi-repression-governance-and-infighting-in-ibb-governorate/.
  20. Veena Ali-Khan, “Yemen’s Troubled Presidential Leadership Council,” International Crisis Group, May 4, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-troubled-presidential-leadership-council.
  21. A Yemeni senior mediator based in Cairo, interview with the author by phone, March 2025.
  22. Houthi journalist based in Sana’a, interview.
  23. For example, a representative assessment published a few years before the latest war accurately predicted many of Hezbollah’s disadvantages but included high estimates of Hezbollah’s missile strength, fighter numbers, and ability to penetrate into Israeli territory. See Nicholas Blanford and Assaf Orion, “Counting the Cost: Avoiding Another War Beween Israel and Hezbollah,” Atlantic Council, May 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/counting-the-cost-avoiding-another-war-between-israel-and-hezbollah/.
  24. “Hezbollah Says It Will Act If Unacceptable Israeli Attacks on Lebanon Continue,” National News, March 30, 2025, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/03/30/hezbollah-says-it-will-act-if-unacceptable-israeli-attacks-on-lebanon-continue/.
  25. “Hezbollah Issues Warning amid Border Tensions,” Al-Manar, February 27, 2025, https://english.almanar.com.lb/2348997.
  26. Interview with the author.
  27. Maya Gebeily, Laila Bassam, and James Mackenzie, “Airplanes Fly Low over Lebanon’s Beirut, Huge Blasts Heard, Reuters Witnesses Say,” Reuters, April 1, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/airplanes-fly-low-over-lebanons-beirut-huge-blasts-heard-reuters-witnesses-say-2025-04-01.
  28. “Walid Jumblatt on Confronting Israel’s Dislocation Plans and Why Syria’s New Leader Deserves a Chance,” National News, April 3, 2025, https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2025/04/03/walid-jumblatt-on-confronting-israels-dislocation-plans-and-why-syrias-new-leader-deserves-a-chance/.
  29. Justin Salhani, “Lebanon-Syria Border Clashes Reflect New Realities on the Ground,” Al Jazeera, Mar 24, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/3/24/lebanon-syria-border-clashes-reflect-new-realities-on-the-ground.

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