In a 1993 essay, Milton Friedman declared that one of the virtues of the free market system was its non-consideration of one’s color or religion.1 The only thing that ultimately matters is the quality of a good or service. Therefore, participants in any free market should expect that their participation in the market would not be hindered by factors outside their control, such as race. Yet historically Black colleges and universities (HBCUs) face just such a set of obstacles, and in a marketplace which, while little discussed beyond specialist circles, harbors funding resources that HBCUs simply cannot do without.

That marketplace is the capital financing market, which allows large-scale institutions like universities and state and local governments to leverage their debt or take out bonds to make critical investments in their infrastructure. In this report, we will discuss how these marketplaces work, why it is essential that HBCUs have equal access to them, and the obstacles to access that these institutions experience in practice. In particular, the report will demonstrate that race has played a role in the capital financing market by comparing HBCUs’ and predominantly White institutions’ (PWIs) participation in the bond markets. We will discover that HBCUs face higher bond costs not solely because of some of the market factors discussed but because of the racial animosity that exists in the states in which they reside.

We will close by presenting several avenues by which policymakers can help make good on Friedman’s assertion and enable HBCUs untrammeled participation in a market crucial to their survival and prosperity. The report will recommend the following:

How the Capital Finance Market Works—and Why It Isn’t Equal-Opportunity in Practice

We will begin by describing how the capital finance marketplace functions. In this case, picture a bond as being similar to a personal loan. When you seek a loan from a bank, that bank will first assess your creditworthiness and ability to repay the loan. Once those factors are considered, the bank will offer you a loan with a specific interest rate that assumes the risk that the bank is taking in providing a loan to you. Similar to loans, the process of how a government entity leverages a bond is similar to how everyday Americans request loans from banks, with a few exceptions to be explained below. But crucial to note is that because governments are budget-constrained, many entities rely on the capital finance market for infrastructure investments.

When a government entity decides to leverage its debt in the capital markets, it pays close attention to how investors view their financial strength. A debt security underwriting firm buys the bonds directly from the issuer and then repackages the bond to make it attractive to investors in the market.5 The issuer will pay the underwriting firm a fee to buy and repackage the bonds on their behalf. It is also important to note that the underwriting firm has a fiduciary responsibility primarily to investors.6 In other words, the underwriting firm is primarily interested in making the bond price attractive to investors, which sometimes may not benefit the issuer. When determining whether a bond will be attractive in the market, the underwriters and investors consider several factors, the first being the creditworthiness of the issuer.

The primary rating agencies in the United States are Standard & Poor, Moody’s, and Fitch. The highest rating an issuer can receive is a “AAA” bond rating, meaning that the issuer will more than likely meet its obligations in repaying the bond debt to investors.7 One of the lowest credit ratings an issuer can receive is a “CCC” rating, which means that the rating agency does not believe the issuer can fulfill its financial obligations in repaying its bond debt, and that therefore investors should invest at their own risk. The rating that an issuer receives has a direct impact on the overall cost of the bond. Specifically, when an issuer has a low credit rating, investors will request higher interest rates for the debt repayment to compensate themselves for the risk. An issuer with a high credit rating will likely have lower interest rates because investors see their debt repayment as more reliable. Another factor underwriters and investors pay close attention to is the issuer’s assets and the resources that the issuer will rely on to repay the debt.

Firstly, some bonds are backed by a state or local pledge, which is a guarantee by the government issuer to repay the bond with any available revenue sources to meet its repayment obligations.8 Also known as a general obligation bond, this pledge is seen as highly favorable to investors, as it is a firm commitment by the government issuer to make payments using any revenue source to repay its debt. Another factor that investors consider is the overall financial health of the issuer. One measure is whether or not the issuer faces a structural deficit, meaning that the issuer operates at a deficit even when the economy is good.

Additionally, investors and the underwriters will review the stability of the revenue sources that will repay the bond. For example, investors may consider a bond that relies solely on local sales tax revenues somewhat risky. For one, many state laws often dictate the percentage of sales tax revenue that an issuer can leverage, and potential economic downturns could affect the amount of revenue collected from the sales tax. Therefore investors may ask for debt service coverage in return for the risk related to the revenue source dedicated to repaying the bond. The debt service coverage is a ratio of money that investors expect the issuer to set aside to repay the bond debt if the issuer can not meet its obligations. The higher the debt service coverage ratio, the higher the cost of the bond.

The factors above are just a few of the most important factors that affect the overall cost associated with bond issuance in capital financing markets. The final cost and many factors noted above are placed in an “official statement,” prepared by the underwriting firm. Figure 1 is an official statement for bonds leveraged by the City of Austin in 2023.9

Figure 1 Official Statement of General Obligation Bonds, City of Austin
Source: City of Austin Official Statement for September 12, 2023

Colleges and universities are budget-constrained and cannot solely seek infrastructure investments through their operating budgets. Although universities and colleges receive funding from their state government and some aid from the federal government, participating in the capital financing markets allows the university to undertake large-scale infrastructure projects. For example, in 2012, the University of Pennsylvania underwent a 100-year, $300 million bond project to renovate the lighting and HVAC systems throughout campus buildings.10 Despite its status as a private university and its large endowment, the University of Pennsylvania still relied on bonds to make much-needed capital infrastructure improvements.

Despite its status as a private university and its large endowment, the University of Pennsylvania still relied on bonds to make much-needed capital infrastructure improvements.

The cost associated with any bond project is based on many of the market factors mentioned above, such as creditworthiness, the assets of the issuer, and the reliability of the revenue source that will be used to repay the debt. This is why Milton Friedman would argue that markets are colorblind, in that market factors determine the cost of bond issuance and not race. However, like many other sectors, research has shown that race has played a systematic role in various ways, and the capital financing market is no different. Historian Dustin Jenkins, in his book The Bonds of Inequality: Debt and the Making of the American City, explains that bonds and the capital market have played an essential role in exacerbating historical inequities based on race.11 He examines the city of San Francisco’s debt policies and how bond debt agreed to and supported by all San Franciscans was primarily used to support the infrastructure investments of White neighborhoods. From the leaders of the underwriting firms to the influence that credit agencies wielded, these reportedly colorblind institutions effectively “racialized both the distribution of income and the resources directed toward cities and select neighborhoods.” Jenkins points out that markets are not just unconscious institutions but social institutions. Specifically, markets are social institutions that have exacerbated racial animosity towards minorities in systematic ways.

HBCUs Have Always Fought an Uphill Battle

Following the end of the Civil War in 1865, higher education was only available to White Americans. In many southern states, legal segregation allowed for the exclusion of Black students from White institutions; and in many northern states, universities often limited the number of Black students that could be enrolled in the university.12 The earliest HBCUs served as institutions that provided higher education, secondary education, and even primary education to this excluded population. Figure 2 displays the location of HBCUs across the United States.

Figure 2 Map of HBCUs in the United States

The passage of the 1890 Morrill Land Grant Act provided for the establishment of more HBCUs in the South. Specifically, the 1890 law required that African Americans either be allowed to attend segregated universities, or states create a separate institution they could attend. Although the law finally gave African Americans an opportunity to pursue higher education, loopholes within the law allowed PWI land grant institutions, created from the 1862 Morrill Land Grant Act, to have more resources than their HBCU counterparts. As a TCF report notes, loopholes within the 1890 Morrill Land Grant Act allowed for the chronic underfunding of land grant HBCUs.13

Despite funding challenges that would persist throughout the next century, HBCUs continued to fulfill their mission of educating the communities they served. Many HBCUs proved vital for allowing African Americans to receive skills such as carpentry, sewing, and gardening. Additionally, many HBCUs also played a role in training Black teachers to provide instruction for other African Americans.14 Finally, with the passage of the Higher Education Act of 1965, the Department of Education officially defined an HBCU as any college or university created before 1964 “…whose principal mission, was, and is, the education of Black Americans.”15

HBCUs play an important role in educating low-income and first-generation students. Figure 3 compares Prairie View A&M University, an HBCU land grant, to Texas A&M University, a PWI land grant. Similar to other HBCUs across the country, many serve underserved communities while being significantly underfunded compared to PWI institutions.

Figure 3

The Infrastructure Needs of HBCUs

For universities, updated infrastructure, including the construction of new labs, dormitories, and campus buildings, play an important role in attracting both expert faculty and doctoral candidates to their campuses. Additionally, infrastructure investments are important to the Carnegie classification ratings. The highest Carnegie classification that a university can receive is R1, meaning the university has very high research activity. For example, one of the metrics that determines the Carnegie classification is the number of doctoral students a university graduates.16 As such, the ability of a university to attract doctoral students is closely related to the availability of resources, including infrastructure such as labs, study spaces, and campus housing.

The ability of a university to attract doctoral students is closely related to the availability of resources, including infrastructure such as labs, study spaces, and campus housing.

A 2018 Government Accountability Report illustrates the extent of the infrastructure needs at HBCUs. Among the HBCUs that responded to the GAO study, 46 percent of the HBCU leaders indicated that the buildings on their campuses needed to be repaired or replaced.17 Figure 4 showcases the planned infrastructure projects at HBCUs over the next five to ten years, according to HBCU leaders who responded to the survey.

Figure 4

Additionally, according to the report, instead of using bond funds to build new facilities, many HBCUs reported using the funds to fulfill their deferred maintenance needs, which, on average, amounted to nearly $67 million at public HBCUs and $17 million for private HBCUs.18 Deferred maintenance are repairs needed for infrastructure that has been delayed due to budget limitations. Therefore, instead of focusing infrastructure investments on building new facilities, many HBCUs must focus simply on ensuring that maintenance needs are met, with new or improved facilities a distant dream. Because of this, many HBCUs still rely on historic buildings built nearly a century ago for classes and meeting spaces.19 It is true that historic buildings play an integral part of the overall campus culture at HBCUs; however, students and faculty should be able to enjoy historic buildings with adequate renovations, and not ancient buildings with moldering or broken facilities.

Infrastructure investments in HBCUs are crucial not only to providing a top-tier education to their students but also benefits to the communities in which they reside. A TCF report found that the nineteen HBCU land-grant institutions contributed nearly $5.5 billion in economic activity to their local communities and states.20 The report also notes that land-grant HBCUs also created approximately $52 billion in earnings for each of their graduating classes. Additionally, a McKinsey Institute for Black Economic Mobility report found that 82 percent of HBCUs are in communities lacking internet access.21 The report also finds that 50 percent of HBCUs are located in food deserts. A food desert is a geographic area where residents do not have adequate access to healthy food options at a reasonably affordable price.22 The McKinsey report notes that if HBCUs could share more of their campus resources with the community, it could unlock nearly $1 billion in additional consumer spending. HBCUs already equip the communities they reside with many of the aforementioned needs despite being chronically underfunded. Therefore, for HBCUs to expand their resources to larger communities, the institutions themselves need more infrastructure investments.

Colorblind Markets Are a Myth

Milton Friedman would argue that the capital financing market is an example of a truly colorblind market, in that after factoring market indicators into the equation, the cost to government institutions to leverage their debt in the capital markets is solely due to market indicators. Unfortunately, this is merely wishful thinking. Research shows HBCUs are penalized for race, and evidence abounds generally that no market is, or can be, colorblind.

In a study to determine the causes of why HBCUs were paying higher borrowing costs compared to PWIs, researchers wanted to discover whether the reasons went beyond market indicators.23 Ultimately, the researchers found that race played a significant role in determining the cost of HBCU bonds.

Firstly, investors looking to invest in bonds often seek to maximize the benefit of investing in bond debt locally: that is, via tax exemption. Specifically, governments often rely on local investors to invest in their debt. The underwriting firm seeks to sell the bonds at a reasonable speed to ensure that the market conditions in which the original official statement was agreed upon still exist. However, suppose the underwriting firm has to hold on to that debt for longer periods of time due to a lack of investor interest. In that case, the underwriting firm will charge the government entity higher underwriting fees to mitigate some of the risk.

The researchers discovered that HBCUs with a AAA credit rating were still paying higher borrowing costs. Additionally, they found that for every $100 raised by an HBCU to leverage their debt, 92 cents goes to pay the underwriter.24 For non-HBCUs, the story is much different. Non-HBCUs only pay 81 cents to the underwriter for every $100 they raise in debt. For example, if an HBCU chose to leverage $50 million in bonds to possibly renovate a college dormitory, it would pay nearly $460,000 in underwriting fees. Meanwhile, a non-HBCU would pay only $405,000 in fees. Table 1 showcases this example.

As we can see the gap that exists in how much the HBCU must pay the underwriting firm compared to the non-HBCU is not because of the lack of creditworthiness. The gap remained even when both institutions had AAA credit ratings, the highest credit rating possible. What the researchers found is that racial animus, in fact, was to blame for why HBCUs paid higher underwriting fees and costs.

Table 1
UNDERWRITING FEES, HBCUS VERSUS NON-HBCUS
Type of Institution Total Amount of Bonds Leveraged Total Underwriting Fees
HBCU $50 million $460,000
Non-HBCU $50 million $405,000
Source: Author’s own analysis based on metrics found in “What’s in a (School) Name? Racial Discrimination in Higher Education Bond Markets”

Racial animus is understood as one’s resentment or negative feelings towards a minority group.25 The researchers measure racial animus by using survey responses from respondents on their thoughts regarding affirmative action, Google searches with racial undertones, and geocoded racist tweets. The states with the highest racial animus are found in many Southern states, which also have the majority of HBCUs. Accordingly, the researchers found that Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana, states that accounted for 26 percent of all HBCUs, had the highest racial animus. The researchers found that HBCUs pay nearly 20 percent more in issuance costs compared to non-HBCUs.26 Higher issuance costs are due to the inability of underwriting firms in finding local investors that are willing to invest in HBCU debt, most likely due to racial animus.

Accordingly, the longer that underwriting firms must hold onto an issuer’s bond debt, the greater the amount of fees the underwriting firm is likely to charge the issuer. As the researchers find, HBCU bonds sit within an underwriter’s inventory 25 percent longer compared to other related bonds. Therefore, HBCUs in states with a high level of racial animus are paying higher issuance costs due to the lack of local investors within their state that are willing to invest in their debt. This would indicate that HBCUs need to seek investors beyond their own state.

Policy Solutions

Policymakers and stakeholders have long been aware of the barriers to entry of Black and Brown borrowers in receiving loans from banks. Likewise, stakeholders are aware of the barriers for HBCUs to leverage their bonds in the capital finance market, which is why the Higher Education Act of 1965 authorized the HBCU Capital Financing Program.27 The HBCU Capital Financing Program is a $1.1 billion program that gives HBCUs access to low-cost capital for the purpose of renovations and construction of new facilities, such as dormitories and laboratories, to name a few. Despite the existence of the HBCU Capital Finance Program, the barrier to entry for HBCUs in the private markets remains. Congress could pursue the following policy solutions to ensure that these historic institutions continue to support their students and the communities who rely on them.

Offer Triple Tax Exemption

Because of the high racial animus in states that have HBCUs, their bond debt is not highly sought after by local investors. The question becomes, why do local tax investors (that is, investors located in the same state as the institution issuing the bonds) have so much influence? One of the biggest benefits to investors investing in the capital finance market is the tax exemption that comes with investing in bond debt. Tax exemption allows individuals or firms to write off the interest income they receive from investing in bond debt. General obligation bond debt, which is bond debt typically leveraged by many local and state governments, is usually exempt from federal taxes.28 Therefore, general obligation bonds are considered highly attractive to investors in the capital finance market. Investors and investment firms want to avoid paying taxes on the interest they receive from investing in bond debt and will avoid debt that is not tax-exempt.

Bond debt can be exempt from state taxes in certain circumstances. Many states offer tax-exempt privileges to investors residing in the state where the bond debt was leveraged. For example, say a university in the state of Virginia leverages a $250 million bond to renovate campus facilities. An investor who lives in Virginia and decides to invest in the bond debt from the university would be eligible for tax exemption from Virginia state income taxes.29 However, if an investor from New York decides to also invest in the bond debt from the university in Virginia, that investor may have to pay New York State income taxes on income they earn from interest. There is only an incentive for local investors residing in the state where the bond was leveraged to invest in the debt. Therefore HBCUs residing in states with high racial animus must rely on those same investors to invest in their debt.

Triple tax exemption would allow investors from other states who are willing to invest in HBCU bond debt from a different state to be exempt from state taxes even if they reside in another state. Triple tax exemption would make any bond debt leveraged by HBCUs tax-exempt, on the federal, state, and local levels. By making HBCU bond debt tax-exempt on all levels, it would expand the pool of investors that would be able to invest in their bond debt.30 To extend the hypothetical example above, the investor from New York that invested in the bond debt leveraged by the university in Virginia would be exempt from state and local taxes in New York if the institution was designated as an HBCU. With an expanded pool of investors that would be able to invest HBCU bond debt, underwriting firms will not have to hold onto HBCU bond debt in their inventory for long periods of time because they will be able to find investors nationally.

The HBCU Investment Expansion Act, introduced by former congressman Keith Ellison, would make bonds issued from HBCUs tax-exempt on the federal, state and local levels.31 For government jurisdictions that lose tax revenue as a result of triple tax-exemption, the bill would require the Department of Treasury to pay a credit equal to the amount of lost revenue to the government jurisdiction.

Improve the HBCU Capital Financing Program

The HBCU Capital Financing Program provides HBCUs with access to $1.1 billion in credit to leverage bonds. The program established caps on how much is available to private and public HBCUs, as shown in Table 2. Specifically, no more than $733 million in credit is available to private HBCUs and no more than $366 million is available to public HBCUs. As of December 2023, the balance of funds that HBCUs have leveraged stands at $994 million, in which $633 million has been leveraged by private HBCUs and $361 million by public HBCUs, as shown in Table 2.32 Given that the program is nearly at its authorized caps, Congress should consider forgiving the outstanding loan balances, as it did with the CARES Act legislation in 2020, or increasing the caps currently in place.33

Table 2
FUNDS AVAILABLE TO HBCUs THROUGH THE CAPITAL FINANCING PROGRAM IN DECEMBER 2023
Type of HBCU Statutory Caps Outstanding Balance Percent of Authorized Amount Outstanding
Private $733,333,333.00 $633,000,000.00 86.32%
Public $366,666,667.00 $361,000,000.00 98.45%
Source: US Department of Education. HBCU Capital Financing Program

In addition to the program being at the cap for private and public HBCUs, there are additional barriers associated with HBCUs and their ability to participate in the program. Fewer than half of the eligible HBCUs do not participate in the Capital Financing Program, for several reasons.34 Firstly, many HBCUs indicated a lack of information about the program and how their institutions can participate. Specifically, HBCUs in larger state university systems indicated that the Department of Education had not informed their university system leadership on how their public HBCUs can participate and get access to low-cost credit for infrastructure investments. Additionally, as shown in Table 3, the programmatic features of the HBCU Capital Financing Program prohibit some institutions from participating according to their state laws. Firstly, to participate in the Capital Financing Program, HBCUs must dedicate at least 5 percent of the loan amount they receive towards an escrow account, an account that will be used to pay back the loan amount in case the university can not repay the loan balance. Additionally, HBCUs must pledge campus buildings or their tuition revenues as collateral in the instance that the institution can not repay the loan balance. Finally, the program is a direct lending program, which violates some state laws that only allow their institutions to receive grants and funding from state agencies or foundations.

Table 3
LEGAL OBSTACLES TO HBCU PARTICIPATION IN THE CAPITAL FINANCING PROGRAM
Federal Requirement Reported State-Level Law of Policy Number of States Reporting This Law of Policy Number of HBCUs Affected
Escrow requirement: HBCUs must place 5 percent of loan amount into a pooled escrow account to cover all participating HBCUs’ delinquencies or defaults. All public colleges are prohibited from taking on the debt of another institution or state university system officials find the requirement risky. 2 9
Collateral requirement: HBCUs are required to provide collateral, such as buildings on campus or a tuition pledge. State buildings or tuition revenue are considered state property and cannot be used as collateral to secure loans for all public colleges. 2 6
Lending requirement: program only allows lending directly to HBCUs. All public colleges are required to use a third-party state agency or foundation to obtain capital financing. 2 7
Source: GAO analysis of Education data, Historically Black College and University (HBCU) responses to GAO’s survey, and interviews with officials from the Department of Education, the designated bonding authority, and officials from state university systems and HBCUs in select states, and 20 U.S.C. § 1066 et seq. | GAO-18-455

To dissolve the barriers to access for HBCUs that want to participate in the HBCU Capital Financing Program, Congresswoman Alma Adams introduced the HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act.35 The bill would change the escrow account requirement into a bond insurance fund. The bond insurance fund will allow funds from the HBCU Capital Financing Program to be set aside by the Department of Education to insure the institution in the case it cannot make payments. The act would also require the Department of Education to provide financial counseling for HBCUs that are eligible to participate in the program. Congress should pass the HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act to ensure that all HBCUs have access to low-cost capital to make much-needed improvements to their infrastructure.

Increase Grant Funding

The discussion thus far has mainly focused on how HBCUs can gain fair access to markets for taking out loans, or on utilizing the HBCU Capital Financing Program to make critical infrastructure investments. Though both these tools are essential for HBCUs to make infrastructure investments, there is still a cost involved in using them. Government-appropriated grants, whether restrictive or non-restrictive, are funds that the university does not have to pay back. Non-restrictive grants and donations allow the university to either invest in its infrastructure or put the funds into its endowment fund. The endowment fund gives the university the tools to make crucial investments towards their long-term goals and priorities.

It is worth noting here that endowments of HBCUs are significantly less than those of non-HBCUs. A TCF study indicates that non-HBCUs have endowments that are three times the size of HBCUs per full-time student.36 This highlights the significance of non-restricted giving to HBCUs, such as philanthropist Mackenzie Scott’s donations. In December 2021, Scott donated nearly $400 million to HBCUs, which most of them placed into their endowments.37 For many HBCUs, Scott’s donation will be the largest in their school’s history, such as Lincoln University’s $20 million donation from Scott.38 While many schools decided to use the donation to support future growth by placing it into their endowment, many others utilized the funds to support student programs and financial aid. Therefore, donations like Scott’s and non-restrictive government grants to HBCUs are a viable way to support these institutions to immediately grow their endowment and support their students.

Looking Forward

Historically Black colleges and universities contribute nearly $15 billion annually in economic impact.39 They are centers of innovation and research, and contribute to the economic health of the local communities and states where they reside. Despite their significant economic impact, HBCUs have been chronically underfunded compared to predominantly White institutions.40 Additionally, HBCUs continue to provide access to higher education for students who are first-generation college students and students from low-income communities. Following the ban on affirmative action, HBCUs are well-positioned to ensure that higher education is accessible to all students. In order to support increased enrollment at HBCUs, they must be able to make essential investments in their infrastructure to continue the high-quality education they have provided for over a century. Eliminating the racist obstructions to their equitable participation in capital finance markets can help ensure that HBCUs will thrive and grow into the future.

Notes

  1. Friedman, Milton. Why Government is the Problem.* Essays in Public Policy, no. 39.Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1993.
  2. Congress.gov. “H.R.5530 – 114th Congress (2015-2016): HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act.” July 12, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5530.
  3. Congress.gov. “H.R.6048 – 114th Congress (2015-2016): HBCU Investment Expansion Act.” September 15, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6048.
  4. Historically Black College and University Capital Financing Program, March 11, 2020. https://www2.ed.gov/programs/hbcucapfinance/index.html.
  5. Banton, Caroline. “Underwriter in Finance: What Do They Do, What Are Different Types?” Investopedia. Accessed May 15, 2024.https://www.investopedia.com/terms/u/underwriter.asp#:~:text=Underwriters%20purchase%20debt%20securities%E2%80%94such,known%20as%20the%20underwriting%20spread.
  6. Hayes, Adam. “Fiduciary Definition: Examples and Why They Are Important.” Investopedia. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fiduciary.asp.
  7. “Rating Definitions.” Fitch Ratings, April 23, 2023. https://www.fitchratings.com/products/rating-definitions.
  8. Chen, James. “General Obligation (Go) Bond: Definition, Types, vs. Revenue Bond.” Investopedia, August 17, 2020. https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/generalobligationbond.asp.
  9. City of Austin. “Financial Documents: Official Statements: General Obligation Bonds.” Austin Finance Online. Accessed January 2, 2024. https://financeonline.austintexas.gov/afo/afo_content.cfm?s=52&p=211.
  10. “Century Bond Program Projects.” University of Pennsylvania Facilities and Real Estate Services. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://facilities.upenn.edu/capital-process/facilities-renewal/century-bond-program-projects.
  11. Jenkins, Dustin. Bonds of inequality: Debt and the making of the American city. S.l.: UNIV OF CHICAGO PRESS, 2022.
  12. “Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going: A Timeline of HBCU Development.” UNCF, June 17, 2022. https://uncf.org/the-latest/where-weve-been-where-were-going-a-timeline-of-hbcu-development.
  13. Smith, Denise. “Nourishing the Nation While Starving: The Underfunding of Black Land-Grant Colleges and Universities.” The Century Foundation, July 25, 2023. https://tcf.org/content/report/nourishing-the-nation-while-starving-the-underfunding-of-black-land-grant-colleges-and-universities/.
  14. “History of Hbcus.” Thurgood Marshall College Fund, March 9, 2020. https://www.tmcf.org/history-of-hbcus/.
  15. “What Is an HBCU?” U.S. Department of Education. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://sites.ed.gov/whhbcu/one-hundred-and-five-historically-black-colleges-and-universities/#:~:text=any%20historically%20black%20college%20or,reliable%20authority%20as%20to%20the.
  16. “Carnegie Classifications.” Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://www.carnegiefoundation.org/our-work/postsecondary-innovation/carnegie-classifications/.
  17. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Action Needed to Improve Participation in Education’s HBCU Capital Financing Program § (2018). https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-455.pdf.
  18. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Action Needed to Improve Participation in Education’s HBCU Capital Financing Program § (2018). https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-455.pdf, 14.
  19. HBCU Infrastructure Needs. Thurgood Marshall College Fund, August 2021. https://www.tmcf.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Infrastructure.Needs_.Fact_.Sheet_.Logo_.Final_.8.23.21.pdf.
  20. Smith, Denise. “Nourishing the Nation While Starving: The Underfunding of Black Land-Grant Colleges and Universities.” The Century Foundation, July 25, 2023.
  21. Bevins, Frankki, Kathryn Fox, Duwain Pinder, Shelley Stewart, and Jimmy Sarakatsannis. “How HBCUs Can Accelerate Black Economic Mobility.” McKinsey & Company, July 30, 2021. https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/education/our-insights/how-hbcus-can-accelerate-black-economic-mobility.
  22. Taylor, Jamila. “Racism, Inequality, and Health Care for African Americans.” The Century Foundation, April 26, 2022. https://tcf.org/content/report/racism-inequality-health-care-african-americans/.
  23. Dougal, Casey, Pengjie Gao, William J. Mayew, and Christopher A. Parsons. “What’s in a (School) Name? Racial Discrimination in Higher Education Bond Markets.” SSRN, February 5, 2016. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727763.
  24. Ibid, 3
  25. Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth I. “The effects of racial animus on a black presidential candidate: using Google search data to find what surveys miss.” Available at SSRN 2050673 (2012).
  26. Dougal, Casey, Pengjie Gao, William J. Mayew, and Christopher A. Parsons. “What’s in a (School) Name? Racial Discrimination in Higher Education Bond Markets.” SSRN, February 5, 2016. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727763, 5.
  27. Historically Black College and University Capital Financing Program, March 11, 2020. https://www2.ed.gov/programs/hbcucapfinance/index.html.
  28. Howard, Cooper. “Choosing Municipal Bonds: GO or Revenue?” Schwab Brokerage, January 18, 2023. https://www.schwab.com/learn/story/choosing-municipal-bonds-go-or-revenue.
  29. “Why Buy Virginia Bonds?” Investor information. Accessed May 15, 2024. https://trs.virginia.gov/Bond-Finance/Investor-Information.
  30. “Written Testimony of Gary Hall On Behalf of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association,” 2021.
  31. Congress.gov. “H.R.6048 – 114th Congress (2015-2016): HBCU Investment Expansion Act.” September 15, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/6048.
  32. Historically Black College and University Capital Financing Program, March 11, 2020. https://www2.ed.gov/programs/hbcucapfinance/index.html.
  33. Whitford, Emma. “Loan Forgiveness ‘Transformative’ for HBCUs.” Inside Higher Ed | Higher Education News, Events and Jobs, January 18, 2021. https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/01/19/hbcus-receive-boost-capital-loan-forgiveness.
  34. Historically Black Colleges and Universities, Action Needed to Improve Participation in Education’s HBCU Capital Financing Program § (2018). https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-18-455.pdf, 33-35.
  35. Congress.gov. “H.R.5530 – 114th Congress (2015-2016): HBCU Capital Financing Improvement Act.” July 12, 2016. https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5530.
  36. Smith, Denise. “It’s Time to Create a Federal HBCU Endowment Fund.” The Century Foundation, January 25, 2024. https://tcf.org/content/commentary/its-time-to-create-a-federal-hbcu-endowment-fund/.
  37. “‘Transformational’: Mackenzie Scott’s Gifts to HBCUs, Other Colleges Surpass $800 Million.” Thurgood Marshall College Fund, December 18, 2020. https://www.tmcf.org/events-media/tmcf-in-the-media/transformational-mackenzie-scotts-gifts-to-hbcus-other-colleges-surpass-800-million/.
  38. Donastorg, Mirtha. “Last December, Mackenzie Scott Gave More than $400 Million to Hbcus. Here’s Where That Money Has Gone.” The Plug, February 25, 2023. https://tpinsights.com/a-year-ago-mackenzie-scott-gave-more-than-400-million-to-hbcus-heres-where-that-money-has-gone/.
  39. “UNCF Releases HBCU Economic Impact Report.” UNCF, April 22, 2020. https://uncf.org/the-latest/uncf-releases-hbcu-economic-impact-report.
  40. Smith, Denise. “Nourishing the Nation While Starving: The Underfunding of Black Land-Grant Colleges and Universities.” The Century Foundation, July 25, 2023. https://tcf.org/content/report/nourishing-the-nation-while-starving-the-underfunding-of-black-land-grant-colleges-and-universities/.

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