American relations with Turkey have always contained contradictions. As Donald Trump embarks on another four years of foreign policy transactionalism, it’s hard to know what U.S.–Turkey trend will win out: a deepening authoritarian embrace with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or increasing enmity grounded in opposing regional goals and cultural prejudice.
Either way, the results will almost certainly be bad.
But even in this grim moment, there are small opportunities. The challenge will be for true friends of the United States and Turkey (the countries, and not their current leaders) to do what little they can in the narrow areas they can still affect.
Two places, in particular, offer possibilities of progress. One is supporting a more realistic Turkish–European relationship. Another is in Syria, where the Syrian Democratic Forces (the SDF, a Kurdish-led coalition that Ankara regards as an enemy) still control large swaths of the country’s northeast. As Syria continues to transition out of years of dictatorship, the international community has a chance to help the country reach a more stable settlement.
Progress in these areas won’t fix the core problems of the Erdogan–Trump dynamic. But it could help avert the worst outcomes—which, given the potential for disaster, progressive-minded policymakers can count as a win.
Two Rival Possibilities
In February, Donald Trump’s attorney general dropped corruption charges against New York mayor Eric Adams, who has been accused of a variety of offences, including accepting bribes from the Turkish government. It wasn’t the first time Trump had intervened on behalf of Turkish corruption. In his first term, he pressured the Justice Department to drop charges against a Turkish bank that had colluded with Erdogan in an illegal sanctions evasion scheme.
But while the Adams scandal was unfolding on the East Coast, Erdogan was in Indonesia, condemning Trump’s plan to ethnically cleanse Gaza as “a major threat to world peace.” For Erdogan, this was a rare chance to be on the right side of ethnic cleansing (a crime of which he’s been remarkably accepting in the past, when the ethnicities involved were different).
These developments foreshadow the two rival possibilities for U.S.–Turkish relations during the new Trump administration, neither of them good. Relations could improve for the wrong reasons, driven by corrupt solidarity between two profoundly antidemocratic leaders. Or relations could get worse for the wrong reasons, driven by the two men’s support for rival violent civilizational projects in the Middle East. Quite likely, the actual result of the next four years will be some incoherent and destructive mix of the two.
For anyone who supports peace and democracy, this reality leaves little to hope for. Good ties will almost certainly be weaponized against democratic core values, while worsening ties could all too easily raise the risk of violent conflict in the region.
Too Cozy with Turkey?
Advocates of a strong U.S.–Turkish alliance have always appealed to shared democratic values and a long history of standing shoulder-to-should in NATO, which Turkey joined in 1952. The rhetoric always outpaced reality, however: through the decades, Washington continued to support Ankara in the wake of multiple coups, while strategic priorities often clashed even within NATO. But the solidarity wasn’t a total fiction, either. Turkey remained doggedly committed to democratic rule, while leaders in both countries repeatedly prioritized NATO solidarity when push came to shove.
Against this backdrop, Ankara’s political trajectory over the past twenty years has forced a deepening divide among commentators. As Erdogan has become increasingly authoritarian and increasingly hostile to NATO, some have continued to champion strong ties at all costs. Others have called on Washington to apply greater conditionality, using leverage like sanctions against Erdogan even when it produces bilateral strain.
Ironically, proudly liberal internationalist think tanks are now promoting improved relations between two leaders who are deeply hostile to everything they stand for.
The divide has only deepened with Trump’s reelection. For the most part, those who supported stronger U.S.–Turkish ties in spite of Erdogan’s politics have continued to support them in spite of Trump’s. The result, however, is a strange situation in which proudly liberal internationalist think tanks are now promoting improved relations between two leaders who are deeply hostile to everything they stand for.
The Turkish Bogeyman
Then, there are those observers who see Turkey mostly as a threat to U.S. interests. This side has its own contradictions, cheering on Israel’s regional aggression even as it sounds the alarm about Turkey’s. In any case, this view is correct in recognizing one danger: with Turkish and Israeli forces now both active within Syria, and the Israeli government increasingly worried about the threat posed by Ankara, the risks of a direct armed confrontation between the two countries have grown.
Some of this ilk of commentators and think tanks are clamoring for the Trump administration to be much more aggressive in confronting Erdogan, going so far as to suggest the American president should be prepared to “kill Turks in Syria.”
Trump could well fulfill their hopes. Since October 7, Erdogan’s strong support for Hamas has driven growing support in Congress for sanctions on Turkey. And many key voices in the Trump administration share strong anti-Turkey sentiments, often couched in Islamophobic, pro-Israel, and Christian nationalist terms. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, to take the most striking example, questioned in his 2020 book American Crusade why “Islamist Turkey” was allowed to be a member of NATO. At a moment when Erdogan routinely denounces his enemies as “Crusaders” and “Byzantines,” Hegseth proudly displays a “Crusader cross” tattoo on his chest and a Chi Rho tattoo on his left shoulder. In other words, it’s easy to see how things can go wrong.
Finding a Principled Middle
It remains unclear how the pro- and anti-Turkey influences in the Trump administration will play out. Trump, for his part, has articulated his continuing personal enthusiasm for Erdogan, calling him a “friend” and a “very smart guy.” At the same time, the American president also appointed Hegseth, not to mention a director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who has said that Erdogan “is not our friend” and is “one of the most dangerous dictators in the world.” As a result, both supporters and opponents of the U.S.–Turkish alliance are hoping for the best, and continue to lobby the administration accordingly.
Unfortunately, this dynamic leaves little room for those who hope to chart a more principled middle path. Erdogan’s government has renewed a crackdown on the opposition in Turkey, but it’s clear that the Trump administration is not going to offer even rhetorical support for democracy, or index U.S. cooperation to the rule of law. Erdogan has been eager to present Turkey as a partner in Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, and many observers have promoted this as a possible venue for greater U.S.–Turkish cooperation. But given Trump’s pro-Russian and neo-imperialist approach to negotiations, such cooperation is unlikely to lead to a positive outcome. What’s more, the administration so far seems to prefer Riyadh as a host for initial diplomatic contacts.
If there is little value in trying to shape Washington’s relationship with Ankara for the better, European decision-making may prove more amenable to strategic and principled appeals. With European leaders scrambling to adapt to a new security environment, the continent’s leaders will face a series of crucial choices about Turkey’s role. One approach would be to aggressively court Turkey on the grounds that its military capacity is now more important for the continent’s security arrangements than ever. The other approach would be to double down on strengthening cooperation between countries that share the same values and strategic outlook. With Europe threatened by an aggressive and authoritarian Russia, the continent’s leaders need to consider whether bringing in another aggressive, authoritarian, and regularly pro-Russian state would really help.
Ultimately, Europe will make its own decisions. But if nothing else, American observers can offer their European colleagues clear-eyed analysis about Turkish and American policies.
Small Opportunities in Syria
The one area in which Washington may still be able to play a positive role is in helping to negotiate a viable relationship between Kurdish forces in Syria and the new government in Damascus. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad and a renewed Turkish campaign against the SDF, these negotiations represent the most plausible path to stability in northeastern Syria. Syrian stability, in turn, will be a lynchpin of any chances for Middle Eastern stability in the years to come—renewed chaos in Syria risks dragging the whole region down. There are still a number of actors in Congress, the U.S. military, and the broader American political establishment who can constructively support such negotiations.
Washington has real leverage in Syria, although it is rapidly diminishing. Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to pull out U.S. forces from the area, and based on the experience of his first term, there is every reason to believe he will eventually withdraw. At the same time, both Congress and Trump’s cabinet have repeatedly threatened sanctions against Turkey if it attacks Kurdish forces. As a result, Erdogan seems to be delaying a larger attack against the SDF, even while maintaining military pressure. Turkey is now engaged in talks with Abdullah Ocalan (the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which is a central component of the SDF). Ankara seems to hope that its negotiations with Ocalan will give it leverage to secure its demands regarding the SDF. But Washington can nudge a more balanced outcome, by pressuring Turkey and Damascus and strengthening the SDF’s hand, which will contribute to a more stable future for northeastern Syria.
Beyond these few opportunities for progress, U.S.–Turkish relations are likely to remain turbulent. And Trump’s second term will almost certainly leave Erdogan more authoritarian and more anti-Western—just one example of the damage that is likely all over the world as the international order reacts to Trump. Anyone hoping for a better outcome should look for opportunities to constructively engage, but, in doing so, must resist appealing to either the Trump administration’s corruption or civilizational chauvinism.
Cover Image: In a November 2019 photo, Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump welcome Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his wife Emine Erdogan upon their arrival at the South Portico of the White House. Source: Alex Wong/Getty Images
Tags: syria, u.s.-turkey, donald trump
Trump and Erdogan: Corrupt Friends or Civilizational Foes?
American relations with Turkey have always contained contradictions. As Donald Trump embarks on another four years of foreign policy transactionalism, it’s hard to know what U.S.–Turkey trend will win out: a deepening authoritarian embrace with Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, or increasing enmity grounded in opposing regional goals and cultural prejudice.
Either way, the results will almost certainly be bad.
But even in this grim moment, there are small opportunities. The challenge will be for true friends of the United States and Turkey (the countries, and not their current leaders) to do what little they can in the narrow areas they can still affect.
Two places, in particular, offer possibilities of progress. One is supporting a more realistic Turkish–European relationship. Another is in Syria, where the Syrian Democratic Forces (the SDF, a Kurdish-led coalition that Ankara regards as an enemy) still control large swaths of the country’s northeast. As Syria continues to transition out of years of dictatorship, the international community has a chance to help the country reach a more stable settlement.
Progress in these areas won’t fix the core problems of the Erdogan–Trump dynamic. But it could help avert the worst outcomes—which, given the potential for disaster, progressive-minded policymakers can count as a win.
Two Rival Possibilities
In February, Donald Trump’s attorney general dropped corruption charges against New York mayor Eric Adams, who has been accused of a variety of offences, including accepting bribes from the Turkish government. It wasn’t the first time Trump had intervened on behalf of Turkish corruption. In his first term, he pressured the Justice Department to drop charges against a Turkish bank that had colluded with Erdogan in an illegal sanctions evasion scheme.
But while the Adams scandal was unfolding on the East Coast, Erdogan was in Indonesia, condemning Trump’s plan to ethnically cleanse Gaza as “a major threat to world peace.” For Erdogan, this was a rare chance to be on the right side of ethnic cleansing (a crime of which he’s been remarkably accepting in the past, when the ethnicities involved were different).
These developments foreshadow the two rival possibilities for U.S.–Turkish relations during the new Trump administration, neither of them good. Relations could improve for the wrong reasons, driven by corrupt solidarity between two profoundly antidemocratic leaders. Or relations could get worse for the wrong reasons, driven by the two men’s support for rival violent civilizational projects in the Middle East. Quite likely, the actual result of the next four years will be some incoherent and destructive mix of the two.
For anyone who supports peace and democracy, this reality leaves little to hope for. Good ties will almost certainly be weaponized against democratic core values, while worsening ties could all too easily raise the risk of violent conflict in the region.
Too Cozy with Turkey?
Advocates of a strong U.S.–Turkish alliance have always appealed to shared democratic values and a long history of standing shoulder-to-should in NATO, which Turkey joined in 1952. The rhetoric always outpaced reality, however: through the decades, Washington continued to support Ankara in the wake of multiple coups, while strategic priorities often clashed even within NATO. But the solidarity wasn’t a total fiction, either. Turkey remained doggedly committed to democratic rule, while leaders in both countries repeatedly prioritized NATO solidarity when push came to shove.
Against this backdrop, Ankara’s political trajectory over the past twenty years has forced a deepening divide among commentators. As Erdogan has become increasingly authoritarian and increasingly hostile to NATO, some have continued to champion strong ties at all costs. Others have called on Washington to apply greater conditionality, using leverage like sanctions against Erdogan even when it produces bilateral strain.
The divide has only deepened with Trump’s reelection. For the most part, those who supported stronger U.S.–Turkish ties in spite of Erdogan’s politics have continued to support them in spite of Trump’s. The result, however, is a strange situation in which proudly liberal internationalist think tanks are now promoting improved relations between two leaders who are deeply hostile to everything they stand for.
The Turkish Bogeyman
Then, there are those observers who see Turkey mostly as a threat to U.S. interests. This side has its own contradictions, cheering on Israel’s regional aggression even as it sounds the alarm about Turkey’s. In any case, this view is correct in recognizing one danger: with Turkish and Israeli forces now both active within Syria, and the Israeli government increasingly worried about the threat posed by Ankara, the risks of a direct armed confrontation between the two countries have grown.
Some of this ilk of commentators and think tanks are clamoring for the Trump administration to be much more aggressive in confronting Erdogan, going so far as to suggest the American president should be prepared to “kill Turks in Syria.”
Trump could well fulfill their hopes. Since October 7, Erdogan’s strong support for Hamas has driven growing support in Congress for sanctions on Turkey. And many key voices in the Trump administration share strong anti-Turkey sentiments, often couched in Islamophobic, pro-Israel, and Christian nationalist terms. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, to take the most striking example, questioned in his 2020 book American Crusade why “Islamist Turkey” was allowed to be a member of NATO. At a moment when Erdogan routinely denounces his enemies as “Crusaders” and “Byzantines,” Hegseth proudly displays a “Crusader cross” tattoo on his chest and a Chi Rho tattoo on his left shoulder. In other words, it’s easy to see how things can go wrong.
Finding a Principled Middle
It remains unclear how the pro- and anti-Turkey influences in the Trump administration will play out. Trump, for his part, has articulated his continuing personal enthusiasm for Erdogan, calling him a “friend” and a “very smart guy.” At the same time, the American president also appointed Hegseth, not to mention a director of national intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, who has said that Erdogan “is not our friend” and is “one of the most dangerous dictators in the world.” As a result, both supporters and opponents of the U.S.–Turkish alliance are hoping for the best, and continue to lobby the administration accordingly.
Unfortunately, this dynamic leaves little room for those who hope to chart a more principled middle path. Erdogan’s government has renewed a crackdown on the opposition in Turkey, but it’s clear that the Trump administration is not going to offer even rhetorical support for democracy, or index U.S. cooperation to the rule of law. Erdogan has been eager to present Turkey as a partner in Trump’s efforts to negotiate an end to the war in Ukraine, and many observers have promoted this as a possible venue for greater U.S.–Turkish cooperation. But given Trump’s pro-Russian and neo-imperialist approach to negotiations, such cooperation is unlikely to lead to a positive outcome. What’s more, the administration so far seems to prefer Riyadh as a host for initial diplomatic contacts.
If there is little value in trying to shape Washington’s relationship with Ankara for the better, European decision-making may prove more amenable to strategic and principled appeals. With European leaders scrambling to adapt to a new security environment, the continent’s leaders will face a series of crucial choices about Turkey’s role. One approach would be to aggressively court Turkey on the grounds that its military capacity is now more important for the continent’s security arrangements than ever. The other approach would be to double down on strengthening cooperation between countries that share the same values and strategic outlook. With Europe threatened by an aggressive and authoritarian Russia, the continent’s leaders need to consider whether bringing in another aggressive, authoritarian, and regularly pro-Russian state would really help.
Ultimately, Europe will make its own decisions. But if nothing else, American observers can offer their European colleagues clear-eyed analysis about Turkish and American policies.
Small Opportunities in Syria
The one area in which Washington may still be able to play a positive role is in helping to negotiate a viable relationship between Kurdish forces in Syria and the new government in Damascus. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad and a renewed Turkish campaign against the SDF, these negotiations represent the most plausible path to stability in northeastern Syria. Syrian stability, in turn, will be a lynchpin of any chances for Middle Eastern stability in the years to come—renewed chaos in Syria risks dragging the whole region down. There are still a number of actors in Congress, the U.S. military, and the broader American political establishment who can constructively support such negotiations.
Washington has real leverage in Syria, although it is rapidly diminishing. Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to pull out U.S. forces from the area, and based on the experience of his first term, there is every reason to believe he will eventually withdraw. At the same time, both Congress and Trump’s cabinet have repeatedly threatened sanctions against Turkey if it attacks Kurdish forces. As a result, Erdogan seems to be delaying a larger attack against the SDF, even while maintaining military pressure. Turkey is now engaged in talks with Abdullah Ocalan (the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, which is a central component of the SDF). Ankara seems to hope that its negotiations with Ocalan will give it leverage to secure its demands regarding the SDF. But Washington can nudge a more balanced outcome, by pressuring Turkey and Damascus and strengthening the SDF’s hand, which will contribute to a more stable future for northeastern Syria.
Beyond these few opportunities for progress, U.S.–Turkish relations are likely to remain turbulent. And Trump’s second term will almost certainly leave Erdogan more authoritarian and more anti-Western—just one example of the damage that is likely all over the world as the international order reacts to Trump. Anyone hoping for a better outcome should look for opportunities to constructively engage, but, in doing so, must resist appealing to either the Trump administration’s corruption or civilizational chauvinism.
Cover Image: In a November 2019 photo, Donald Trump and first lady Melania Trump welcome Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his wife Emine Erdogan upon their arrival at the South Portico of the White House. Source: Alex Wong/Getty Images
Tags: syria, u.s.-turkey, donald trump