Century International: President Donald J. Trump showcased his signature foreign policy style on his Middle East tour last week, revealing as much as there might be of a Trump Doctrine. On his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, he made significant policy decisions. He lifted sanctions on Syria and met with its new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. He threatened Iran but offered the prospect of a grand bargain. And he signed billions of dollars worth of arms deals that will fuel another generation of regional conflict.
The centerpiece of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy seems to be, in practice, about big-dollar deals (for the U.S. economy and for the Trump Organization), and the optics of dominance. Century International fellows in this roundtable assess some of the most important outcomes of the Trump Gulf trip.
Lifting Sanctions Gives Syria a Chance
Sam Heller: Donald Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that his administration would remove U.S. sanctions on post-Assad Syria was hugely welcome. It was also totally discontinuous with the Trump administration’s previous Syria policy, which, only weeks before, had demanded Syria’s new government satisfy a list of difficult conditions in exchange for relatively limited, piecemeal sanctions relief.
What seems to have happened is that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and de facto Saudi head of state Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked Trump to remove sanctions on Syria, and Trump decided—with no real deliberative process, or warning to relevant U.S. agencies—to override his administration’s policy as a favor to two of his preferred regional partners. It probably helped that, we must assume, Trump had no real familiarity with the more punitive Syria policy that his subordinates had developed. So, when a few of Trump’s favorite foreign counterparts personally appealed to him, he could just throw out a policy he didn’t care about and had never actually bought into.
It’s an entirely screwed up way to arrive at the ideal policy outcome. Since December, it has been clear that without dramatic steps by Washington to relax U.S. sanctions, Syria’s economic recovery and reconstruction would be impossible, and the country’s political transition would likely fail. The Trump administration had seemed intent on withholding sanctions relief, in order to extract maximum concessions from an extremely vulnerable new Syrian government. But if Trump now wants to do the right thing because Erdogan and Prince Mohammed asked him to—okay, let’s take it.
It remains to be seen whether Trump administration officials committed to the administration’s previous hard-line Syria policy try to subvert the president’s expressed intent on sanctions relief. It seemed notable that in Joel Rayburn’s May 16 confirmation hearing as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs, three Democratic senators asked Rayburn if he would actually implement Trump’s directive to relieve sanctions on Syria—strongly implying that they suspect Rayburn will not. And that concern seems entirely reasonable. Rayburn, after all, was part of a Syria team during Trump’s first term that worked to frustrate and undermine Trump’s repeated direction to pull U.S. troops out of Syria and—as Senator Rand Paul noted in that same hearing—later bragged they played “shell games” with U.S. troop numbers to dupe Trump. With that in mind, the fight over whether and how Trump’s public about-face is translated into administration policy may not be over yet.
Trump Endorses Syria’s New Leader
Aron Lund: To say that Ahmed al-Sharaa’s first meeting with Donald Trump went well seems like an understatement. In addition to ending the U.S. sanctions that had devastated Syria’s economy, Trump has kept piling praise on its new president.
Sharaa is “terrific,” Trump has told interviewers—he’s “a strong guy,” “young and attractive,” and “handsome.”
As longtime Syria watchers will know, however, Sharaa is more than a pretty face. The former jihadist firebrand may have changed his tune politically, but he remains a ruthless power-hoarder atop a regime staffed by hardline Islamists.
Trump alluded to that, too, noting Sharaa’s “tough” background—but he didn’t seem to mind. “When you think about it,” he told Fox News’s Bret Baier, “are you going to put a choirboy in that position? I don’t think so.”
It’s cynical but it’s not wrong, and it must have been music to Sharaa’s ears.
Ultimately, however, it was neither Sharaa’s agreeable appearance nor his strongman politics that ended the sanctions—and it also wasn’t a judgement call by Trump, the hard-nosed realist.
Rather, as Trump explained to Baier, he was simply doing a favor to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. If so, we can be quite certain that it was more out of a love for Saudi Arabia’s oil billions than due to any interest in Syria’s well-being.
As positive as it was, Trump’s snap sanctions decision illustrates the dangerous degree to which Syria’s future depends on fickle foreign leaders—among them Prince Mohammed, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Emirati president Mohammed bin Zayed, and Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu. And did I mention Donald Trump?
In dealing with men like that, Sharaa will need more than good looks. After triumphing as a guerrilla commander and starting out as a state builder, he will now have to prove himself as a diplomat.
Over the Long Term, Gulf Deals Might Underwhelm
Rohan Advani: It looks like the busiest roads to the wider Middle East now pass through Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh. With potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in critical sectors and access to some of the latest chips, Gulf rulers will be confident that their national vision strategies are coming to fruition. They’ve also cemented themselves as leading political brokers in the region, convincing Trump to lift sanctions on Syria and maintain the real possibility of a diplomatic negotiations with Iran. They are also closer to getting some sort of comprehensive defense agreement, which looks increasingly decoupled from normalizing ties with Israel.
Yet norm erosion and state capture pose risks for the Gulf states, just as they do in the United States. From a strictly financial view, the vastness of Gulf investments may suggest that their strategies are not particularly prudent or sensitive to the real risks of technological disruption or sudden change in U.S. domestic politics. It may take decades to see a return on these investments, and there are real limits on how much capital they can actually deploy. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the largest issuer of dollar debt among emerging markets and is a net importer of capital. Over the past ten years, it only once recorded a budget surplus. If relatively low oil prices persist, Saudi Arabia will probably record fiscal deficits well into the next decade.
Geopolitically, these states will also need to offer a compelling vision of what a future Middle East will look like under Gulf tutelage. Exquisite infrastructural projects and powerful artificial intelligence technologies may sound great to investors, but they risk feeling irrelevant to many people throughout the region. What will the “new” Middle East look like for the millions who continue to suffer from basic material scarcity, unemployment, and unresolved political issues? A transactional mode of politics has clearly found favor with Trump, but it’s not a substitute for genuine regional leadership. New institutions and visions for the region will need to be constructed by all of those involved.
Caption: Trump gestures on stage as he tours the Al Udeid Air Base on May 15 in Doha. Source: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Threats and Olive Branch to Iran
Veena Ali-Khan: Iran closely—and warily—watched Donald Trump’s recent tour of the Gulf. The visit stirred memories of 2019, when his first-term policies veered sharply toward Saudi Arabia and he adopted a confrontational posture against Tehran. Although the regional landscape has dramatically shifted since then—particularly following the 2023 Saudi–Iran détente—Trump’s sharp anti-Iran rhetoric during his trip revived the symbolic contours of a regional divide that once deeply unsettled Iranian officials. His May 13 speech in Riyadh—where he denounced Iran as “the most destructive force” in the Middle East and a source of “collapse and suffering”—caught Tehran off guard, particularly given the fragile progress made over four rounds of indirect nuclear talks, which both sides had cautiously described as constructive.
Trump’s visit to Qatar marked an exception. Reports suggest he sought mediation support in Doha—an approach that may be more palatable to Tehran, particularly given the $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets held in Qatari banks. In the immediate aftermath of Trump’s tour, the Omani and Qatari foreign ministers met with Iranian officials in Tehran, likely to discuss the upcoming fifth round of talks—forecasting Doha’s growing influence in the diplomatic process. This trip likely tempered some of Iran’s anxiety about the broader symbolism of Trump’s regional alignment. Still, for Iranian officials, the broader takeaway from Trump’s trip was clear: a renewed display of U.S.–Gulf unity aimed at sidelining Iran both diplomatically and economically.
Trump’s contradictory posture—escalatory threats paired with transactional overtures—could strengthen the hand of Iranian hardliners. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said some of Trump’s comments were not worthy of response. Conservative Iranian outlets like Kayhan quickly seized the moment to discredit reformists, accusing them of capitulating to American pressure. “The West-leaning spectrum,” Kayhan claimed, “mistakenly believes Iran’s future is tied to Trump’s green light.” Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf went further, describing the U.S. approach as a “media game”—weaponizing public opinion via the media while offering something completely different behind closed doors.
Others, meanwhile, view the Trump tour with more urgency. They argue that if Iran risks falling irreversibly behind as Gulf Arab states secure multibillion-dollar energy and defense deals with Washington. The contrasts between these mega deals and Tehran’s enduring energy crisis, which has accumulated to daily electricity cut outs, sheds an even bigger light on Iran’s lost economic opportunity, largely due to its leaders’ incompetence.
To shift the narrative, Iranian diplomats have reportedly floated the idea, during ongoing talks, of a regional uranium enrichment consortium, potentially involving Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Though the idea sounds far-fetched for now, the messaging is clear: Iran wants to avoid renewed rifts with its Gulf neighbors over the nuclear file, and is looking to frame its nuclear industry as an economic prize rather than a security issue.
Still, the path ahead remains uncertain and riddled with contradictions, despite Trump’s claim that Iran has “sort of” agreed to the terms of a deal. The Guardian reported that the latest U.S. proposal includes a three-year suspension of enrichment to build trust, in exchange for partial sanctions relief. Yet both sides remain firmly entrenched. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff went back on his previous stance, and declared on 18 May that enrichment is a red line. Tehran, for its part, maintains that enrichment is a sovereign right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With both sides holding firm—and Washington’s position continuing to tilt—it remains unclear how talks can substantively move forward without crossing their own stated red lines.
Silence on Palestine
Thanassis Cambanis: The war in Gaza and Palestinian statehood were not a priority for either Trump or his Gulf hosts. The president spoke of his long-standing goal to see all the Gulf states normalize relations with Israel, and the Gulf leaders reiterated—in passing—that they would only do so once Palestinians had a state.
But none of these leaders mentioned the horrific plight of Palestinians in Gaza, who are experiencing a renewed Israeli military assault that comes after Israeli leaders have promised to make all of Gaza uninhabitable. Nor did they discuss the nearly three-month blockade of food and humanitarian aid. Trump has expressed irritation with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but he has continued his predecessor’s open-handed support of Israel’s military campaign no matter how many civilians it kills and displaces. Gulf leaders appear willing to go along with Trump’s tolerance of atrocities in Gaza and the unfolding annexation of the West Bank.
Was Israel Snubbed?
Dahlia Scheindlin: Arguably, Trump has skillfully snubbed both sides of the Israel–Hamas war. His unmistakable disregard for the policy preferences of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu dates back to early April, when Trump announced direct diplomacy with Iran, diminishing the chances of an Israeli or American military strike. Trump has since moved on to advanced negotiations for a new nuclear deal. Ahead of his Middle East trip, Trump cut a deal with the Houthi rebels in Yemen to cease attacks on Red Sea shipping while the group continues to fire at Israel, and Trump’s team negotiated directly (or close enough) with Hamas for the release of an American-Israeli soldier being held hostage in Gaza. Then, while he was in the region, he made a sumptuous weapon-sale deal with Saudi Arabia that left out Israeli normalization and canceled sanctions on the new Syrian leadership that Israel prefers to bomb.
Trump promised peace. Instead, his administration has only managed to raise and then dash hopes—on all sides of the war.
But snubbing Israel is no great gift to Hamas: since the group made its “gesture” by releasing American hostage Edan Alexander in a deal that reportedly circumvented the Israeli government, Israel ramped up its air campaign, bombing hundreds of Gazans to death last week. Hamas had expected that America would make sure Israel allows humanitarian aid into Gaza after three months of total blockade, and the following week Israel announced a renewal of humanitarian aid that will be insufficient and politically misused, while expanding its full-blown military operation whose stated aim is to indefinitely seize large portions of Gaza.
Trump promised peace. Instead, his administration has only managed to raise and then dash hopes—on all sides of the war.
A Trump Doctrine: Money and Dominance
Thanassis Cambanis: Does all this add up to a Trump Doctrine?
Susan Glasser, writing in the New Yorker, argues that Trump’s approach to foreign policy is “not a doctrine at all, in fact, but a way of life, defined by extreme transactionalism and self-interest above all else.”
But Trump’s worldview and chaotic international deal-making add up to something.
Trump has twice chosen the Gulf for his first foreign visit. The glitz and glamor of the oil monarchies provides an obvious analogue to the aesthetics of Mar-a-Lago. But the Gulf leaders embody something more: hereditary absolute rule by heads of state unburdened by any democratic institutions or public accountability. Trump admires authoritarian rulers; this seems to be a central tenet of his vague foreign policy doctrine. The other seems to be peak transactionalism: he seeks political, military, and economic policy that he can describe as an immediate win, and preferably with a dollar amount attached. The Trump Organization mopped up deals in the Gulf ahead of the president’s trip; along with the proposed gift of a Qatari jet, the deals seem to be as much about the president’s personal gain as about U.S. interests. No matter if the ballyhooed wins are never finalized after being announced, or the financial windfalls never materialize.
Needless to say, Trump’s approach undoes the most important tenet of any sound foreign policy, progressive or not—the advancement of clearly articulated American interests and values, even when that incurs short-term costs. Over the last century, America has benefited most when it has invested in strong alliances and international regimes and institutions, which bring some consistency to questions of war, peace, and the world economy.
The Trump Doctrine seems to be that America doesn’t need to define mutual interests or cooperate with others; it can instead pursue dominance in the assumption that dominance will be good for America. History suggests otherwise. When powerful countries go rogue and try to dominate the world order, what tends to follow is authoritarianism, instability, and armed conflict.
Header image Caption: Trump is greeted by young girls as he arrives for an official arrival ceremony at the Qasr al-Watan (Palace of the Nation) on May 15 in Abu Dhabi. Source: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Tags: middle east, foreign relations, global economy
Roundtable: Trump’s Middle East Transactions
Century International: President Donald J. Trump showcased his signature foreign policy style on his Middle East tour last week, revealing as much as there might be of a Trump Doctrine. On his visit to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, he made significant policy decisions. He lifted sanctions on Syria and met with its new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa. He threatened Iran but offered the prospect of a grand bargain. And he signed billions of dollars worth of arms deals that will fuel another generation of regional conflict.
The centerpiece of Trump’s “America First” foreign policy seems to be, in practice, about big-dollar deals (for the U.S. economy and for the Trump Organization), and the optics of dominance. Century International fellows in this roundtable assess some of the most important outcomes of the Trump Gulf trip.
Lifting Sanctions Gives Syria a Chance
Sam Heller: Donald Trump’s announcement in Riyadh that his administration would remove U.S. sanctions on post-Assad Syria was hugely welcome. It was also totally discontinuous with the Trump administration’s previous Syria policy, which, only weeks before, had demanded Syria’s new government satisfy a list of difficult conditions in exchange for relatively limited, piecemeal sanctions relief.
What seems to have happened is that Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan and de facto Saudi head of state Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman asked Trump to remove sanctions on Syria, and Trump decided—with no real deliberative process, or warning to relevant U.S. agencies—to override his administration’s policy as a favor to two of his preferred regional partners. It probably helped that, we must assume, Trump had no real familiarity with the more punitive Syria policy that his subordinates had developed. So, when a few of Trump’s favorite foreign counterparts personally appealed to him, he could just throw out a policy he didn’t care about and had never actually bought into.
It’s an entirely screwed up way to arrive at the ideal policy outcome. Since December, it has been clear that without dramatic steps by Washington to relax U.S. sanctions, Syria’s economic recovery and reconstruction would be impossible, and the country’s political transition would likely fail. The Trump administration had seemed intent on withholding sanctions relief, in order to extract maximum concessions from an extremely vulnerable new Syrian government. But if Trump now wants to do the right thing because Erdogan and Prince Mohammed asked him to—okay, let’s take it.
It remains to be seen whether Trump administration officials committed to the administration’s previous hard-line Syria policy try to subvert the president’s expressed intent on sanctions relief. It seemed notable that in Joel Rayburn’s May 16 confirmation hearing as assistant secretary of state for Near East Affairs, three Democratic senators asked Rayburn if he would actually implement Trump’s directive to relieve sanctions on Syria—strongly implying that they suspect Rayburn will not. And that concern seems entirely reasonable. Rayburn, after all, was part of a Syria team during Trump’s first term that worked to frustrate and undermine Trump’s repeated direction to pull U.S. troops out of Syria and—as Senator Rand Paul noted in that same hearing—later bragged they played “shell games” with U.S. troop numbers to dupe Trump. With that in mind, the fight over whether and how Trump’s public about-face is translated into administration policy may not be over yet.
Trump Endorses Syria’s New Leader
Aron Lund: To say that Ahmed al-Sharaa’s first meeting with Donald Trump went well seems like an understatement. In addition to ending the U.S. sanctions that had devastated Syria’s economy, Trump has kept piling praise on its new president.
Sharaa is “terrific,” Trump has told interviewers—he’s “a strong guy,” “young and attractive,” and “handsome.”
As longtime Syria watchers will know, however, Sharaa is more than a pretty face. The former jihadist firebrand may have changed his tune politically, but he remains a ruthless power-hoarder atop a regime staffed by hardline Islamists.
Trump alluded to that, too, noting Sharaa’s “tough” background—but he didn’t seem to mind. “When you think about it,” he told Fox News’s Bret Baier, “are you going to put a choirboy in that position? I don’t think so.”
It’s cynical but it’s not wrong, and it must have been music to Sharaa’s ears.
Ultimately, however, it was neither Sharaa’s agreeable appearance nor his strongman politics that ended the sanctions—and it also wasn’t a judgement call by Trump, the hard-nosed realist.
Rather, as Trump explained to Baier, he was simply doing a favor to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. If so, we can be quite certain that it was more out of a love for Saudi Arabia’s oil billions than due to any interest in Syria’s well-being.
As positive as it was, Trump’s snap sanctions decision illustrates the dangerous degree to which Syria’s future depends on fickle foreign leaders—among them Prince Mohammed, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Qatari emir Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, Emirati president Mohammed bin Zayed, and Israeli prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu. And did I mention Donald Trump?
In dealing with men like that, Sharaa will need more than good looks. After triumphing as a guerrilla commander and starting out as a state builder, he will now have to prove himself as a diplomat.
Over the Long Term, Gulf Deals Might Underwhelm
Rohan Advani: It looks like the busiest roads to the wider Middle East now pass through Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Riyadh. With potentially hundreds of billions of dollars in investments in critical sectors and access to some of the latest chips, Gulf rulers will be confident that their national vision strategies are coming to fruition. They’ve also cemented themselves as leading political brokers in the region, convincing Trump to lift sanctions on Syria and maintain the real possibility of a diplomatic negotiations with Iran. They are also closer to getting some sort of comprehensive defense agreement, which looks increasingly decoupled from normalizing ties with Israel.
Yet norm erosion and state capture pose risks for the Gulf states, just as they do in the United States. From a strictly financial view, the vastness of Gulf investments may suggest that their strategies are not particularly prudent or sensitive to the real risks of technological disruption or sudden change in U.S. domestic politics. It may take decades to see a return on these investments, and there are real limits on how much capital they can actually deploy. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the largest issuer of dollar debt among emerging markets and is a net importer of capital. Over the past ten years, it only once recorded a budget surplus. If relatively low oil prices persist, Saudi Arabia will probably record fiscal deficits well into the next decade.
Geopolitically, these states will also need to offer a compelling vision of what a future Middle East will look like under Gulf tutelage. Exquisite infrastructural projects and powerful artificial intelligence technologies may sound great to investors, but they risk feeling irrelevant to many people throughout the region. What will the “new” Middle East look like for the millions who continue to suffer from basic material scarcity, unemployment, and unresolved political issues? A transactional mode of politics has clearly found favor with Trump, but it’s not a substitute for genuine regional leadership. New institutions and visions for the region will need to be constructed by all of those involved.
Caption: Trump gestures on stage as he tours the Al Udeid Air Base on May 15 in Doha. Source: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Threats and Olive Branch to Iran
Veena Ali-Khan: Iran closely—and warily—watched Donald Trump’s recent tour of the Gulf. The visit stirred memories of 2019, when his first-term policies veered sharply toward Saudi Arabia and he adopted a confrontational posture against Tehran. Although the regional landscape has dramatically shifted since then—particularly following the 2023 Saudi–Iran détente—Trump’s sharp anti-Iran rhetoric during his trip revived the symbolic contours of a regional divide that once deeply unsettled Iranian officials. His May 13 speech in Riyadh—where he denounced Iran as “the most destructive force” in the Middle East and a source of “collapse and suffering”—caught Tehran off guard, particularly given the fragile progress made over four rounds of indirect nuclear talks, which both sides had cautiously described as constructive.
Trump’s visit to Qatar marked an exception. Reports suggest he sought mediation support in Doha—an approach that may be more palatable to Tehran, particularly given the $6 billion in frozen Iranian assets held in Qatari banks. In the immediate aftermath of Trump’s tour, the Omani and Qatari foreign ministers met with Iranian officials in Tehran, likely to discuss the upcoming fifth round of talks—forecasting Doha’s growing influence in the diplomatic process. This trip likely tempered some of Iran’s anxiety about the broader symbolism of Trump’s regional alignment. Still, for Iranian officials, the broader takeaway from Trump’s trip was clear: a renewed display of U.S.–Gulf unity aimed at sidelining Iran both diplomatically and economically.
Trump’s contradictory posture—escalatory threats paired with transactional overtures—could strengthen the hand of Iranian hardliners. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said some of Trump’s comments were not worthy of response. Conservative Iranian outlets like Kayhan quickly seized the moment to discredit reformists, accusing them of capitulating to American pressure. “The West-leaning spectrum,” Kayhan claimed, “mistakenly believes Iran’s future is tied to Trump’s green light.” Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf went further, describing the U.S. approach as a “media game”—weaponizing public opinion via the media while offering something completely different behind closed doors.
Others, meanwhile, view the Trump tour with more urgency. They argue that if Iran risks falling irreversibly behind as Gulf Arab states secure multibillion-dollar energy and defense deals with Washington. The contrasts between these mega deals and Tehran’s enduring energy crisis, which has accumulated to daily electricity cut outs, sheds an even bigger light on Iran’s lost economic opportunity, largely due to its leaders’ incompetence.
To shift the narrative, Iranian diplomats have reportedly floated the idea, during ongoing talks, of a regional uranium enrichment consortium, potentially involving Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. Though the idea sounds far-fetched for now, the messaging is clear: Iran wants to avoid renewed rifts with its Gulf neighbors over the nuclear file, and is looking to frame its nuclear industry as an economic prize rather than a security issue.
Still, the path ahead remains uncertain and riddled with contradictions, despite Trump’s claim that Iran has “sort of” agreed to the terms of a deal. The Guardian reported that the latest U.S. proposal includes a three-year suspension of enrichment to build trust, in exchange for partial sanctions relief. Yet both sides remain firmly entrenched. Trump’s envoy Steve Witkoff went back on his previous stance, and declared on 18 May that enrichment is a red line. Tehran, for its part, maintains that enrichment is a sovereign right under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With both sides holding firm—and Washington’s position continuing to tilt—it remains unclear how talks can substantively move forward without crossing their own stated red lines.
Silence on Palestine
Thanassis Cambanis: The war in Gaza and Palestinian statehood were not a priority for either Trump or his Gulf hosts. The president spoke of his long-standing goal to see all the Gulf states normalize relations with Israel, and the Gulf leaders reiterated—in passing—that they would only do so once Palestinians had a state.
But none of these leaders mentioned the horrific plight of Palestinians in Gaza, who are experiencing a renewed Israeli military assault that comes after Israeli leaders have promised to make all of Gaza uninhabitable. Nor did they discuss the nearly three-month blockade of food and humanitarian aid. Trump has expressed irritation with Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but he has continued his predecessor’s open-handed support of Israel’s military campaign no matter how many civilians it kills and displaces. Gulf leaders appear willing to go along with Trump’s tolerance of atrocities in Gaza and the unfolding annexation of the West Bank.
Was Israel Snubbed?
Dahlia Scheindlin: Arguably, Trump has skillfully snubbed both sides of the Israel–Hamas war. His unmistakable disregard for the policy preferences of Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu dates back to early April, when Trump announced direct diplomacy with Iran, diminishing the chances of an Israeli or American military strike. Trump has since moved on to advanced negotiations for a new nuclear deal. Ahead of his Middle East trip, Trump cut a deal with the Houthi rebels in Yemen to cease attacks on Red Sea shipping while the group continues to fire at Israel, and Trump’s team negotiated directly (or close enough) with Hamas for the release of an American-Israeli soldier being held hostage in Gaza. Then, while he was in the region, he made a sumptuous weapon-sale deal with Saudi Arabia that left out Israeli normalization and canceled sanctions on the new Syrian leadership that Israel prefers to bomb.
But snubbing Israel is no great gift to Hamas: since the group made its “gesture” by releasing American hostage Edan Alexander in a deal that reportedly circumvented the Israeli government, Israel ramped up its air campaign, bombing hundreds of Gazans to death last week. Hamas had expected that America would make sure Israel allows humanitarian aid into Gaza after three months of total blockade, and the following week Israel announced a renewal of humanitarian aid that will be insufficient and politically misused, while expanding its full-blown military operation whose stated aim is to indefinitely seize large portions of Gaza.
Trump promised peace. Instead, his administration has only managed to raise and then dash hopes—on all sides of the war.
A Trump Doctrine: Money and Dominance
Thanassis Cambanis: Does all this add up to a Trump Doctrine?
Susan Glasser, writing in the New Yorker, argues that Trump’s approach to foreign policy is “not a doctrine at all, in fact, but a way of life, defined by extreme transactionalism and self-interest above all else.”
But Trump’s worldview and chaotic international deal-making add up to something.
Trump has twice chosen the Gulf for his first foreign visit. The glitz and glamor of the oil monarchies provides an obvious analogue to the aesthetics of Mar-a-Lago. But the Gulf leaders embody something more: hereditary absolute rule by heads of state unburdened by any democratic institutions or public accountability. Trump admires authoritarian rulers; this seems to be a central tenet of his vague foreign policy doctrine. The other seems to be peak transactionalism: he seeks political, military, and economic policy that he can describe as an immediate win, and preferably with a dollar amount attached. The Trump Organization mopped up deals in the Gulf ahead of the president’s trip; along with the proposed gift of a Qatari jet, the deals seem to be as much about the president’s personal gain as about U.S. interests. No matter if the ballyhooed wins are never finalized after being announced, or the financial windfalls never materialize.
Needless to say, Trump’s approach undoes the most important tenet of any sound foreign policy, progressive or not—the advancement of clearly articulated American interests and values, even when that incurs short-term costs. Over the last century, America has benefited most when it has invested in strong alliances and international regimes and institutions, which bring some consistency to questions of war, peace, and the world economy.
The Trump Doctrine seems to be that America doesn’t need to define mutual interests or cooperate with others; it can instead pursue dominance in the assumption that dominance will be good for America. History suggests otherwise. When powerful countries go rogue and try to dominate the world order, what tends to follow is authoritarianism, instability, and armed conflict.
Header image Caption: Trump is greeted by young girls as he arrives for an official arrival ceremony at the Qasr al-Watan (Palace of the Nation) on May 15 in Abu Dhabi. Source: Win McNamee/Getty Images
Tags: middle east, foreign relations, global economy