Syrians have created a historic opportunity, albeit precarious, to build a democratic, pluralistic state.
The moment of opportunity dawned on December 8, when Syrian rebels toppled the Assads, one of the world’s most depraved dictatorial dynasties, which had ruled Syria since 1971. For now, Syria’s new provisional rulers have avoided the twin traps of sectarian bloodshed and authoritarian overreach.
But Syria’s moment of possibility is fragile, and can’t last long without support, wisdom, and luck. The international community must act quickly to create the conditions for recovery, by lifting sanctions and permitting reconstruction and foreign investment.
International support alone will not guarantee a democratic transition. But if Western and Arab governments, along with the rest of the international community, stick to the status quo, they all but guarantee that Syria’s future will look like its recent past.
A Globalized Civil War
Syrians did not get to this juncture alone—international sponsors enabled both the regime and the opposition, and fueled the long civil war that began in 2011. From its onset, the Syrian conflict was heavily internationalized.
Bashar al-Assad’s weak government sought protection from foreign patrons Iran and Russia. Assad displaced half the country’s population and killed hundreds of thousands with chemical weapons, starvation sieges, bombings, and forced disappearances. His most effective and murderous ground troops consisted of local Syrian sectarian militias and foreign fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, an array of Iraqi Shia militias, and Afghan Shia mobilized by Iran.
Rebels enjoyed widespread, albeit at times incoherent, support. The United States spent billions on rebel factions before largely abandoning the main anti-Assad effort in 2015, although U.S. troops maintain a protectorate in the Kurdish northeast. Many Arab states, along with Israel, sponsored or coordinated with Syrian militias. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey took in millions of displaced Syrians. Qatar and Turkey maintained close relations with Syrian rebel factions, and Turkey appears to have played a pivotal role in the lightning campaign that overthrew Assad this month.
Just as the civil war was internationalized, so too must be the recovery. Although Assad was the central culprit in the destruction of Syria, foreign powers played a pivotal role in the escalation and long duration of Syria’s war. They now can invest in democratic possibilities—or at least clear the legal hurdles to aid groups and governments willing to invest in reconstruction and institution-building.
Mostly Negative Influence
The complicated origin story of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel group that so swiftly overthrew Assad’s hollowed-out state, has made its turn toward governing more fraught. Tahrir al-Sham got its start as a jihadist group in rural Idlib governorate. On its march to local power in Idlib, the group’s early incarnations aligned at times with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result, Tahrir al-Sham is listed as a terrorist group by the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and other governments, including Turkey, one of its most important putative backers.
But Tahrir al-Sham eventually distanced itself from both jihadist motherships and crushed its main competitors, including factions backed by the United States. At the same time, Tahrir al-Sham oppressed local Syrian dissidents in Idlib—but also exhibited some room for cooperation.
Ultimately, Tahrir al-Sham was able to extend its reach across Syria—partly due to its own efforts, but mostly due to the patchwork of conditions created by foreign intervention. Foreign intervention kept the Assad regime on life support long past the time when it would have naturally collapsed, hiding until the last week of November the extent to which government institutions and the national economy had utterly ceased to function. And foreign intervention on behalf of rival rebel groups created competing, relatively autonomous zones across the country. In their respective fiefdoms, these various rebel groups have been able to experiment with local administration—and plunder.
Throughout this saga, foreign influence has, more often than not, been incoherent. It’s a problem that continues. Until a few weeks ago, endless-war lobbying groups Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy were arguing against normalization with Assad. Now, they have quickly shifted their sights from Assad to his successor, arguing to keep sanctions in place against Tahrir al-Sham—the very sanctions that were designed to bring down the old regime.
Impossible Conditions
Facing this type of foreign influence, Syrians might be forgiven for thinking that the international community doesn’t want the country to be free and stable. Why place impossible conditions on Tahrir al-Sham and the other Syrian groups—groups with which Tahrir al-Sham must reach an accommodation in order to humanely govern Syria—unless the aim is a forever campaign against Syrians?
Foreign governments and the international community have every right to withhold direct aid, and even impose new sanctions and designations on Syria if Tahrir al-Sham commits atrocities or war crimes now that it has taken control of the country. But the current waiting game reeks of bad faith. The United States has stationed at least 2,000 troops in the Kurdish enclave to fight ISIS, according to the Pentagon. The Kurdish faction in charge has a tight security partnership with the U.S. military but inconveniently is considered by Turkey to be a top strategic enemy and font of separatist terrorism. The Syrian Kurds, with full U.S. support, maintain a locally authoritarian security regime that fights ISIS but upholds little resembling due process or civic rights for political dissenters or the Arab minority under their control.
Singling out the nascent Syrian regime for especially high human rights scrutiny would ring particularly hollow given the regional postures of the United States and its European partners. Western governments enjoy warm relationships with a rogue’s gallery of Middle Eastern governments that are authoritarian, commit war crimes, or sponsor destabilizing proxy wars around the region; these problem partners include Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.
Quickly Lift Sanctions
There are promising early statements from the U.S. government, but as yet no critical action. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken is in direct talks with Tahrir al-Sham and has espoused a set of principles for Syria’s transition that sound reasonable in theory: an inclusive, Syrian-led government that poses no threat to neighboring countries, respects Syrians’ rights, and delivers aid and services. Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa explicitly agrees with the key terms in interviews, including with the BBC and the New York Times. But the U.S. principles only hold water if the United States quickly follows words with action and puts incentives in place. A terror designation can quickly be reinstated, and crucial waivers can be implemented—and withdrawn—at the flick of a pen in the White House.
Syria’s plight points to a wider problem with sanctions regimens, which are often designed without a clear exit strategy. Effective sanctions should impose a cost on the target, but should also come with simple instructions for what the targeted party can do to have the sanctions lifted. U.S. sanctions bills are frequently overbroad and open-ended, without built-in expiration dates, so that elected officials have to take the unpopular and politically risky move of actively lifting a sanction or designation rather than allowing it to expire when its time is up or conditions are met. It will clearly be a travesty if sanctions intended to punish Assad are imposed on the rebels who finally overthrew him, and if a group like Tahrir al-Sham cannot have the chance to prove that it has renounced the policies that earned its original terror designation.
It will clearly be a travesty if sanctions intended to punish Assad are imposed on the rebels who finally overthrew him.
In the immediate term, the Biden administration can, in its waning days, lift the U.S. designation of Tahrir al-Sham, and immediately promulgate licenses or waivers that will enable reconstruction, aid, and investment. There is no reason to continue isolating institutions like Syria’s Central Bank now that Assad is gone.
Unless international actors quickly lift sanctions and permit reconstruction and investment, Syria has little chance of recovery. There are many ways that things could still go badly for Syria. But the international community, and especially the Western and Arab powers who opposed Assad, owe it to Syrians to maximize Syria’s prospects.
Not a Binary Choice
Syria’s future isn’t a binary choice between liberal democracy and jihadist dystopia. In all likelihood, Syria will forge a future that will involve some improvement over Assad’s dismal record on governance, but also a continuation of armed conflict and fragmented state authority. Where Syria lands in the gradations along that continuum is of colossal consequence to the well-being of millions, who might be able to return home, be spared a new era of arbitrary detention, and enjoy, at least, security from hunger and state-sponsored murder.
Sure, there’s reason to worry and to plan for some of the realistic and troubling possible outcomes in Syria. But there’s plenty of reason to quickly lay the groundwork for Syria’s recovery. International powers cannot save Syria or forge a democracy there—but if they leave the Assad-era sanctions in place, they guarantee that Syria won’t move on from the war Assad started.
Tags: Syrian civil war, Syrian uprisings, progressive foreign policy, middle east
Lift Sanctions to Give Syria a Chance to Recover
Syrians have created a historic opportunity, albeit precarious, to build a democratic, pluralistic state.
The moment of opportunity dawned on December 8, when Syrian rebels toppled the Assads, one of the world’s most depraved dictatorial dynasties, which had ruled Syria since 1971. For now, Syria’s new provisional rulers have avoided the twin traps of sectarian bloodshed and authoritarian overreach.
But Syria’s moment of possibility is fragile, and can’t last long without support, wisdom, and luck. The international community must act quickly to create the conditions for recovery, by lifting sanctions and permitting reconstruction and foreign investment.
International support alone will not guarantee a democratic transition. But if Western and Arab governments, along with the rest of the international community, stick to the status quo, they all but guarantee that Syria’s future will look like its recent past.
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A Globalized Civil War
Syrians did not get to this juncture alone—international sponsors enabled both the regime and the opposition, and fueled the long civil war that began in 2011. From its onset, the Syrian conflict was heavily internationalized.
Bashar al-Assad’s weak government sought protection from foreign patrons Iran and Russia. Assad displaced half the country’s population and killed hundreds of thousands with chemical weapons, starvation sieges, bombings, and forced disappearances. His most effective and murderous ground troops consisted of local Syrian sectarian militias and foreign fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, an array of Iraqi Shia militias, and Afghan Shia mobilized by Iran.
Rebels enjoyed widespread, albeit at times incoherent, support. The United States spent billions on rebel factions before largely abandoning the main anti-Assad effort in 2015, although U.S. troops maintain a protectorate in the Kurdish northeast. Many Arab states, along with Israel, sponsored or coordinated with Syrian militias. Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey took in millions of displaced Syrians. Qatar and Turkey maintained close relations with Syrian rebel factions, and Turkey appears to have played a pivotal role in the lightning campaign that overthrew Assad this month.
Just as the civil war was internationalized, so too must be the recovery. Although Assad was the central culprit in the destruction of Syria, foreign powers played a pivotal role in the escalation and long duration of Syria’s war. They now can invest in democratic possibilities—or at least clear the legal hurdles to aid groups and governments willing to invest in reconstruction and institution-building.
Mostly Negative Influence
The complicated origin story of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the rebel group that so swiftly overthrew Assad’s hollowed-out state, has made its turn toward governing more fraught. Tahrir al-Sham got its start as a jihadist group in rural Idlib governorate. On its march to local power in Idlib, the group’s early incarnations aligned at times with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As a result, Tahrir al-Sham is listed as a terrorist group by the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and other governments, including Turkey, one of its most important putative backers.
But Tahrir al-Sham eventually distanced itself from both jihadist motherships and crushed its main competitors, including factions backed by the United States. At the same time, Tahrir al-Sham oppressed local Syrian dissidents in Idlib—but also exhibited some room for cooperation.
Ultimately, Tahrir al-Sham was able to extend its reach across Syria—partly due to its own efforts, but mostly due to the patchwork of conditions created by foreign intervention. Foreign intervention kept the Assad regime on life support long past the time when it would have naturally collapsed, hiding until the last week of November the extent to which government institutions and the national economy had utterly ceased to function. And foreign intervention on behalf of rival rebel groups created competing, relatively autonomous zones across the country. In their respective fiefdoms, these various rebel groups have been able to experiment with local administration—and plunder.
Throughout this saga, foreign influence has, more often than not, been incoherent. It’s a problem that continues. Until a few weeks ago, endless-war lobbying groups Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy were arguing against normalization with Assad. Now, they have quickly shifted their sights from Assad to his successor, arguing to keep sanctions in place against Tahrir al-Sham—the very sanctions that were designed to bring down the old regime.
Impossible Conditions
Facing this type of foreign influence, Syrians might be forgiven for thinking that the international community doesn’t want the country to be free and stable. Why place impossible conditions on Tahrir al-Sham and the other Syrian groups—groups with which Tahrir al-Sham must reach an accommodation in order to humanely govern Syria—unless the aim is a forever campaign against Syrians?
Foreign governments and the international community have every right to withhold direct aid, and even impose new sanctions and designations on Syria if Tahrir al-Sham commits atrocities or war crimes now that it has taken control of the country. But the current waiting game reeks of bad faith. The United States has stationed at least 2,000 troops in the Kurdish enclave to fight ISIS, according to the Pentagon. The Kurdish faction in charge has a tight security partnership with the U.S. military but inconveniently is considered by Turkey to be a top strategic enemy and font of separatist terrorism. The Syrian Kurds, with full U.S. support, maintain a locally authoritarian security regime that fights ISIS but upholds little resembling due process or civic rights for political dissenters or the Arab minority under their control.
Singling out the nascent Syrian regime for especially high human rights scrutiny would ring particularly hollow given the regional postures of the United States and its European partners. Western governments enjoy warm relationships with a rogue’s gallery of Middle Eastern governments that are authoritarian, commit war crimes, or sponsor destabilizing proxy wars around the region; these problem partners include Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt.
Quickly Lift Sanctions
There are promising early statements from the U.S. government, but as yet no critical action. U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken is in direct talks with Tahrir al-Sham and has espoused a set of principles for Syria’s transition that sound reasonable in theory: an inclusive, Syrian-led government that poses no threat to neighboring countries, respects Syrians’ rights, and delivers aid and services. Tahrir al-Sham leader Ahmed al-Sharaa explicitly agrees with the key terms in interviews, including with the BBC and the New York Times. But the U.S. principles only hold water if the United States quickly follows words with action and puts incentives in place. A terror designation can quickly be reinstated, and crucial waivers can be implemented—and withdrawn—at the flick of a pen in the White House.
Syria’s plight points to a wider problem with sanctions regimens, which are often designed without a clear exit strategy. Effective sanctions should impose a cost on the target, but should also come with simple instructions for what the targeted party can do to have the sanctions lifted. U.S. sanctions bills are frequently overbroad and open-ended, without built-in expiration dates, so that elected officials have to take the unpopular and politically risky move of actively lifting a sanction or designation rather than allowing it to expire when its time is up or conditions are met. It will clearly be a travesty if sanctions intended to punish Assad are imposed on the rebels who finally overthrew him, and if a group like Tahrir al-Sham cannot have the chance to prove that it has renounced the policies that earned its original terror designation.
In the immediate term, the Biden administration can, in its waning days, lift the U.S. designation of Tahrir al-Sham, and immediately promulgate licenses or waivers that will enable reconstruction, aid, and investment. There is no reason to continue isolating institutions like Syria’s Central Bank now that Assad is gone.
Unless international actors quickly lift sanctions and permit reconstruction and investment, Syria has little chance of recovery. There are many ways that things could still go badly for Syria. But the international community, and especially the Western and Arab powers who opposed Assad, owe it to Syrians to maximize Syria’s prospects.
Not a Binary Choice
Syria’s future isn’t a binary choice between liberal democracy and jihadist dystopia. In all likelihood, Syria will forge a future that will involve some improvement over Assad’s dismal record on governance, but also a continuation of armed conflict and fragmented state authority. Where Syria lands in the gradations along that continuum is of colossal consequence to the well-being of millions, who might be able to return home, be spared a new era of arbitrary detention, and enjoy, at least, security from hunger and state-sponsored murder.
Sure, there’s reason to worry and to plan for some of the realistic and troubling possible outcomes in Syria. But there’s plenty of reason to quickly lay the groundwork for Syria’s recovery. International powers cannot save Syria or forge a democracy there—but if they leave the Assad-era sanctions in place, they guarantee that Syria won’t move on from the war Assad started.
Tags: Syrian civil war, Syrian uprisings, progressive foreign policy, middle east