Donald Trump’s second presidency promises another four-year tightrope walk for Iraq.
More than two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains deeply linked, if not dependent, on American security institutions, markets, and banks.
Yet it also has strong historical, cultural, economic, and security ties—not to mention a 1,000-mile border—with Iran, which Trump is again poised to treat as an enemy. Iraq has several Iran-aligned political parties and armed groups, some of which have, in the past, launched anti-American attacks and drawn American retaliation. Additional Iran–U.S. clashes are a concerning possibility in the years to come. Trump injected more anxiety into Iraq’s situation on February 4 when he signed a “national security presidential memorandum” that restores “maximum pressure” on Iran. Iran’s interests and networks in Iraq will become a target for that pressure.
Add to that the complications of U.S. policy toward other regional conflicts such as Israel–Palestine, and policymakers in Baghdad have many hazards to navigate during the second Trump administration, even as some hope that Trump’s penchant for “deals” holds some promise for long-term regional peace.
The Iraqi government, with the backing of the Shia Islamist political elite, needs to take steps to ensure that Iraq does not invite pressure from the Trump administration—and that it’s in a position to benefit if Trump’s deal-making pans out. These steps include:
- Ensure that pro-Iran groups in Iraq do not become involved in any effort to destabilize Syria, that they do not conduct any anti-American activities in Iraq or abroad, and that they fall in line with the Popular Mobilization Commission chain of command.
- Comply with U.S. government decrees on secondary sanctions and safeguarding dollar flows while promoting more financial reforms and challenging corruption that benefits foreign countries.
- Work with the Trump administration and Congress to prevent further sanctions on Iraqi individuals, banks, companies, and institutions, while using trade deals to promote Iraq’s potential benefit to the American economy
Iraq’s Quandary
Iraq is, in many ways, in a conundrum. It is an ally of Iran, yet hosts a U.S.-led military coalition. The Iraqi government is a collective of political parties, some of which are friendly to the United States and others that are critical of it. Over the years, Iran-backed armed groups calling themselves the “Islamic Resistance” have repeatedly targeted the American embassy in Baghdad and military and diplomatic facilities elsewhere in Iraq. The United States has carried out airstrikes in retaliation that have killed dozens, including senior officials such as Iran’s Qassem Soleimani and Iraq’s Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (both assassinated by American drone strike in January 2020). Tehran sees Iraq as its most important neighbor—an economic lifeline and a base from which to project military power to coerce domestic and foreign actors into cooperating with it. Washington sees Iraq as an arena to push back Iranian influence and capabilities and redeem some of the mistakes of regime change in 2003.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear why the Trump administration brings opportunities and threats to Iraq. Iraq has demonstrated an ability to resist Iranian pressure, having managed to largely stay out of the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon and regime upheaval in Syria—despite the losses of Iran’s allies in those countries. Should the main Iraqi players aligned with Iran become convinced that an Iraqi foreign policy decoupled from Iran’s is the best outcome, it could mean that Iraq can truly present itself as neutral and prioritize its national interests. Winding down activity of the Islamic Resistance will further stabilize Iraq’s security and help turn Washington away from the view that Iraq is merely a proxy of Iran.
Most importantly, if the United States does reach a new deal with Iran on nukes and de-escalation—something Trump said he wanted just a day after announcing a new maximum-pressure campaign—it will give Iraq the time and space to bolster state institutions. It will also give Iraq space to demobilize armed groups acting outside the framework of the Popular Mobilization Commission—the government body that was set up to organize hybrid armed groups that emerged to fight the Islamic State a decade ago, and which have become permanent fixtures in Iraq.
Iraqi political talk shows are consumed by speculations about regime change in Iraq, fueled by comments from pro-Trump politicians.
But there are also potential dangers ahead for Iraq if Trump follows through on his promise to increase pressure on Iran. Such pressure could lead to a surge of anti-U.S. activity in Iraq and an effort to destabilize Syria by Iran’s allies. The Trump administration has already signaled that it will not provide Iraq with secondary sanctions waivers for importing energy from Iran (the current one expires March 7). Hawkish voices in the United States are already calling for sanctions on senior Iraqi leaders, for providing support to Iran, and on Iraqi banks and institutions. Iraqi political talk shows are consumed by speculations about regime change in Iraq, fueled by comments from pro-Trump politicians that are focused on Iran.
Iraq’s economy is also essentially dependent on the United States, since it is based on oil exports sold in dollars which are deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then transferred to Iraq’s Central Bank. A deterioration in the Iraqi–U.S. relationship would have a severe impact on Iraq’s economy. Trump’s flippancy with tariff threats against even friendly countries such as Mexico and Canada shocked Iraq’s politicians, who saw it as a warning that economic pressure is very possible.
Iraq Still Needs America
Clearly, the vast majority of Iraq’s political elite do want to maintain good ties with the United States, and are urging Iran-aligned actors to avoid any missteps that would attract Trump’s ire. There have even been quiet discussions within the ruling Shia coalition about extending the mission of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq as a hedge against a potentially resurgent Islamic State in Syria, and to keep the United States more engaged in Iraq. For the last three years, pro-Iran groups’ top concern in Iraq has been calling for the withdrawal of American forces. Extending the U.S. mission would thus be a significant turnaround. Iraq is also considering awarding more contracts to American firms in the energy, construction, and agriculture sectors, to give Trump positive signals.
It is still early days for the Trump administration. Elements of Trump’s Iraq policy are still unknown, though it’s clear that the administration is likely to view Iraq within the context of Iran policy. Issues such as potential U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, the cutback on aid spending, and the change in officials in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council will eventually have an impact on Iraq.
For now, though, the Trump administration is not focused on Iraq, while Iran has suffered setbacks forcing it to reassess its role in the region. Iraq should use this time to impress upon all domestic actors the need to prioritize national interests and reassure the United States that Baghdad remains friendly to America—while adopting a conflict-free approach in the region.
Header Image: Iraqi police cadets take part in a rehearsal of the police cadet passing out ceremony at the Iraq National Police College on November 26, 2024 in Baghdad. Source: Henry Nicholls-WPA Pool/Getty Images
Tags: iraq, donald trump, baghdad
Iraq Walks a Tightrope into the New Trump Era
Donald Trump’s second presidency promises another four-year tightrope walk for Iraq.
More than two decades after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iraq remains deeply linked, if not dependent, on American security institutions, markets, and banks.
Yet it also has strong historical, cultural, economic, and security ties—not to mention a 1,000-mile border—with Iran, which Trump is again poised to treat as an enemy. Iraq has several Iran-aligned political parties and armed groups, some of which have, in the past, launched anti-American attacks and drawn American retaliation. Additional Iran–U.S. clashes are a concerning possibility in the years to come. Trump injected more anxiety into Iraq’s situation on February 4 when he signed a “national security presidential memorandum” that restores “maximum pressure” on Iran. Iran’s interests and networks in Iraq will become a target for that pressure.
Add to that the complications of U.S. policy toward other regional conflicts such as Israel–Palestine, and policymakers in Baghdad have many hazards to navigate during the second Trump administration, even as some hope that Trump’s penchant for “deals” holds some promise for long-term regional peace.
The Iraqi government, with the backing of the Shia Islamist political elite, needs to take steps to ensure that Iraq does not invite pressure from the Trump administration—and that it’s in a position to benefit if Trump’s deal-making pans out. These steps include:
Iraq’s Quandary
Iraq is, in many ways, in a conundrum. It is an ally of Iran, yet hosts a U.S.-led military coalition. The Iraqi government is a collective of political parties, some of which are friendly to the United States and others that are critical of it. Over the years, Iran-backed armed groups calling themselves the “Islamic Resistance” have repeatedly targeted the American embassy in Baghdad and military and diplomatic facilities elsewhere in Iraq. The United States has carried out airstrikes in retaliation that have killed dozens, including senior officials such as Iran’s Qassem Soleimani and Iraq’s Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (both assassinated by American drone strike in January 2020). Tehran sees Iraq as its most important neighbor—an economic lifeline and a base from which to project military power to coerce domestic and foreign actors into cooperating with it. Washington sees Iraq as an arena to push back Iranian influence and capabilities and redeem some of the mistakes of regime change in 2003.
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear why the Trump administration brings opportunities and threats to Iraq. Iraq has demonstrated an ability to resist Iranian pressure, having managed to largely stay out of the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon and regime upheaval in Syria—despite the losses of Iran’s allies in those countries. Should the main Iraqi players aligned with Iran become convinced that an Iraqi foreign policy decoupled from Iran’s is the best outcome, it could mean that Iraq can truly present itself as neutral and prioritize its national interests. Winding down activity of the Islamic Resistance will further stabilize Iraq’s security and help turn Washington away from the view that Iraq is merely a proxy of Iran.
Most importantly, if the United States does reach a new deal with Iran on nukes and de-escalation—something Trump said he wanted just a day after announcing a new maximum-pressure campaign—it will give Iraq the time and space to bolster state institutions. It will also give Iraq space to demobilize armed groups acting outside the framework of the Popular Mobilization Commission—the government body that was set up to organize hybrid armed groups that emerged to fight the Islamic State a decade ago, and which have become permanent fixtures in Iraq.
But there are also potential dangers ahead for Iraq if Trump follows through on his promise to increase pressure on Iran. Such pressure could lead to a surge of anti-U.S. activity in Iraq and an effort to destabilize Syria by Iran’s allies. The Trump administration has already signaled that it will not provide Iraq with secondary sanctions waivers for importing energy from Iran (the current one expires March 7). Hawkish voices in the United States are already calling for sanctions on senior Iraqi leaders, for providing support to Iran, and on Iraqi banks and institutions. Iraqi political talk shows are consumed by speculations about regime change in Iraq, fueled by comments from pro-Trump politicians that are focused on Iran.
Iraq’s economy is also essentially dependent on the United States, since it is based on oil exports sold in dollars which are deposited in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and then transferred to Iraq’s Central Bank. A deterioration in the Iraqi–U.S. relationship would have a severe impact on Iraq’s economy. Trump’s flippancy with tariff threats against even friendly countries such as Mexico and Canada shocked Iraq’s politicians, who saw it as a warning that economic pressure is very possible.
Iraq Still Needs America
Clearly, the vast majority of Iraq’s political elite do want to maintain good ties with the United States, and are urging Iran-aligned actors to avoid any missteps that would attract Trump’s ire. There have even been quiet discussions within the ruling Shia coalition about extending the mission of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq as a hedge against a potentially resurgent Islamic State in Syria, and to keep the United States more engaged in Iraq. For the last three years, pro-Iran groups’ top concern in Iraq has been calling for the withdrawal of American forces. Extending the U.S. mission would thus be a significant turnaround. Iraq is also considering awarding more contracts to American firms in the energy, construction, and agriculture sectors, to give Trump positive signals.
It is still early days for the Trump administration. Elements of Trump’s Iraq policy are still unknown, though it’s clear that the administration is likely to view Iraq within the context of Iran policy. Issues such as potential U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, the cutback on aid spending, and the change in officials in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council will eventually have an impact on Iraq.
For now, though, the Trump administration is not focused on Iraq, while Iran has suffered setbacks forcing it to reassess its role in the region. Iraq should use this time to impress upon all domestic actors the need to prioritize national interests and reassure the United States that Baghdad remains friendly to America—while adopting a conflict-free approach in the region.
Header Image: Iraqi police cadets take part in a rehearsal of the police cadet passing out ceremony at the Iraq National Police College on November 26, 2024 in Baghdad. Source: Henry Nicholls-WPA Pool/Getty Images
Tags: iraq, donald trump, baghdad