How Trump Can Make Things Worse in the Middle East
Many Middle Eastern leaders welcomed Donald Trump’s election victory, convinced that Trump policies would better serve their regional interests. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly rooted for Trump. And while authoritarian leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt had warmed to the Biden administration, they historically prefer Republican leaders who dispense with even rhetorical demands for human rights.
The Middle East today is experiencing a level of tumult transformational even by the heightened standards of recent history. With full U.S. support, Israel has destroyed Gaza and announced plans to annex the West Bank; some Israeli officials openly propose to annex and settle Gaza as well. Israel is destroying Lebanese border villages and has exchanged direct strikes with Iran, courting a full war. Trump’s son-in-law and former Middle East adviser Jared Kushner recently mused on X that the region was “liquid and the ability to reshape is unlimited.”
There has been more continuity than change in U.S. policy in the Middle East across four presidential administrations, since George W. Bush abandoned his plans to create pro-American democracies across the Arab world. American policy has been simultaneously reactive and over-militarized—and perhaps as a result of its strategic incoherence, the United States has failed to contain regional conflicts.
Trump could follow a grim path of business as usual: a free hand for Israel, confrontation with Iran, a half-hearted desire to avoid all-out war. Or he could usher in a period of still-greater tumult in the delusional belief that America and its partners can transform the Middle East through unfettered military force.
In this roundtable, Century International’s fellows evaluate the most consequential changes they expect for the Middle East under a second Trump presidency.
A Bigger Blank Check for Israel
Dahlia Scheindlin
The most predictable thing about Donald Trump is his unpredictability. In such cases, the best indicator is past behavior.
Trump likes to make deals, and he is comfortable abandoning all prior groundwork to do so. The deal he proposed for Israel and Palestinians in 2020 crashed through international law and prior agreements by endorsing Israel’s settlements and annexation. Trump’s strategy through the previous three years of his administration had been to alienate, humiliate, and isolate the Palestinians. His so-called peace plan envisioned a Palestinian archipelago as their reward—in effect, a mockery of a Palestinian state. The deal wasn’t really meant for Palestinian consideration, nor was it intended as a basis for a negotiation between the parties to the conflict. Instead, it was a handshake between two allies, Israel and the United States—and it still wasn’t good enough for Israel’s hardest of hard-liners. The “peace plan” came to nothing.
All signs point to a similar approach during the second Trump presidency. In February, David Friedman, who served as Trump’s ambassador to Israel, unveiled the outline of a new plan, titled “The Future of Judea and Samaria,” which showed his continued enthusiasm for the broad approach of the first Trump administration. The plan begins from the premise, as the website Jewish News Syndicate describes it, that Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel “proved longstanding Israeli fears that any independent Palestinian entity without overriding Israeli security control would become a staging ground for barbaric terrorism against the Jewish state.” The truth is the opposite: Israel has had overriding Israeli security control, without an independent Palestinian entity, from 1967 to the present. It was also the fact on October 6, 2023, and therefore illogical to suggest that the status quo ante will protect Israel. If Mike Huckabee, Trump’s next ambassador-designate, takes Friedman’s path—matched by Israel’s religious fundamentalist ministers—then further destruction of Palestinian rights is inevitable.
Given what is known so far about the administration’s Middle East personnel, the administration’s orientation is likely to continue insisting on an inverted reality, seeking to dismantle Palestinian national aspirations for good, and showering gifts on the party that holds unrivaled military, political, and economic strength.
The possibility that Trump will want to end the war and avoid starting a new one with Iran cannot be dismissed. It’s not impossible that he’ll find ways to entice Israel to wind down. But the most likely enticement will be promising that Palestine is never actually free. The result will be future cycles of violence, long after he’s gone.
It’s not impossible that Trump will find ways to entice Israel to wind down its war. But the most likely enticement will be promising that Palestine is never actually free.
More Peace, Less Sovereignty for Lebanon
Sima Ghaddar
On October 26, Trump addressed the Lebanese-American community in a letter promising to bring “real and lasting peace” to the Middle East, urging voters to “Vote Trump for Peace.” His campaign increasingly emphasized “peace” and “stability” with a vow to “end all foreign wars.” However, many Lebanese fear this vision could come at the cost of Lebanese sovereignty and Palestinian statehood.
Trump claims he will live up to his dealmaker image by reengaging in Middle East diplomacy, as he did with the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized ties between Israel, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet Trump’s approach also involves deal-breaking, like when he withdrew, in 2018, from the hard-won Iran nuclear deal—a move that deepened regional divides. Other actions Trump took during his first term, such as moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and supporting illegal Israeli settlements, emboldened Israel while sidestepping the Palestinian issue—a reality that Trump may now have to confront if he seeks to stabilize the region. Moreover, skeptics in the Middle East see the normalization agreements like the Abraham Accords as tools for authoritarian states to consolidate power, not as pathways to peace.
This approach makes for impressive headlines but has numerous problems, chief among them that it systematically violates Lebanese sovereignty and makes negotiations all but impossible. (It doesn’t help that Lebanon hasn’t had a president for two years.) The approach also jettisons ongoing efforts in which the international community is invested. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, created, on paper, a Hezbollah-free zone in southern Lebanon, secured by the Lebanese military and verified by UN peacekeepers. While Hezbollah never fully withdrew from those areas, UNSCR 1701 represents a process with legitimate buy-in from all parties, including the Lebanese state. Now, Israel has unilaterally decided that the provisions of UNSCR 1701 are “not enough” to end war on Lebanon. Israel is wiping out Lebanese border towns, making it unclear what Israeli–Lebanese deal—if any—could be reached.
Reactions to Trump’s reelection among Lebanese vary from trepidation to cautious optimism. Some view U.S. policy as inevitably pro-Israel, while others are hopeful that Tiffany Trump’s father-in-law, Lebanese-born businessman Massad Boulos, could help mediate some type of de-escalation with Israel. (Boulos advised Trump during his campaign.) But Boulos could be more of a partisan than a peacemaker: he has deep ties to Christian factions in Lebanon, and his involvement could risk deepening Lebanon’s internal divisions, especially if the Shia community feels sidelined or sacrificed as collateral damage.
There are also concerns that Trump’s “peace” negotiations, whatever form they take, may further expand Israel’s ground operations. Israel is implementing the “Gaza doctrine” in Lebanon’s southern border areas, which are now functionally uninhabitable. It is also pushing for an Israeli-controlled military zone. Badly designed Trump negotiations could simply provide cover for Israel to expand its ground operations, which would risk a Hezbollah retaliation and possibly ignite a protracted guerrilla conflict. Trump’s influence on Gulf alliances and the most recent defense talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran might further isolate Hezbollah, potentially intensifying internal discord or even civil conflict in Lebanon—a scenario that, some fear, Israel may be betting on.
A Dark Future for the Environment
Zeinab Shuker
There are many unknowns about the second Trump administration, but climate policy is not one of them. At a turning-point moment for climate change mitigation, all signs point to the next Trump presidency being disastrous—domestically, in the Middle East, and around the world. The only question is how bad it will be.
On the domestic level, the president-elect has signaled his intention to roll back many environmental policies introduced during and before the Biden administration. The first order of business was Trump nominating Lee Zeldin to head the Environmental Protection Agency; Zeldin is a four-term House Republican from New York, a climate denier, and an advocate of fracking and offshore drilling.
On the international front, the Trump administration is likely to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, a setback to international efforts to address climate change. The withdrawal of the United States, the biggest economy in the world, will complicate the efforts of countries that are currently gathered for COP29 in Baku trying to figure out how to provide aid and financial support for low- and middle-income countries most impacted by climate change. The American withdrawal also opens the door for other countries to take a step back from controlling their greenhouse emissions. This development is particularly alarming given that the global average temperature is expected to reach 1.5°C above preindustrial levels for the first time this year, and environmental degradation continues to be central in the Middle East as conflict escalates.
Turkish Toss-up
Nick Danforth
Under the Trump administration, U.S.–Turkish relations could get better for the wrong reasons, get worse for the wrong reasons, or somehow manage to do both at the same time.
Last time around, Trump and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan enjoyed a close personal relationship, driven by personal interests, a common leadership style, and a shared hostility to liberal values and institutions. As a result, Trump proved willing to prioritize Erdogan’s recommendations over both the views of his advisors and the requirements of U.S. law. This history has led to considerable and well-founded optimism in Ankara about reestablishing this relationship in Trump’s new term.
There were, however, palpable ideological tensions during the last Trump term that will continue to cause problems. Trump’s coalition contains many figures whose evangelical, Islamophobic, or Christian nationalist worldviews are a natural foil to Erdogan’s Islamism. In 2018, Trump imposed damaging sanctions on Turkey when Ankara refused to release an unjustly jailed American pastor. Subsequently, Trump’s secretary of state played a key role in strengthening trilateral relations between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Now, amidst heightened tensions surrounding the war in Gaza, this ideological rift could deepen even more, and cause bigger problems.
At this point, the best-case scenario for U.S.–Turkish ties is that corruption wins out over chauvinism and we get authoritarian solidarity instead of a clash of civilizations.
About That Clash of Civilizations
Abdelrahman Ayyash
It’s important to consider the policy that Trump’s administration is going to take, more generally, toward Islamic movements in the region. Middle Eastern dictators and strongmen such as Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, the United Arab Emirates’ Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and, to a much lesser extent, Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, have been trying to push the U.S. administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliates as terrorist organizations. This could gain momentum given the urgency of the matter for Israel, which continues to refer to Hamas, dubiously, as a Muslim Brotherhood group. If this designation is forthcoming, it could negatively affect American Muslims, and might mobilize them away from Trump, whom they agree with over several social and economic issues.
Of course, religion isn’t the only factor driving alliances; economic and social disenchantment plays a significant role. Such discontent was at play in the U.S. election and continues to fuel unrest in the Middle East. The approach to deradicalization in the region has often been mired in tactical maneuvers, which can overlook deeper causes of radicalization, such as the conditions leading up to the Arab Spring revolutions or the attack on October 7. These radicalizing conditions are mainly the result of U.S. and Israeli policies; continuing such policies will not lead to a safer, more prosperous, or more Israel-friendly region. If the Trump administration is actually going to be a paradigm shifter, as Trump has promised in so many words, it will need to avoid past mistakes and adopt fresh perspectives to genuinely change the situation.
The best case scenario for U.S.-Turkish ties is that corruption wins out over chauvinism and we get authoritarian solidarity instead of a clash of civilizations.
But the choices Trump will make toward the Muslim-majority countries and the Israeli war on Palestine could lead many among those who voted for him in response to Biden’s failures to change their minds within the next two years. Such a turnaround could threaten the Republican congressional majority and negatively affect the strong political position Trump holds.
For Iraq, Neglect or Crossfire
Sajad Jiyad
As Trump prepares to take office again, the United States has already announced that it is drawing down troops from Iraq and reducing its footprint, moves Trump has been eager for in the past. If Washington follows through on these plans, Trump will have little need to engage with Iraq, and he might be content to watch from the sidelines if Iraq is dragged into a war between Iran and Israel.
The Iraqi government is right to be worried that the Trump administration will use Iraq—or allow it to be used—as a battleground against Iran. But it is also unsure of how Trump’s second term will differ from his first. And they know from experience that Trump’s actions and rhetoric frequently diverge: in Trump’s first term, he inherited a U.S.-led military coalition fighting the Islamic State in Iraq. Despite his frequent criticisms of past U.S. policy in Iraq, he happily took credit for the victory against the Islamic State.
For now, Baghdad will be waiting to see if Trump really is capable of dialing down the temperature in the region. Many Iraqis believe Trump’s administration cannot be worse than Biden’s.
A woman sits amongst damaged homes caused by Israeli air strikes on January 18 in Rafah, Gaza. Source: Ahmad Hasaballah/Getty Images
But the harsh reality is that what happens in the White House will have direct repercussions for Tehran. During Trump’s previous term, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and launched his “maximum pressure” campaign, a series of stringent sanctions that severely crippled the Iranian economy.
It is certain that Trump’s victory heralds more crippling sanctions on Tehran. Brian Hook, who spearheaded Trump’s previous Iran policies, is leading the Trump campaign’s State Department transition team. In a recent interview, Hook said that Trump is committed to “diplomatically isolating Iran and weakening them economically so they can’t fund violence.”
But there’s not a lot of clarity on what the details of this policy will look like. Hook also mentioned that the president-elect has “no interest” in toppling the Iranian government—a notable shift from the warlike rhetoric that marked Trump’s previous term. This suggests that “maximum pressure 2.0” may primarily aim at weakening and isolating the Iranian leadership rather than pursue overt regime change.
Sanctions targeting Iranian exports and trade with China will likely accelerate Iran’s integration into the China-led, BRICS-aligned economic sphere, incentivizing Beijing to pull Tehran closer into its orbit. Russia, in particular, may benefit: if Iran is exporting less oil, Russia can grab more of the global market, while also deepening its sway in Syria at the expense of an increasingly beleaguered Iran.
Opinions within Tehran are mixed. Among the reformist and moderate camps, and some hard-line figures, there is cautious optimism that Trump’s ambition as a self-styled dealmaker might drive him to seek renewed negotiations with Iran and stay away from regional wars—a promise seen in his campaign. Also, there is a perception that a deal cut under the Republicans would be far more durable than one made with the Democrats. In this vein, a former top Iranian official even urged Pezeshkian to congratulate Trump on his victory and “express hope for resolving Iran–U.S. issues.” Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice president for strategic affairs, made a post on X encouraging Trump, stating his hope that Trump would honor his campaign pledge “to stand against war and heed the clear message from the American electorate to end conflicts and prevent new ones.”
For many others, the Trump administration’s 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani still leaves a bitter taste and won’t be easily forgotten. The idea of negotiating with Trump—even if he shows willingness—will be a hard sell, not just for hard-liners, but also for some centrists and reformists.
Pezeshkian, who built his campaign around reengaging with the West to ease sanctions, now faces a daunting task should Trump prioritize drastically increasing sanctions on Iran and throttling its oil sales. The stakes are high, since Trump is also discussing plans to bolster support for Israel in the midst of Israeli–Iranian conflict. If Tehran advances its nuclear program to gain leverage in negotiations with Western powers, it could provide Israel with a pretext for strikes on Iranian nuclear sites—something Trump would likely support more readily than the Biden administration. Israel’s growing appetite for conflict, paired with Trump’s closer relationship with Netanyahu, could give Tel Aviv more freedom to act. Whatever unfolds, Iran finds itself in a highly vulnerable position.
Assume the Worst
Eamon Kircher-Allen
When it comes to Middle East policy, Trump’s in a pickle, just like he is in a bunch of other areas of his agenda: he promised everything to everyone so he could get elected. In just one example, Trump wrote an open letter to Lebanese-Americans on October 26 promising to “stop the suffering and destruction in Lebanon.” Of course, the main party destroying things in Lebanon in the last few months has been Israel, though Trump’s letter didn’t mention that. Only a month earlier, at an Israeli–American Council summit, Trump described himself as Israel’s “protector,” adding that “anybody who’s Jewish and loves being Jewish and loves Israel is a fool if they vote for a Democrat.” On November 8, Trump called Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas and told him he wanted to stop the Gaza war. A few days later, Trump announced that he had chosen Mike Huckabee as U.S. ambassador to Israel. Huckabee opposes Palestinian statehood and has even indicated he doesn’t think that the Palestinian people exist. Let’s not forget Trump’s Muslim ban that kicked off his first term.
Trump’s history of extreme Islamophobia and Israel support notwithstanding, it’s actually hard to know with any certainty what he’ll do in the Middle East. He’s not a man of principle, and what happens is going to be more a result of the people he keeps around him—or who gets to talk to him early enough in the day before his attention span is fully spent. He could follow his isolationist tendencies; he could follow the warmongers in his inner circle; he could pursue profit above all else; or he could erratically lurch between competing, incompatible approaches.
In the Middle East, Trump’s in a pickle, just like he is in a bunch of other areas of his agenda: he promised everything to everyone so he could get elected.
But although several outcomes are possible, policymakers must assume the worst: the Trump presidency will be captured by aggressive Middle East hawks who will facilitate the acceleration of the Gaza genocide and the expansion of war, perhaps to Iran. It stands to reason that Trump will toss aside any promises he’s made to draw down U.S. military activity in the Middle East, or support for Israel, once it becomes clear to him that he can’t shore up his power much by further pandering to the interest groups asking for the opposite.
Incoherence for Syria and Beyond
Sam Heller
I’m actually not sure what shape Trump’s Middle East policy will take, and how his administration will reconcile its various contradictory policy impulses.
Trump himself has promised to “stop the wars” and, based on his previous term, seems averse to open military confrontation. He certainly seems unwilling to go to war on behalf of regional partners. At the same time, his forthcoming administration is already being populated with much more forward-leaning and aggressive hawks. These new administration hires are likely to, at minimum, ramp up diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and its regional allies in ways that risk new hostilities. Trump will also be hearing from favored foreign interlocutors, including the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, who may not want a resumption of regional instability and violence that could jeopardize their ambitious programs of national development.
Trump’s Syria policy exemplifies these conflicting tendencies, and will be worth watching. For his part, Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria’s northeast. Yet his presidential transition includes staffers who helped subvert his previous attempts to pull out of Syria, and who want to crush the government of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad economically—either as part of a “maximum pressure” policy targeting Iran, or because of a more Syria-specific vendetta. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have by now normalized diplomatic relations with Syria and attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to convince Washington to relax its Syria sanctions. What will happen when they make a similar case to Trump? And what happens when Turkey’s president presses Trump, yet again, to abandon the United States’ Kurdish-led local Syrian partners and pull out of Syria militarily?
These policy preferences are incompatible, obviously, and, in what may be another chaotic Trump administration, I don’t think we know yet which will win out.
Pressure and Contradictions on Syria
Aron Lund
Sam has already noted how the contradictions in Trump’s Middle East policy are likely to make U.S. Syria policy particularly incoherent and unstable in the coming years. Amid all that unpredictability, however, some things still seem like safe bets.
For instance, Syria will come under more U.S. sanctions, since sanctions can serve both Trump the Iran-slayer and Trump the war-ender. Then again, there are countervailing forces. If Trump decides to negotiate a U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, he might offer sanctions relief as a way to secure the cooperation of Damascus or Moscow. Trump’s allies in Europe—I’m thinking of leaders like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni or Viktor Orban of Hungary, who view Syria’s economic collapse as a chief driver of migration—could also sway the U.S. president.
Slashing foreign aid is one of Trump’s few unchanging opinions, however, and on that point he’s not likely to listen to contrary views.
In sum, Trump’s reelection seems more likely than not to rekindle a conflict that’s been frozen in carbonite for close to five years. We just don’t know how, only that it will be accompanied by the simultaneous onset of a profoundly destabilizing humanitarian crisis.
Trump is likely to rekindle a Syria conflict that’s been frozen in carbonite for close to five years—along with a profoundly destabilizing humanitarian crisis.
Solutions? Happy endings? Oh, please. Although the European Union (and no one else) has the financial muscle to at least plug the aid gap, we all know that’s not going to happen. If there’s one thing European foreign policy excels at, it’s being too late.
Cuts to U.S. Aid
Sam Heller
On whether Trump will slash foreign aid, though: the Biden administration has already cut aid funds substantially for countries such as Syria. In 2024, for example, major reductions to U.S. support forced the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) to discontinue food assistance that had benefited nearly 7 million Syrians. WFP had to institute a much more strictly targeted program benefiting just over 1 million people—only one-third of the Syrians whom WFP believes to be severely food insecure.
Now we’ll see whether Trump maintains aid spending at these reduced levels, or cuts it even further. But in addition to reducing overall U.S. support for foreign aid, I’ll also be on the lookout for whether the Trump administration targets some specific programs that have become bugbears on the American right.
In Syria, I’m waiting to see if the Trump administration threatens to halt U.S. funding for aid to areas under Syrian government control, where critics of the Syria humanitarian response and the UN have played up concerns over aid diversion; and if the administration attempts to block humanitarian early recovery assistance, which some have alleged risks verging into stealth reconstruction and normalization with the Assad government. The United States has not itself contributed substantially to early recovery assistance, but a Trump administration could additionally try to intimidate other donor countries to discourage them from funding early recovery—although, again, that could mean conflict with European and Gulf partners now interested in stabilizing Syria and mitigating new migration.
And in Lebanon, I want to see if the Trump administration calls into question U.S. assistance to the Lebanese army, which some right-wing critics have insisted is functionally an adjunct to Hezbollah. The Biden administration has helped sustain Lebanon’s army amid the country’s protracted economic crisis, and the ceasefire agreements the administration has proposed for Israel’s current war in Lebanon presuppose an expanded role for the army in south Lebanon. If the Trump administration reduces or halts U.S. support for the Lebanese army, that would mark a major change in how America relates to Lebanon and could have implications for any new dispensation for south Lebanon.
Isolationist in Name Only?
Abdelrahman Ayyash
As Trump announces his picks for senior administration positions, those of us in the Middle East are particularly anxious to know who will be the secretaries of defense and state, national security advisers, and to a lesser extent, his Middle East ambassadors and envoys. These positions have the greatest impact on our precarious immediate future. In contrast, many of the victims of the U.S.-supported atrocities in the region won’t live long enough to see the impacts of Trump’s stance on the Paris Agreement or his policies on the environment.
As Trump’s foreign policy team fills up with China hawks and pro-Israel fanatics, Trump is proving that the label of “isolationist,” as much as it’s bandied about, just doesn’t fit him. It doesn’t seem like the United States under Trump is going to retract much from the region despite, for example, his talks about withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Trump may allow the bloodbath that Netanyahu’s government has started to continue, which could spread farther through the region and lead to more damage that will have consequences as far-reaching as China. Trump’s picks—including Mike Waltz (national security adviser), Marco Rubio (secretary of state), Pete Hegseth (secretary of state)—point toward uncontained regional escalation. (Hegseth has called Iran a “Shia version of ISIS.”) Such escalation will probably push China to act to secure its oil interests in the region.
Emboldened Gulf Monarchs …
Veena Ali-Khan
Gulf leaders were quick to embrace Donald Trump after his victory. His tenure is remembered for multimillion-dollar deals and discreet diplomacy. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are especially pleased, viewing Trump as an ally who readily supports their policies, remains silent on human rights issues, and is eager to engage in business. Trump is expected to try to advance a Saudi–Israeli normalization pact—a goal of the last Trump administration that Biden adopted but failed to achieve. Adding to the Kingdom’s optimism, Republican control of the Senate makes the long-sought U.S.–Saudi defense treaty more likely, along with other key Saudi nuclear asks.
Shifting regional politics and priorities may present some challenges to improved relations, however. Saudi Arabia now firmly insists on Palestinian statehood as a nonnegotiable precondition for any deal with Israel. But at the moment, Israel won’t even broach that subject—and Trump has promised unwavering support for Israel.
Meanwhile, Gulf ties with China and Iran—which the Trump administration sees as two of its main adversaries—have improved over the course of the past four years. The Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iranian channel has thus far proven to be an effective de-escalation mechanism. As such, Riyadh is likely to steer clear of taking sides in any future U.S.-Iran conflict. Reflecting a desire for a more reconciliatory U.S. approach toward the region, Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi official, penned an open letter to Trump this month, asking him to “bring PEACE, with capital letters, to the Middle East.”
There are other signs the Gulf is rebalancing the Middle East away from unipolar, Washington-dictated policy. The Emirates has joined BRICS (the economic bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and Riyadh is flirting with the idea of doing so as well.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are also wary of Trump’s unpredictability, which could disrupt oil markets and heighten regional instability. Memories linger of 2019, when Iranian-linked strikes halved Saudi oil supplies overnight, and Trump’s response fell well short of offering the expected security assurances to Riyadh. The regional landscape has since shifted, and this time, the Kingdom is determined not to let the United States draw it into conflict with Iran.
… but Also Risks Ahead
Veena Ali-Khan
Another complication is the emerging rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The Emirates, while tactically pleased with Trump’s return, is wary of his close ties with Mohammed bin Salman, and worries that this could lead to the United States favoring Saudi Arabia in certain regional policies, including those related to OPEC. U.S. preference for Saudi policies would exacerbate existing rivalries between the two uneasy allies, particularly in conflicts where the two nations back somewhat opposing sides—such as in Yemen and Sudan.
Oman will face further challenges to its increasingly tenuous regional balancing act with the new Trump administration. The southernmost Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state has long prized its political neutrality and ability to maintain ties with all sides, often facilitating talks between rivals like the United States and Iran, or Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi movement. But Muscat’s neutrality has been tested by the Gaza war, which senior Ibadi clerics (the dominant sect of Islam in Oman) and elite political figures have vociferously protested. At the same time, Oman has ceded the role of regional mediator to some of its neighbors (Saudi Arabia in Sudan, and Qatar in Gaza). “Maximum pressure 2.0” may add further strain, given strong political and trade ties between Iran and Oman, Muscat’s hosting of Houthi representatives, and widespread allegations that arms are smuggled to the Houthis via Omani territory.
Donald Trump holds up a chart of military hardware sales as he meets with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Oval Office of the White House on March 20, 2018, during the first Trump administration. Source: Kevin Dietsch-Pool/Getty Images
Economic Continuity in the Gulf
Rohan Advani
While leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may have been quick to congratulate Trump on his electoral victory, they may be less sanguine about economic matters. Gulf states are constantly worried about the threat of inflation, and high U.S. tariffs won’t help. Similarly, the potential long-term decrease in the value of the U.S. dollar could make it more difficult to keep a lid on prices, since GCC countries peg their currencies to the greenback. And if a Trump presidency pushes a harder line on China, this may put Gulf states in an awkward position with one of their most important economic allies.
Economic opportunities in the Gulf under the Trump administration will not be new or a result of his presidency. For example, some in the Gulf plan to develop artificial intelligence (AI) hubs and build data-processing centers. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates may welcome the return of a transactional style of politics in order to ink glitzy AI deals, but a lot of progress toward these developments has already been made under the Biden administration. In 2023, Abu Dhabi’s AI holding company, G42, announced that it was divesting from Chinese companies in order to assuage U.S. concerns over potential technology transfer. This September, the United States and the Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding to promote cooperation on AI technologies.
And when it comes to the Gulf’s ambitious development plans, it doesn’t seem likely that a change of guard in the White House will force Gulf states to dramatically reformulate their economic blueprints. In 2022, Biden reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and welcomed the Saudi bid to host the World Expo in 2030—Trump will most likely do the same. And even if Trump presses for more detachment from China, the Gulf states will want to maintain good relations with their largest trading partner.
Escalating Conflict in Yemen
Peter Salisbury
Yemen is all but certain to experience an increase in violent conflict in 2025, and the United States is more than likely to get sucked in, despite Trump’s promises to end the wars. Trump officials see Yemen as a low-cost opportunity to build pressure on Iran without getting directly involved in its decade-old civil war. If they decide to take more aggressive action in Yemen, they will encounter little stateside political resistance.
The political context around Yemen has changed dramatically since Trump left office in 2021. After Saudi operatives killed Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, Congress pushed to end U.S. support for Saudi military operations in Yemen. Now, Saudi–Israeli normalization is a bipartisan priority and the Houthi movement Riyadh has spent the past decade trying to dislodge from northern Yemen is seen as a critical regional and global threat. Since October 2023, the group has launched hundreds of missile and drone strikes at Israel and Red Sea shipping while using spurious espionage charges to detain dozens of U.S., UN, and international nongovernmental organization personnel. In response, Biden has reinstated Trump’s Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation, conducted targeted strikes against Houthi military sites, and contemplated reinstating a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation and additional strikes targeting senior Houthi leaders. Trump is likely to pursue these and more aggressive measures.
Two factors will shape the conflict from 2025: Houthi responses to pressure, likely in the form of drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Yemeni rivals and Red Sea shipping; and U.S. support for new anti-Houthi military campaigns. A U.S. green light or even direct support for anti-Houthi forces could prompt Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to target Houthi-controlled Red Sea ports. Equally, the Houthis may preemptively strike domestic rivals before they launch their own campaign, and are certain to sustain maritime attacks, drawing the United States further in. Either way, the risk of conflict escalation will remain high for some time to come.
Israeli Expansion and Expropriation
Zachary Davis Cuyler
Building on the foundation established by Biden’s support for Israel’s war on Palestine and Lebanon, the next Trump administration could oversee a significant expansion of Israeli domination of Palestinian and Lebanese life, land, and resources. Trump could well sign off on the recolonization of Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank, just as he recognized Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Golan Heights the last time around. This would deepen Palestinians’ infrastructural dependence on Israel, increasing their vulnerability to siege and removal. Any Gulf-backed Palestinian pseudo-state would be subject to similar vulnerabilities. Reconstruction aid for Lebanon and Gaza—if it is forthcoming—will likely be subject to Israeli- or U.S.-imposed restrictions on movement across Gaza’s boundaries, Lebanon’s borders, and the Beirut airport.
Trump could well sign off on the recolonization of Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank—just as he recognized Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Golan Heights the last time around.
Israel has already granted exploration licenses to Israeli and international energy companies in Palestinian waters, signaling an intent to expropriate whatever natural gas resources might exist there. Israeli minister of energy Eli Cohen has also indicated Israel’s intention to dispense with the U.S.-brokered maritime border agreement with Lebanon concluded in 2022, putting Lebanon’s Qana gas field at risk of expropriation. Though there is little reason to believe that Israeli ambitions toward these resources caused the current war, there is every reason to believe that Israel will take this opportunity to claim them, and good reason to think that the Trump administration will provide broad and explicit support for Israeli expansionism. There is also little reason to believe that Palestinians and Lebanese will accept these outcomes without fighting back.
War and Maximalism
Thanassis Cambanis
Since 9/11, war and maximalism have dominated conditions in the Middle East. Under Trump’s second administration, there’s sure to be more of both—and while violent attempts to create “a new Middle East” are unlikely to improve anyone’s actual quality of life, it’s very possible that a policy of “status quo on steroids” can change the Middle East (though probably for the worse).
What do I mean by war and maximalism? In the period since 9/11, the wars I’m referring to are not those that stem from the breakdown of politics but rather the more ideological and destabilizing wars of attempted conquest and transformation. The most glaring examples are the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Saudi war on Yemen in 2015, and the Israeli war on Palestine and Lebanon since 2023. These conflicts all have in common the aspiration (some would say delusion) that killing civilians and destroying infrastructure will somehow create new political arrangements in which the targeted society allies with the foreign state that is attacking it.
Historically, such an outcome has proved unlikely. But militarized states like the United States and Israel and other regional hegemons in the Middle East fall for the temptation again and again when their appetite for reality-based policy flags and they dream of a magical, easy solution supposedly available to the states bold enough to use more violence and disregard more laws and norms. That’s also what I mean by maximalism—setting extreme and unattainable state goals like the eradication of the Palestinian national movement or the complete domination of Iraq.
Trump’s advisers include interventionists (neocons, warmongers) who want the United States to push harder against rivals, like China or Iran. Then there are isolationists, who want the United States to withdraw from NATO, stay out of Russia’s sphere of influence, and do business rather than project power. Trump’s actual inclination and approach seem to be something else—a personalistic “all of the above.”
In the Middle East, that means we’re likely to see heightened conflict and new (likely doomed) experiments in fashioning a new regional order.
American policymakers mistakenly concluded from the last year that there is no strategic price to pay for vitiating Palestinian society—that U.S. complicity in ethnic cleansing or even genocide might be morally problematic but isn’t a political problem. Trump has internalized the view that accountability is for suckers and that if there is a price for reckless American foreign policy, it will be paid by someone else in the future.
Cover Image: Donald Trump speaks during a campaign rally at Van Andel Arena on November 5 in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Source: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Rohan Advani is a fellow at Century International and the executive producer of the Order From Ashes podcast. He is a PhD candidate in sociology at UCLA.
Veena Ali-Khan is an analyst, researcher, and fellow at Century international, focusing on the Arabian Peninsula, Gulf energy dynamics, and political economy in the Middle East. She was previously the Yemen researcher at the International Crisis Group.
Abdelrahman Ayyash is a fellow at Century International and director of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood working group. Ayyash is an award-winning journalist and a researcher specialized in Islamic movements
Nicholas Danforth is a fellow at Century International and an editor at War on the Rocks, where he writes the politics and cartography newsletter Mid-Afternoon Map. Danforth received his MA from the School of Oriental and African Studies and his BA from Yale. He completed his PhD in history at Georgetown University in 2015.
Sima Ghaddar is a fellow at Century Foundation specializing in Middle Eastern affairs. Her research focuses on identity and mechanisms of social control.
Sam Heller is a Beirut-based researcher, analyst, and fellow at Century International. Sam’s work focuses on politics and security in Lebanon, Syria, and their regional neighborhood. He has published extensively with International Crisis Group and The Century Foundation and for outlets including Foreign Affairs, War on the Rocks and The Daily Beast.
Sajad Jiyad is a fellow at Century International and director of the Shia Politics Working Group. An Iraqi political analyst based in Baghdad, he is the managing director of Bridge, an Iraqi nongovernmental organization and consultancy focused on development projects for young people.
Eamon Kircher-Allen is editor-in-chief at Century International. He has worked as a journalist in the United States and East Africa, and for more than a decade as a writer, editor, and researcher focusing on economics, the environment, and the Middle East and Africa.
Aron Lund is a Swedish writer on Middle Eastern affairs and a fellow at Century International who has published several books and reports on Syrian politics.
Dahlia Scheindlin is a fellow at Century International, based in Tel Aviv. She is a public opinion expert and an international political and strategic consultant, as well as a scholar and a writer. She is the author of The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel, published in September 2023.
Thanassis Cambanis is an author, journalist, and director of Century International. His work focuses on U.S. foreign policy, Arab politics, and social movements in the Middle East.
How Trump Can Make Things Worse in the Middle East
Many Middle Eastern leaders welcomed Donald Trump’s election victory, convinced that Trump policies would better serve their regional interests. Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu openly rooted for Trump. And while authoritarian leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt had warmed to the Biden administration, they historically prefer Republican leaders who dispense with even rhetorical demands for human rights.
The Middle East today is experiencing a level of tumult transformational even by the heightened standards of recent history. With full U.S. support, Israel has destroyed Gaza and announced plans to annex the West Bank; some Israeli officials openly propose to annex and settle Gaza as well. Israel is destroying Lebanese border villages and has exchanged direct strikes with Iran, courting a full war. Trump’s son-in-law and former Middle East adviser Jared Kushner recently mused on X that the region was “liquid and the ability to reshape is unlimited.”
There has been more continuity than change in U.S. policy in the Middle East across four presidential administrations, since George W. Bush abandoned his plans to create pro-American democracies across the Arab world. American policy has been simultaneously reactive and over-militarized—and perhaps as a result of its strategic incoherence, the United States has failed to contain regional conflicts.
Trump could follow a grim path of business as usual: a free hand for Israel, confrontation with Iran, a half-hearted desire to avoid all-out war. Or he could usher in a period of still-greater tumult in the delusional belief that America and its partners can transform the Middle East through unfettered military force.
In this roundtable, Century International’s fellows evaluate the most consequential changes they expect for the Middle East under a second Trump presidency.
Dahlia Scheindlin
The most predictable thing about Donald Trump is his unpredictability. In such cases, the best indicator is past behavior.
Trump likes to make deals, and he is comfortable abandoning all prior groundwork to do so. The deal he proposed for Israel and Palestinians in 2020 crashed through international law and prior agreements by endorsing Israel’s settlements and annexation. Trump’s strategy through the previous three years of his administration had been to alienate, humiliate, and isolate the Palestinians. His so-called peace plan envisioned a Palestinian archipelago as their reward—in effect, a mockery of a Palestinian state. The deal wasn’t really meant for Palestinian consideration, nor was it intended as a basis for a negotiation between the parties to the conflict. Instead, it was a handshake between two allies, Israel and the United States—and it still wasn’t good enough for Israel’s hardest of hard-liners. The “peace plan” came to nothing.
All signs point to a similar approach during the second Trump presidency. In February, David Friedman, who served as Trump’s ambassador to Israel, unveiled the outline of a new plan, titled “The Future of Judea and Samaria,” which showed his continued enthusiasm for the broad approach of the first Trump administration. The plan begins from the premise, as the website Jewish News Syndicate describes it, that Hamas’s October 7 attack on Israel “proved longstanding Israeli fears that any independent Palestinian entity without overriding Israeli security control would become a staging ground for barbaric terrorism against the Jewish state.” The truth is the opposite: Israel has had overriding Israeli security control, without an independent Palestinian entity, from 1967 to the present. It was also the fact on October 6, 2023, and therefore illogical to suggest that the status quo ante will protect Israel. If Mike Huckabee, Trump’s next ambassador-designate, takes Friedman’s path—matched by Israel’s religious fundamentalist ministers—then further destruction of Palestinian rights is inevitable.
Given what is known so far about the administration’s Middle East personnel, the administration’s orientation is likely to continue insisting on an inverted reality, seeking to dismantle Palestinian national aspirations for good, and showering gifts on the party that holds unrivaled military, political, and economic strength.
The possibility that Trump will want to end the war and avoid starting a new one with Iran cannot be dismissed. It’s not impossible that he’ll find ways to entice Israel to wind down. But the most likely enticement will be promising that Palestine is never actually free. The result will be future cycles of violence, long after he’s gone.
Sima Ghaddar
On October 26, Trump addressed the Lebanese-American community in a letter promising to bring “real and lasting peace” to the Middle East, urging voters to “Vote Trump for Peace.” His campaign increasingly emphasized “peace” and “stability” with a vow to “end all foreign wars.” However, many Lebanese fear this vision could come at the cost of Lebanese sovereignty and Palestinian statehood.
Trump claims he will live up to his dealmaker image by reengaging in Middle East diplomacy, as he did with the 2020 Abraham Accords, which normalized ties between Israel, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates. Yet Trump’s approach also involves deal-breaking, like when he withdrew, in 2018, from the hard-won Iran nuclear deal—a move that deepened regional divides. Other actions Trump took during his first term, such as moving the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem and supporting illegal Israeli settlements, emboldened Israel while sidestepping the Palestinian issue—a reality that Trump may now have to confront if he seeks to stabilize the region. Moreover, skeptics in the Middle East see the normalization agreements like the Abraham Accords as tools for authoritarian states to consolidate power, not as pathways to peace.
Trump’s “maximum-pressure” approach to Iran during his first presidency enabled the Israeli excesses of recent years. The American assassination of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in 2020 set a precedent for Israel’s intensified and relentless cross-border assassinations on Iranian-backed “Axis of Resistance” leaders since the October 7 attacks. Israel has hit Hezbollah especially hard with assassinations of its leadership, chain of command, and rank and file. Trump’s plan to renew and intensify his “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran will strain Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon even more than they already are.
This approach makes for impressive headlines but has numerous problems, chief among them that it systematically violates Lebanese sovereignty and makes negotiations all but impossible. (It doesn’t help that Lebanon hasn’t had a president for two years.) The approach also jettisons ongoing efforts in which the international community is invested. UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701, which ended the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah, created, on paper, a Hezbollah-free zone in southern Lebanon, secured by the Lebanese military and verified by UN peacekeepers. While Hezbollah never fully withdrew from those areas, UNSCR 1701 represents a process with legitimate buy-in from all parties, including the Lebanese state. Now, Israel has unilaterally decided that the provisions of UNSCR 1701 are “not enough” to end war on Lebanon. Israel is wiping out Lebanese border towns, making it unclear what Israeli–Lebanese deal—if any—could be reached.
Reactions to Trump’s reelection among Lebanese vary from trepidation to cautious optimism. Some view U.S. policy as inevitably pro-Israel, while others are hopeful that Tiffany Trump’s father-in-law, Lebanese-born businessman Massad Boulos, could help mediate some type of de-escalation with Israel. (Boulos advised Trump during his campaign.) But Boulos could be more of a partisan than a peacemaker: he has deep ties to Christian factions in Lebanon, and his involvement could risk deepening Lebanon’s internal divisions, especially if the Shia community feels sidelined or sacrificed as collateral damage.
There are also concerns that Trump’s “peace” negotiations, whatever form they take, may further expand Israel’s ground operations. Israel is implementing the “Gaza doctrine” in Lebanon’s southern border areas, which are now functionally uninhabitable. It is also pushing for an Israeli-controlled military zone. Badly designed Trump negotiations could simply provide cover for Israel to expand its ground operations, which would risk a Hezbollah retaliation and possibly ignite a protracted guerrilla conflict. Trump’s influence on Gulf alliances and the most recent defense talks between Saudi Arabia and Iran might further isolate Hezbollah, potentially intensifying internal discord or even civil conflict in Lebanon—a scenario that, some fear, Israel may be betting on.
Zeinab Shuker
There are many unknowns about the second Trump administration, but climate policy is not one of them. At a turning-point moment for climate change mitigation, all signs point to the next Trump presidency being disastrous—domestically, in the Middle East, and around the world. The only question is how bad it will be.
On the domestic level, the president-elect has signaled his intention to roll back many environmental policies introduced during and before the Biden administration. The first order of business was Trump nominating Lee Zeldin to head the Environmental Protection Agency; Zeldin is a four-term House Republican from New York, a climate denier, and an advocate of fracking and offshore drilling.
On the international front, the Trump administration is likely to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, a setback to international efforts to address climate change. The withdrawal of the United States, the biggest economy in the world, will complicate the efforts of countries that are currently gathered for COP29 in Baku trying to figure out how to provide aid and financial support for low- and middle-income countries most impacted by climate change. The American withdrawal also opens the door for other countries to take a step back from controlling their greenhouse emissions. This development is particularly alarming given that the global average temperature is expected to reach 1.5°C above preindustrial levels for the first time this year, and environmental degradation continues to be central in the Middle East as conflict escalates.
Turkish Toss-up
Nick Danforth
Under the Trump administration, U.S.–Turkish relations could get better for the wrong reasons, get worse for the wrong reasons, or somehow manage to do both at the same time.
Last time around, Trump and Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan enjoyed a close personal relationship, driven by personal interests, a common leadership style, and a shared hostility to liberal values and institutions. As a result, Trump proved willing to prioritize Erdogan’s recommendations over both the views of his advisors and the requirements of U.S. law. This history has led to considerable and well-founded optimism in Ankara about reestablishing this relationship in Trump’s new term.
There were, however, palpable ideological tensions during the last Trump term that will continue to cause problems. Trump’s coalition contains many figures whose evangelical, Islamophobic, or Christian nationalist worldviews are a natural foil to Erdogan’s Islamism. In 2018, Trump imposed damaging sanctions on Turkey when Ankara refused to release an unjustly jailed American pastor. Subsequently, Trump’s secretary of state played a key role in strengthening trilateral relations between Greece, Cyprus, and Israel. Now, amidst heightened tensions surrounding the war in Gaza, this ideological rift could deepen even more, and cause bigger problems.
At this point, the best-case scenario for U.S.–Turkish ties is that corruption wins out over chauvinism and we get authoritarian solidarity instead of a clash of civilizations.
Abdelrahman Ayyash
It’s important to consider the policy that Trump’s administration is going to take, more generally, toward Islamic movements in the region. Middle Eastern dictators and strongmen such as Saudi Arabia’s Mohammed bin Salman, the United Arab Emirates’ Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and, to a much lesser extent, Egypt’s Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, have been trying to push the U.S. administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood and affiliates as terrorist organizations. This could gain momentum given the urgency of the matter for Israel, which continues to refer to Hamas, dubiously, as a Muslim Brotherhood group. If this designation is forthcoming, it could negatively affect American Muslims, and might mobilize them away from Trump, whom they agree with over several social and economic issues.
Of course, religion isn’t the only factor driving alliances; economic and social disenchantment plays a significant role. Such discontent was at play in the U.S. election and continues to fuel unrest in the Middle East. The approach to deradicalization in the region has often been mired in tactical maneuvers, which can overlook deeper causes of radicalization, such as the conditions leading up to the Arab Spring revolutions or the attack on October 7. These radicalizing conditions are mainly the result of U.S. and Israeli policies; continuing such policies will not lead to a safer, more prosperous, or more Israel-friendly region. If the Trump administration is actually going to be a paradigm shifter, as Trump has promised in so many words, it will need to avoid past mistakes and adopt fresh perspectives to genuinely change the situation.
But the choices Trump will make toward the Muslim-majority countries and the Israeli war on Palestine could lead many among those who voted for him in response to Biden’s failures to change their minds within the next two years. Such a turnaround could threaten the Republican congressional majority and negatively affect the strong political position Trump holds.
Sajad Jiyad
As Trump prepares to take office again, the United States has already announced that it is drawing down troops from Iraq and reducing its footprint, moves Trump has been eager for in the past. If Washington follows through on these plans, Trump will have little need to engage with Iraq, and he might be content to watch from the sidelines if Iraq is dragged into a war between Iran and Israel.
Fearing this approach, the Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has already reached out to Trump to remind him of his campaign promise that he would end wars in the Middle East. Baghdad is also wary of the potential for further economic pressure from Washington, including sanctions and withholding dollar transfers, in an effort to tackle Iranian influence in Iraq.
The Iraqi government is right to be worried that the Trump administration will use Iraq—or allow it to be used—as a battleground against Iran. But it is also unsure of how Trump’s second term will differ from his first. And they know from experience that Trump’s actions and rhetoric frequently diverge: in Trump’s first term, he inherited a U.S.-led military coalition fighting the Islamic State in Iraq. Despite his frequent criticisms of past U.S. policy in Iraq, he happily took credit for the victory against the Islamic State.
For now, Baghdad will be waiting to see if Trump really is capable of dialing down the temperature in the region. Many Iraqis believe Trump’s administration cannot be worse than Biden’s.
Veena Ali-Khan
“To us, it does not matter at all who has won the American election,” Iranian president Masoud Pezeshkian declared the day after Trump’s decisive victory. “Our country and system relies on its inner strength.”
But the harsh reality is that what happens in the White House will have direct repercussions for Tehran. During Trump’s previous term, he withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and launched his “maximum pressure” campaign, a series of stringent sanctions that severely crippled the Iranian economy.
It is certain that Trump’s victory heralds more crippling sanctions on Tehran. Brian Hook, who spearheaded Trump’s previous Iran policies, is leading the Trump campaign’s State Department transition team. In a recent interview, Hook said that Trump is committed to “diplomatically isolating Iran and weakening them economically so they can’t fund violence.”
But there’s not a lot of clarity on what the details of this policy will look like. Hook also mentioned that the president-elect has “no interest” in toppling the Iranian government—a notable shift from the warlike rhetoric that marked Trump’s previous term. This suggests that “maximum pressure 2.0” may primarily aim at weakening and isolating the Iranian leadership rather than pursue overt regime change.
Sanctions targeting Iranian exports and trade with China will likely accelerate Iran’s integration into the China-led, BRICS-aligned economic sphere, incentivizing Beijing to pull Tehran closer into its orbit. Russia, in particular, may benefit: if Iran is exporting less oil, Russia can grab more of the global market, while also deepening its sway in Syria at the expense of an increasingly beleaguered Iran.
Opinions within Tehran are mixed. Among the reformist and moderate camps, and some hard-line figures, there is cautious optimism that Trump’s ambition as a self-styled dealmaker might drive him to seek renewed negotiations with Iran and stay away from regional wars—a promise seen in his campaign. Also, there is a perception that a deal cut under the Republicans would be far more durable than one made with the Democrats. In this vein, a former top Iranian official even urged Pezeshkian to congratulate Trump on his victory and “express hope for resolving Iran–U.S. issues.” Javad Zarif, Iran’s vice president for strategic affairs, made a post on X encouraging Trump, stating his hope that Trump would honor his campaign pledge “to stand against war and heed the clear message from the American electorate to end conflicts and prevent new ones.”
For many others, the Trump administration’s 2020 assassination of Qassem Soleimani still leaves a bitter taste and won’t be easily forgotten. The idea of negotiating with Trump—even if he shows willingness—will be a hard sell, not just for hard-liners, but also for some centrists and reformists.
Pezeshkian, who built his campaign around reengaging with the West to ease sanctions, now faces a daunting task should Trump prioritize drastically increasing sanctions on Iran and throttling its oil sales. The stakes are high, since Trump is also discussing plans to bolster support for Israel in the midst of Israeli–Iranian conflict. If Tehran advances its nuclear program to gain leverage in negotiations with Western powers, it could provide Israel with a pretext for strikes on Iranian nuclear sites—something Trump would likely support more readily than the Biden administration. Israel’s growing appetite for conflict, paired with Trump’s closer relationship with Netanyahu, could give Tel Aviv more freedom to act. Whatever unfolds, Iran finds itself in a highly vulnerable position.
Eamon Kircher-Allen
When it comes to Middle East policy, Trump’s in a pickle, just like he is in a bunch of other areas of his agenda: he promised everything to everyone so he could get elected. In just one example, Trump wrote an open letter to Lebanese-Americans on October 26 promising to “stop the suffering and destruction in Lebanon.” Of course, the main party destroying things in Lebanon in the last few months has been Israel, though Trump’s letter didn’t mention that. Only a month earlier, at an Israeli–American Council summit, Trump described himself as Israel’s “protector,” adding that “anybody who’s Jewish and loves being Jewish and loves Israel is a fool if they vote for a Democrat.” On November 8, Trump called Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas and told him he wanted to stop the Gaza war. A few days later, Trump announced that he had chosen Mike Huckabee as U.S. ambassador to Israel. Huckabee opposes Palestinian statehood and has even indicated he doesn’t think that the Palestinian people exist. Let’s not forget Trump’s Muslim ban that kicked off his first term.
Trump’s history of extreme Islamophobia and Israel support notwithstanding, it’s actually hard to know with any certainty what he’ll do in the Middle East. He’s not a man of principle, and what happens is going to be more a result of the people he keeps around him—or who gets to talk to him early enough in the day before his attention span is fully spent. He could follow his isolationist tendencies; he could follow the warmongers in his inner circle; he could pursue profit above all else; or he could erratically lurch between competing, incompatible approaches.
But although several outcomes are possible, policymakers must assume the worst: the Trump presidency will be captured by aggressive Middle East hawks who will facilitate the acceleration of the Gaza genocide and the expansion of war, perhaps to Iran. It stands to reason that Trump will toss aside any promises he’s made to draw down U.S. military activity in the Middle East, or support for Israel, once it becomes clear to him that he can’t shore up his power much by further pandering to the interest groups asking for the opposite.
Sam Heller
I’m actually not sure what shape Trump’s Middle East policy will take, and how his administration will reconcile its various contradictory policy impulses.
Trump himself has promised to “stop the wars” and, based on his previous term, seems averse to open military confrontation. He certainly seems unwilling to go to war on behalf of regional partners. At the same time, his forthcoming administration is already being populated with much more forward-leaning and aggressive hawks. These new administration hires are likely to, at minimum, ramp up diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran and its regional allies in ways that risk new hostilities. Trump will also be hearing from favored foreign interlocutors, including the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, who may not want a resumption of regional instability and violence that could jeopardize their ambitious programs of national development.
Trump’s Syria policy exemplifies these conflicting tendencies, and will be worth watching. For his part, Trump has repeatedly expressed his desire to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria’s northeast. Yet his presidential transition includes staffers who helped subvert his previous attempts to pull out of Syria, and who want to crush the government of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad economically—either as part of a “maximum pressure” policy targeting Iran, or because of a more Syria-specific vendetta. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have by now normalized diplomatic relations with Syria and attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to convince Washington to relax its Syria sanctions. What will happen when they make a similar case to Trump? And what happens when Turkey’s president presses Trump, yet again, to abandon the United States’ Kurdish-led local Syrian partners and pull out of Syria militarily?
These policy preferences are incompatible, obviously, and, in what may be another chaotic Trump administration, I don’t think we know yet which will win out.
Aron Lund
Sam has already noted how the contradictions in Trump’s Middle East policy are likely to make U.S. Syria policy particularly incoherent and unstable in the coming years. Amid all that unpredictability, however, some things still seem like safe bets.
For instance, Syria will come under more U.S. sanctions, since sanctions can serve both Trump the Iran-slayer and Trump the war-ender. Then again, there are countervailing forces. If Trump decides to negotiate a U.S. troop withdrawal from Syria, he might offer sanctions relief as a way to secure the cooperation of Damascus or Moscow. Trump’s allies in Europe—I’m thinking of leaders like Italy’s Giorgia Meloni or Viktor Orban of Hungary, who view Syria’s economic collapse as a chief driver of migration—could also sway the U.S. president.
Slashing foreign aid is one of Trump’s few unchanging opinions, however, and on that point he’s not likely to listen to contrary views.
Given that Syria’s economic contraction has pushed the number of needy Syrians close to 17 million while UN aid programs run on fumes, major funding cuts by one of the UN’s top donors could be catastrophic.
In sum, Trump’s reelection seems more likely than not to rekindle a conflict that’s been frozen in carbonite for close to five years. We just don’t know how, only that it will be accompanied by the simultaneous onset of a profoundly destabilizing humanitarian crisis.
Solutions? Happy endings? Oh, please. Although the European Union (and no one else) has the financial muscle to at least plug the aid gap, we all know that’s not going to happen. If there’s one thing European foreign policy excels at, it’s being too late.
Sam Heller
On whether Trump will slash foreign aid, though: the Biden administration has already cut aid funds substantially for countries such as Syria. In 2024, for example, major reductions to U.S. support forced the UN’s World Food Program (WFP) to discontinue food assistance that had benefited nearly 7 million Syrians. WFP had to institute a much more strictly targeted program benefiting just over 1 million people—only one-third of the Syrians whom WFP believes to be severely food insecure.
Now we’ll see whether Trump maintains aid spending at these reduced levels, or cuts it even further. But in addition to reducing overall U.S. support for foreign aid, I’ll also be on the lookout for whether the Trump administration targets some specific programs that have become bugbears on the American right.
In Syria, I’m waiting to see if the Trump administration threatens to halt U.S. funding for aid to areas under Syrian government control, where critics of the Syria humanitarian response and the UN have played up concerns over aid diversion; and if the administration attempts to block humanitarian early recovery assistance, which some have alleged risks verging into stealth reconstruction and normalization with the Assad government. The United States has not itself contributed substantially to early recovery assistance, but a Trump administration could additionally try to intimidate other donor countries to discourage them from funding early recovery—although, again, that could mean conflict with European and Gulf partners now interested in stabilizing Syria and mitigating new migration.
And in Lebanon, I want to see if the Trump administration calls into question U.S. assistance to the Lebanese army, which some right-wing critics have insisted is functionally an adjunct to Hezbollah. The Biden administration has helped sustain Lebanon’s army amid the country’s protracted economic crisis, and the ceasefire agreements the administration has proposed for Israel’s current war in Lebanon presuppose an expanded role for the army in south Lebanon. If the Trump administration reduces or halts U.S. support for the Lebanese army, that would mark a major change in how America relates to Lebanon and could have implications for any new dispensation for south Lebanon.
Abdelrahman Ayyash
As Trump announces his picks for senior administration positions, those of us in the Middle East are particularly anxious to know who will be the secretaries of defense and state, national security advisers, and to a lesser extent, his Middle East ambassadors and envoys. These positions have the greatest impact on our precarious immediate future. In contrast, many of the victims of the U.S.-supported atrocities in the region won’t live long enough to see the impacts of Trump’s stance on the Paris Agreement or his policies on the environment.
As Trump’s foreign policy team fills up with China hawks and pro-Israel fanatics, Trump is proving that the label of “isolationist,” as much as it’s bandied about, just doesn’t fit him. It doesn’t seem like the United States under Trump is going to retract much from the region despite, for example, his talks about withdrawing U.S. troops from Syria. Trump may allow the bloodbath that Netanyahu’s government has started to continue, which could spread farther through the region and lead to more damage that will have consequences as far-reaching as China. Trump’s picks—including Mike Waltz (national security adviser), Marco Rubio (secretary of state), Pete Hegseth (secretary of state)—point toward uncontained regional escalation. (Hegseth has called Iran a “Shia version of ISIS.”) Such escalation will probably push China to act to secure its oil interests in the region.
Veena Ali-Khan
Gulf leaders were quick to embrace Donald Trump after his victory. His tenure is remembered for multimillion-dollar deals and discreet diplomacy. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are especially pleased, viewing Trump as an ally who readily supports their policies, remains silent on human rights issues, and is eager to engage in business. Trump is expected to try to advance a Saudi–Israeli normalization pact—a goal of the last Trump administration that Biden adopted but failed to achieve. Adding to the Kingdom’s optimism, Republican control of the Senate makes the long-sought U.S.–Saudi defense treaty more likely, along with other key Saudi nuclear asks.
Shifting regional politics and priorities may present some challenges to improved relations, however. Saudi Arabia now firmly insists on Palestinian statehood as a nonnegotiable precondition for any deal with Israel. But at the moment, Israel won’t even broach that subject—and Trump has promised unwavering support for Israel.
Meanwhile, Gulf ties with China and Iran—which the Trump administration sees as two of its main adversaries—have improved over the course of the past four years. The Beijing-brokered Saudi–Iranian channel has thus far proven to be an effective de-escalation mechanism. As such, Riyadh is likely to steer clear of taking sides in any future U.S.-Iran conflict. Reflecting a desire for a more reconciliatory U.S. approach toward the region, Turki al-Faisal, a former Saudi official, penned an open letter to Trump this month, asking him to “bring PEACE, with capital letters, to the Middle East.”
There are other signs the Gulf is rebalancing the Middle East away from unipolar, Washington-dictated policy. The Emirates has joined BRICS (the economic bloc comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), and Riyadh is flirting with the idea of doing so as well.
Riyadh and Abu Dhabi are also wary of Trump’s unpredictability, which could disrupt oil markets and heighten regional instability. Memories linger of 2019, when Iranian-linked strikes halved Saudi oil supplies overnight, and Trump’s response fell well short of offering the expected security assurances to Riyadh. The regional landscape has since shifted, and this time, the Kingdom is determined not to let the United States draw it into conflict with Iran.
Veena Ali-Khan
Another complication is the emerging rivalry between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. The Emirates, while tactically pleased with Trump’s return, is wary of his close ties with Mohammed bin Salman, and worries that this could lead to the United States favoring Saudi Arabia in certain regional policies, including those related to OPEC. U.S. preference for Saudi policies would exacerbate existing rivalries between the two uneasy allies, particularly in conflicts where the two nations back somewhat opposing sides—such as in Yemen and Sudan.
Qatar and Oman, the Gulf countries less aligned with Trump, are feeling cautious. Doha recalls Trump’s initial support for the 2017 Saudi-led blockade. In response to pressure from Biden, who seeks concessions from Hamas before his term ends, Doha is already rumored to have asked the group to leave the country. A Trump administration might scrutinize Qatar’s ties to Hamas even more closely, and pressure Doha to distance itself further. But whatever happens next, Qatar will ultimately prioritize its security relationship with Washington over accommodating controversial figures.
Oman will face further challenges to its increasingly tenuous regional balancing act with the new Trump administration. The southernmost Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member state has long prized its political neutrality and ability to maintain ties with all sides, often facilitating talks between rivals like the United States and Iran, or Saudi Arabia and Yemen’s Houthi movement. But Muscat’s neutrality has been tested by the Gaza war, which senior Ibadi clerics (the dominant sect of Islam in Oman) and elite political figures have vociferously protested. At the same time, Oman has ceded the role of regional mediator to some of its neighbors (Saudi Arabia in Sudan, and Qatar in Gaza). “Maximum pressure 2.0” may add further strain, given strong political and trade ties between Iran and Oman, Muscat’s hosting of Houthi representatives, and widespread allegations that arms are smuggled to the Houthis via Omani territory.
Rohan Advani
While leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi may have been quick to congratulate Trump on his electoral victory, they may be less sanguine about economic matters. Gulf states are constantly worried about the threat of inflation, and high U.S. tariffs won’t help. Similarly, the potential long-term decrease in the value of the U.S. dollar could make it more difficult to keep a lid on prices, since GCC countries peg their currencies to the greenback. And if a Trump presidency pushes a harder line on China, this may put Gulf states in an awkward position with one of their most important economic allies.
Still, continuity is more likely than change for Gulf economies. Trump harps about establishing “American energy dominance,” but under Biden, the United States has already consistently produced more oil than any other country.
Economic opportunities in the Gulf under the Trump administration will not be new or a result of his presidency. For example, some in the Gulf plan to develop artificial intelligence (AI) hubs and build data-processing centers. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates may welcome the return of a transactional style of politics in order to ink glitzy AI deals, but a lot of progress toward these developments has already been made under the Biden administration. In 2023, Abu Dhabi’s AI holding company, G42, announced that it was divesting from Chinese companies in order to assuage U.S. concerns over potential technology transfer. This September, the United States and the Emirates signed a memorandum of understanding to promote cooperation on AI technologies.
And when it comes to the Gulf’s ambitious development plans, it doesn’t seem likely that a change of guard in the White House will force Gulf states to dramatically reformulate their economic blueprints. In 2022, Biden reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 and welcomed the Saudi bid to host the World Expo in 2030—Trump will most likely do the same. And even if Trump presses for more detachment from China, the Gulf states will want to maintain good relations with their largest trading partner.
Peter Salisbury
Yemen is all but certain to experience an increase in violent conflict in 2025, and the United States is more than likely to get sucked in, despite Trump’s promises to end the wars. Trump officials see Yemen as a low-cost opportunity to build pressure on Iran without getting directly involved in its decade-old civil war. If they decide to take more aggressive action in Yemen, they will encounter little stateside political resistance.
The political context around Yemen has changed dramatically since Trump left office in 2021. After Saudi operatives killed Jamal Khashoggi in 2018, Congress pushed to end U.S. support for Saudi military operations in Yemen. Now, Saudi–Israeli normalization is a bipartisan priority and the Houthi movement Riyadh has spent the past decade trying to dislodge from northern Yemen is seen as a critical regional and global threat. Since October 2023, the group has launched hundreds of missile and drone strikes at Israel and Red Sea shipping while using spurious espionage charges to detain dozens of U.S., UN, and international nongovernmental organization personnel. In response, Biden has reinstated Trump’s Specially Designated Global Terrorist designation, conducted targeted strikes against Houthi military sites, and contemplated reinstating a Foreign Terrorist Organization designation and additional strikes targeting senior Houthi leaders. Trump is likely to pursue these and more aggressive measures.
Two factors will shape the conflict from 2025: Houthi responses to pressure, likely in the form of drone and missile strikes against Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Yemeni rivals and Red Sea shipping; and U.S. support for new anti-Houthi military campaigns. A U.S. green light or even direct support for anti-Houthi forces could prompt Abu Dhabi and Riyadh to target Houthi-controlled Red Sea ports. Equally, the Houthis may preemptively strike domestic rivals before they launch their own campaign, and are certain to sustain maritime attacks, drawing the United States further in. Either way, the risk of conflict escalation will remain high for some time to come.
Zachary Davis Cuyler
Building on the foundation established by Biden’s support for Israel’s war on Palestine and Lebanon, the next Trump administration could oversee a significant expansion of Israeli domination of Palestinian and Lebanese life, land, and resources. Trump could well sign off on the recolonization of Gaza and the annexation of the West Bank, just as he recognized Israeli sovereignty over Jerusalem and the Golan Heights the last time around. This would deepen Palestinians’ infrastructural dependence on Israel, increasing their vulnerability to siege and removal. Any Gulf-backed Palestinian pseudo-state would be subject to similar vulnerabilities. Reconstruction aid for Lebanon and Gaza—if it is forthcoming—will likely be subject to Israeli- or U.S.-imposed restrictions on movement across Gaza’s boundaries, Lebanon’s borders, and the Beirut airport.
Israel has already granted exploration licenses to Israeli and international energy companies in Palestinian waters, signaling an intent to expropriate whatever natural gas resources might exist there. Israeli minister of energy Eli Cohen has also indicated Israel’s intention to dispense with the U.S.-brokered maritime border agreement with Lebanon concluded in 2022, putting Lebanon’s Qana gas field at risk of expropriation. Though there is little reason to believe that Israeli ambitions toward these resources caused the current war, there is every reason to believe that Israel will take this opportunity to claim them, and good reason to think that the Trump administration will provide broad and explicit support for Israeli expansionism. There is also little reason to believe that Palestinians and Lebanese will accept these outcomes without fighting back.
Thanassis Cambanis
Since 9/11, war and maximalism have dominated conditions in the Middle East. Under Trump’s second administration, there’s sure to be more of both—and while violent attempts to create “a new Middle East” are unlikely to improve anyone’s actual quality of life, it’s very possible that a policy of “status quo on steroids” can change the Middle East (though probably for the worse).
What do I mean by war and maximalism? In the period since 9/11, the wars I’m referring to are not those that stem from the breakdown of politics but rather the more ideological and destabilizing wars of attempted conquest and transformation. The most glaring examples are the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Saudi war on Yemen in 2015, and the Israeli war on Palestine and Lebanon since 2023. These conflicts all have in common the aspiration (some would say delusion) that killing civilians and destroying infrastructure will somehow create new political arrangements in which the targeted society allies with the foreign state that is attacking it.
Historically, such an outcome has proved unlikely. But militarized states like the United States and Israel and other regional hegemons in the Middle East fall for the temptation again and again when their appetite for reality-based policy flags and they dream of a magical, easy solution supposedly available to the states bold enough to use more violence and disregard more laws and norms. That’s also what I mean by maximalism—setting extreme and unattainable state goals like the eradication of the Palestinian national movement or the complete domination of Iraq.
Trump’s advisers include interventionists (neocons, warmongers) who want the United States to push harder against rivals, like China or Iran. Then there are isolationists, who want the United States to withdraw from NATO, stay out of Russia’s sphere of influence, and do business rather than project power. Trump’s actual inclination and approach seem to be something else—a personalistic “all of the above.”
In the Middle East, that means we’re likely to see heightened conflict and new (likely doomed) experiments in fashioning a new regional order.
American policymakers mistakenly concluded from the last year that there is no strategic price to pay for vitiating Palestinian society—that U.S. complicity in ethnic cleansing or even genocide might be morally problematic but isn’t a political problem. Trump has internalized the view that accountability is for suckers and that if there is a price for reckless American foreign policy, it will be paid by someone else in the future.
Cover Image: Donald Trump speaks during a campaign rally at Van Andel Arena on November 5 in Grand Rapids, Michigan. Source: Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images
Tags: middle east, Trump administration, U.S. Foreign Policy