The Saudi–Iranian Détente Has Proved Vital for De-escalation. But Regional War Could Still Break It.

When Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to restore diplomatic relations in March 2023, the rapprochement seemed fragile.¹ The two regional powers set modest public expectations for the pact, with supporters hoping it would, at the very least, help contain violence in Arab countries where both states play a role, and prevent new wars from emerging.

But in the last year and a half, the agreement has proved surprisingly durable and effective—even though the Gaza war, and its regional spillover, came as a surprise to all. Since October 7, the fragile rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran has transformed into a vital deconfliction channel, helping to contain some of the potential escalation and fallout from the widening regional war.

Yet, with no formal international framework in place and with lingering deep-seated mistrust between the two sides, this delicate truce is still at risk of unraveling. The length, scope, and intensity of the current situation is putting immense strain on a pact that was initially better understood as a diplomatic opening, rather than a solid partnership. If the wars in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen continue to metastasize, drawing in more international actors, the Saudi–Iranian accord risks no longer serving as an effective tool for de-escalation.

This report is based on fieldwork in Gulf countries during late summer and fall 2024. Several interviewees are quoted by name, while other analysis is based on background discussions and interviews with other experts in the region who participated on condition of anonymity.

Origins of a Fragile Accord

The Saudi–Iranian deal was brokered by China, with groundwork laid by Iraq and Oman. It established a cold peace between the two longtime adversaries.

The accord followed years of bitter rivalry. Riyadh and Tehran viewed each other as serious security threats, and constantly accused each other of destabilizing the region. They frequently supported opposing sides in conflicts across Yemen, Lebanon, and Syria. Riyadh, along with Washington, has also blamed Tehran for striking Saudi ships, territory, and critical energy infrastructure—either directly or through forces that Iran supports, most notably Ansar Allah (commonly known as the Houthis).

Relations reached a nadir in 2015, when Saudi authorities executed several Shia dissidents, including prominent Shia cleric Sheikh Nimr Baqr al-Nimr. After Iranian protesters stormed the Saudi embassy in Tehran, Saudi Arabia decided to sever diplomatic ties with Iran.²

But at least by 2019, the Saudi–Iranian rivalry was proving increasingly costly and inconvenient for both countries. That year, Houthi-claimed strikes hit two of Saudi Arabia’s key oil facilities—causing the largest single disruption ever in the global oil supply. Washington and Riyadh suspected that the attack had originated from Iraq or Iran.³ Donald Trump, then the U.S. president, made it clear that the United States would not intervene—leaving Riyadh feeling hung out to dry.

This incident pushed the Kingdom to rethink its entire regional strategy and to directly engage with Tehran, and its allies, to avoid ever again getting caught in the crossfire of U.S.–Iran rifts. According to experts in the region interviewed for this commentary, a key component of this approach was to remove any reasons for Iran to act aggressively toward the Kingdom—choosing instead a path of “deterrence and dialogue.”

By 2023, the potential for regional war seemed to be shrinking, and Iran and Saudi Arabia came to a formal détente.

The Agreement Survives Gaza—So Far

Then came the Gaza war, which put the agreement to the test (and upended assumptions that the region was, in general, headed toward more stability). Impressively, the agreement has so far not only held, but succeeded in maintaining relative calm in the Gulf.

To be fair, the understanding between Riyadh and Tehran is of limited scope, and both sides have been frustrated by a lack of any big wins. But had the war broken out a few years ago, Saudi Arabia would almost certainly have been drawn into the conflict, with Iran likely seeking retaliation on Saudi soil. Instead, the two states’ communication channels have been strengthened to avert a wider war—something neither side can afford.

In other words, the region would be far worse off without the deal. If nothing else, it has stopped the United States and Israel from exploiting Saudi and Iranian differences for their own military pursuits.

Each side has reaped benefits from the deal, though not the ones they expected in 2023. Saudi Arabia has secured assurances from Iran that the former will be shielded from any conflict with Israel, while Riyadh has promised Tehran that Saudi airspace won’t be used for any strikes by the United States or Israel. True to this commitment, the Kingdom did not allow Israel to use its airspace during Tel Aviv’s most recent strikes on Iranian air defense systems and military sites on October 26, 2024.

Yet the core issues that initially fueled the Saudi–Iranian rivalry persist. The key question now is whether the deal can evolve beyond a mere deconfliction mechanism into something more sustainable and long-lasting. Achieving this will require genuine diplomacy, overcoming the deep-rooted mistrust that persists between Tehran and Riyadh.

Vague by Design

The March 2023 Joint Trilateral Statement, which the signatories publicly released, was deliberately kept broad and vague—anything more specific would have been difficult to commit to. It included pledges to resume diplomatic relations, reopen embassies and missions, and reaffirm respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.

The agreement had to overcome major differences, many of which remain unresolved. For Iran, a major point of contention has been Saudi Arabia’s ties to Persian-speaking opposition media, which openly called for the downfall of the Iranian government—particularly sensitive during Iran’s 2021 “Women, Life, Freedom” protests.⁴ Meanwhile, Riyadh has long accused Tehran of using its ideological influence and sectarian networks to stir unrest across the region—particularly through groups within the so-called Axis of Resistance. Saudi Arabia also has also long viewed Iran as exploiting sectarian ties to advance its revolutionary agenda, especially in Bahrain during the 2011 Arab Spring protests—a movement that Riyadh feared could spill over into its Eastern governorate, home to a large Shia population.

Tehran has proved reluctant to let go of its key bargaining chip—its support of Axis groups—while it waits for a bigger show of Saudi commitment.

Despite these differences, the two former adversaries agreed to revive previous cooperation accords, including the 1998 General Agreement for Cooperation and the 2001 Security Cooperation Agreement, which cover areas such as trade, economy, science, culture, sports, and youth. The security aspect of the new deal, in particular, opened the door for Iranian and Saudi intelligence agencies to collaborate on addressing common threats, including terrorism.

The essence of the pact went beyond what was written—driven by a shared recognition, at a specific time, that the adversarial relationship no longer served either side. Saudi Arabia recognized that it could not count on U.S. support as much as expected, creating an incentive for Tehran and Riyadh to find their own ways to contain conflict. Leaked reports suggest that Saudi Arabia wanted Iran to stop its “aggressive” policies in the region through groups it supports.⁵ In return, Saudi Arabia would distance itself from the U.S.-led maximum pressure campaign, and to make much-needed economic investments to help Iran’s struggling economy.⁶

Mismatched Expectations

The vagueness of the agreement may have been necessary, but it is also, without a doubt, a source of its weakness going forward. The unwritten understandings of the agreement contained many unrealistic expectations on both sides. On the surface, the accord was little more than a minimal nonaggression pact. In reality, however, both parties hoped to achieve broader ambitions through it. Saudi Arabia viewed the détente as a way to deter Houthi attacks on its borders and to help quickly bring an end to the war in Yemen.⁷ For Iran, improved relations with the Kingdom symbolized a gateway to stronger ties with the wider Arab world, and a potential for Saudi investments at a time of near-total financial and political isolation from the West. Iran was much in need of a Saudi olive branch.

Mismatched expectations left both sides frustrated with the deal’s shortcomings. Aside from the reopening of embassies, there were few tangible successes to point to. In interviews, experts said that Riyadh soon tempered its initial enthusiasm to invest in Iran, wary of getting caught up in U.S. sanctions and viewing Iran’s market as too small to be worth the risk.

Tehran’s ties with the Axis of Resistance only deepened—even before Israel’s onslaught in Gaza intensified—with each group playing a distinct role.⁸ (Tehran consistently denies providing financial backing to these groups, making negotiations on this front essentially a nonstarter.) While the Houthis largely ceased pinging missiles directly at Saudi Arabia, talks between the Yemeni group and Riyadh—which began in 2022 to end the war—have dragged on, and proven far more difficult than the Kingdom initially expected.⁹ The Houthis are tough negotiators and understand that threatening to strike Riyadh is an effective tactic to slowly tick off their political wish list.

“The Saudi–Iran pact has been limited in its achievement—restoring diplomatic relations,” said Abdulaziz Sager, founder and chair of the Gulf Research Center. “There is no relation on a strategic level and no understanding of the regional situation. The Iranians showed unwillingness to change their interventionist and expansionist regional policies.”¹⁰

Both sides appeared to be waiting for the other to make the first move to deepen the détente. Saudi Arabia hoped Iran would demonstrate its commitment to potential economic dividends by scaling back its support for its Axis allies. But Tehran struggled to make any public show of reducing support for these groups, since it had never officially acknowledged providing that support in the first place. Further, Tehran proved reluctant to let go of its key bargaining chip when it was still waiting for a bigger show of Saudi commitment.

The Impact of the Gaza War

The regional spillover from Gaza has put the Saudi–Iranian pact to the test. Not only has the agreement weathered these new challenges, but it has even yielded unexpected benefits (even if it has yet to meet all the expectations of 2023). The relationship has evolved into a stabilizing force in the Gulf—helping to insulate Gulf states from the growing Israeli–Iranian conflagration. The Saudi–Iranian dialogue has served as a deconfliction mechanism amidst the rising rhetoric for war.

Saudi and Iranian diplomats have kept diplomacy alive and communication channels have dramatically strengthened. A pivotal moment came in November 2023, when the late Iranian president Ebrahim Raisi attended an emergency summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in Riyadh, marking the first visit by an Iranian leader to Saudi Arabia since the two countries restored diplomatic relations. Throughout December 2023, diplomats from the two sides held high-level meetings in Jeddah and Geneva. In a further display of warming ties, Saudi foreign minister Faisal bin Farhan attended Raisi’s funeral in May.

In August, Iran’s acting foreign minister, Ali Bagheri, visited Jeddah for another OIC session. The following month, Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araghchi met with his Saudi counterpart during the UN General Assembly in New York. And in October, Araghchi returned to Riyadh amid escalating concerns over a potential Israeli counterattack after Iran’s missile barrage earlier in the month. Also in the last year, Saudi Arabia has refrained from joining a U.S.-led Red Sea task force aimed at countering Houthi maritime threats.

Tehran may, however, be overly optimistic about its recent diplomatic strides, especially after Iranian officials visited Jordan and Egypt, two of Riyadh’s closest regional allies. Araghchi, in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper, suggested forming a “regional alliance,” proposing that Iran, Turkey, and Arab countries could become strong partners. The formation of such an alliance still seems far-fetched, however. While Araghchi’s efforts have opened a new chapter in relations between Tehran and Riyadh and its allies, those Saudi allies remain top recipients of U.S. aid in the region, and hence are unlikely to draw too close to Tehran.¹¹

Still, the overall effect of the Gaza war has been to draw Tehran and Riyadh closer. “The more they communicate, the more they reassure one another,” said Saudi-based analyst Aziz Arghashian, who works for Observer Research Foundation Middle East. “Now, there’s something more organic within the deal—a clear strategy to invest in the relationship and make it more intrinsic. This isn’t just about buying time to confront the Iranian threat later. The longer this war drags on, the more opportunities arise for both sides to demonstrate they are not adversaries.”¹²

The Kingdom has also quietly tested its role as a regional mediator, a position it has long aspired to. Traditionally, communication between the United States and Iran has been handled by intermediaries like Oman, Qatar, and Switzerland. However, in January, a Saudi security delegation reportedly visited Tehran, allegedly delivering a message from the United States. More recently, during a meeting between Araghchi and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, on October 9, Riyadh is said to have conveyed a message from the United States assuring that Washington would not be involved in any potential Israeli attacks on Iran’s nuclear facilities.

These new arrangements also benefit Tehran. Not only Saudi Arabia but also Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar—all of which host U.S. troops—informed the Biden administration prior to the Israeli strike on Iran that they do not want their military infrastructure or airspace used by the United States or Israel for an offensive operation against Iran. (Despite Jordan’s official denials, rumors still circulate on social media that Israel did, in fact, use its airspace.) Arguably, Araghchi’s visits in the last year to Jordan, Egypt, and other regional capitals to elicit these assurances were, in part, made possible by the Saudi–Iranian pact. The agreement normalized communication and diplomatic exchanges between Arab countries closely aligned with Riyadh—visits that likely wouldn’t have happened so freely without the Kingdom’s green light.

Riyadh’s Reputational Balancing Act

The battle of narratives—in the media and in popular discourse—is a priority for Riyadh. The Kingdom still wants to counter Iranian influence, and it also wants to avoid regional criticism that it is siding with Israel or the United States as the Gaza war rages. Media outlets aligned with the Axis groups have been quick to highlight how Saudi Arabia chose not to intervene in Gaza, and Riyadh understands how this might be interpreted in the region. Hence, Riyadh’s strategy has been to distance itself from Israel and the United States, while also condemning Israeli actions, without directly implicating itself in either direction. In this vein, Saudi Arabia was the first Gulf country to condemn the attack on Iran on October 26, carefully avoiding any direct mention of Israel. The Kingdom has also stated that it will not back a new coalition against Iran via a normalization deal with Israel.¹³

Saudi Arabia also refused to play a role in intercepting the barrage of missiles fired by Tehran at Tel Aviv on October 1. In April, there had been widespread speculation, in both Arabic and Persian social media, that the Kingdom shot down Iranian missiles bound for Israel, and had also shared intelligence with the Israelis about that earlier Iranian attack. Riyadh denied all these rumors, and by October the Kingdom purposely refrained from even commenting on the situation, to prevent similar speculation.

“Anything that will put a target on Saudi Arabia is something the Kingdom is keen to avoid,” said Sager, the Gulf Research Center founder. “Gulf states have given assurances to Iran, publicly and privately, that all Gulf states will observe a neutral stand, and they will not be part of any military action against Iran, and will not allow any party to use their land, waters, or airspace to conduct an attack on Iran.”

Threats Persist

The health of the Saudi–Iranian détente appears good, even improving. However, it remains to be seen whether the two countries can seize on the current momentum to establish a deal that will last when the war ends.

While the pact has been effective at containing conflict in the Gulf, cooperation between the two sides remains extremely limited. Communication channels remain open, but there is no active or official coordination on regional security—something that could help dissipate tensions as they arise and prevent dangerous miscalculations. Yes, diplomats do meet, and Saudi Arabia has recently proposed a joint naval exercise in the Red Sea, according to Iranian media. But these are still meager steps, and structured cooperation aimed at resolving conflicts in which both Saudi Arabia and Iran are involved (like Yemen) is still lacking. Beyond reaching temporary truces in such contexts—which risk collapsing at any moment—there is little in the way of lasting solutions.

The Saudi–Iranian relationship also remains clouded by deep-seated mistrust and paranoia. The accord is primarily upheld out of fear: without it, the United States and Israel could use Saudi airspace and military bases against Iran, while Iran could unleash its militias against Saudi Arabia. This isn’t true diplomacy—it’s merely a pact to avert all-out war.

With Israel vying to bring the war to Iran, Tehran is strapped for options. Israel has landed a series of blows against Hezbollah, starting in September. And after Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel on October 1, Israel responded with its first direct strike on Tehran—dramatically shifting the dynamics of their long-standing shadow war and leaving the new boundaries of the conflict more unpredictable than ever.

With few options left to counter Israel and the United States aside from escalating its nuclear rhetoric, Tehran is falling back on familiar tactics, once again threatening to target Gulf states if they are perceived as conspiring with its adversaries. In Tehran’s view, these threats—promising global economic upheaval—might finally force the United States to intervene and rein in Israel.

“The longer the Gaza war drags on, the more opportunities arise for both Tehran and Riyadh to show they are not adversaries.”

These threats run counter to Tehran’s “Look East” policy, which aims to foster stronger political, economic, and strategic connections with countries in the Eastern hemisphere.¹⁴ On one hand, Iran seeks to emphasize stronger ties with its neighbors and promote potential economic and regional connectivity projects. On the other, Tehran still uses threats against Gulf infrastructure as a bargaining chip.

Tehran keeps these threats on the table because it feels like it can’t trust Gulf states, who are vulnerable to U.S. pressure, said Fereshteh Sadegh, an analyst and freelance journalist based in Tehran. Tehran’s thinking is that, if the Gulf states “can’t say no” to the United States, “let them at least be fearful of possible Iranian revenge,” Sadegh said.¹⁵

Of course, the threats may be empty. That’s the opinion of Saeed Azimi, the Tehran correspondent for France24, who said, in an interview, that he didn’t think Iran would seriously consider targeting oil facilities in the Gulf, now or in the future, because it would jeopardize years of intensive negotiations.¹⁶

Interviews with Saudi commentators in Riyadh also revealed growing confidence that Iran will not target Saudi oil facilities again, primarily due to new economic disincentives. Abdulrahman al-Rashed, writing in the Saudi-owned Asharq Al-Awsat, highlights the fact that Beijing imports around two million barrels of oil daily from Saudi Arabia. Any attack on Saudi oil infrastructure would endanger China’s economic interests and drive up global oil prices. As Beijing is the guarantor of the rapprochement and a key market for Iranian oil, these economic ties create a strong deterrent against further strikes.

A Poverty of Trust

Nevertheless, the fact is that Iran’s threats prevent Saudi–Iranian relations from deepening—whether or not those threats are serious.

Iran still largely sees Saudi Arabia as an outpost of American military might in the region, and as long as that perception persists, the chances of building a closer relationship will remain slim. Riyadh and Washington’s longstanding security relationship will always take precedence, and Tehran knows this. In fact, according to Sadegh, Iran doesn’t “fully” trust any Gulf states that host U.S. military bases. In Tehran’s view, Sadegh said, those countries would “side with the United States the moment the Islamic Republic shows any signs of weakness.”

The distrust runs so deep that some in Tehran suspect that Saudi Arabia has quietly welcomed Israel’s actions against the wider range of Axis groups, even though the Kingdom is not directly involved in those actions. There is a suspicion that Israel is reshaping the region in a way that the Kingdom has long desired but has been unable to accomplish on its own. It does not help that Israeli media has been pushing the same narrative.

Iranian media discourse toward Saudi Arabia during the war, and vice versa, reflects the deep-seated distrust between them. A major source of contention for Tehran is how Riyadh frames the Axis groups in its media.

“Saudi news channels and websites have been actively propagandizing against certain elements of the Axis of Resistance,” especially Hezbollah and its late leader, Hassan Nasrallah, Sadegh said. “At least through their media, the Saudis are working to harm Iranian interests.”¹⁷

And after an Israeli strike on Iran in April, channels affiliated with the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps resurfaced a video showing missiles striking U.S. airbases and threatening Prince Mohammed’s megaprojects in the Kingdom. The video, originally circulated after the U.S. assassination of Qassem Soleimani in 2019, reinforced Saudi concerns that the possibility of an Iranian strike is ever-present.

Saudi–Israeli normalization would, of course, only worsen the discord between Riyadh and Tehran. It would fuel Iran’s paranoia that the Kingdom and Israel are plotting against it. The Kingdom, meanwhile, will continue striving to compartmentalize its relationship with Israel from Tel Aviv’s military ambitions.

Riyadh harbors similar mistrust, because of the long history of Iran and its allies attacking Saudi oil infrastructure and shipping lanes. Tehran’s recent threats may or may not be credible. But Sager, the Gulf Research Center founder, pointed out that the Saudis are well aware of Tehran’s “oil for oil” strategy—a long-standing tactic whereby, if Iran is unable to export its own oil due to conflict, it will do whatever it can to prevent other states from benefiting. In this context, the Kingdom’s maintenance of U.S. military bases on its soil serves as a crucial insurance policy.

“Reconciliation with Gulf states is important for Iran,” Sager said. “But strategic considerations take precedence.”¹⁸

Making a Durable Pact

The Saudi–Iranian pact shows both the possibilities and limitations of diplomacy. While the United States hopes that regional powers can assume responsibility for their own security—a goal that remains elusive—the adaptability of the pact offers strong potential. Primarily, it shows how a deconfliction channel can evolve in unexpected and meaningful ways during times of crisis, even when such reconciliation starts off very limited in scope.

But for the deal to last, it must tackle the root, longer-term strains on the Saudi–Iranian relationship. Without addressing these issues—namely, Tehran’s support for regional allies and Riyadh’s relationship with Iranian adversaries—the pact will forever remain fragile, susceptible to falling apart with just one misstep or misunderstanding.

The rapprochement has so far prevented the region from spiraling into total chaos. Still, there is much the agreement could yet do to help avert the wider war that Israel and the United States seem so intent on nurturing. Regional countries have shown far more pragmatism than their Western counterparts since the war began. Now, concrete steps must be taken to turn that pragmatism into a durable Saudi–Iranian deal, rather than the vague and ephemeral agreement that exists today.

This report is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.

Cover Image: Saudi crown prince Mohammed bin Salman attends the APEC Economic Leaders Informal Dialogue with Guests in Thailand in November 2022. Source: Lauren DeCicca/Getty Images

1. Inside Story: Iranian-Saudi Dialogue Elevated, but Few Expect Investment,” Amwaj Media, October 16, 2023, https://amwaj.media/article/inside-story-iranian-saudi-dialogue-elevated-but-few-expect-investment.
2. Ben Hubbard, “Iranian Protesters Ransack Saudi Embassy After Execution of Shiite Cleric,” New York Times, January 2, 2016.
3. “Saudi Arabia Says Oilfield Attack Came ‘From North’ and Blames Iran,” Middle East Eye, September 18, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-denies-role-saudi-oil-attacks-diplomatic-note-us-report.
4. Nadeen Ebrahim and Abbas Al Lawati, “London-Based TV Channel Sparks Iranian Leaders’ Ire amid Protests,” CNN, October 24, 2022.
5. Stephen Kalin et al., “Saudi Arabia, Iran Restore Relations in Deal Brokered by China,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-iran-restore-relations-in-deal-brokered-by-china-406393a1.
6. “Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi Détente,” International Crisis Group, June 13, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran-saudi-arabia/b92-great-expectations-future.
7. Yasmine Farouk, “Riyadh’s Motivations Behind the Saudi-Iran Deal,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 30, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2023/03/riyadhs-motivations-behind-the-saudi-iran-deal?lang=en.
8. Veena Ali-Khan, “The Gaza War Has Irreversibly Strengthened the “Axis of Resistance,” The Century Foundation, August 30, 2024.
9. “How Huthi-Saudi Negotiations Will Make or Break Yemen,” International Crisis Group, December 29, 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/b089-how-huthi-saudi-negotiations-will-make-or-break-yemen.
10. Interview with the author, Riyadh, September 2024.
11. Julia Haines, “Countries That Receive the Most Foreign Aid from the U.S.,” U.S. News and World Report, January 18, 2024, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/countries-that-receive-the-most-foreign-aid-from-the-u-s.
12. Interview with the author by phone, October 2024.
13. Julien Barnes-Dacey and Cinzia Bianco, “Mending Fences: Europe’s Stake in the Saudi-Iran Detente,” European Council on Foreign Relations, September 30, 2024, https://ecfr.eu/publication/mending-fences-europes-stake-in-the-saudi-iran-detente/.
14. Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran’s Policy, and Its Relations with China and Russia,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs, September 14, 2023, https://mecouncil.org/publication/irans-policy-and-its-relations-with-china-and-russia-me-council/.
15. Interview with the author by phone, October 2024.
16. Interview with the author by phone, October 2024.
17. Ibid.
18. Interview with the author.

Tags: lebanon, gaza, middle east conflict, yemen