On July 20, Yemen’s Houthi movement stunned the world by using a drone to penetrate Israel’s vaunted Iron Dome defense, killing a civilian in Tel Aviv. In retaliation, Israel bombed the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeida in Yemen.
The incident was a prime example of the development of an alarming new reality in the Middle East. Iran-led allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” many of them nonstate actors, have evolved over the last year into a formidable bloc. The war in Gaza has handed the Axis an unprecedented opportunity to unite. Once a loosely connected coalition, they are now a more formal alliance with sophisticated capabilities.
The Houthis, in particular, have crossed a threshold—formerly a spoiler, they are now a powerful regional actor capable of directly threatening Israel, U.S. military bases in the region, global shipping lanes, and the Arab states of the Gulf. The Tel Aviv drone strike was just one of a series of increasingly brazen and effective Houthi attacks on Israel-connected targets since last October.
Western policymakers need to recognize the new geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and take urgent action to end the war in Gaza. If they do not, the region faces spiraling conflict in the short term and, in the long term, a more hostile dynamic in which the Houthis’ new political and military power will make it harder to de-escalate regional crises—undermining security for Saudi Arabia, international shipping, and U.S. interests.
It’s too late to undo the transformation of the Axis of Resistance. But it is possible to prevent the Axis from growing even stronger and more entrenched throughout the region. An end to the conflict in Gaza is the only path, and policymakers need to make it their top priority.
Multiple New Fronts Emerge
The world is only beginning to reckon with the scale of the Gaza war’s impact.
The tragedy in Gaza is one part of the story. Israel’s devastating campaign, launched in response to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attack, has killed at least 40,000 Palestinians and laid waste to the Strip.
But borders have not contained the conflict, and as the war drags on, it is transforming the broader region. Five regional fronts have emerged: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the Red Sea, and Iraq. The first is the main front line: the ongoing war of attrition between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip.
Then, on the Lebanon front to Israel’s north, Hezbollah and Israeli forces are engaged in daily exchanges—with Hezbollah vowing to continue its attacks until Israel ends its “aggression” on Gaza.
The third front extends to Syria, where Israel has intermittently struck Hezbollah and Iranian-linked positions. In response, these groups have targeted military bases that host U.S. forces.
The Red Sea front, active since November 2022, has taken the Gaza war into the maritime domain. In a proclaimed show of solidarity with the Palestinians, the Houthis have transformed the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and even the Indian Ocean into active battlegrounds by targeting commercial ships. These attacks have forced vessels to take lengthy detours around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Houthis’ range. In tandem, the Yemeni group has launched long-range drones aimed directly at Eilat and Tel Aviv, though Israel’s Iron Dome defense system has intercepted most.
On the Iraqi front, Shia armed factions have, since October 7, ramped up their strikes on U.S. military bases. Although Iraqi groups have played a limited role in the conflict so far, the Tower 22 strikes on January 28 marked a turning point—killing three American soldiers and prompting a series of air and missile strikes by the United States. Additionally, an umbrella group of Shia armed factions in Iraq calling itself the “Islamic Resistance” began targeting U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria. It also claimed joint responsibility, alongside the Houthis, for attacks on the Israeli cities of Ashdod and Haifa—though Israel has denied that these strikes actually occurred.
Axis Hubs Encircle Israel
Iran’s allies in the region are separated into hubs. Each actor within the Axis has carved out a unique role for itself—carefully tailored to their geographic position, proximity to their adversaries, and strategic value within the intricate web of allies. The war in Gaza paved the way for Axis members to consolidate these hubs.
Naturally, Hamas and Hezbollah doubled down on confronting Israel head-on. Meanwhile, a second hub has been operating from afar. Iraqi Shia armed groups and the Houthis have prioritized ramping up pressure by launching rocket and missile attacks on U.S. positions and disrupting commercial shipping. Yet these groups also go further, uniting to launch direct attacks on Israel. In this vein, the Axis has proven its ability to fight many fronts at the same time.
Israel now finds itself encircled by Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi groups. The United States and its close regional ally, Saudi Arabia, are also feeling the squeeze. American ships and military bases have increasingly come under fire, while Saudi Arabia is surrounded by a growing and menacing alliance between the Houthis and Iraqi groups, pressing in from the north and south. If and when the Gaza war ends, these new installations are likely to remain—fueling other regional conflicts as they emerge.
Facing enemies on all sides, Israel has recalibrated its regional military strategy to focus on high-level assassinations. In April, strikes on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus forced a symbolic, yet historic, response from Iran. In its first direct attack on Israeli territory, Iran launched a few hundred projectiles toward Israel—although most were intercepted by a coalition of Western and Arab forces and Israel’s air defense systems. The situation escalated further when Israel bombed southern Beirut, killing Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander, in retaliation for a rocket, allegedly fired from Lebanon, that killed twelve children in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights on July 27. Shortly after, Israel also assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Both Hezbollah and Iran have vowed to retaliate—though whether their responses will be coordinated across all fronts or carried out independently remains to be seen.
The Axis Combines Forces
The Gaza war has revealed how the armed capabilities of Iran-backed actors—sharpened through years of direct and indirect combat with Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia—can complement each other in real time, while also confusing their adversaries.
While coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi groups is nothing new, military cooperation between the two resistance fronts has become more prominent: the Gaza war has entrenched relations between the Houthis and Iraqi groups, transforming them from a political alliance into more overt military and intelligence cooperation.
In one example, the Houthis established a representative office in Baghdad in July. (The Houthis already had a presence in Iraq as early as 2015—when Abdel Malek al-Houthi, the Houthis’ political and spiritual leader, appointed an individual to focus on building relations, as Yemeni journalist Adnan al-Jabarni has reported.) And there are long-standing rumors that Iraq has quietly served as a training ground for Houthis preparing for battle in Yemen.
There are long-standing rumors that Iraq has quietly served as a training ground for Houthis preparing for battle in Yemen.
The first signs of more direct military coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi groups surfaced in 2018, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for high-stakes attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities. However, American officials later suggested that Iraq could have been used as a launching pad for these strikes—a claim that was never fully substantiated.
Since October 7, military and intelligence coordination has become more pronounced and public, particularly with the arrival to Baghdad of Abu Idris al-Sharafi, a prominent Houthi official who inaugurated the new office in Iraq. Sharafi’s appointment is noteworthy because he is a well-known military figure with experience supervising strategic Yemeni governorates like Hajjah and Hodeida, supervising Houthi military production, and maintaining strong connections with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. Sharafi’s arrival and the establishment of the office mark a crucial step toward realizing the principle of “Unity of Arenas” within the Axis—a concept its members increasingly embrace. Axis allies now see themselves as part of a single struggle—the war in Gaza—spanning multiple fronts.
“The previous [Houthi–Iraqi group] coordination of 2015 could be described as building a communication base, and nothing more,” said a source in Sana’a close to the Houthi movement. Axis activities since October 7 have been explicitly coordinated, the source said, with Iraq and Yemen emerging as a “united front” and a source of “shared experiences.”
The Houthis Surge to Prominence
There is additional evidence that the Axis alliance is collaborating more closely and on a much larger scale than ever before—exchanging military intelligence, conducting joint maneuvers, and training together on equipment use and military assistance. On August 4, a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Sha’bal, a Houthi commander and reputed drone expert who is known by the nom de guerre “Abu Jihad Mastour.” Sha’bal was presumably there to share his expertise.
The Houthis were once dismissed as a lower-in-the-Axis-hierarchy militia, lacking the military prowess of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia groups. Now, the Yemeni group appears to be in Iraq not to be trained, but to train others, according to media reports and analysts familiar with the issue. Although many Houthi attacks at sea and on Israel have been swatted away, their strategic control over critical waterways, coupled with their ability to launch drones to the heart of Tel Aviv, have redefined their role within the Axis of Resistance. The Houthis are no longer just confined to Yemen; they have become a crucial chip in Iran’s forward defense strategy, now able to share their expertise with others.
Such synergies serve Iran well. A more decentralized system of allies removes a heavy burden from Tehran while granting these groups the autonomy they need for public legitimacy in their home countries—whether Yemen, Iraq, or elsewhere. After years under Iran’s tutelage, factions in Iraq and Yemen are now capable of independently training and manufacturing their own military equipment. The 2020 U.S. assassination of IRGC officer Qasem Soleimani, who had tightly controlled the Axis of Resistance, led to a shift toward a more decentralized and less top-down set of partnerships under Soleimani’s replacement, Esmail Qaani. Inadvertently, this new arrangement forced resistance members to rely more on connections with each other and less on a single, shot-calling commander.
No Longer Clandestine
The Gaza war has taken coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi factions out of the shadows. Previously, the Yemeni group kept its relations with other Axis members—most particularly Iran—under wraps. They feared that openly acknowledging these ties would undermine their agency and credibility. Today, however, the Houthis confidently embrace their role in the broader network.
“We are in a process of continuous development of our capabilities, and our coordination with our brothers will [make] an additional contribution,” said Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the group’s political and spiritual leader, in a recent speech.
While Axis members have become more vocal about their coordination, they still maintain a psychological ambiguity about their methods. Hezbollah and Hamas, operating on the front lines and acutely aware of their vulnerability to Israeli military intelligence, have been particularly discreet. This intentional obscurity is designed to keep Israel and the United States in a state of constant uncertainty, never quite sure whether they will face a coordinated, multipronged assault from all sides or a single, isolated strike. Deliberate ambiguity is a cornerstone in the Axis’s strategy.
Iraqi groups and the Houthis, meanwhile, have become more vocal about their network capabilities, stressing their role in a cross-border, cross-country Axis that is strategically aligned with Iran. They have made it clear that they are willing to conduct joint operations, coordinate attacks, and escalate if necessary. This new posture not only serves to elevate their standing among Axis members, but also signals to the United States and Israel the risks involved in targeting them, since they are now formally embedded in an alliance. Their new stance also poses risks—it’s easy to imagine that Israel might make Iraq a new hotspot for high-profile assassinations.
For Israel, the biggest impact of the alliance’s new formality is that the country now has to worry about a lot of other international adversaries besides Iran. It’s already becoming clear that Israel is confused about where to allocate military resources, or whether to prepare for a singular strike from either Lebanon or Iran or a multipronged attack from all directions. Tehran further muddies the water by sending mixed signals. “There may be no attack at all, or there could be one tonight,” an Iranian regime insider recently told the Financial Times. “Waiting for death is more difficult than death itself.”
Saudi Arabia in a Vice
With the Yemeni group now established in Iraq, the Houthis can potentially threaten Saudi Arabia from both the north and south, creating a new leverage point in their ongoing negotiations with Riyadh to end the conflict in Yemen. Granted, it is unlikely that the Iraqi national government would allow the Houthis to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia from its territory, due to the potential strain on its delicate relations with Riyadh. But the Houthi presence in Iraq is still threatening: the reality is that a consolidated Iranian alliance all but encircles Saudi Arabia—and is increasingly coordinating its military efforts.
Already, in recent months Houthi leaders have warned of “war on Riyadh and its allies.” (The Houthis blame Saudi Arabia for compelling the internationally recognized Yemeni government to economically target the Houthis with bank sanctions and other measures.) And some Iraqi groups have also joined in the intimidation. Firas al-Yasser, a member of the political bureau of the Harakat al-Nujaba’ al-Iraqiya (an Iran-aligned Shia paramilitary group) told the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar that the militia was zeroing in on Saudi Arabia based on intelligence about the extent of aid Riyadh has provided to Israel—despite the Houthi attempts to impose an economic blockade on Tel Aviv.
Axis members maintain a psychological ambiguity about their methods, keeping Israel and the United States in a state of constant uncertainty.
With a foothold in Iraq, the Houthis can credibly escalate their threats against Saudi Arabia to get what they want at the negotiating table. The Iraqi national government imposes constraints on what Iraqi Axis groups can realistically do for other Axis of Resistance movements. But the Houthi threats can still be effective, because the group is unpredictable, and Riyadh is extremely risk-averse and quick to make concessions when faced with the looming threat of an attack.
In much the same way, Iraqi factions could join forces with the Houthis in their efforts to hasten the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by targeting U.S. positions—especially if exit negotiations drag on. With the recent influx of Yemenis into Iraq, aided by newly loosened Iraqi visa rules, Iraq could conceivably become a training ground for the creation of combined military forces composed of Houthi and Iraqi militia fighters.
Iran, for its part, has adapted to the post-Soleimani order by doubling down on a decentralized resistance network—a network of networks rather than a network with Tehran as its central node. Iran undoubtedly views this development as an efficient response to its encirclement by U.S. military bases—Tehran can similarly position allied forces to encircle both U.S. interests and allies. But the strategy is dangerous. One obvious problematic result is that even Tehran and the IRGC have limits on how much they can control the Axis of Resistance. And maximalist or powerful members of the coalition—like the Houthis today, and perhaps others in the future—can follow their own strategy.
Point of No Return
If the Gaza war were to end tomorrow, the strengthened composition of the Axis of Resistance, alongside the newly cemented hubs, would endure. It is clear that the regional interests of Iraqi groups and the Houthis have already become increasingly intertwined. Furthermore, the partnership between Iraqi groups and the Houthis could easily be leveraged to advance those groups’ domestic agendas in the future.
Ultimately, the Axis of Resistance has crossed a threshold in military expertise and coordination that cannot be undone, even if the conflict in Gaza is resolved. The sophistication it has achieved is here to stay, and it is a direct consequence of Israel’s reluctance to stop its onslaught.
The real issue is that the United States appears unwilling to seriously confront the emerging regional order—one that will seriously undermine its interests in the long run. Houthi media have already gloated that the United States “cannot find effective and cheaper defensive alternatives to confront Yemeni threats that have targeted U.S. military ships.” And, to some extent, they are right. The United States has nearly exhausted its options for dealing with the Houthis. Beyond bombing Houthi strongholds, the only tool left is more economic sanctions—a tool that, in Iran, has been shown to have little effect on military posture.
America has vowed to protect Israel no matter what. This decision has only harmed U.S. interests in the region in the longer term and allowed the Axis to continue to gain strength. The United States needs to change course, and press Israel to halt its offensive in Gaza and promptly cut a deal with Hamas. Israel also needs to stop its high-level assassination campaign, which is only fueling the flames of conflict across the region. If it continues, Axis groups will only be more motivated to test what else their alliance can achieve. The Israeli military is powerful, to be sure, but even it cannot battle on all fronts indefinitely.
To prevent the emergence of an even more dangerous cross-regional force, the conflict in Gaza must end now.
Header Image: A screen grab captured from a video shows Houthi fighters’ takeover of the Galaxy Leader Cargo in the Red Sea off the coast of Hodeida, Yemen on November 20, 2023. Source: Houthi Movement via Getty Images
Tags: ceasefire, gaza war, axis of resistance
The Gaza War Has Irreversibly Strengthened the “Axis of Resistance”
On July 20, Yemen’s Houthi movement stunned the world by using a drone to penetrate Israel’s vaunted Iron Dome defense, killing a civilian in Tel Aviv. In retaliation, Israel bombed the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeida in Yemen.
The incident was a prime example of the development of an alarming new reality in the Middle East. Iran-led allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” many of them nonstate actors, have evolved over the last year into a formidable bloc. The war in Gaza has handed the Axis an unprecedented opportunity to unite. Once a loosely connected coalition, they are now a more formal alliance with sophisticated capabilities.
The Houthis, in particular, have crossed a threshold—formerly a spoiler, they are now a powerful regional actor capable of directly threatening Israel, U.S. military bases in the region, global shipping lanes, and the Arab states of the Gulf. The Tel Aviv drone strike was just one of a series of increasingly brazen and effective Houthi attacks on Israel-connected targets since last October.
Western policymakers need to recognize the new geopolitical landscape of the Middle East and take urgent action to end the war in Gaza. If they do not, the region faces spiraling conflict in the short term and, in the long term, a more hostile dynamic in which the Houthis’ new political and military power will make it harder to de-escalate regional crises—undermining security for Saudi Arabia, international shipping, and U.S. interests.
It’s too late to undo the transformation of the Axis of Resistance. But it is possible to prevent the Axis from growing even stronger and more entrenched throughout the region. An end to the conflict in Gaza is the only path, and policymakers need to make it their top priority.
Multiple New Fronts Emerge
The world is only beginning to reckon with the scale of the Gaza war’s impact.
The tragedy in Gaza is one part of the story. Israel’s devastating campaign, launched in response to Hamas’s deadly October 7 attack, has killed at least 40,000 Palestinians and laid waste to the Strip.
But borders have not contained the conflict, and as the war drags on, it is transforming the broader region. Five regional fronts have emerged: Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, the Red Sea, and Iraq. The first is the main front line: the ongoing war of attrition between Hamas and Israel in the Gaza Strip.
Then, on the Lebanon front to Israel’s north, Hezbollah and Israeli forces are engaged in daily exchanges—with Hezbollah vowing to continue its attacks until Israel ends its “aggression” on Gaza.
The third front extends to Syria, where Israel has intermittently struck Hezbollah and Iranian-linked positions. In response, these groups have targeted military bases that host U.S. forces.
The Red Sea front, active since November 2022, has taken the Gaza war into the maritime domain. In a proclaimed show of solidarity with the Palestinians, the Houthis have transformed the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and even the Indian Ocean into active battlegrounds by targeting commercial ships. These attacks have forced vessels to take lengthy detours around the Cape of Good Hope to avoid the Houthis’ range. In tandem, the Yemeni group has launched long-range drones aimed directly at Eilat and Tel Aviv, though Israel’s Iron Dome defense system has intercepted most.
On the Iraqi front, Shia armed factions have, since October 7, ramped up their strikes on U.S. military bases. Although Iraqi groups have played a limited role in the conflict so far, the Tower 22 strikes on January 28 marked a turning point—killing three American soldiers and prompting a series of air and missile strikes by the United States. Additionally, an umbrella group of Shia armed factions in Iraq calling itself the “Islamic Resistance” began targeting U.S. forces stationed in Iraq and Syria. It also claimed joint responsibility, alongside the Houthis, for attacks on the Israeli cities of Ashdod and Haifa—though Israel has denied that these strikes actually occurred.
Axis Hubs Encircle Israel
Iran’s allies in the region are separated into hubs. Each actor within the Axis has carved out a unique role for itself—carefully tailored to their geographic position, proximity to their adversaries, and strategic value within the intricate web of allies. The war in Gaza paved the way for Axis members to consolidate these hubs.
Naturally, Hamas and Hezbollah doubled down on confronting Israel head-on. Meanwhile, a second hub has been operating from afar. Iraqi Shia armed groups and the Houthis have prioritized ramping up pressure by launching rocket and missile attacks on U.S. positions and disrupting commercial shipping. Yet these groups also go further, uniting to launch direct attacks on Israel. In this vein, the Axis has proven its ability to fight many fronts at the same time.
Israel now finds itself encircled by Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iraqi groups. The United States and its close regional ally, Saudi Arabia, are also feeling the squeeze. American ships and military bases have increasingly come under fire, while Saudi Arabia is surrounded by a growing and menacing alliance between the Houthis and Iraqi groups, pressing in from the north and south. If and when the Gaza war ends, these new installations are likely to remain—fueling other regional conflicts as they emerge.
Facing enemies on all sides, Israel has recalibrated its regional military strategy to focus on high-level assassinations. In April, strikes on the Iranian embassy compound in Damascus forced a symbolic, yet historic, response from Iran. In its first direct attack on Israeli territory, Iran launched a few hundred projectiles toward Israel—although most were intercepted by a coalition of Western and Arab forces and Israel’s air defense systems. The situation escalated further when Israel bombed southern Beirut, killing Fuad Shukr, a top Hezbollah commander, in retaliation for a rocket, allegedly fired from Lebanon, that killed twelve children in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights on July 27. Shortly after, Israel also assassinated Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Both Hezbollah and Iran have vowed to retaliate—though whether their responses will be coordinated across all fronts or carried out independently remains to be seen.
The Axis Combines Forces
The Gaza war has revealed how the armed capabilities of Iran-backed actors—sharpened through years of direct and indirect combat with Israel, the United States, and Saudi Arabia—can complement each other in real time, while also confusing their adversaries.
While coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi groups is nothing new, military cooperation between the two resistance fronts has become more prominent: the Gaza war has entrenched relations between the Houthis and Iraqi groups, transforming them from a political alliance into more overt military and intelligence cooperation.
In one example, the Houthis established a representative office in Baghdad in July. (The Houthis already had a presence in Iraq as early as 2015—when Abdel Malek al-Houthi, the Houthis’ political and spiritual leader, appointed an individual to focus on building relations, as Yemeni journalist Adnan al-Jabarni has reported.) And there are long-standing rumors that Iraq has quietly served as a training ground for Houthis preparing for battle in Yemen.
The first signs of more direct military coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi groups surfaced in 2018, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for high-stakes attacks on Saudi Aramco oil facilities. However, American officials later suggested that Iraq could have been used as a launching pad for these strikes—a claim that was never fully substantiated.
Since October 7, military and intelligence coordination has become more pronounced and public, particularly with the arrival to Baghdad of Abu Idris al-Sharafi, a prominent Houthi official who inaugurated the new office in Iraq. Sharafi’s appointment is noteworthy because he is a well-known military figure with experience supervising strategic Yemeni governorates like Hajjah and Hodeida, supervising Houthi military production, and maintaining strong connections with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders. Sharafi’s arrival and the establishment of the office mark a crucial step toward realizing the principle of “Unity of Arenas” within the Axis—a concept its members increasingly embrace. Axis allies now see themselves as part of a single struggle—the war in Gaza—spanning multiple fronts.
“The previous [Houthi–Iraqi group] coordination of 2015 could be described as building a communication base, and nothing more,” said a source in Sana’a close to the Houthi movement. Axis activities since October 7 have been explicitly coordinated, the source said, with Iraq and Yemen emerging as a “united front” and a source of “shared experiences.”
The Houthis Surge to Prominence
There is additional evidence that the Axis alliance is collaborating more closely and on a much larger scale than ever before—exchanging military intelligence, conducting joint maneuvers, and training together on equipment use and military assistance. On August 4, a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed Hussein Abdullah Mastour al-Sha’bal, a Houthi commander and reputed drone expert who is known by the nom de guerre “Abu Jihad Mastour.” Sha’bal was presumably there to share his expertise.
The Houthis were once dismissed as a lower-in-the-Axis-hierarchy militia, lacking the military prowess of Hezbollah and Iraqi Shia groups. Now, the Yemeni group appears to be in Iraq not to be trained, but to train others, according to media reports and analysts familiar with the issue. Although many Houthi attacks at sea and on Israel have been swatted away, their strategic control over critical waterways, coupled with their ability to launch drones to the heart of Tel Aviv, have redefined their role within the Axis of Resistance. The Houthis are no longer just confined to Yemen; they have become a crucial chip in Iran’s forward defense strategy, now able to share their expertise with others.
Such synergies serve Iran well. A more decentralized system of allies removes a heavy burden from Tehran while granting these groups the autonomy they need for public legitimacy in their home countries—whether Yemen, Iraq, or elsewhere. After years under Iran’s tutelage, factions in Iraq and Yemen are now capable of independently training and manufacturing their own military equipment. The 2020 U.S. assassination of IRGC officer Qasem Soleimani, who had tightly controlled the Axis of Resistance, led to a shift toward a more decentralized and less top-down set of partnerships under Soleimani’s replacement, Esmail Qaani. Inadvertently, this new arrangement forced resistance members to rely more on connections with each other and less on a single, shot-calling commander.
No Longer Clandestine
The Gaza war has taken coordination between the Houthis and Iraqi factions out of the shadows. Previously, the Yemeni group kept its relations with other Axis members—most particularly Iran—under wraps. They feared that openly acknowledging these ties would undermine their agency and credibility. Today, however, the Houthis confidently embrace their role in the broader network.
“We are in a process of continuous development of our capabilities, and our coordination with our brothers will [make] an additional contribution,” said Abdul Malik al-Houthi, the group’s political and spiritual leader, in a recent speech.
While Axis members have become more vocal about their coordination, they still maintain a psychological ambiguity about their methods. Hezbollah and Hamas, operating on the front lines and acutely aware of their vulnerability to Israeli military intelligence, have been particularly discreet. This intentional obscurity is designed to keep Israel and the United States in a state of constant uncertainty, never quite sure whether they will face a coordinated, multipronged assault from all sides or a single, isolated strike. Deliberate ambiguity is a cornerstone in the Axis’s strategy.
Iraqi groups and the Houthis, meanwhile, have become more vocal about their network capabilities, stressing their role in a cross-border, cross-country Axis that is strategically aligned with Iran. They have made it clear that they are willing to conduct joint operations, coordinate attacks, and escalate if necessary. This new posture not only serves to elevate their standing among Axis members, but also signals to the United States and Israel the risks involved in targeting them, since they are now formally embedded in an alliance. Their new stance also poses risks—it’s easy to imagine that Israel might make Iraq a new hotspot for high-profile assassinations.
For Israel, the biggest impact of the alliance’s new formality is that the country now has to worry about a lot of other international adversaries besides Iran. It’s already becoming clear that Israel is confused about where to allocate military resources, or whether to prepare for a singular strike from either Lebanon or Iran or a multipronged attack from all directions. Tehran further muddies the water by sending mixed signals. “There may be no attack at all, or there could be one tonight,” an Iranian regime insider recently told the Financial Times. “Waiting for death is more difficult than death itself.”
Saudi Arabia in a Vice
With the Yemeni group now established in Iraq, the Houthis can potentially threaten Saudi Arabia from both the north and south, creating a new leverage point in their ongoing negotiations with Riyadh to end the conflict in Yemen. Granted, it is unlikely that the Iraqi national government would allow the Houthis to launch attacks on Saudi Arabia from its territory, due to the potential strain on its delicate relations with Riyadh. But the Houthi presence in Iraq is still threatening: the reality is that a consolidated Iranian alliance all but encircles Saudi Arabia—and is increasingly coordinating its military efforts.
Already, in recent months Houthi leaders have warned of “war on Riyadh and its allies.” (The Houthis blame Saudi Arabia for compelling the internationally recognized Yemeni government to economically target the Houthis with bank sanctions and other measures.) And some Iraqi groups have also joined in the intimidation. Firas al-Yasser, a member of the political bureau of the Harakat al-Nujaba’ al-Iraqiya (an Iran-aligned Shia paramilitary group) told the Lebanese newspaper Al-Akhbar that the militia was zeroing in on Saudi Arabia based on intelligence about the extent of aid Riyadh has provided to Israel—despite the Houthi attempts to impose an economic blockade on Tel Aviv.
With a foothold in Iraq, the Houthis can credibly escalate their threats against Saudi Arabia to get what they want at the negotiating table. The Iraqi national government imposes constraints on what Iraqi Axis groups can realistically do for other Axis of Resistance movements. But the Houthi threats can still be effective, because the group is unpredictable, and Riyadh is extremely risk-averse and quick to make concessions when faced with the looming threat of an attack.
In much the same way, Iraqi factions could join forces with the Houthis in their efforts to hasten the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq by targeting U.S. positions—especially if exit negotiations drag on. With the recent influx of Yemenis into Iraq, aided by newly loosened Iraqi visa rules, Iraq could conceivably become a training ground for the creation of combined military forces composed of Houthi and Iraqi militia fighters.
Iran, for its part, has adapted to the post-Soleimani order by doubling down on a decentralized resistance network—a network of networks rather than a network with Tehran as its central node. Iran undoubtedly views this development as an efficient response to its encirclement by U.S. military bases—Tehran can similarly position allied forces to encircle both U.S. interests and allies. But the strategy is dangerous. One obvious problematic result is that even Tehran and the IRGC have limits on how much they can control the Axis of Resistance. And maximalist or powerful members of the coalition—like the Houthis today, and perhaps others in the future—can follow their own strategy.
Point of No Return
If the Gaza war were to end tomorrow, the strengthened composition of the Axis of Resistance, alongside the newly cemented hubs, would endure. It is clear that the regional interests of Iraqi groups and the Houthis have already become increasingly intertwined. Furthermore, the partnership between Iraqi groups and the Houthis could easily be leveraged to advance those groups’ domestic agendas in the future.
Ultimately, the Axis of Resistance has crossed a threshold in military expertise and coordination that cannot be undone, even if the conflict in Gaza is resolved. The sophistication it has achieved is here to stay, and it is a direct consequence of Israel’s reluctance to stop its onslaught.
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The real issue is that the United States appears unwilling to seriously confront the emerging regional order—one that will seriously undermine its interests in the long run. Houthi media have already gloated that the United States “cannot find effective and cheaper defensive alternatives to confront Yemeni threats that have targeted U.S. military ships.” And, to some extent, they are right. The United States has nearly exhausted its options for dealing with the Houthis. Beyond bombing Houthi strongholds, the only tool left is more economic sanctions—a tool that, in Iran, has been shown to have little effect on military posture.
America has vowed to protect Israel no matter what. This decision has only harmed U.S. interests in the region in the longer term and allowed the Axis to continue to gain strength. The United States needs to change course, and press Israel to halt its offensive in Gaza and promptly cut a deal with Hamas. Israel also needs to stop its high-level assassination campaign, which is only fueling the flames of conflict across the region. If it continues, Axis groups will only be more motivated to test what else their alliance can achieve. The Israeli military is powerful, to be sure, but even it cannot battle on all fronts indefinitely.
To prevent the emergence of an even more dangerous cross-regional force, the conflict in Gaza must end now.
Header Image: A screen grab captured from a video shows Houthi fighters’ takeover of the Galaxy Leader Cargo in the Red Sea off the coast of Hodeida, Yemen on November 20, 2023. Source: Houthi Movement via Getty Images
Tags: ceasefire, gaza war, axis of resistance