Among the possible U.S. policies to reign in Israeli excesses, measures targeting illegal settlements in the West Bank might seem to be relatively low-hanging fruit. Even among those American politicians and pundits who are broadly pro-Israel, there are many critics of the Israeli settlement project and many more of settler violence.1 In Israel, too, many Jewish Israelis either oppose settlement or, at the least, believe it needs to be curtailed. Settler violence is widely condemned.

Yet when President Biden sanctioned violent Israeli settlers last year, the results were mixed at best. As Israel dug into the war in Gaza in response to the October 7 attacks, Israeli settler violence reached record highs in the West Bank. In February 2024, the Biden administration created a legal framework to sanction Israeli citizens who had attacked Palestinians in the territory. U.S. officials ramped up the sanctions over an eleven-month period. Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway, and the UK created similar sanctions lists.

President Trump scrapped the sanctions on his first day in office, and it is impossible to know whether the sanctions regime would have ultimately evolved into a more effective policy under a different American administration. But it is clear that the sanctions failed to stem rising settler violence during the eleven months they were in effect—and became burdened by loopholes and backlash over the course of their brief existence.

This report offers a retrospective assessment of the Biden administration’s sanctions, with lessons for any future sanctions-based policy against Israeli settlers. These lessons have immediate relevance to ongoing debates in Canada, Europe, and the UK about expanding existing sanctions and the effectiveness of those programs. A key finding is that internal disagreements in the Biden administration—about the goals of the sanctions, or whether sanctions were warranted at all—hamstrung the effort from the start. From this initial problem, others stemmed.

The sanctions did interrupt some settlers’ banking, riled Israeli officials and settler leaders, broke a taboo in U.S. policy on Israel, and bolstered support for anti-occupation activists. But sanctioned settlers and organizations also used the new policy as a rallying point. When the Biden administration backpedaled, far-right Israeli politicians claimed victory. Conversely, when the White House expanded certain measures, those same Israeli politicians were able to leverage the public reaction to strengthen their hand, including their positions in negotiations on Palestinian banking and other components of Palestinian governance.

Washington was right to impose consequences on settler violence. But sanctions cannot be truly effective as long as they are a surrogate for a broader policy on Israel’s settlements. The overwhelming financial, political, and legal support provided by the Israeli government to settlements rendered the impact of the sanctions that were issued comparatively marginal. This was especially true as the sanctions lacked a consistent communications campaign and clear off-ramps for sanctions lifting. Policymakers in the United States and elsewhere should learn from this experience and deploy sanctions differently in the future.

This report, a collaboration between Century International and the International Crisis Group, is based on dozens of interviews in Washington, D.C., New York, Brussels, London, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem with current and former U.S., Israeli, and European officials and diplomats; and financial professionals; political commentators; legal experts; and human rights activists. Interviewees were balanced by gender with an approximately equal number of women and men interviewed. The report is also informed by the large body of work published since October 7, 2023, by media organizations, think tanks and human rights groups on the topic of settler violence.2

A Brief History of U.S. Sanctions on Israeli Settlers

Israel took control of the West Bank, along with Gaza, East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights, in the Six Day War in June 1967, after which settlement by Israeli Jews proceeded at first slowly and then later expanded rapidly.3 Today, settlers live in a combination of settlements that the Israeli government officially established, and outposts which are considered illegal according to Israeli law.4 In Israeli discourse, the West Bank is referred to by its biblical names, Judea, for the part south of Jerusalem, and Samaria, to Jerusalem’s north.

Most countries consider the West Bank and the other territories Israel has controlled since the 1967 war to be occupied territory according to international law.5 Israel has long rejected this characterization.6 Successive U.S. administrations since 1967 (except those of Trump) have held that the settlements are “inconsistent” with international law.7 They have also generally seen the settlements as an obstacle to peace between Israel and the Palestinians and, in particular, to a two-state solution.8

Over the last thirty years, the Jewish Israeli population of the settlements has increased fivefold, and construction has expanded commensurately. The number of settlements and outposts has more than doubled. The Jewish Israeli population in the West Bank now numbers over 500,000, and continues to grow. The current Israeli government is encouraging the settlements at an unprecedented pace, having greenlit the biggest expansion in decades in May 2025.9

A Surge in Settler Violence

As the Gaza war dominated the headlines in late 2023, violence in the West Bank was mounting. A wave of attacks by Israeli settlers in the months following October 7 killed and injured forty-one Palestinians, damaged hundreds of properties, and drove more than a thousand Palestinians from their lands.10 Other assaults included intimidation and harassment, theft of livestock, uprooting of olive trees, and denial of access to land and water.11

Violence was a feature of settlement expansion for decades, but the policies of Israel’s most right-wing and explicitly pro-settlement government in history have supercharged it.12 Hardline settlers in key posts—Bezalel Smotrich as the minister of finance and de facto governor of the West Bank, and Itamar Ben Gvir as the national security minister with oversight of the police—openly called for settlement expansion and the annexation of the West Bank. They used their offices to expand settlement construction at record rates.

Israeli ministers also condoned, and sometimes incited, acts of violence, while shielding violent settlers from consequences.13 In one illustrative example, after a February 2023 rampage in the town of Huwara, during which settlers injured hundreds of Palestinians and burned homes and vehicles, Smotrich proclaimed that the town “should be wiped out,” while Ben Gvir chastised security forces for arresting the perpetrators and called the arsonists “sweet kids.”14

Smotrich proclaimed that the town “should be wiped out,” while Ben Gvir chastised security forces for arresting the perpetrators and called the arsonists “sweet kids.”

The dynamic of settlement growth, government support for it, and accompanying violence intensified after October 7. Settlers built at least forty-three new outposts in the West Bank in the following year, six times the yearly average of outpost establishment in the years from 1996 through 2022.15 When the latest Israel–Gaza war started, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) called up thousands of men and women from the settlements to serve as reserve soldiers in their own communities. Squads of armed settler resident volunteers, which had long operated under a local army officer to provide security in their communities, were given thousands of additional military-grade weapons and increased in numbers. With IDF uniforms, army salaries, and a soldier’s prerogatives, the line between settler and soldier blurred.16 According to the UN, Israeli forces accompanied or supported the attackers in half of all incidents of settler violence recorded after October 7. Other kinds of turmoil in the West Bank, such as an uptick in militant attacks as well as killings by the IDF, contributed to the growing tumult.17

Concerned about the escalating violence, officials at the U.S. State Department urged the White House to take action, and brought the issue to Biden’s desk.18 The administration decided to ramp up pressure on the Israeli government, both publicly and in private bilateral exchanges. Top U.S. diplomats made statements calling on the Israeli government to take action.19 But when the Israeli government took no action in response to Washington’s pleas, the State Department announced visa bans for dozens of Israeli settlers involved in the violence. “The United States is ready to take action using our own authorities,” Secretary of State Antony Blinken said in December 2023.20 Then, the United States went further.

Washington Sanctions Israeli Settlers for the First Time

On February 1, 2024, Biden issued an executive order imposing sanctions on “persons undermining peace, security and stability in the West Bank.”21 The order banned anyone listed from traveling to, transacting with people in, or accessing assets in the United States. For the first time in history, Washington had taken punitive action with regard to the settlements and imposed real consequences on Israeli citizens.22

A Jewish Israeli man swims in a pool in the Israeli settlement of Vered Yericho in the West Bank Jordan Valley on June 24, 2020. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images
A Jewish Israeli man swims in a pool in the Israeli settlement of Vered Yericho in the West Bank Jordan Valley on June 24, 2020. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images

The sanctions started as penalties for a handful of extremists. The first batch of listings in February 2024 included Israeli settlers accused of leading riots on Palestinian towns, assaulting Palestinian and Bedouin civilians and Israeli activists, and forcing Palestinians from their homes. In the months that followed, Washington progressively added more prominent targets to the blacklist. It added farms (a central part of the illegal settlements); a group that attacked humanitarian aid convoys en route to Gaza; settlers who organized crowdfunding campaigns for others on the blacklist; and a Palestinian militant organization called Lions’ Den.23 Eventually, the blacklist included actors directly connected to far-right ministers and organizations at the heart of the settlement movement, notably Amana, a prominent pro-settlement construction company that had channeled hundreds of thousands of dollars to unauthorized outposts in the West Bank. By the end of Biden’s term, the West Bank sanctions targeted thirty-three people, farms, organizations, and groups.24

EU, UK, and Other Sanctions

Following Washington’s lead, Australia, Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway, and the UK developed their own blacklists from early 2024 and into the summer, listing many of the same individuals and groups as the United States did.25 The UK and Canada even sanctioned Amana before the United States did, a major move considering that Washington had wavered over whether or not to sanction that prominent settlement organization before it did so in November 2024.26

Most countries refrained from significantly expanding their lists until June 2025, when Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, and the UK sanctioned Ben Gvir and Smotrich.27 Before that, Australia and Canada had levied sanctions against eight and twenty-two targets, respectively. Japan has not sanctioned the ministers; its only sanctions action came in July 2024 when it listed four settlers.

The UK was the first to expand its sanctions after Trump revoked the U.S. program. London added seven additional targets to its sanctions list in May 2025 and two—Ben Gvir and Smotrich—in June 2025, bringing the total number of UK targets to twenty-six. In interviews, UK officials indicated that they were not necessarily taking cues from the United States as they expanded their sanctions.28

At the time of publication, the EU had only issued two packages of sanctions on fourteen extremist groups and outposts, mostly matching U.S. targets. EU states had been divided on the question of expanding sanctions, and given that EU sanctions require the consensus of all twenty-seven member states, the vehement opposition of some blocked further action. An informal rule that each listing of an Israeli settler had to be accompanied by a Palestinian target further complicated matters.29

Washington’s Contradictions

Washington’s sanctions rollout was riven by conflicting visions from within the Biden administration. Officials disagreed about the scope of the program’s goals. Some hoped it would reduce West Bank violence, while others hoped it would thwart the entire settlement enterprise. Others focused on changing overall U.S.–Israeli policy and the opinion of Arab-American and Muslim voters about the Biden–Harris ticket. Officials vigorously debated whether or not to ramp up the program before Trump entered office. Although from one perspective, the sanctions were unprecedented, they also did not go nearly as far as some in Washington had hoped they would. For example, the U.S. administration never sanctioned Israeli right-wing ministers Ben Gvir or Smotrich. There were also debates about overall goals, timing, and sequence of the actions.

These disputes within the Biden administration may help explain why the sanctions were not more successful.

Conflicting Goals

Officials in the Biden administration had varying goals. Officials in the White House, Treasury, and State Department broadly supported the measures, but disagreed about their scope. Roughly, their objectives fell into two categories: one facing outward, to change Israeli policy, and the other facing inward, to change U.S. policy.

Some U.S. officials wanted the sanctions to be less of a punishment: “We don’t want to have these people not buy food, or not have their kids go to camp.”

On Israel, U.S. officials differed about whether the executive order was narrowly aimed at curbing settler violence or whether it was meant to affect the wider settlement enterprise. Those who saw the sanctions as limited to settler violence either hoped that they would deter future violence, or, for those who did not believe that deterrence was realistic, that the sanctions would at least punish offenders.30 Not all envisaged the punishments to be severe. As one U.S. official said, the intent of the sanctions was not to bankrupt the settlers: “We don’t want to have these people not buy food, or not have their kids go to camp.”31 Another stated goal was to “hold Jews [in the West Bank] accountable” when the Israeli system was failing to do so.32

Others in the Biden administration had more ambitious goals. They hoped that the sanctions would expand enough to stop settlement growth and make existing settlements in the occupied territories unsustainable.33 The hope was that, eventually, foreign funders of the settlement movement would stop making donations out of concern that doing so would violate U.S. law. Foreign firms would stop engaging with sectors of the settler economy in the West Bank due to similar risk calculations, as well as fear of reputational fallout. This would make it harder for settlements to economically survive.34

Other Biden officials hoped that the sanctions would drive a wedge between violent settlers and the rest of Israeli society. One official hoped that the sanctions would stigmatize violent settlers and put them in the same pariah category as Russian criminals and Iran. “It should be a wake-up call,” the official said, that “makes Israelis uncomfortable with these individuals, their behavior, and the fact that they are operating with impunity.”35

The second category of U.S. aims was inward-facing. Officials hoped that the sanctions would influence U.S. policy on Israel “through the back door,” gradually conditioning the U.S. government into a more robust confrontation of settlement expansion in the West Bank.36 The idea, it seems, was that these initial sanctions would break an American taboo on directly punishing Israelis for violations. “Getting our own system comfortable [with a stronger anti-settlement approach] is a big part of this,” one U.S. official said.37 Another American official explained that part of the rationale of the sanctions was to make Washington more willing to “call out, stop funding for, and disconnect from the different layers of the settlement enterprise.”38

Some individuals in the administration hoped that the sanctions would also influence the American Jewish community. One American official hoped that the prohibitions against providing money, goods, or services to sanctions targets would reduce American support for the settlement movement, and would in due course be accompanied by U.S. government pressure on synagogues and Jewish community organizations to disassociate from it. Eventually, members of the mainstream Jewish community might reassess their connections to the settlement movement and undertake due diligence to ensure they were not connected to it.39 Such hopes seemed reasonable, given the power of sanctions to chill donations to charities in other countries.

As the U.S. presidential elections loomed, others in the administration hoped the sanctions would affect American domestic politics, in particular the perceptions of Arab-American and Muslim constituencies in key states like Michigan who opposed Biden’s policies on the Israel–Gaza war. Officials hoped that, by penalizing Jewish Israelis, the sanctions could shift perceptions of anti-Palestinian bias amongst critics of the administration’s Israel policies.40

The Debate over Ramping Up

Some U.S. officials, legislators, and activists urged the Biden administration to seriously expand the sanctions during his lame duck period. They theorized that the higher the profile of the targets, the more the sanctions would affect the settlements. They discussed targeting owners of farms, public personalities, and important bodies facilitating settlement expansion such as the regional settlement councils and the settlement division of the World Zionist Organization. They argued that, if sanctions’ effects had been limited, it was because they had not gone far enough. Deterring low-level ideologues might be impossible, but they believed that targeting organizations with budgets in the millions of shekels was more likely to make a difference.41

Many in the Biden administration, particularly at the working level, and some in Congress, pushed hard for the president to sanction Smotrich and Ben Gvir.42 Treasury officials had even prepared the listings so that they were ready to go if approved by the president. If Treasury were to designate them, “the entire Near Eastern Affairs bureau [of the State Department] would be popping a bottle of champagne,” one official said in May 2024.43 Some U.S. diplomats in Israel, whose day-to-day jobs involved tracking the deteriorating situation in the West Bank, also supported an expanded approach.44 Activist and advocacy groups in the United States, such as the liberal Jewish advocacy group J Street, also called for enlarging the sanctions regime to reach ministers and high-profile settlement organizations.45

However, several U.S. officials had misgivings about expanding the program. Biden rejected proposals to sanction Ben Gvir and Smotrich, reportedly because he was hesitant to sanction elected members of a close partner country.46 Senior members of his administration felt the sanctions should focus narrowly on settler violence rather than the broader settlement enterprise, and wanted to restrict the listing to individuals and organizations directly involved in violent acts against Palestinians.47 Others worried that expanded measures could affect American charities or donors who fund settlement organizations, something that they felt would unfairly target those with different views than the Biden administration and prompt accusations of free speech violations. Indeed, dual U.S.-Israeli citizens ended up suing the government in August 2024.48 After Trump won the election, most officials recognized that he would likely scrap the program, and did not want to provide him with further rationale to do so.49

Certain senior U.S. officials based in Israel worried that expanding the sanctions would backfire, particularly if they targeted Ben Gvir and Smotrich. “People bearing the brunt of the Israeli responses tend to be more measured,” one U.S. official explained.50 The U.S. ambassador to Israel, Jacob Lew, was reportedly uneasy with the program (Lew is a known sanctions skeptic who led U.S. sanctions efforts as a secretary of the Treasury from 2013 to 2017).51 Other U.S. officials worried that expanded sanctions would prompt retaliatory measures on Palestinians that would compound their hardship.52 It was an early warning sign that many of the officials most deeply embedded in the day-to-day dealings with the Israeli government—including the administration’s lead diplomat in Jerusalem—were skeptical of Washington’s approach. If the people who were expected to translate Washington’s policy into operational reality doubted its wisdom, the program’s chances of success were limited.

Inside Israel

In Israel, U.S. sanctions had a mixed impact. Initially defiant, blacklisted settlers quickly felt the sting of the sanctions when they could not withdraw money from their bank accounts. Settler leaders viewed the sanctions as a crisis, and far-right settler ministers, as well as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, lobbied for their removal. Their advocacy led to the release of a letter from the U.S. Treasury that partially mitigated the sanctions’ impact. Israeli government officials started to use the sanctions as leverage in negotiations with the U.S. government and as a basis for retaliation against Palestinians. Across the Israeli government, in the media and among the public, initial shock at the punitive impact of the sanctions eventually faded. Washington’s military and diplomatic backing of Israel ultimately overshadowed the sanctions’ impact, with many Israelis perceiving them as symbolic gestures rather than a true shift in American policy.

Israeli Border Police stand guard in the Wadi al-Joz Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem on December 29, 2023. Source: Maja Hitij/Getty Images
Israeli Border Police stand guard in the Wadi al-Joz Palestinian neighborhood in East Jerusalem on December 29, 2023. Source: Maja Hitij/Getty Images

Impact on Sanctioned Settlers

The settlers themselves initially downplayed the impact of the sanctions. Days after Biden’s sanctions announcement, one listed settler accused of leading the February 2023 rampage in Huwara told a journalist that he was “happy to be on the U.S. blacklist” and that he would not change his behavior.53 Another settler alleged to have organized assaults on Palestinian civilians told ABC News that “Biden thinks we will be scared, but these sanctions do the opposite. They reaffirm our commitment.”54

Yet as the restrictions took effect, the sanctioned settlers started to suffer. Israeli banks blocked their accounts and made it impossible for them to withdraw shekels. While the sanctions did not prohibit Israeli banks from banking blacklisted settlers, the banks were nonetheless afraid to expose themselves to any risk of violating, or being perceived as violating, U.S. sanctions lest they be cut off from the U.S. financial system.55 This resulted in a situation where, as one settler leader complained, “farmers found themselves unable to buy food for their children.” Other sanctioned settlers could not “fill up with gas in the middle of the night.”56 One human rights activist told the author that the settlers he regularly spoke to constantly brought up the sanctions. “It’s a real issue for them,” he said.57

The sting of the sanctions, however, was partially mitigated by a letter from the U.S. Treasury to the Bank of Israel in March 2024. After extensive lobbying by the Israeli government, the U.S. Treasury clarified that the withdrawal of small sums by sanctioned individuals from their accounts did not constitute a sanctions violation.58 It is not unusual for Treasury to allow transactions that are necessary to cover basic expenses, but other sanctions regimes do not involve such detailed, public clarifications and, in that sense, the March 2024 communication was unprecedented.59 The Treasury reportedly offered the letter after Smotrich threatened action against Palestinian banks that would have resulted in an economic meltdown in the West Bank.60

The letter gave comfort to Israeli banks that their critical relationships with U.S. financial institutions would not suffer if they continued to work with settlers on the blacklist, provided that their services were not in U.S. dollars and did not exceed amounts necessary for basic living expenses and subsistence payments. Banks began to allow sanctioned settlers to withdraw a certain amount per day, with a limit.61 One expert noted sardonically that the limit was high enough to buy a gun.62

Response of the Settler Community

Settler leaders were alarmed by what they framed as a sanctions crisis.63 They demanded swift government action and lobbied officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, to overturn the sanctions. In a meeting in August 2024, the chairman of an umbrella organization of settlement councils in the West Bank, the Yesha Council, urged the prime minister to prioritize the issue. “The sword is already on the country’s neck,” he warned.64 Another settler leader denounced the sanctions as a “complete crushing of Israeli sovereignty.”65

As sanctions by the United States and other Western countries intensified, settler leaders ramped up their pressure on the government. The community rallied around sanctioned settlers, revealed by attempts to raise hundreds of thousands of shekels for those who could not access their bank accounts.66 In an unusual appeal in October 2024, the head of the Yesha Council demanded a review of the way that the government had dealt with the sanctions, and decried Netanyahu’s inattention.67

A settler leader urged the government to completely stop funding the Palestinian Authority in response to the sanctions, and called on Netanyahu to take unilateral measures to annex the West Bank if they continued.

Settler leaders also exploited the backlash by pushing for actions that would reinforce the dispossession of Palestinians. For example, the Yesha Council submitted a formal request urging the government to adopt measures in response to the sanctions that would expand the settlement footprint.68 A settler leader urged the government to completely stop funding the Palestinian Authority in response to the sanctions, and called on Netanyahu to take unilateral measures to annex the West Bank if they continued.69 Smotrich repeatedly threatened to sever funding to the Palestinian Authority.70

In one case, the sanctions may have prompted settler leaders to issue a rare condemnation of violence. After settlers violently attacked four Bedouin women and a child on August 9, 2024, in the illegal outpost of Givat Ronen south of Nablus, Yesha Council Chair Israel Gantz and the Samaria Regional Council Head Yossi Dagan issued a statement condemning the violence and calling for the perpetrators to be punished according to Israeli law.71 Some U.S. officials suspected that the sanctions had pushed local leaders to issue that appeal for calm, but this was a rare case amid a general trend of rising settler violence from 2023 onwards.72 Still, at minimum, the reactions of settler leaders to the listings showed that the sanctions constituted a major issue of concern for their communities.

Government Reactions

Israeli government officials perceived the listings as a serious blow.73 Netanyahu repeatedly protested the listings in his calls with Biden.74 He defended the “overwhelming majority of residents” of the West Bank as law-abiding citizens and called the measures unnecessary.75

Yoav Gallant, the defense minister until November 2024, was silent on the sanctions issue and took action on settler violence by placing extremist settlers into administrative detention.76 His successor, Israel Katz, however, revoked the detentions as soon as he took office and publicly called the sanctions “unjustified.”77

Ben Gvir and Smotrich, whose constituencies were affected by the actions, vehemently criticized the U.S. move. Smotrich called the sanctions an “inappropriate and unacceptable step between friendships” that was “crossing a red line.”78 Ben Gvir called the sanctions a “campaign of persecution” and “blood libel by antisemitic, Israel-hating elements.”79

As time went on, hardliners in the Israeli government used the sanctions as leverage in negotiations to advance objectives that contradicted American goals. As noted above, Smotrich refrained from cutting off the Palestinian banking system in return for the March 2024 Treasury letter. In June 2024, he again threatened to send Palestinian banking into crisis. While he ultimately refrained from doing so, in a gesture of defiance he pushed through the Israeli government’s legalization of five settler outposts, one for each country that recognized Palestine in 2024.80 Smotrich continued to use the sanctions as a negotiating chip throughout the year.81

Hard-line ministers also used their campaigns against the sanctions to bolster the support of their bases, both because the sanctions played into the “everyone is against us” narrative and because they were able to claim that they were outmaneuvering the Americans, for example through securing the March 2024 comfort letter.82 In some cases the sanctions prompted senior government officials to make a dedicated show of support for those on the blacklists. For example, after Canada listed the construction company Amana in July 2024, three ministers went on a tour with the firm’s CEO to show support for what they called “the important enterprise of farms in Judea and Samaria.” In a video message, the ministers committed to strengthening the firm “as much as possible.”83

Israel’s security establishment and other technocratic elements of the government saw the sanctions as a setback in Israeli–U.S. relations, even though they tended to view settler violence as corrosive and deserving of criminal penalties.84 U.S. officials said that, at the working level, their Israeli counterparts responded to the sanctions with “disappointment and shock.”85 They read the sanctions as a breach of friendship by the Americans. As one former official explained, while the behavior of extremist settlers was despicable, “the sanctions are an expression of disrespect for the Israeli political system, the electorate and the Israel–U.S. alliance.”86

Public Perceptions

It is difficult to measure the effects of sanctions on the Israeli public, but early indications suggest they were polarizing. Centrist and left-wing Israeli Jews believed that the sanctions were justified: a poll found that 48 percent of centrists and 75 percent of left-wing Israeli Jews felt that way.87 A common perspective of right-wing commentators was opposition to the measures and concern about violations of Israeli sovereignty. They also discredited the policy as equivalent to the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, an initiative that is strongly associated with antisemitism in Israel.88

The media initially cast the move as a major development. A common refrain was one of shock that Israel, a close partner of the United States, was being put in the same category as global pariahs. “Iran. Cuba. North Korea. Russia. Syria. Tzav 9?” an incredulous Jerusalem Post editorial board asked in June 2024.89 Commentators noted their concern that the sanctions signaled a rupture in the U.S.–Israeli relationship.90

As time went on, however, the sanctions seemed more like a slap on the wrist, as U.S. military and diplomatic backing for Israel continued. Extensive U.S. support for Israel in the months after October 7, such as the continuous flow of military supplies for the wars in Gaza and Lebanon and Washington’s diplomatic cover at the UN, prompted some Israelis to conclude that where it counted, America stood by Israel. As one observer put it, “If you want to shoot, shoot, don’t talk.”91 Another agreed: “Israelis care about tachlis,” he said, using the Yiddish word that roughly translates to the bottom line. “But Americans . . . think that politics is done through talking.”92 Ultimately, many saw the sanctions as symbolic. After Trump’s election, they figured Israel could withstand any consequences until the Trump administration did away with the whole program.93

Moreover, to many Israelis, the sanctions paled in comparison to the atrocities of October 7, the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, the Iranian missile attacks, and the other dramatic events of that year. “It’s like a mosquito bite,” one Israeli financial expert said, and then paused before reframing: “It’s even less than that. It’s like a fly that flew into the room, and then left.”94

Assessing Effectiveness

Evaluating the U.S. sanctions’ impact is challenging, given that they were only in effect for eleven months and the settlements have been a feature of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict for almost six decades. In other parts of the world, sanctions’ economic and political impacts often take years to materialize. Another challenge is that the U.S. government set no benchmarks by which to measure the program’s effectiveness. While many officials across the administration were invested in the program’s success, they had different perspectives on what success looked like. The mix of different and at times conflicting aspirations for the program—and resistance to it among some officials—make a clear assessment impossible.

However, early signals revealed both successes and unintended consequences of the program.

Limited Successes

The West Bank sanctions achieved some limited successes before Trump terminated the program.95 First, the sanctions broke a long-standing taboo in U.S. foreign policy toward Israel by taking punitive action with regard to settler violence, something that had previously gone largely unchallenged by Washington. That shone a spotlight on settler violence and the illegal settlements.

Secondly, the sanctions had tangible effects on the individuals and organizations they targeted. The economic penalties presented obstacles to their day-to-day lives and limited their financial resources, even if the Treasury eased some of the impact with its March 2024 letter. The fact that Israeli banks adhered to the sanctions at all should be seen as a success, given that Israeli banks were not obligated to enforce them. The sanctions created enough of a crisis that settler leaders put time and energy into finding ways to mitigate their effects, such as through crowdfunding and vigorous petitions of the Israeli government.

Thirdly, the sanctions succeeded in riling up key figures within the Israeli government, particularly Smotrich and Ben Gvir. Their vociferous criticism of the measures shows the extent to which the sanctions created discomfort among Israeli leaders closely linked to the settlement movement.

Fourthly, the sanctions had the effect of bolstering anti-occupation activists in Israel. Those who had long condemned and worked against settler violence said that the sanctions made them feel supported after years of isolation.96 As one activist put it, “For the first time in the twenty years that I have been active against the occupation, I have a stick that I can beat them with.”97

Unintended Consequences

But the sanctions also inadvertently resulted in consequences that ran counter to the objectives of U.S. policymakers. First, as detailed above, hardliners in the Israeli government used the sanctions as leverage in negotiations to advance objectives that contradicted American goals and harmed Palestinians. Secondly, settler leaders retaliated against the sanctions by pushing the Israeli government to take actions that further deprived Palestinians of their rights. Thirdly, settler leaders and far-right politicians used the measures to drum up support for blacklisted parties.

Fourthly, the perception that the sanctions were merely symbolic diminished their effectiveness. Other missteps also lessened the program’s impact. In one incident, Treasury mistakenly added the wrong Israeli man to the blacklist, confusing a violent settler with a reservist in Haifa with a similar name.98 Incidents such as these caused one former government official to opine that “the programs are done so unseriously, it stretches credulity.”99 This perception was strengthened by the choice of some of the sanctions targets, which some Israelis viewed as marginal or obscure.100

A Palestinian shepherd herds his sheep in Ein al-Auja in the Jordan Valley of the West Bank on June 24, 2020. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images
A Palestinian shepherd herds his sheep in Ein al-Auja in the Jordan Valley of the West Bank on June 24, 2020. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images

Facts on the Ground

On the ground in the West Bank, settler violence did not abate throughout the eleven-month period in which sanctions were in place. Incidents of settler violence remained steady compared to the period before the program came into effect—a period which had seen the highest number of incidents related to settler violence since records began.101

The trend of settlement expansion also continued. Government funding for the settlements shot up, with the government doubling the budget for the minister of settlements and increasing the budget for the settlement division.102 Settlers built a record number of new illegal outposts in the West Bank in 2024. They also constructed dozens of kilometers of new roads, and West Bank committees advanced plans to create 9,884 new housing units in the settlements. In 2024, the government declared more than 24,000 dunams (around 6,000 acres) of new state land, recognized seventy illegal outposts as eligible for funding and infrastructure, and devoted a record amount of funding to illegal outposts.103

The Israeli government also amplified its public support for settlement expansion. Far-right ministers doubled down on their expansionist rhetoric, with Smotrich noting that “now is the time . . . to apply [Israeli] sovereignty to the settlements in Judea and Samaria.”104 The government also kickstarted an administrative infrastructure that would facilitate the full-blown annexation of the West Bank via a newly created civil and political administration under Smotrich’s direct authority and control, an unprecedented move.105

Ultimately, sanctions against individuals and groups were no match for the powerful elements of the Israeli government driving both settlement expansion and providing top cover—legal, military, and financial—for violent actors. The influence of settler ministers in key positions meant that settlers were more intertwined with the state apparatus than ever before, and thus more entrenched.106 The increased militarization in the West Bank after October 7 also contributed to increased violence.107

The sanctions did not appear to have a chilling effect on the economy of the West Bank or Israel’s broader financial system, and it is unclear whether the sanctions discouraged U.S. charitable donations to the settlements. Banks in the United States and Israel never revised their policies on doing business with settlers in the West Bank, nor did Israel’s central bank issue Israeli banks guidance to change their practices based on the U.S. measures.108

Views on Expansion

What would have happened if the U.S. sanctions were expanded, or if the U.S. sanctioned ministers Ben Gvir and Smotrich, as the UK and other countries did in June 2025? It is impossible to know, but this research raises several possibilities.

Activists believed that expanded designations would deter settlement expansion.109 As one said, “We have an opportunity—it’s a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity—where the ‘S’ word is being used for Israelis, and we need to squeeze this out as much as we can.” The more expansive the targets, he believed, the more illegal settlements would be compromised.110

But several experts feared retaliation against Palestinians if sanctions reached Israeli ministers.111 One Palestinian expert predicted that “backlash would be a net negative for Palestinians” and that targeting Smotrich would give his cabinet “license to tank the Palestinian economy.”112 An Israeli expert agreed: “I know these guys, and if you push them, they push back. If you push them really hard, they’ll push back really hard.”113 Indeed, after being listed, Smotrich immediately made moves to paralyze the West Bank economy.114

Others predicted that sanctioning the ministers would backfire other ways. One expert said that Ben Gvir and Smotrich “couldn’t care less” about being sanctioned by the United States and would only use a listing to strengthen their political bases.115 “Israelis will go mad that the U.S. is boycotting our finance minister,” the expert said.116 Several experts and current and former government officials predicted a “rally ’round the flag” reaction, in which the Israeli public would increase support for Israeli leaders to show national unity.117

“Other countries could take this as a signal that it’s now okay to start boycotting us,” one Israeli commentator said. “It could really be a disaster for Israel.”

Some guessed that if the United States had listed ministers or major Israeli organizations it would have triggered a cascade of withdrawals by foreign companies from the Israeli market. “Other countries could take this as a signal that it’s now okay to start boycotting us,” one Israeli commentator said. “It could really be a disaster for Israel.”118 Yet some predicted that divestment on a large scale would unite Israelis, rather than drive wedges between constituencies.119 Others thought that, despite Israel’s deep links with the United States, economic and otherwise, the Israeli economy would have adapted to greater sanctions. “Israelis are risk takers. You don’t threaten us with a little sanction,” one Israeli financial expert said.120

Such scenarios will remain hypothetical under the Trump administration, which seems unlikely to sanction Israelis in the coming years. However, the expanding sanctions by the UK and other countries will provide concrete lessons for policymakers. They deserve further study.

Lessons Learned

Early successes, like breaking a U.S. policy taboo, disrupting the day-to-day lives of certain violent settlers, putting Israeli officials and settler leaders on the defensive, and supporting anti-occupation efforts show the sanctions’ impact. But unintended consequences, such as the inadvertent empowerment of hardliners and expressions of support for the settlers, reveal that such economic measures are not a silver bullet. The Trump administration’s jettisoning of the sanctions program makes it impossible to know whether the program, had it been refined, would have had more impact.121 However, the brief history of these sanctions offers lessons about how future U.S. administrations—and especially other governments—could more effectively use this tool.

Integrating Sanctions with Broader Policy

First, sanctions cannot be the surrogate for a broader policy on the settlement issue. Whether the overarching goal of such a program is focused narrowly on settler violence or broadly on the settlement project, it is unlikely to have a significant effect in the absence of other actions. When it comes to influencing the settlers, sanctions’ symbolic and financial impacts pale in comparison with the Israeli government’s pro-settlement agenda; the pro-settler politicians’ control over the policing, civil administration, and finances of the West Bank; the increased militarization in the territory; and a failure of the judicial system to prosecute violations of Israeli law when it comes to Israeli attacks against Palestinians. Sanctions cannot work in a vacuum; they can only function as part of a comprehensive policy regarding the settlements.

Addressing the root of the issue would require a future U.S. government to recognize that the problem of settler violence is not one of a few bad apples, but something entrenched in the Israeli state.122 Such an approach would involve recognizing the array of legal, political, security, and economic support that the current Israeli government provides to the settlement movement. It would also require a U.S. response to the expansion of illegal outposts, the legalization of existing outposts, attacks on Palestinian civilians, and the facade of law enforcement when it comes to settler violence.123 Grappling with these issues will be essential alongside any future sanctions policy.

Communicating Clearly

Secondly, sanctions’ effects are limited in the absence of a comprehensive communications strategy. Inconsistent messaging undercut the West Bank program’s effectiveness. The March 2024 letter providing comfort to banks is an instructive example. The letter, even though it did not create a new policy, diluted the message that the sanctions were meant to sting. The ability of far-right ministers to capture the narrative and suggest that they had the advantage similarly blunted the sanctions’ impact. Much of sanctions’ effectiveness lies in the message that they send, requiring a vigorous and cohesive public diplomacy and media outreach strategy. But this needs coherence from policymakers about the aims of the program, something that the Biden administration lacked.

Designing Off-Ramps

Thirdly, an improved future sanctions policy would include off-ramps: clear paths for targets to become delisted. Without such exit routes, sanctions targets are more likely to double down on their bad behavior. If a future U.S. government chooses to use sanctions to tackle the issue of settler violence, potential steps for delisting could include enforcement by Israel of its existing laws to prosecute violent settlers. If a future U.S. government wants to use a sanctions program to tackle the broader settlement enterprise (beyond settler violence), delisting criteria could include steps taken by a future Israeli government to halt settlement expansion, such as a commitment to avoid further legalization of outposts. Any relief guidelines would have the added value of clarifying the sanctions’ goals.

U.S. sanctions on Israeli settlers marked a significant departure in Washington’s approach to the West Bank and to Israel more broadly. But alone, the measures could not shift entrenched dynamics. Nor could they change the direction of the current Israeli government, which strongly supports settlement expansion and at best tolerates settler violence. Future policymakers should learn from this experience and apply the lessons of the West Bank sanctions program when designing future measures.

This report is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.

Header Image: An Israeli soldier looks at the Palestinian village of Kfar Kadum as she guards the Jewish settlement of Har Hemed near Nablus in the West Bank, on June 26, 2020. Source: Amir Levy/Getty Images

Notes

  1. Dan Rothem, Jess Manville, and Michael Koplow, “An Unsettled Question: Recalibrating U.S. Policy on Israeli Settlements,” Israel Policy Forum, July 2023, https://www.israelpolicyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/08/An-Unsettled-Question-Recalibrating-U.S.-Policy-on-Israeli-Settlements.pdf.
  2. A selection includes Shane Bauer, “The Israeli Settlers Attacking their Palestinian Neighbors,” New Yorker, February 26, 2024 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2024/03/04/israel-west-bank-settlers-attacks-palestinians; Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Unpunished: How Extremists Took over Israel,” New York Times Magazine, May 16, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/16/magazine/israel-west-bank-settler-violence-impunity.html; “West Bank: Israel Responsible for Rising Settler Violence,” Human Rights Watch, April 17, 2024 https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/04/17/west-bank-israel-responsible-rising-settler-violence. For an earlier report that informs the research here, see “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root,” Crisis Group Middle East Report no. 246, September 6, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena-israelpalestine/246-stemming-israeli-settler-violence. See also, “Settler Violence Rises in the West Bank during the Gaza War,” Crisis Group Q&A, 6 November 2023 https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/east-mediterranean-mena/israelpalestine/settler-violence-rises-west-bank-gaza-war.
  3. See Gershom Gorenberg, The Accidental Empire: Israel and the Birth of the Settlements, 1967–1977 (New York: Times Books, 2006).
  4. “Mapping Israeli Settlement Expansion in the West Bank,” International Crisis Group visual explainer, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/israeli-settlements/.
  5. UN Security Council resolutions such as Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) and Security Council Resolution 2334 (2016).
  6. “The Levy Commission Report on the Legal Status of Building in Judea and Samaria,” commissioned by the Prime Minister of Israel, June 21, 2012.
  7. “Question of the Observance of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 in Occupied Palestinian Territory,” UN, 1979, https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-200116/; Brian Finucane, “Biden Can’t Denounce Russia’s Annexations and Ignore Israel’s,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2022 https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/12/06/biden-cant-denounce-russias-annexations-and-ignore-israels/ and Rothem, Manville, and Koplow, “An Unsettled Question.”
  8. Rothem, Manville, and Koplow, “An Unsettled Question.”
  9.  Yaakov “Ketzaleh” Katz, “West Bank Jewish Population Stats (Not Including Eastern Jerusalem),” updated January 1, 2025, https://westbankjewishpopulationstats.com/; “30 Years after Oslo—The Data That Shows How the Settlements Proliferated Following the Oslo Accords,” Peace Now, September 11, 2023 https://peacenow.org.il/en/30-years-after-oslo-the-data-that-shows-how-the-settlements-proliferated-following-the-oslo-accords; and David Gritten and Yolande Knell, “Israel Announces Major Expansion of Settlements in Occupied West Bank,” BBC, May 29, 2025, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c1j5954edlno.
  10. “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel: Flash Update #91,” UN OCHA, January 13, 2024, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/hostilities-gaza-strip-and-israel-flash-update-91#:~:text=Violence%20and%20casualties%20(West%20Bank)&text=Since%207%20October%202023%20and,in%20Israel%20on%2030%20November; and “The Other Mass Displacement: Settlers Advance on West Bank Herders,” UN OCHA, November 1, 2023, https://www.ochaopt.org/content/other-mass-displacement-while-eyes-are-gaza-settlers-advance-west-bank-herders.
  11. Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root,” and UN OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel.”
  12. Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root.” See also “The Status of de Jure West Bank Annexation,” Israel Policy Forum, July 2024, https://israelpolicyforum.org/2024/07/11/the-status-of-de-jure-west-bank-annexation/.
  13.  Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root,” and “War and Annexation: How the Israeli Government Changed the West Bank,” Peace Now, October 2024, https://peacenow.org.il/en/war-and-annexation-how-the-israeli-government-changed-the-west-bank-during-the-first-year-of-war.
  14.  “Smotrich: Huwara Should Be Wiped Out,” Times of Israel, March 1, 2023 https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/smotrich-huwara-should-be-wiped-out/; and “In Fiery Security Meeting Ben Gvir Said to Defend Violent Settlers as ‘Sweet Kids’,” Times of Israel, June 28, 2023 https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-fiery-security-meeting-ben-gvir-said-to-defend-violent-settlers-as-sweet-kids/.
  15. Peace Now, “War and Annexation.”
  16. Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root.”
  17. UN OCHA, “Hostilities in the Gaza Strip and Israel.”
  18. Senior U.S. government officials, interviews with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  19. Linda Thomas Greenfield (@USAmbUN, U.S. Ambassador to the UN), post on X, November 30, 2023 https://x.com/USAmbUN/status/1730017591052132443; and “Secretary Blinken’s Call with Israeli Minister Ganz,” readout, U.S. State Department, November 16, 2023 https://2021-2025.state.gov/secretary-blinkens-call-with-israeli-minister-gantz-3/.
  20.  Jennifer Hansler, “Blinken Announces Policy to Restrict Visas to US for Extremists in the West Bank,” CNN, December 5, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/12/05/politics/blinken-visa-restrictions-extremists-west-bank.
  21. “Executive Order on Imposing Certain Sanctions on Persons Undermining Peace, Security and Stability in the West Bank,” White House, February 1, 2024 https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/02/01/executive-order-on-imposing-certain-sanctions-on-persons-undermining-peace-security-and-stability-in-the-west-bank/.
  22.  Brad Brooks-Rubin, “Do Sanctions Work? It Depends. Burma and the West Bank Might Be Models,” Just Security, November 13, 2024, https://www.justsecurity.org/104800/sanctions-effectiveness-models/.
  23. “Plundered Pastures: Israeli Settler Shepherding Outposts in the West Bank and Their Infringement on Palestinian’s Human Rights,” position paper, Yesh Din, 2021, https://www.yesh-din.org/en/plundered-pastures-israeli-settler-shepherding-outposts-in-the-west-bank-and-their-infringement-on-palestinians-human-rights/.
  24. U.S. Treasury and State Department press releases from February 2024 to January 2025, https://www.state.gov/press-releases/ https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases. Also, U.S. officials, interviews with Crisis Group in Jerusalem,  Washington, D.C. and conducted virtually, May, August, and September 2024.
  25. European diplomats, interviews with Crisis Group, Brussels, September 2024; and “G7 Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in the West Bank,” July 11, 2024 https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/israelpalestine-g7-foreign-ministers%E2%80%99-statement-situation-west-bank_e.
  26.  Lazar Berman, “Canada Sanctions Israeli Extremists, Settler Groups over Violence against Palestinians,” Times of Israel, June 27, 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/canada-sanctions-israeli-extremists-settler-groups-over-violence-against-palestinians/; Hagar Shezaf, “Israeli Settler Group Funneled Half a Million Dollars in Public Money to Illegal Settlements,” Haaretz, December 16, 2020 https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2020-12-16/ty-article/.premium/israeli-settler-council-funneled-half-a-million-dollars-to-illegal-settlements/0000017f-dc60-d3a5-af7f-feee0d270000; and European diplomats, Crisis Group interviews, Brussels, 2024.
  27. “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom on Measures Targeting Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich,” joint statement from foreign ministers, June 10, 2025, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-ministers-joint-statement-on-measures-targeting-itamar-ben-gvir-and-bezalel-smotrich.
  28. UK diplomats, interview with Crisis Group, London, October 2024.
  29. European diplomats, interviews with Crisis Group, Brussels, September 2024.
  30. U.S. government officials, interviews with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  31. Senior U.S. government official, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  32. Ibid.
  33. Ibid.
  34. U.S. government officials, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  35. Ibid.
  36. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024.
  37. Senior U.S. government official, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  38. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024.
  39. Ibid.
  40. U.S. officials, interviews with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  41. Senators Benjamin L. Cardin, Jack Reed, and Mark R. Warner, letter addressed to Secretary Blinken and Secretary Yellin on extremist settler violence in the West Bank, September 27, 2024 https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/92724cardinreedwarnerlettertoblinkenrewestbank.pdf; U.S. officials, interviews with the author, conducted virtually, November 2024; and Israeli anti-occupation activist, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  42. U.S. officials, interviews with the author, Washington, D.C. and conducted virtually, May 2024.
  43. U.S. official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024.
  44.  U.S. diplomat, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  45. Washington-based Israel advocacy organization, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  46. Senior U.S. government official, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  47. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024.
  48.  Concerns also extended to issues related to revoking charities’ 501(c)(3) status. Senior U.S. government official, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024 and Daniel Weissner, “Biden Administration Sued over Sanctions for Israeli Settlers,” Reuters, August 7, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/biden-administration-sued-over-sanctions-israeli-settlers-2024-08-07/.
  49. U.S. government officials, interviews with the author, conducted virtually, November 2024.
  50. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024.
  51. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024; and U.S. diplomat, Crisis Group interview, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  52. U.S. official, interview with the author,  Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  53. “Local Bank Freezes Account of Second Extremist Settler Hit with US Sanctions,” The Times of Israel, February 6, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/local-bank-freezes-account-of-second-extremist-settler-hit-with-us-sanctions/.
  54. James Longman and Yael Benaya, “Israeli Settler Sanctioned by Biden Speaks Out,” ABC News, February 8, 2024, https://abcnews.go.com/International/israeli-settler-sanctioned-biden-speaks/story?id=106988009.
  55. U.S. government official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, May 2024; and former U.S. government official, written correspondence with the author, April 2024.
  56. A senior member of the Yesha Council, an umbrella organization of settlement councils in the West Bank, quoted in Yosef Arnfeld, “They Took All Our Money,” Olam Katan, August 8, 2024, https://olam-katan.co.il/Article.aspx?id=35331.
  57. Israeli human rights activist, interview with the author, Jerusalem, 2024.
  58.  “Letter from Bradley T. Smith, Director, Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of the Treasury, to Daniel Hahiashvili, Supervisor of Banks, Bank of Israel,” U.S. Treasury, March 26, 2024 https://ofac.treasury.gov/media/932781/download?inline.
  59. U.S. official, interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  60.  “Meltdown Looms for the West Bank’s Financial Lifelines,” International Crisis Group, June 27, 2024 https://www.crisisgroup.org/united-states-israelpalestine/meltdown-looms-west-banks-financial-lifelines; and U.S. official, interview with the author,  Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  61. Sam Mednick and Julia Frankel, “Israeli Settlers in the West Bank Were Hit with International Sanctions. It Only Emboldened Them,” Associated Press, June 6, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/us-sanctions-israeli-settlers-west-bank-palestinians-354f8b0a44b70c25bf013614b477590.
  62. Palestinian expert, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  63. “Sanctions Crisis: Yesha Council Heads Will Meet Netanyahu Today,” 0404 News, August 8, 2024, https://www.0404.co.il/?p=1008777;“Sanctions against Settlers: Yesha Council Heads to Meet Netanyahu,” B’Hadrei Haredim, August 8, 2024, https://www.bhol.co.il/news/1670747.
  64.  Elisha Ben-Kimon and Itamar Eichner. “Settler Representatives Demanded a Sanctions Coordinator; Netanyahu: ‘Good Idea,’” Yedioth Ahronoth, August 8, 2024, https://www.ynet.co.il/news/article/hyumovzqr.
  65. Ibid
  66.  Julia Frankel, “Online Fundraisers for Violent West Bank Settlers Raised Thousands, Despite International Sanctions,” Associated Press, February 23, 2024 https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-sanctions-settlers-biden-west-bank-85cee76d68c17091d9b4d3e14f3eeb74.
  67. Shirit Avitan Cohen, “Yesha Council in an Unusual Appeal to the State Comptroller: Investigate the Government over the Sanctions,” Israel Hayom, 28 October 2024, https://www.israelhayom.co.il/news/geopolitics/article/16683235.
  68.  Ibid. and “The Cabinet Has Decided to Establish Five New Settlements Deep in the West Bank,” Peace Now, June 30,  2024 https://peacenow.org.il/en/cabinet-decision-5-new-settlements.
  69. -Kimon and Itamar Eichner, “Settler Representatives Demanded a Sanctions Coordinator.”
  70. Crisis Group, “Meltdown Looms for the West Bank’s Financial Lifelines.”
  71.  “Samaria Resident Arrested in Givat Ronen Released to House Arrest,” Israel National News, August 18, 2024, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/news/394808.
  72. U.S. official, correspondence with the author, September 2024.
  73. Former Israeli officials, Israeli commentators, and U.S. diplomats, interviews with the author, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and conducted virtually, October and November 2024.
  74. U.S. officials, interviews with the author,  Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  75. “Prime Minister’s Office Statement on Us President Biden’s Executive Order,” press release, Office of the Prime Minister of Israel, February 1, 2024, https://www.gov.il/en/pages/pmo-statement-on-us-president-biden-s-executive-order-3-feb-2024.
  76. Emanuel Fabien, “Katz Releases All Israeli Settlers in Administrative Detention, Ties It to Palestinians’ Release,” Times of Israel, January 17, 2025 https://www.timesofisrael.com/katz-says-settlers-in-administrative-detention-to-go-free-ties-it-to-palestinian-release/ ; and “Israel DM Slams Settler Violence, Attacks Ben-Gvir,” Middle East Monitor, August 23, 2023 https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20230823-israel-dm-slams-settler-violence-attacks-ben-gvir/.
  77. Barak Ravid, “U.S. Warns Israel Against Dropping Detention of Settlers in Occupied West Bank,” Axios, November 23,  2024, https://www.axios.com/2024/11/23/us-israel-jewish-settler-detention-west-bank.
  78. “EU Slaps Sanctions on 6 Israeli Individuals, 3 Entities over ‘Rights Abuses,’” Reuters, July 15, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/eu-imposes-sanctions-five-israeli-individuals-three-entities-2024-07-15/.
  79. Leon Kraiem, “Us Sanctions Lehava Leader, Fundraisers for Violent Settlers,” Jerusalem Post, April 19, 2024, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/article-797944.
  80. Spain, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, and Armenia officially recognized a Palestinian state in May and June 2024. Crisis Group, “Meltdown Looms for the West Bank’s Financial Lifelines”; and U.S. diplomat, interviews with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024. Also see Aaron Boxerman and Adam Rasgon, “Israeli Minister Will Release Palestinian Funds if Settlements Are Legalized, Officials Say,” New York Times, June 28, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/29/world/middleeast/israel-funds-palestinian-authority-smotrich.html.
  81. U.S. official, interview with the author,  Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  82. David Israel, “Biden Cries Uncle as Smotrich Wins War against Sanctions on Settlers,” Jewish Press, March 29, 2024 https://www.jewishpress.com/news/israel/settlements-israel/biden-cries-uncle-as-smotrich-wins-war-against-sanctions-on-settlers/2024/03/29/. Also, Israeli commentators, interviews with the author, conducted virtually, September and October 2024.
  83. Video released by Ministers Chikli, Strook, and Dichter on a tour with Amana’s CEO, in support of settler herding farms, available via Yehuda Shaul (@YehudaShaul), post to X, July 4, 2024, https://x.com/YehudaShaul/status/1808677155821531434.
  84.  Statements of former senior security officials condemning settler violence, available via Yehuda Shaul (@YehudaShaul), posts to X, September 8, 2024 https://x.com/YehudaShaul/status/1832719862315045162 and August 19, 2024, https://x.com/YehudaShaul/status/1825520020937404812.
  85. U.S. government officials,  interview with the author, Washington, D.C., May 2024.
  86. Former Israeli government official, interview with the author, September 2024.
  87. Tamar Hermann, Lior Yohanani, and Yaron Kaplan, “A Majority of Jewish Israelis See a Hostage Deal as a Higher National Priority than Military Action in Rafah,” Israeli Voice Index, War in Gaza Survey 16, May 13, 2024, https://en.idi.org.il/articles/54052. Left-wingers and centrists constitute about 40 percent of Jewish Israeli society. See Dahlia Scheindlin, “Israel: The Left in Peril,” New York Review of Books, November 12, 2023, https://www.nybooks.com/online/2023/11/12/israel-the-left-in-peril/; and “Dahlia Scheindlin on Israeli Opinion—Gaza: the Human Toll,” transcript of a Center for Strategic and International Studies event hosted on August 29, 2024 https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2024-08/240829_Scheindlin_Israeli_Opinion.pdf?VersionId=4sjK.k23nnv2z7hbZaWVxqUKN5eQbfc3.
  88. Israeli political commentator, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  89.  “Sanctioning Tzav 9 Shows Biden Administration’s Detachment from Reality,” Jerusalem Post editorial, June 18, 2024 https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-806614.
  90. Israeli commentators, interviews with the author, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, and conducted virtually, May to November 2024.
  91. Israeli legal scholar, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  92. Israeli activist and expert, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  93. Israeli legal scholar, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  94. Israeli official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  95. Brooks-Rubin, “Do Sanctions Work?”
  96. U.S. diplomat, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024. Also, comments by Nadav Weiman, Executive Director, Breaking the Silence at an event organized by the Stimson Center titled “Voices for Peace and Human Rights in Israel/Palestine,” September 9, 2024 https://www.stimson.org/event/voices-for-peace-and-human-rights-in-israel-palestine/.
  97. Israeli anti-occupation activist, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  98.  ToI Staff and Jacob Magid, “After Mix-up, US Lifts Sanctions on Israeli Man, Blacklists Similarly Named Activist,” Times of Israel, July 16, 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-mix-up-us-lifts-sanctions-on-israeli-man-blacklists-similarly-named-activist/.
  99.  Former Israeli government official, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  100. Ibid.
  101. “The Other Mass Displacement: Settlers Advance on West Bank Herders,” UN OCHA, November 1, 2023 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/other-mass-displacement-while-eyes-are-gaza-settlers-advance-west-bank-herders-enhe; “West Bank Snapshot,” UN OCHA, December 14, 2023, https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/west-bank-snapshot-14-december-2023; and “Humanitarian Situation Update #252: West Bank,” UN OCHA, January 2, 2025 https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/humanitarian-situation-update-252-west-bank.
  102. “2024 in the West Bank—The Year of Annexation and Expulsion,” Peace Now, February 2025, https://peacenow.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/SW-Report-Summary-2024-Peace-Now-February-2025.pdf.
  103. Peace Now, “War and Annexation” and “2024 in the West Bank—The Year of Annexation and Expulsion.”
  104. “Smotrich Says Trump’s Victory an Opportunity to ‘Apply Sovereignty’ in the West Bank,” Times of Israel, November 11, 2024 https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-says-trumps-victory-an-opportunity-to-apply-sovereignty-in-the-west-bank/.
  105. Ibid.
  106. UN official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  107. Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root.”
  108. U.S. banking and sanctions expert, interview with the author, February 2024 and Israeli official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  109. Magen Inon, “UK Sanctions on Settlers Are Making a Difference. Take It from an Israeli—They Should Go Further,” = Guardian, October 23, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/oct/23/uk-sanctions-settlers-israel-politicians.
  110. Israeli anti-occupation activist, interview with the author, conducted virtually, September 2024.
  111. U.S. official, interview with the author,  Washington, D.C., May 2024 and Palestinian policy expert, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  112. Palestinian expert, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.
  113. Israeli commentator, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  114. Jacob Magid, “Smotrich Moves to Paralyze Palestinian Economy in Response to Western Sanctions,” Times of Israel, June 11, 2025, https://www.timesofisrael.com/smotrich-moves-to-paralyze-palestinian-economy-in-response-to-western-sanctions/.
  115. Israeli commentator, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  116. Ibid.
  117. Experts, UN officials, and current and former Israeli government officials, interviews with the author, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and conducted virtually, September and October 2024.
  118. Ibid.
  119. UN official, interview with the author, conducted virtually October 2024.
  120. Israeli official, interview with the author, conducted virtually, October 2024.
  121. Brad Brooks-Rubin, “What Just Happened: Trump’s Termination of West Bank Settler Sanctions,” Just Security, January 30, 2025, https://www.justsecurity.org/107176/trump-west-bank-settler-sanctions/.
  122. Crisis Group, “Stemming Israeli Settler Violence at Its Root.”
  123. Israeli activist and expert, interview with the author, Jerusalem, September 2024.

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