The Horn of Africa Needs an End to the Gulf’s Proxy Wars. Cooperation Is Key.

Across the Horn of Africa, a dangerous “great game”-style contest for influence is brewing between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. With civil war raging in Sudan, unrest in Ethiopia, and unending instability in Somalia—to name just a few of the region’s challenges—the stakes could not be higher.

For the competing Gulf powers, the Horn represents a source of raw materials and much-needed agricultural products, and a strategic asset—both as the gateway to the Red Sea and as an arena for flexing geographic, economic, and even cultural influence. For the peoples of the Horn, this competition represents something much more ominous: yet another cycle of interference from foreign powers that have shown a willingness to sacrifice the peace, security, and governance of local populations to serve their own interests. Countries and militias and other nonstate actors are sorting themselves into blocs according to Gulf patronage, with deadly consequences.

Yet there is also potential good that could come from the Gulf countries’ interest in the Horn of Africa. Gulf countries are a source of humanitarian aid and conflict mediation, even if the related benefits have so far been overshadowed by the harms of competition. So too, Gulf countries have made much-needed investment in the Horn, and could do more if they worked together instead of against each other.

To mitigate the negative effects of Gulf competition in the Horn of Africa and bring out more of the positive potentials of Gulf interest in the region, coordination is essential. And the benefits of coordination would accrue to all involved. Aside from more aid and investment, Horn of Africa countries with conflicts would have better forums for negotiating peace. International powers, including the United States, would benefit from more stability in the critical Red Sea corridor. Not least, the Gulf countries themselves would enjoy synergistic economic and political benefits from coordination.

Unfortunately, the cards are somewhat stacked against better coordination, because the administration of Donald Trump has gutted the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development, which has led to the loss of significant institutional knowledge about the Horn of Africa. In particular, there has been a dismaying decline of American interest in urgent conflict situations in desperate need of relief, such as Sudan’s.

But neither the Horn of Africa countries nor even the Gulf powers that are struggling for dominance can wait for a lucky break in American attitudes. They will need to spearhead their own coordination to fend off another season of bloodshed and chaos—like that of the proxy battles that destabilized the Horn during the 2017–21 Gulf crisis, which pitted Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt against Qatar (and its regional ally Turkey). The Gulf powers are already in regular contact with the Trump administration about a wide range of issues, including economic relationships, advanced technological cooperation, and regional security concerns. Improving regional stability in the Horn of Africa should be added to the list.

This report, based on deep research of media sources and reports from nongovernmental organizations, along with interviews of experts, provides an overview of the Gulf competition in the Horn of Africa—its actors, strategic considerations, costs, and potential upsides. Further, it hints at the structure of international coordination that is needed to bring more stability and prosperity, and to channel Gulf interest in Africa into more positive outcomes.

Background: Intra-Gulf Competition in the Middle East and Africa

Middle Eastern and global rivalries have played out in Africa for decades, particularly during the Cold War.¹ In the last decade, Arab states of the Gulf have become particularly significant foreign players along the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa, a region with strategic significance for the Gulf and the global economy. The 2017–21 Gulf crisis projected intra-Gulf rivalries to the Horn, intensifying the region’s political and ideological fault lines. The Saudi, Emirati, Bahraini, and Egyptian boycott of Qatar during this period often pitted a Saudi–Emirati–Egyptian axis against a Qatari–Turkish one in the Middle East and neighboring regions. The two sides often engaged in zero-sum proxy battles for political, economic, and ideological influence in the Horn, looking to consolidate alliances while being divided by disparate views on the role of Islamists in the region’s politics and threat perceptions about Iran.²

After Qatar and its Gulf neighbors signed a reconciliation accord in January 2021 (known as the “al-Ula agreement”), competition between them gradually decreased, though it persists.³ Multiple factors contributed to this de-escalation. Qatar had backed or tolerated Islamist movements in the region, which Saudi Arabia and the Emirates viewed as a threat. But the political power of Islamists across the region receded in the decade after the 2011 Arab uprisings, somewhat dampening the regional security threat that Abu Dhabi and Riyadh perceived from them. Moreover, Doha, anxious to avoid another boycott, seems to have taken a more cautious approach in its foreign policy since the Gulf rift. Qatar has worked hard to improve bilateral political and economic cooperation with both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, and the three states cooperate more regularly on regional de-escalation and conflict mitigation.⁴

Another factor contributing to lower tensions between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors has been that the Emirates and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume full diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022 and 2023, respectively. The countries had both been proponents of Trump’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran during his first term in office, whereas Qatar had always maintained warm or neutral ties with Tehran.⁵ Further, the signing of the al-Ula agreement in 2021 coincided with much of the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic (as well as the change in U.S. administrations), motivating a renewed focus on economic diversification goals and regional de-escalation efforts from Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, in particular with Iran and its allies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and the regime of former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad.⁶ The pandemic’s impact on energy prices and global supply chains hit the rentier states of the Gulf particularly hard, making their economic diversification efforts all the more urgent.⁷ And improving economic links with Africa became a major pillar of Gulf strategies to diversify their economies.⁸

While the al-Ula agreement helped alleviate some of the deep-seated tensions around Qatari, Turkish, and Iranian influence in the region, Saudi–Emirati competition intensified as the push for economic diversification heated up, and Riyadh’s ambitions to assert its regional leadership increased. These Saudi ambitions include the Red Sea and Africa.⁹ “Today we are more active in Africa,” an Emirati businessman said. “And maybe Saudi Arabia sees this as their turf.”¹⁰

Saudi and Emirati Strategy: Overlapping, but with Key Differences

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have much in common in their foreign policies and economic statecraft. Both are very wealthy petrostates, major players in global financial markets, and leading members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Arab League, and Organization for Islamic Cooperation. They pursue a foreign policy rooted in hedging and balancing between regional and global rivals and are focused on domestic economic development goals, particularly diversifying their economies away from hydrocarbons.¹¹ Both states have increased their South-to-South cooperation, preparing themselves politically and economically for an increasingly multipolar world order, and both have been invited to join the BRICS bloc.¹² (Abu Dhabi agreed and participated as a full member in the October 2024 summit in Russia,¹³ while Riyadh has yet to confirm its membership, opting to participate instead in the BRICS+ gathering the following day.¹⁴)

Influence through Investment

Both Gulf states influence the Horn of Africa’s economies and politics to varying degrees through investment, humanitarian assistance, and conflict mediation. They invest, or have plans to invest, in agriculture, minerals, infrastructure, and the communications sector, motivated by shared objectives of improving their food security, diversifying their economies, and developing a domestic advanced technology sector and renewable energy infrastructure (which requires access to many critical minerals found in Africa). They also both profess interest in economic and political stability in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.¹⁵ Officials from both countries emphasize their support for Arab League member countries in the region, such as Sudan and Somalia, and they have a shared interest in counterterrorism efforts to limit the influence of groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia.¹⁶ Both countries have facilitated peace deals, such as the Ethiopia–Eritrea peace accord signed in Jeddah in 2018,¹⁷ and have participated in the stalled conflict mediation efforts to end the civil war in Sudan.¹⁸

The Emirates and Saudi Arabia are motivated by similar threat perceptions and pursue similar strategies in the Horn of Africa, but there are important differences in their approaches due to differences in geography, preferred partners, and level of state capacity.

Saudi Arabia Focuses on Its Domestic Priorities

Saudi officials affirm the strategic importance of the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea to their national interests. Saudi Arabia has the longest Red Sea coastline, and most of its trade arrives via this strategic waterway. Riyadh has invested in mediation and humanitarian aid delivery to help promote regional stability, and Saudi officials underline a special relationship with Arab and Muslim-majority states in the region, particularly Sudan and Somalia. But Saudi Arabia is more focused on its ambitious domestic plans, leaving it limited space to do substantive work on the foreign policy front. It is preoccupied with what it perceives as more direct domestic threats emanating from the Horn of Africa, such as irregular immigration from Ethiopia, or wars in the region threatening its megaprojects along its Red Sea coastline, such as Neom, which are integral to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Vision 2030 plan to socioeconomically reshape the kingdom.¹⁹ Saudi Arabia’s government is a huge bureaucracy that is in the midst of unprecedented domestic economic reforms to increase foreign investment and build real estate ventures and infrastructure across the country to turn it into a regional tourism hub.²⁰

Saudi Arabia has been involved with Sudan mediation, in partnership with the United States, since the war broke out in April 2023. Additionally, it hosted its first-ever Africa summit in November 2023, promising to invest $25 billion across the continent by 2030. However, the amount of state resources Saudi Arabia truly has available to devote to such projects is unclear. As with much of Saudi foreign policy, the problem is often with the capacity of the state and whether it has the tools and financing to implement its objectives. For example, the defunct Red Sea Council was touted in 2020 as Riyadh’s flagship project (in cooperation with Egypt) to build influence and stabilize the region, but it has yet to hold its inaugural meeting, due to disagreements over membership and various other bureaucratic and logistical hurdles, according to Saudi officials.²¹

An Ambitious Emirati Agenda

The Emirates is different in several relevant ways. It is a small state with global expertise in building trade and logistics infrastructure. Yet even though the Emirates’ geography does not include any Red Sea coastline, it is arguably the most important external player in the Red Sea region and in the Horn of Africa.²² Its economic, political, and security presence in the Horn of Africa significantly outweighs that of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab states of the Gulf. The Emirates’ entire foreign policy ethos is rooted in what Emirati officials and experts call the “global connectivity agenda.”²³ This includes building “corridors” in trade, finance, people, and data that inherently need to be protected and supported with an array of political, economic, and security relationships. The Emirates invested $60 billion in Africa from 2012 to 2022, making it the fourth-largest investor on the continent, behind the United States, China, and Europe.²⁴ The gateway for much of that Emirati investment was the Horn of Africa.²⁵ The Emirates’ expertise in port infrastructure, free trade zones, and logistics brought Emirati companies, including the Dubai-based firm DP World, to the Horn of Africa in the early 2000s. And the Emirates has developed economic, political, and security cooperation over the last two decades with Ethiopia, Somalia and its semiautonomous regions, Chad, and nonstate actors, such as the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan (a belligerent in the Sudan civil war that has been accused of genocide). The Emirates is also home to large immigrant communities from across the Horn of Africa,²⁶ has sent troops to fight al-Shabaab in Somalia, and is leading the way in critical mineral investments across Africa.²⁷ 

In Yemen, the Emirates’ role in the Saudi-led coalition has augmented its ties with southern Yemeni armed groups and opened the door to Abu Dhabi’s establishment of military bases in Assab in Eritrea, and on several southern Yemeni islands.²⁸ The Emirates reportedly closed the Assab base in 2021 after ending its official involvement in the Yemen war;²⁹ however, Abu Dhabi’s security presence around strategic chokepoints, such as the Bab al-Mandab and Gulf of Aden, remains intact, due to its strong ties with southern Yemen and semiautonomous regions in Somalia, such as Somaliland and Puntland. According to media reports and satellite images, the Emirates has constructed military outposts in Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia (including in Somaliland and Puntland), Chad, Libya, and Egypt—though Abu Dhabi denies the existence of these bases. Eleonora Ardemagni, an expert on the Gulf monarchies, argues that the “bases are built from scratch, expanded from existing installations, or temporarily used by the Emiratis in allied countries.”³⁰ Several media and research reports suggest that the Emirates continues to expand this network of Red Sea bases.³¹

Rivalries Spill into Ethiopia and Eritrea

Saudi–Emirati competition has played out in major regional rivalries in the Horn of Africa in recent years—including between Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Emirates is more aligned with the former, and Saudi Arabia with the latter, though both Gulf states maintain political and economic relationships with both countries. The potential for renewed conflict between Addis Ababa and Asmara has increased in recent months, and concerns have risen that the competition between their respective Gulf partners could worsen tensions. As the Emirates’ presence in the Horn of Africa has expanded, and the relationship with Ethiopian prime minister Abiy Ahmed has deepened, Eritrean president Isaias Afwerki has increasingly criticized what he sees as the Emirates’ interventionist and imperialist conduct in Africa, calling the Gulf state an “enemy,” castigating its security cooperation with Israel on the continent, and calling out Abu Dhabi’s alleged supplying of weapons to Ethiopia and its intervention in Sudan’s war.³² Eritrean semiofficial media has repeatedly accused the Emirates of supporting Ethiopia’s “expansionist agenda” in the Horn of Africa, meaning its push for sea access and infrastructure.³³

Saudi Arabia’s Narrower Objectives

Both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates maintain economic and political ties with Ethiopia, which, with a population of around 130 million people, is the second most populous country in Africa. Both Gulf countries are among Ethiopia’s top trade and investment partners. But Abu Dhabi prioritizes the relationship in ways that Riyadh does not—Ethiopia is central to the Emirates’ Horn of Africa strategy and a key ally in the more Emirati-aligned bloc of Horn of Africa countries.³⁴ For Riyadh, economic cooperation and stability are critical in Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia has often supported this goal through conflict mediation (and previously, in partnership with the Emirates, at least in some cases). For example, Jeddah hosted talks and the signing of an eventual peace deal between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018 after significant efforts from both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. 

Riyadh also views the relationship with Addis Ababa through the lens of domestic concerns, such as cracking down on irregular immigration from Ethiopia into Saudi Arabia.³⁵ While Saudi Arabia maintains a solid relationship with Ethiopia, Riyadh has become closer in recent years with Eritrea, Addis Ababa’s major regional foe. As the Emirati–Ethiopian relationship has deepened, Saudi–Eritrean ties have followed suit. Riyadh is likely wary of the close personal relationship between the two leaders of the Emirates and Ethiopia, particularly as tensions increase between Ethiopia and Eritrea and renewed conflict between them becomes increasingly likely. 

Like many of Abu Dhabi’s relationships, its ties with Addis Ababa are highly personalized and rooted in economic, security, and political interests.

Like many of Abu Dhabi’s relationships, its ties with Addis Ababa are highly personalized and rooted in economic, security, and political interests. Sending a powerful message about the strategic importance of the relationship with Ethiopia, Emirati president Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan visited Addis Ababa in August 2023 with a large delegation of his closest advisors, including his powerful brothers, who manage the Emirates’ most influential sovereign wealth funds and state security apparatus. The state visit led to the signing of several memorandums of understanding to increase trade and investment between the two countries, particularly in agriculture and food security.³⁶

Bigger Emirati Ambitions

But Abu Dhabi’s support for Addis Ababa goes beyond economic cooperation and political ties with Ahmed. The Emirates provided security support when Ahmed needed it—along with other countries, including Turkey, Abu Dhabi supplied Ahmed with drones during the conflict with the region of Tigray, giving Addis Ababa an advantage in the civil war. Beyond supplying drones, Abu Dhabi provided training to Ahmed’s Republican Guard.³⁷ (The civil war officially ended in 2022, though violence continues; the UN has said that Ethiopia has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity, while others have alleged that Ethiopia committed genocide against the Tigrayan people.)³⁸

Many regional experts also argue that the Emirates quietly supported Ahmed’s decision to sign a memorandum of understanding, in January 2024, with Somaliland, a self-governing region of Somalia. This memorandum is said to have granted Ethiopia a land lease to build a naval facility in exchange for Ethiopia recognizing Somaliland’s independence. The contents of the memorandum have not been made public, and the existence of a lease agreement has not been confirmed.³⁹ But if the deal is realized, it would cause complications for Somaliland’s Port of Berbera, which is managed by Dubai-based DP World. On the other hand, this agreement between two close Emirati partners would help Ethiopia gain more maritime access, which would fit in well with the Emirates’ “regional economic connectivity” agenda, according to one Emirati academic.⁴⁰ 

The announced deal reignited tensions in Mogadishu because Somalia still considers Somaliland a part of its sovereign territory, even though Somaliland declared independence in 1991 (though no country recognizes it) and became a self-governing territory.⁴¹ Further, many countries in the Horn of Africa fear that granting Ethiopia maritime access and naval infrastructure would encroach upon Somali sovereignty and further embolden Ahmed.⁴² Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, as well as the Arab League, officially expressed support for Mogadishu amid uproar around the Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum.⁴³ Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan stepped in to broker a deal between Ethiopia and Somalia to ease tensions, though the details of the agreement and the outlines of future talks remain unclear.⁴⁴

Both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates played a crucial role in the peace deal signed between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2018, but Emirati–Eritrean relations soured in recent years, as Eritrea began to develop stronger relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. What was once a strong partnership between the Emirates and Eritrea began to shift around the time that Abu Dhabi began to scale down its role in the Yemen war in 2019 and reduce its reliance on the military base in Assab, Eritrea. These developments coincided with Eritrea increasing its cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. While Riyadh often seeks to push back against rising Emirati influence in the Horn of Africa, Cairo is more focused on countering Ethiopia, especially as regards the Egypt–Ethiopia dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project, which Cairo views as an encroachment on its water resources.⁴⁵

Eritrea hugs the other side of the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia and the Bab al-Mandab strait, and has a historically tense relationship with Ethiopia. Relations with Ethiopia have grown particularly strained during periods when Ahmed has asserted Ethiopia’s right to maritime access, as happened, for example, in January 2024. The Emirates closed its military base in Assab in 2021, after it scaled down its role in the Yemen war, but it built up military infrastructure on islands off the coast of southern Yemen and in northern Somalia. It also maintains large networks of influence among powerful militias in southern Yemen—yet another source of tension between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.⁴⁶

Somalia and Its Semiautonomous Regions

In Somalia, the Emirates and Saudi Arabia also find themselves on opposite sides of major political fault lines, even if they maintain shared interests in Somalia’s overall stability. The Emirates maintains closer relations with the country’s semiautonomous regions, including Somaliland and Puntland, while Saudi Arabia is more closely aligned to the federal government in Mogadishu.

Security Concerns Draw in the Gulf

Somalia is a member of the Arab League and a priority for Saudi Arabia and the Emirates in the Horn of Africa for security and economic reasons. Somalia’s vast territory is strategically located along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. The country is a trade partner and an essential gateway to economic connectivity between Africa and Asia, and central to both Saudi and Emirati visions for domestic economic growth and regional connectivity. But perhaps more important than economic considerations are the security threats coming from the twenty-year-old al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency. A government offensive against al-Shabaab, backed by the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia—which reached a size of 22,000 troops at one point—has dragged on for more than fifteen years.⁴⁷ The UN Security Council voted in December 2024 to replace this sprawling effort with a smaller force of around 12,000 troops—the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia.⁴⁸ But U.S. funding cuts have put many UN programs in jeopardy, and threaten to severely limit funding for this African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia.⁴⁹ On May 15, the UN Security Council missed its own deadline to secure UN funding for the African Union mission, putting the entire operation at risk.⁵⁰

U.S. funding cuts have put many UN programs in jeopardy, and threaten to severely limit funding for the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

Despite Somalia being a strategic priority for Saudi Arabia, the kingdom has a limited presence there. Prince Mohammed hosted Somali president Hassan Sheikh Mohamud in April 2024, and the King Salman Humanitarian Relief Fund continues working with international partners to tackle Somalia’s various crises, ranging from famine to health care to electricity.⁵¹ However, these engagements do not seem to signal deeper economic or security cooperation between the two countries. Other Arab states of the Gulf, such as Qatar and the Emirates, in addition to other powerful Middle Eastern players, including Turkey and Egypt, feature more prominently in the security and economic landscape of Somalia today.⁵²

Tensions over Semiautonomous States

Relations between the federal government in Mogadishu and its federal states ebb and flow. Tensions reached a zenith between Mogadishu and Somaliland after the abovementioned Ethiopia–Somaliland memorandum of understanding in early 2024.⁵³ Qatar, Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have long been backers of Mogadishu over the federal states, and they expressed their condemnation of the Ethiopia–Somaliland deal. The Emirates has cultivated strong ties with Somalia’s semiautonomous regions, particularly after Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Mogadishu soured during the 2017–22 presidency of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed, known as Farmaajo. Farmaajo was a close ally of both Qatar and Turkey, placing Somalia at the center of Emirati–Qatari tensions during the 2017–21 Gulf rift.⁵⁴ Since the end of the Gulf rift in 2021 and the election of Mohamud in 2022, Abu Dhabi has seemingly been improving ties with Mogadishu, while at the same time continuing to cultivate closer cooperation with Somalia’s semiautonomous regions. The Emirates has financed and committed troops to support training federal and regional Somali forces to help defeat al-Shabaab, and signed a defense agreement with Mogadishu in January 2023.⁵⁵

Maritime Access

Some experts have argued that the Emirates quietly supported the Ethiopia–Somaliland agreement because of its close, strategic relations with both Ethiopia and Somaliland, and Abu Dhabi’s history of support for Ethiopia’s past efforts to secure maritime access.⁵⁶ Suspicions around the Emirates’ role in the deal soured relations between Abu Dhabi and Mogadishu once again and seemed to pit the Emirates against Saudi Arabia and the other regional powers, such as Egypt, that condemned the agreement. Erdogan’s mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia cooled tensions, and paved the way for technical talks between the two sides that took place in February.⁵⁷ But core points of contention, such as Somalia’s sovereignty, Somaliland’s desire for independence, and Ethiopia’s maritime access, remain unresolved. 

The Emirates also has significant economic and security interests in Somaliland and Puntland. DP World has invested heavily in the Port of Berbera on Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coast. These investments have included $400 million to finance an expansion of the deep-sea port in 2016 in exchange for Somaliland giving DP World a thirty-year concession to manage the port, with an automatic ten-year extension.⁵⁸ The deal also includes the creation of the Berbera Economic Zone, a free trade zone to attract more foreign investment into Somaliland. DP World’s interest in developing the Port of Berbera and, later on, the Port of Bosaso,⁵⁹ in Puntland, another federal state in Somalia that declared itself autonomous in 1998, reflects these ports’ strategic significance along the Bab al-Mandab strait and the Gulf of Aden, key global maritime routes, and the Emirates’ goals to develop these regions into “major trade hubs.”⁶⁰

Thirty Years of Military Involvement

Emirati military involvement in Somalia dates back to the early 1990s, when Abu Dhabi committed troops to UN peacekeeping operations to support conflict mitigation around Somalia’s decades-long civil war.⁶¹ The Emirates’ military footprint in Berbera and Bosaso grew after 2015, in support of its base in Assab, Eritrea and military operations in Yemen. In Bosaso, the Emirates supported the Puntland Maritime Police Force, initially as a counterpiracy mission and then as a counterterrorism force. In Berbera, the Emirates had plans to train Somaliland military and police forces as part of a deal to establish a military base there in 2018.⁶²

Since the Emirates’ official withdrawal in 2019 from the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen, its military footprint has shrunk in Eritrea, while actually expanding in Yemen and Somalia, according to satellite images of Emirati military infrastructure around the Gulf of Aden. This shift was likely one of the most concerning developments for Saudi Arabia, which has major political, security, and economic interests in Yemen and in stability in the wider Red Sea region.⁶³

Sudan: War and Ambiguous Intentions

Sudan’s deadly war is in its third year, and has led to the world’s worst mass displacement (12 million people) and a worsening humanitarian crisis.⁶⁴ The war has killed an estimated 150,000 people—and many more face starvation—with factions on both sides perpetuating widespread atrocities and, in the case of the anti-government Rapid Support Forces, alleged genocide.⁶⁵ The conflict has also been the death knell for Sudan’s short-lived nonviolent democracy movement, which ended the thirty-year rule of dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019.⁶⁶ Research and media reports suggest heavy foreign involvement in the war from several countries in Africa and the Middle East, including powerful Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Qatar, as well as global powers like Russia.⁶⁷ The conflict has also led to spillover effects in the region, and is increasingly fueled by a hugely profitable gold trade. As Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo argue in a Chatham House research paper published in March, “the gold trade connects Sudan’s civil war to the wider region and highlights the roles that commodities play in perpetuating violent conflict. Even before the start of the civil war in 2023, Sudan’s main warring parties . . . were in competition for the country’s natural resources. In fact, the fight to control gold assets was one of the drivers of the conflict.”⁶⁸ This fight over natural resources also fuels much of the external intervention in Sudan. The Emirates is the primary destination for Sudan’s gold exports (both licit and illicit), both directly and via regional countries.⁶⁹

While both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are involved in mediation efforts to end the war in Sudan, their role as sponsors of the belligerents has, justifiably, garnered much more attention.⁷⁰ Each country has aligned itself with political and military actors on opposite sides of the war, according to multiple media and research reports. Reported Emirati backing for the Rapid Support Forces encompasses massive security cooperation that experts say has been decisive in the paramilitary group’s battlefield wins, whereas Saudi support for the Sudanese Armed Forces has more taken the form of diplomatic and political cooperation than outright defensive support. 

For both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, Sudan is a top priority in the Horn of Africa.⁷¹ It is a member of both the Arab League and OPEC+, and both countries have invested deep political and economic resources in the country. Both states had fraught relations with Bashir, whom Abu Dhabi and Riyadh both viewed as an Islamist-leaning leader. Both states are now involved in Sudan’s civil war, providing humanitarian assistance and facilitating mediation, while also reportedly backing different sides of the war to varying degrees. Both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are members of the GCC and Arab League, which expressed support for Sudan’s state institutions, including the Sudanese Armed Forces. Saudi Arabia maintains closer ties with General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s Sudanese Armed Forces, while the Emirates is a long-time ally and, reportedly, arms supplier to the Rapid Support Forces, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. The Sudanese Armed Forces and Rapid Support Forces joined together to support the civilian protests to overthrow the dictator in 2019. But now, these two Sudanese forces are at war with each other.⁷²

Efforts to Mediate

Saudi Arabia and the Emirates wield immense influence in Sudan’s war, but they are far from the only foreign powers involved. Still, Western officials say that, as much as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates bear some responsibility for arming and supporting the warring factions, their influence over both sides of the civil war can also be used to stop it. In the first year of the war, Saudi Arabia partnered with the United States to lead mediation efforts in the Jeddah process, though to little effect. (The Jeddah process was difficult, and Riyadh often balked at holding meetings, leading some Western officials to question whether Saudi Arabia lacked capacity or was actively obstructing the process.)⁷³ But mediation shifted to a more inclusive format in Geneva in August 2024, still led by the United States and Saudi Arabia, and now joined by Switzerland, and also including the Emirates, Egypt, the African Union, and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development as observers.

Western officials say that, as much as Saudi Arabia and the Emirates bear responsibility for arming and supporting the warring factions, their influence over both sides of the civil war can also be used to stop it.

The benefit of the mediation efforts only goes so far. Over the last year, reports from the New York Times, Amnesty International, and other organizations argue that the Emirates has continued to supply weapons to the Rapid Support Forces in the war even as the country attempts to support conflict mediation.⁷⁴ Many other countries, including Egypt, Qatar, and Iran, have also become involved to varying degrees, on the side of the Sudanese Armed Forces. Egypt and Iran have reportedly provided military support,⁷⁵ while Qatar has furnished some financial support, according to Western diplomats.⁷⁶ 

Turkey, fresh off its successful mediation between Ethiopia and Somalia, has also offered to mediate in Sudan, notably by facilitating direct dialogue between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Emirates, since the latter is a close ally of the Rapid Support Forces.⁷⁷ However, this effort has yet to materialize into anything more than some communication between General Burhan and Emirati president Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan. 

Despite the dearth of interest and resources on Africa within the Trump administration, the president’s team has rightly concluded that convening the regional states that are closest to Sudan’s belligerents—and getting those states on the same page—is essential in moving the mediation process forward. On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York in September, the United States hosted a “quad” meeting that included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates; shortly afterward, it announced a road map for ending Sudan’s war. The road map represents a step in the right direction, but it is far from being implemented; further, Sudan’s warring parties are not abiding by it.⁷⁸

The Trump administration is struggling to make headway with this quad format. At the end of October, amid increasingly deadly Rapid Support Forces attacks on civilians in the city of al-Fashir in the Darfur region of Sudan, the administration gathered senior officials from the three other countries, as well as from Sudan’s warring parties, to host indirect talks, aiming for a three-month humanitarian ceasefire.⁷⁹ For eighteen months, the Rapid Support Forces had blocked the entry of food and aid into al-Fashir, one of the remaining army-controlled cities in Darfur, causing mass starvation. The diplomatic effort ultimately failed just before the Rapid Support Forces captured the city, where it has reportedly committed mass atrocities. The UN said it had received “horrendous accounts of summary executions, mass killings, rapes, attacks against humanitarian workers, looting, abductions and forced displacement.”⁸⁰

An Economic and Strategic Prize

Saudi and Emirati motivations behind their Sudan engagement are complex. Both Abu Dhabi and Riyadh affirm the strategic importance of Sudan, particularly its natural resource wealth— especially its gold trade—and the Red Sea coastline. Both Saudi Arabia and the Emirates fear a return of Islamists from the Bashir era, but this seems a more pressing concern for the Emirates, and not the primary concern for either. Both Gulf countries are likely thinking of how to gain an upper hand for their respective preferred partners, to ensure their economic and political interests are protected in the future, while, somewhat paradoxically, also trying to stop the war and alleviate the humanitarian crisis.

Relations between Abu Dhabi and Sudan’s army continue to deteriorate. Sudanese officials continue to accuse the Emirates of arming the Rapid Support Forces and officially cut ties with Abu Dhabi this year. Emirati support for the unsavory paramilitary group has continued, despite more public scrutiny about its ties.⁸¹ The GCC and other Arab countries are likely to continue publicly backing the Sudanese Armed Forces, which they consider to be part of Sudan’s sovereign institutional framework. During Ramadan last March, Prince Mohammed hosted General Burhan (who in addition to being the Sudanese Armed Forces leader is the country’s Sovereign Council president) and prayed with him in Mecca. The two leaders announced plans to establish a coordination council between their countries to improve bilateral ties.⁸² Both Saudi Arabia and Egypt have attempted to convince the Sudanese Armed Forces to attend more recent peace talks, though so far to little avail.

Still, it’s unclear how much leverage Riyadh actually has with the army and whether it’s willing to use it. For now, Saudi Arabia’s support seems largely diplomatic and political. The more direct military support from other countries, such as Egypt, Turkey, and Iran, is important, but also doesn’t seem to play a decisive role in the Sudanese Armed Forces’ decision making.⁸³ The battlefield remains hot, as both sides continue to invest in military wins over political ones. After the Sudanese Armed Forces retook Khartoum earlier this year, the Rapid Support Forces took a strategic area on the borders of Sudan, Egypt, and Libya, which is integral to smuggling networks in the region. As concerns mount about ethnic cleansing in al-Fashir following the Rapid Support Forces’ conquest of the city, the Emirates is facing increasing international scrutiny, including from several members of the U.S. Congress. But the White House has remained silent on the Emirates’ role in the conflict.⁸⁴ Further, the public relations battle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Emirates has intensified.⁸⁵

Emirati and Saudi involvement in Sudan is not a simple story of side-taking in a civil war. The two Gulf countries have hedged their bets in Sudan in much more complex ways, which reflect their webs of interest—some of which appear contradictory.

The Emirates remains the most powerful foreign actor in Sudan, and this influence extends heavily into the political, economic, and security sectors. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia’s role should not be overlooked. When the civil war broke out, Saudi Arabia played a major role in the initial evacuations and humanitarian aid deliveries to Port Sudan. Though Saudi Arabia has little to show for its mediation efforts so far, its maintenance of close ties with Burhan and the Sudanese Armed Forces suggests that the conflict is a high priority for the kingdom.

Ambiguous Alliances

Looking closer at the Emirati and Saudi involvement in Sudan, it becomes clear that it is not a simple story of side-taking in a civil war. The two Gulf countries have hedged their bets in Sudan in much more complex ways, which reflect their webs of interest—some of which appear contradictory. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have both developed ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces over several years, but the Emirates’ greater strategic investments across Sudan’s security, economic, and political spectrums are what has made it such a powerful foreign actor in the country and across the Horn and much of Eastern Africa. And while the Emirates may be supplying weapons to the Rapid Support Forces and have major financial and political connections to Hemedti—especially via the gold trade in western Sudan—banks and mining companies are also huge players in parts of the country controlled by the government’s forces. Thus, Abu Dhabi has leverage with both sides of the war.⁸⁶ Moreover, the influence that the Emirates has built in and around Sudan into other parts of the Sahel and Eastern Africa (such as in neighboring Chad, southern Libya, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Central African Republic, Uganda, and elsewhere) demonstrates exactly how much the Emirates has prioritized Africa in its foreign policy. Abu Dhabi has developed vast economic, political, and security networks with powerful state and non-state actors.⁸⁷ But the Emirates’ role in Sudan’s war has pushed some regional leaders, such as the presidents of Djibouti and Eritrea (both of whom are more politically aligned with Riyadh), to speak out against what they view as Abu Dhabi’s malign influence in the region.⁸⁸

Djibouti: A Small but Strategic Hub

Saudi Arabia is intent on building its own alliances and gateways of influence and is particularly focused on deepening political and economic ties with Djibouti and Eritrea. The two countries are small (with populations of 1.2 and 3.5 million, respectively) but strategically located, and have had a volatile relationship with the Emirates over recent years. Both states sided with the Saudi–Emirati axis during the 2017–21 Gulf rift, but since then, they seem to have leaned closer to Riyadh than Abu Dhabi. Both states offer Saudi Arabia partnerships with close neighbors, located just opposite the kingdom across the Red Sea. Djibouti, in particular, is a strategic hub for foreign military bases in the region, and its free trade zone is an economic gateway to Africa.

Thus, Djibouti provides inroads for Saudi Arabia to build economic and security networks in the region. It is also significant because, through commercial agreements, it gives Ethiopia its only maritime outlet for exports. The Port of Djibouti accounts for 95 percent of Ethiopia’s imports and exports, costing Addis Ababa around $1 billion a year.⁸⁹  Djibouti has hosted several foreign military bases, including those controlled by the United States, France, and China. In 2017, the Saudi and Djiboutian governments reportedly finalized a deal to build a Saudi military base, so Riyadh could take “a more assertive approach to regional security.”⁹⁰ Seven years later, there is still no base, and it’s unclear if the plans will come to fruition. In 2022, the Saudi and Djiboutian governments signed a joint cooperation agreement to increase maritime cooperation and transportation.⁹¹ In February 2024, Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, said in an interview with a Saudi newspaper that “cooperation is ongoing across various sectors, including security, military, and business.” He added that he hoped to increase collaboration “particularly in maritime transport, logistics, and port services, building on our significant progress in port development.”⁹² In June 2024, the Federation of Saudi Chambers, an organization the kingdom formed to represent its businesses, signed a ninety-two-year contract to develop a Saudi logistics city in the Djibouti Free Zone to improve Saudi Arabia’s trade access to African markets.⁹³

In contrast, the Emirates’ relationship with Djibouti has soured. Djibouti was the location for one of DP World’s earliest forays into the Horn of Africa, which began in 2006 with the development of the Port of Doraleh. But relations between the two countries deteriorated after Djibouti abruptly terminated DP World’s contract and seized control of the Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018.⁹⁴ Several lawsuits between the two sides ensued. Various jurisdictions have ruled in favor of DP World. The most recent successful case was in a U.S. court in 2024, which included a ruling to enforce $200 million in compensation to DP World. The government of Djibouti seems to have no intention to abide by these rulings, but DP World has said it will continue its legal efforts until it receives full compensation or is able to retake control of the terminal.⁹⁵ Guelleh has also criticized the Emirates more generally, saying in an interview this year that Emirati investments in Africa were a “strategic ploy” for domination. Guelleh also said that his country had refused to allow the Emirates to establish a military base in Djibouti.⁹⁶ These sentiments reflect a growing uneasiness about the Emirates’ expanding regional influence in Africa, which many African policymakers and citizens view with acute suspicion given the long history of colonial exploitation across the continent. 

Promoting Coordination over Conflict

The growing economic and political competition between Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, in a context of intense foreign meddling from multiple regional and great powers, is exacerbating existing fault lines in the Horn of Africa. The Emirates is the Gulf Arab state with the largest footprint in the region, but Saudi Arabia seems eager to catch up. Saudi Arabia announced its vision by hosting its first Africa summit in November 2023, along with its promise to exponentially expand both investment and its embassy presence across the continent. But Riyadh’s follow-through remains constrained by its focus on domestic reforms.

The two states can avoid miscalculations and worsening tensions by increasing their bilateral dialogue and continuing to work through regional blocs like the GCC. They can also work together, along with Egypt, to reactivate the dormant Red Sea Council and expand its membership to include as observers some countries that don’t have Red Sea coasts but are nevertheless deeply invested in the region, such as the Emirates and Ethiopia. Including these countries could help encourage Riyadh and Abu Dhabi into more direct, multilateral dialogue about regional security in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. If the Red Sea Council is unable to move forward, a regional security dialogue platform that gathers Middle Eastern and African states to discuss Red Sea security would help promote greater coordination.

Saudi and Emirati support of conflict mediation and humanitarian aid in the region has continuing value, and would best occur through relevant bilateral and multilateral organizations. Greater economic cooperation between the two Gulf powers can also leverage a more positive impact. But even more important for the people of the Horn of Africa and the region’s stability is better coordination of Emirati and Saudi political and security efforts to avoid further exacerbating tensions and increasing violence. Abu Dhabi and Riyadh can use their immense influence in the region to pressure their respective partners to cease hostilities and come to the negotiating table.

For now, Saudi Arabia and the Emirates are likely to manage their bilateral relations to prevent an outright rift while intensifying competition in their neighborhood. But if these two states fail to coordinate their efforts better and increase dialogue, their competition will worsen political tensions and conflicts in the region—even as they simultaneously supply humanitarian aid and support conflict mediation in the region. Saudi–Emirati leaders compartmentalize their points of disagreement for now, but an outright rift resembling the 2017–21 Gulf dispute could occur again without investing in more cooperation and dialogue around the Red Sea.

The importance to both Gulf states of their relationships with the United States, and growing U.S.–Gulf cooperation in conflict mediation, makes Washington’s support essential in this endeavor. The United States needs to prioritize Red Sea and Horn of Africa security and, in particular, facilitate more Gulf coordination. The Trump administration is attempting to do this by organizing meetings on the Sudan war with Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and Egypt. But American efforts haven’t yet led to concrete changes.

It is clear that improving Saudi–Emirati cooperation will be no easy task. Even with the existence of several multilateral organizations that include the two countries, there is a long history of intra-Gulf competition and mistrust that is difficult to overcome. But where improved coordination succeeds, it could make a serious difference in the effectiveness of mediation efforts—and a much-needed respite from cycles of violence in a beleaguered part of Africa.

This report is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.

Header Image Caption: A newly arrived refugee from the Darfur region of Sudan sits on a donkey as she heads to shelter on April 24, 2024, in Adre, Chad. The situation in Sudan has worsened this fall as militias backed by Gulf powers have committed atrocities. Source: Dan Kitwood/Getty Images

1. Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter, “Patterns of External Involvement in the Modern Political History of the Horn of Africa States,” in The Gulf States and the Horn of Africa: Interests, Influences, and Instability, eds. Robert Mason and Simon Mabon, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2022), 15–30.
2. See Zach Vertin, “Red Sea Rivalries: The Gulf, the Horn, and the New Geopolitics of the Red Sea,” Brookings Institution, August 8, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/red-sea-rivalries-the-gulf-the-horn-and-the-new-geopolitics-of-the-red-sea/; International Crisis Group, “Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact,” Report 206, September 19, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula-horn-africa-turkiye/intra-gulf-competition.
3. Anna Jacobs, “Gulf Arab Reconciliation Hides Simmering Tensions,” International Crisis Group, July 12, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/qatar-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates/gulf-arab-reconciliation-hides-simmering-tensions.
4. Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari officials, interviews with the International Crisis Group in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha, 2022–24.
5. “Great Expectations: The Future of Iranian-Saudi Détente,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 92, June 13, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran-saudi-arabia/b92-great-expectations-future; Giorgio Cafiero, “The UAE-Iran Rapprochement: Causes and Effects,” Gulf International Forum, July 25, 2022, https://gulfif.org/the-uae-iran-rapprochement-causes-and-effects/; “The Failure of U.S. ‘Maximum Pressure’ against Iran,” International Crisis Group, March 8, 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/iran-united-states/failure-us-maximum-pressure-against-iran.
6. Anna Jacobs, “Gulf Arab Reconciliation Hides Simmering Tensions,” International Crisis Group, July 12, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/qatar-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates/gulf-arab-reconciliation-hides-simmering-tensions; Anna Jacobs, “Refining Priorities: Small States’ Foreign Policies in a Changing Middle East,” in The Middle East’s Fragile Reset: Actors, Battlegrounds, and (Dis)order, Middle East Council on Global Affairs dossier, ed. Galip Dalay and Tarik M. Yousef, November 2023, https://mecouncil.org/publication/the-middle-easts-fragile-reset-actors-battlegrounds-and-disorder/.
7. Ibrahim Al Muhanna, “COVID-19 in the Middle East and Gulf States: Coping With Historic Demand Drop,” World Energy Council, June 22, 2020, https://www.worldenergy.org/news-views/entry/covid-19-in-the-middle-east-and-gulf-states-coping-with-historic-demand-drop; Nader Kabbani and Nejla Ben Mimoune, “Economic Diversification in the Gulf: Time to Redouble Efforts,” Brookings Doha Center policy briefing, January 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/economic-diversification-in-the-gulf-time-to-redouble-efforts/; “Understanding the Recent Contours of UAE Foreign Policy,” Emirates Policy Center, September 21, 2021, https://epc.ae/en/details/brief/understanding-the-recent-contours-of-uae-foreign-policy.
8. Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Cok, “Diversification Nations: The Gulf Way to Engage With Africa,” European Council on Global Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/diversification-nations-the-gulf-way-to-engage-with-africa/#:~:text=Summary,inroads%20into%20sub%2DSaharan%20Africa; Chido Munyati, “A New Economic Partnership Is Emerging Between Africa and the Gulf States,” World Economic Forum, April 28, 2024, https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/04/africa-gcc-gulf-economy-partnership-emerging/.
9. See Summer Said and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Arabia and UAE Clash Over Oil, Yemen as Rift Grows,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-and-u-a-e-clash-over-oil-yemen-as-rift-grows-ff286ff9; Summer Said et al., “The Best of Frenemies: Saudi Crown Prince Clashes With UAE President,” Wall Street Journal, July 18, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/frenemies-saudi-crown-prince-mbs-clashes-uae-president-mbz-c500f9b1; Anna Jacobs, “Gulf Arab Reconciliation Hides Simmering Tensions,” International Crisis Group, July 12, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/qatar-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates/gulf-arab-reconciliation-hides-simmering-tensions.
10. Emirati businessman, interview with the International Crisis Group, Dubai, October 2024.
11. See Emirates Policy Center, “Understanding the Recent Contours of UAE Foreign Policy,” September 21, 2021, https://epc.ae/en/details/brief/understanding-the-recent-contours-of-uae-foreign-policy; Layla Ali, “Understanding the Drivers of Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy,” Gulf Research Center, March 12, 2025, https://www.grc.net/single-commentary/234.
12. Mariel Ferragamo, “What Is the BRICS Group and Why Is It Expanding?,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 12, 2024, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-brics-group-and-why-it-expanding#chapter-title-0-8; “Saudi Arabia Has Not Yet Joined BRICS – Saudi Official Sources,” Reuters, February 1, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/saudi-arabia-has-not-yet-joined-brics-saudi-official-source-2024-02-01/. See also Alexandre Kateb, “The GCC’s Multipolar Pivot: From Shifting Trade Patterns to New Financial and Diplomatic Alliances,” Carnegie Europe, May 28, 2024, https://carnegieindia.org/research/2024/05/the-gccs-multipolar-pivot-from-shifting-trade-patterns-to-new-financial-and-diplomatic-alliances?lang=en&center=europe, “BRICS: What Is the Group and Which Countries Have Joined?,” BBC News, February 1, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-66525474.
13. “UAE President Attends BRICS Summit Inaugurated by Russian President,” Emirates New Agency–WAM, October 23, 2024, https://www.wam.ae/en/article/b5tthpo-uae-president-attends-brics-summit-inaugurated.
14. “Saudi FM at BRICS Plus Summit: Continuing Conflict in Gaza and Lebanon Will Lead to Worsening Regional Situation,” Saudi Gazette, October, 24, 2024, https://saudigazette.com.sa/article/646500/SAUDI-ARABIA/Saudi-FM-at-BRICS-Plus-Summit-Continuing-conflict-in-Gaza-and-Lebanon-will-lead-to-worsening-regional-situation. See also Oliver Stuenkel and Margot Treadwell, “Why is Saudi Arabia Hedging its BRICS invite?” Carnegie Endowment, November 21, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/emissary/2024/11/brics-saudi-arabia-hedging-why?lang=en.
15. Maddalena Procopio and Corrado Cok, “Diversification Nations: The Gulf Way to Engage With Africa,” European Council on Global Affairs, March 24, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/diversification-nations-the-gulf-way-to-engage-with-africa/#:~:text=Summary,inroads%20into%20sub%2DSaharan%20Africa; Said Bakr, “Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s Quest for African Critical Minerals,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 20, 2024, https://agsiw.org/saudi-arabias-and-the-uaes-quest-for-african-critical-minerals/.
16. Saudi and Emirati officials, interviews with the International Crisis Group, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, April-May 2023.
17. “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 65, November 6, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa.
18. Anna Jacobs, “Can Gulf States Help End the War in Sudan?,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, February 25, 2025, https://agsiw.org/can-gulf-states-help-end-the-war-in-sudan/.
19. Saudi officials, interviews with the International Crisis Group, Riyadh, October 2022, March–April 2023, February–March 2024.
20. See Anna Jacobs, “Understanding Saudi Arabia’s Recalibrated Foreign Policy,” International Crisis Group, September 14, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/saudi-arabia/understanding-saudi-arabias.
21. Saudi officials, interviews with the International Crisis Group, Riyadh, March 2023.
22. David Pilling, Chloe Cornish, and Andreas Schipani, “The UAE’s Rising Influence in Africa,” Financial Times, May 30, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/388e1690-223f-41a8-a5f2-0c971dbfe6f0; Patricia Cohen, “U.A.E Is Pouring Money Into Africa, Seeking Resources and Power,” New York Times, May 17, 2025, https://www.nytimes.com/2025/05/17/business/uae-africa-finance.html#:~:text=Persian%20Gulf%20investments%20in%20Africa,pledged%20by%20any%20other%20country.
23. Emirati officials and think-tanks in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, interviews with the author, 2022–24; Mohammed Baharoon, “The Keys to Reading the UAE Strategic Map,” Middle East Institute, April 5, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/keys-reading-uaes-strategic-map.
24. Ronald Kato, “The United Arab Emirates as 4th Investor in Africa,” Africa News, March 22, 2024, https://www.africanews.com/2024/03/22/the-united-arab-emirates-as-4th-investor-in-africa-business-africa/.
25. David Pilling, Chloe Cornish, and Andreas Schipani, “The UAE’s Rising Influence in Africa,” Financial Times, May 30, 2024, https://www.ft.com/content/388e1690-223f-41a8-a5f2-0c971dbfe6f0.
26. “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 65, November 6, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa.
27. Said Bakr, “Saudi Arabia’s and the UAE’s Quest for African Critical Minerals,” Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, June 20, 2024, https://agsiw.org/saudi-arabias-and-the-uaes-quest-for-african-critical-minerals/.
28. Jon Gambrell, “Mysterious Airstrip Appears on a Yemeni Island as Houthi Rebel Attacks Threaten Region,” Associated Press, January 17, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/yemen-island-airstrip-houthis-israel-hamas-war-gaza-8f1e8b70ddff7ca25842509ca7f0f2b0.
29. Jon Gambrell, “UAE Dismantles Eritrea Base as It Pulls Back After Yemen War,” Associated Press, February 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/eritrea-dubai-only-on-ap-united-arab-emirates-east-africa-088f41c7d54d6a397398b2a825f5e45a.
30. “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 65, November 6, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa; “IntelBrief: The UAE Builds Its Strategic Position in East Africa,” Soufan Center, March 11, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-11/; Eleonora Ardemagni, “Flexible Outposts: The Emirati Approach to Military Bases Abroad,” Carnegie Middle East, April 30, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/04/flexible-outposts-the-emirati-approach-to-military-bases-abroad?lang=en.
31. Oscar Rickett, “How the UAE built a circle of bases to control the Gulf of Aden,” October 2, 2025 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-yemen-somalia-circle-bases-control-gulf-of-aden; “IntelBrief: The UAE Builds Its Strategic Position in East Africa,” Soufan Center, March 11, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-11/; Eleonora Ardemagni, “Flexible Outposts: The Emirati Approach to Military Bases Abroad,” Carnegie Middle East, April 30, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/04/flexible-outposts-the-emirati-approach-to-military-bases-abroad?lang=en. See also Estifanos Balew Liyew, “Geopolitics of the Red Sea: Implications of foreign military bases expansion to the Horn of Africa security,” African Security Review 33, no. 3 (2024): 294–306, https://doi.org/10.1080/10246029.2024.2340015.
32. “Eritrea’s Afwerki Blasts UAE as Somalia’s ‘Enemy,’ Warns of Planned Israeli Red Sea Empire,” Somali Stream, https://somalistream.com/eritreas-afwerki-blasts-uae-as-somalias-enemy-warns-of-planned-israeli-red-sea-empire/; “Eritrean President Afwerki Blames Foreign Powers for Sudan Crisis, Urges Regional Action and UN Withdrawal,” July 28, 2025, Horn Pulse, https://hornpulse.com/2025/07/28/eritrean-president-afwerki-blames-foreign-powers-for-sudan-crisis-urges-regional-action-and-un-withdrawal/.
33. Martin Plaut, “Eritrea Accuses UAE of Stoking War With Ethiopia, Appeals to Saudis to Intervene,” personal blog, November 17, 2023, https://martinplaut.com/2023/11/17/eritrea-accuses-uae-of-stoking-war-with-ethiopia-appeals-to-saudis-to-intervene/; Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia: Implications for the Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical and Security Landscapes,” SWP Berlin Policy Brief 35, March 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA-PB35_UAE_Engagement_in_Ethiopia_Gebru_Korrektur.pdf.
34. See “The United Arab Emirates in the Horn of Africa,” International Crisis Group, Briefing 65, November 6, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/united-arab-emirates/b65-united-arab-emirates-horn-africa; “IntelBrief: The UAE Builds Its Strategic Position in East Africa,” Soufan Center, March 11, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-11/; Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia: Implications for the Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical and Security Landscapes,” SWP Berlin Policy Brief 35, March 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA-PB35_UAE_Engagement_in_Ethiopia_Gebru_Korrektur.pdf.
35. Saudi officials, interviews with the International Crisis Group, Riyadh, March 2023. See also “Returns from Saudi Arabia,” International Organization for Migration, https://eastandhornofafrica.iom.int/returns-saudi-arabia; Andrew Mills, Tiksa Negeri, and Milan Pavicic, “Saudi Border Guards Killed Hundreds of Ethiopian Migrants, Says HRW,” Reuters, August 22, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-border-guards-killed-hundreds-ethiopian-migrants-hrw-says-2023-08-21/.
36. “President Sheikh Mohamed in Ethiopia on Official Visit,” The National, August 18, 2023, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2023/08/18/president-sheikh-mohamed-arrives-in-ethiopia-on-official-visit/.
37. Declan Walsh, “Foreign Drones Tip the Balance in Ethiopia’s Civil War,” New York Times, December 20, 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/4/strong-evidence-that-ethiopia-committed-genocide-in-tigray-war-report.
38. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/6/4/strong-evidence-that-ethiopia-committed-genocide-in-tigray-war-report
39. See“The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal,” International Crisis Group, March 6, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal; Hassan Hassan and Rana Mamdouh, “How the Gulf States Are Exerting Their Influence in Africa,” New Lines Magazine, September 11, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/how-the-gulf-states-are-exerting-their-influence-in-africa/.
40. Emirati academic, Interview with the author, Dubai, March 2024.
41. Mariel Ferragamo and Claire Klobucista, “Somaliland: The Horn of Africa’s Breakaway State,” Council on Foreign Relations, January 21, 2025, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/somaliland-horn-africas-breakaway-state.
42. See Hisham Qadri Ahmed, “Somalia’s Strategic Counterbalance to Ethiopian Influence in the Horn of Africa,” Carnegie Sada, November 7, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/11/somalia-ethiopia-relations?lang=en; “The Stakes in the Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal,” International Crisis Group, March 6, 2024, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia-somaliland/stakes-ethiopia-somaliland-deal.
43. Abdiqani Abdullahi, “Saudi Arabia Backs Somalia in Maritime Dispute with Ethiopia,” Somali National News Agency, January 12, 2024, https://sonna.so/en/saudi-arabia-backs-somalia-in-maritime-dispute-with-ethiopia/; Abdiqani Abdullahi, “UAE Supports Somalia’s Territorial Integrity in Face of Ethiopia’s Interference,” Somali National News Agency, January 18, 2024, https://sonna.so/en/uae-supports-somalias-territorial-integrity-in-face-of-ethiopias-interference/; “Somalia: Arab League Unanimously Backs Somalia’s Sovereignty Against Ethiopia-Somaliland Deal,”Shabelle Media Network via All Africa, September 12, 2024, https://allafrica.com/stories/202409120204.html.
44. Kalkidan Yibeltal and Basillioh Rukanga, “Ethiopia and Somalia Agree to End Bitter Somaliland Port Feud,” BBC, December 12, 2024, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cvgr7v1evvgo.
45. “Ethiopia and Eritrea Slide Closer to War amid Tigray Upheaval,” International Crisis Group, March 27, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopiaeritrea/ethiopia-and-eritrea-slide-closer-war-amid-tigray-upheaval.
46. Summer Said and Stephen Kalin, “Saudi Arabia and UAE Clash Over Oil, Yemen as Rift Grows,” Wall Street Journal, March 3, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/saudi-arabia-and-u-a-e-clash-over-oil-yemen-as-rift-grows-ff286ff9?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqe0A9BgdSu82q84HsbxOVOqDHBLUMLyv_nridrmuZ4g_dND0xgSHElv1Ggtu40%3D&gaa_ts=69092f46&gaa_sig=LbrKG5tdFIDhm0bzkiAfxfYmn8jYZvq_y2ti1vQVqTQ7S0CI01lNA_utPYq6CoVUUECQEBiDpa3b6oxL7EzddA%3D%3D.
47. Bashir Mohamed Caato, “What’s Next for Security in Somalia After the AU Mission Ends?” Al Jzeera, August 25, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2023/8/25/whats-next-for-security-in-somalia-after-the-au-mission-ends.
48. Faisal Ali, “U.N. authorises New Mission Against Al Shabaab in Somalia,” Guardian, December 28, 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/28/un-authorises-new-mission-against-al-shabaab-in-somalia#:~:text=The%20UN%20has%20authorised%20a,remain%20part%20of%20the%20deployment. See also “What to Expect From the New AU Mission in Somalia?,” The Horn Podcast, International Crisis Group, January 16, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/what-expect-new-au-mission-somalia.
49. Anton Ferreira, “Will the US Leave the AU Peacekeeping Mission in Somalia Out on a Limb?,” Pass Blue, April 15, 2025., https://www.passblue.com/2025/04/15/will-the-us-leave-the-au-peacekeeping-mission-in-somalia-out-on-a-limb/.
50. Daniel Forti, “Security Council Misses Funding Deadline for AU Mission in Somalia,” International Crisis Group Analyst’s Notebook, May 16, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/african-union-regional-bodies-somalia/security-council-misses-funding-deadline-au-mission-somalia.
51. “King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Centre Helps Bridge Somalia’s Electricity and Oxygen Gap,” World Health Organization, October 22, 2024, https://www.emro.who.int/somalia/news/king-salman-humanitarian-aid-and-relief-centre-helps-bridge-somalias-electricity-and-oxygen-gap.html.
52. See International Crisis Group, “Intra-Gulf Competition in Africa’s Horn: Lessening the Impact,” Report 206, September 19, 2019, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula-horn-africa-turkiye/intra-gulf-competition; Hassan Hassan and Rana Mamdouh, “How the Gulf States Are Exerting Their Influence in Africa,” New Lines Magazine, September 11, 2024, https://newlinesmag.com/argument/how-the-gulf-states-are-exerting-their-influence-in-africa/; “IntelBrief: The UAE Builds Its Strategic Position in East Africa,” Soufan Center, March 11, 2024, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2024-march-11/.
53. Abigail Kabandula, “Rising Tensions in the Horn of Africa: Ethiopia, Somaliland, and the Potential for Further Regional Instability,” Wilson Center, January 28, 2025, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/rising-tensions-horn-africa-ethiopia-somaliland-and-potential-further-regional-instability.
54. “Somalia and the Gulf Crisis,” International Crisis Group, Report 260, June 5, 2018, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/somalia/260-somalia-and-gulf-crisis.
55. Mohammed Dhaysane, “Somalia, UAE Strike Security Deal in Push to Mend Fences,” Andalou Agency, January 5, 2023, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somalia-uae-strike-security-deal-in-push-to-mend-fences/2780549.
56. Micheale Kihishen Gebru, “The United Arab Emirates Engagement in Ethiopia: Implications for the Horn of Africa’s Geopolitical and Security Landscapes,” SWP Berlin Policy Brief 35, March 2025, https://www.swp-berlin.org/assets/afrika/publications/policybrief/MTA-PB35_UAE_Engagement_in_Ethiopia_Gebru_Korrektur.pdf.
57. “Ethiopia and Somalia Hold a First Round of Technical Talks in Turkey Toward Resolving Their Dispute,” Associated Press, February 18, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/ethiopia-somalia-turkey-talks-dispute-72097d9b183709197300baa3e080dc0d.
58. Jonas Gerding, “At Port of Berbera, Dubai Invests in Horn of Africa Shipping,” Deutsche Welle, December 26, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/at-port-of-berbera-dubai-invests-in-horn-of-africa-shipping/a-64198524.
59. DP World, “DP World and Puntland Government Sign Construction Agreement to Upgrade Port of Bosaso,” December 8, 2022, https://www.dpworld.com/news/releases/dp-world-and-puntland-government-sign-construction-agreement-to-upgrade-port-of-bosaso/.
60. Jonas Gerding, “At Port of Berbera, Dubai Invests in Horn of Africa Shipping,” Deutsche Welle, December 26, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/at-port-of-berbera-dubai-invests-in-horn-of-africa-shipping/a-64198524.
61. Ido Levy, “Emirati Military Support Is Making a Difference in Somalia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 14, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/emirati-military-support-making-difference-somalia; Eleonora Ardemagni, “Flexible Outposts: The Emirati Approach to Military Bases Abroad,” Carnegie Sada Journal, April 30, 2024, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2024/04/flexible-outposts-the-emirati-approach-to-military-bases-abroad?lang=en.
62. See Ido Levy, “Emirati Military Support Is Making a Difference in Somalia,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 14, 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/emirati-military-support-making-difference-somalia; and Alexander Cornwell, “UAE to Train Somaliland Forces Under Military Base Deal—Somaliland President,” Reuters, March 16, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/world/uae-to-train-somaliland-forces-under-military-base-deal-somaliland-president-idUSKCN1GR2ZH/.
63. Jon Gambrell, “UAE Dismantles Eritrea Base as It Pulls Back After Yemen War,” Associated Press, February 18, 2021, https://apnews.com/article/eritrea-dubai-only-on-ap-united-arab-emirates-east-africa-088f41c7d54d6a397398b2a825f5e45a; Oscar Rickett, “How the Uae Built a Circle of Bases to Control the Gulf of Aden,” Middle East Eye, October 2, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-yemen-somalia-circle-bases-control-gulf-of-aden.
64. Vibhu Mishra, “Sudan Faces Unprecedented Hunger and Displacement as War Enters Third Year,” UN News, April 10, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/04/1162096.
65. Natasha Booty and Farouk Chothia, “Sudan War: A Simple Guide to What Is Happening,” *BBC News*, July 4, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cjel2nn22z9o; “Genocide Determination in Sudan and Imposing Accountability Measures,” U.S. Department of State, January 7, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/genocide-determination-in-sudan-and-imposing-accountability-measures/; “‘Blood on the Sand, Blood on the Hands’: UN Decries World’s Failure as Sudan’s El Fasher Falls,” UN News, October 30, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166224.
66. Ivan Marovic, “Nonviolent Movements Can Save a World in Crisis,” The Century Foundation, March 14, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/report/nonviolent-movements-can-save-a-world-in-crisis/.
67. Zeinab Mohammed Salih, “Conflict in Sudan: A Map of Regional and International Actors,” Wilson Center, December 19, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/conflict-sudan-map-regional-and-international-actors; Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, “Gold and the War in Sudan,” Chatham House, March 26, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan; Declan Walsh, “As War Rages in Sudan, Countries Angle for Advantage,”, April 22, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/22/world/africa/sudan-war-international-relations.html.
68. Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, “Gold and the War in Sudan,” Chatham House, March 26, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan.
69. Ahmed Soliman and Suliman Baldo, “Gold and the War in Sudan,” Chatham House, March 26, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/gold-and-war-sudan.
70. “UAE Increasing Support to Sudan’s RSF with New Chinese Drones: Report,” Middle East Eye, October 28, 2025, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/uae-increasing-support-sudans-rsf-new-chinese-drones-report
71. There is no universal agreement about which countries the “Horn of Africa” comprises, but many definitions, including that of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, include Sudan.
72. “Two Years On, Sudan’s War Is Spreading,” International Crisis Group, April 7, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/two-years-sudans-war-spreading.
73. Western officials, interviews with the author, Gulf capitals, Spring 2024.
74. Declan Walsh and Christoph Koettl, “How a U.S. Ally Uses Aid as a Cover in War,” New York Times, September 25, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/21/world/africa/uae-sudan-civil-war.html; “Sudan: Advanced Chinese Weaponry Provided by Uae Identified in Breach of Arms Embargo—New Investigation,” Amnesty International, May 8, 2025, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2025/05/sudan-advanced-chinese-weaponry-provided-by-uae-identified-in-breach-of-arms-embargo-new-investigation/.
75. “What Egypt Wants in Sudan,” The Horn Podcast, International Crisis Group, June 22, 2023, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan-egypt/what-egypt-wants-sudan; Khalid Abdelaziz, Parisa Hafezi, and Aidan Lewis, “Sudan Civil War: Are Iranian Drones Helping the Army Gain Ground?,” Reuters, April 10, 2024, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/are-iranian-drones-turning-tide-sudans-civil-war-2024-04-10/.
76. Western diplomats, interviews with the author, Doha, Spring 2024.
77. “Turkey’s Erdogan Offers to Mediate Between Sudan and the UAE,” Associated Press, December 13, 2024, https://apnews.com/article/turkey-mediation-off-sudan-uae-6236cd13f14886f94a25bfabeac4e1a4.
78. Alan Boswell, “All Eyes on the Quad: How the U.S. and Its Partners Can Push for Peace in Sudan,” International Crisis Group, October 1, 2025, https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/sudan-united-states-egypt-saudi-arabia-united-arab-emirates/all-eyes-quad-how-us-and-its-partners-can-push-peace-sudan.
79. William Wallis and Chloe Cornish, “Sudan Civil War Atrocities Cast Spotlight on UAE,” Financial Times, November 3, 2025, https://www.ft.com/content/e88e0973-3218-4ce6-a73e-20961c71c33b; “Analysis: Burhan’s Secret Diplomacy and the Unfulfilled Promises from Washington,” Ayin Network, October 28, 2025, https://3ayin.com/en/burhan/.
80. “Tens of Thousands Fleeing on Foot amid Atrocities in Sudan’s El Fasher,” UN News, October 31, 2025, https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/10/1166237.
81. Jared Malsin, Benoit Faucon, and Robbie Gramer, “Tens of Thousands Fleeing on Foot amid Atrocities in Sudan’s El Fasher,” Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2025, https://www.wsj.com/world/how-u-a-e-arms-bolstered-a-sudanese-militia-accused-of-genocide-781b9803?gaa_at=eafs&gaa_n=AWEtsqdQWYD7eC9bARpuVuWqzja4jDIsUXbamwyL2HHcuKnd3bWtJfzpYGv0OZqyTU0%3D&gaa_ts=6907c1a0&gaa_sig=_6ccm6O_WpoLSiWX7Zcjo3Uw09SJNACapo-7WDEExFlBUWzYsiWz3RBqRgK1CfKT25Uxw_O5vZRwo2z6WZXi2A%3D%3D.
82. “Crown Prince Receives Sudan’s Sovereign Council President in Makkah, Agrees to Establish Coordination Council,” Saudi Gazette, March 28, 2025, https://www.saudigazette.com.sa/article/650506/SAUDI-ARABIA/Crown-Prince-receives-Sudans-Sovereign-Council-President-in-Makkah-agrees-to-establish-coordination-council.
83. Jonas Horner, “The Falcons and the Secretary Bird: Arab Gulf States in Sudan’s War,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 30, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-falcons-and-the-secretary-bird-arab-gulf-states-in-sudans-war/.
84. Patricia Zengerle, “US Lawmakers Want Response After Sudan ‘Horrors’ by Paramilitaries,” Reuters, October 29, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-lawmakers-want-response-after-sudan-horrors-by-paramilitaries-2025-10-29/.
85. Barbara Plett Usher, “Drone Attacks Raise Stakes in New Phase of Sudan’s Civil War,” BBC, May 14, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg4vz0qy77no.
86. Jonas Horner, “The Falcons and the Secretary Bird: Arab Gulf States in Sudan’s War,” European Council on Foreign Relations, July 30, 2025, https://ecfr.eu/publication/the-falcons-and-the-secretary-bird-arab-gulf-states-in-sudans-war/.
87. “Mapping Gulf State Actors Expanding Engagements in East Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, July 8, 2025, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/gulf-state-actors-east-africa/. See also Simon Marks, “The UAE in Africa: Power, Influence, and Conflict,” Bloomberg, July 8, 2025, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2025-07-08/the-uae-in-africa-power-influence-and-conflict.
88. Highlights of Local Media Interview with President Isaias Afwerki (Part II),” Eritrean Ministry of Information, July 24, 2025, https://shabait.com/2025/07/23/highlights-of-local-media-interview-with-president-isaias-afwerki-part-ii/; and “Djibouti’s President Warns of UAE’s Hidden Military Agenda Behind African Investments,” AllAfrica, May 25, 2025, https://allafrica.com/stories/202505260040.html.
89. Hailu Gelana Erko, “Analysing Opportunities and Obstacles in Ethio–Djibouti Relations: Post-Cold War Era Historical Analysis,” Current Research Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 6, no. 2 (2023): 223, https://journalofsocialsciences.org/pdf/vol6no2/CRJSSH_Vol06_No2_p_219-229.pdf; Redie Bereketeab, “Ethiopia’s Quest for a Seaport: A Threat to Regional Stability?,” Middle East Council on Global Affairs Issue Brief, September 2024, https://mecouncil.org/publication/ethiopias-quest-for-a-seaport-a-threat-to-regional-stability/.
90. “Djibouti Finalizing Pact Soon for Saudi Military Base,” Al Arabiya, January 18, 2017, https://english.alarabiya.net/News/gulf/2017/01/18/Djibouti-finalizing-pact-soon-for-Saudi-military-base.
91. “Saudi Arabia, Djibouti Sign Joint Cooperation Agreement on Maritime Transport,” Saudi Press Agency, June 23, 2022, https://www.spa.gov.sa/2365027.
92. “Djibouti Committed to Working With Saudi Arabia on Red Sea Maritime Security, Fighting Terrorism: President,” Arab News, February 12, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2458566/saudi-arabia.
93. “Saudi Arabia, Djibouti Explore New Maritime Initiative to Strengthen Trade Links,” Arab News, August 8, 2024, https://www.arabnews.com/node/2564941/business-economy.
94. Jon Gambrell, “Djibouti Seizes Control of DP World’s Container Terminal,” Associated Press, February 23, 2018, https://apnews.com/general-news-30a132e5129441ff981ecee6df88bcd3.
95. Michele Labrut, “U.S. Court Rules in DP World’s Favour over Djibouti Legal Battle,” Seatrade Maritime News, July 31, 2024, https://www.seatrade-maritime.com/ports-logistics/us-court-rules-in-dp-world-s-favour-over-djibouti-legal-battle.
96. “Djibouti’s President Warns of UAE’s Hidden Military Agenda Behind African Investments,” AllAfrica, May 25, 2025, https://allafrica.com/stories/202505260040.html.

Tags: saudi arabia, united arab emirates, horn of africa