Iraq’s two-decade-long state-building project is facing a precarious moment. On the one hand, the country is closer than ever to having a functioning state and good governance. On the other, there are forces within Iraq that have an interest in keeping the state weak and beholden to nonstate armed groups, even as the country is caught in the vice of regional power competitions between Iran, Israel, and the United States.

The ongoing friction between Iraq’s Shia Coordination Framework (CF) and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI) represents one of the most significant manifestations of these challenges in Iraq, exposing deep weaknesses in the country’s post-2003 state-building project, particularly regarding the government’s monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The existence of powerful armed groups that receive state funding while maintaining operational independence represents a fundamental challenge to effective governance and democratic accountability.

Drawing on a detailed overview of the rivalry between CF and IRI, this report argues that, much as international policymakers may want to encourage Iraq to rid itself of so-called Axis of Resistance influence, Iraqi factions and the Iraqi state must work toward better governance—independently and on their own time. Drastic measures by the United States to freeze IRI groups out of power will only increase divisions and instability, and set Iraq back on its path toward modern statehood.

The core of the conflict revolves around two irreconcilable visions for Iraq. The first, articulated by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and backed by the CF, is that of a modern nation-state: a sovereign entity that controls its borders, manages its foreign policy through diplomacy, and channels its resources toward public services and economic development. The second, championed by the IRI, is that of a revolutionary “resistance” state: an ideological outpost in a regional struggle, where national sovereignty is secondary to the imperatives of the Axis, and where armed power exists parallel to, and often above, the formal institutions of government.

Sudani is nudging the country toward his vision via a path of compromise and the strategic inclusion of IRI factions in government. But international meddling has complicated the prime minister’s tightrope walk: The United States has taken an absolutist stance against Iran-aligned IRI groups, threatening sanctions and more if they are allowed into government. Meanwhile, Iran continues to attempt to exert control over IRI factions. And popular antipathy toward Israel’s assault on Gaza has given nonstate armed groups fresh credibility and leverage.

The resolution of these tensions will likely determine Iraq’s political trajectory for years to come, affecting not only domestic stability but also the broader regional balance of power and the future of Iranian influence in the Arab world. The upcoming November 2025 parliamentary elections may provide an opportunity for political renewal, but they could equally result in further fragmentation and instability if underlying issues remain unresolved. The stakes of this political struggle extend far beyond Iraq’s borders, with implications for regional security, counterterrorism efforts, and the broader challenge of democratic transition in the Middle East.

Twenty-Two Years of Tension

In the complex political landscape of post-2003 Iraq, numerous Shia political and military organizations have emerged and evolved, creating intricate webs of cooperation and competition. Among the most significant developments in recent years has been the growing friction between the CF and various IRI groups operating under the broader umbrella of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). This tension, which has markedly intensified over the past eighteen months, represents a fundamental shift in Iraq’s Shia political dynamics and has far-reaching implications for the country’s stability, sovereignty, and regional relationships.

The CF, established in 2021 as a loose coalition of Iran-backed Shia political parties, initially served as a unifying structure following the withdrawal of Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement from Iraqi politics. However, the CF attempts to institutionalize state control over armed factions through legislative means, balanced against external pressures from the United States and internal resistance from militant groups, have created unprecedented fissures within Iraq’s Shia establishment. These divisions have become particularly pronounced as the CF navigates between maintaining its alliance with Iran while accommodating American demands for militia disarmament and integration into formal state structures.1

The IRI comprises five major groups: Kata’eb Hezbollah, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, Kata’eb Sayyid al-Shuhada, Kata’eb Imam Ali, and Ansar Allah al-Awfiya. The IRI operates as both a component of the official PMU structure and as an independent network aligned with Iran’s broader Axis of Resistance. This dual identity has become a source of increasing tension, as these groups maintain operational independence while simultaneously receiving state salaries and resources through their PMU affiliation.2 (The PMU is an umbrella organization for paramilitary groups, mostly Shia, that were formed to fight the Islamic State’s advance in 2014. The Iraqi government later formalized the PMU structure to give the groups some kind of oversight, but some maintain independence and have foreign benefactors.)

“Resistance” groups maintain operational independence while simultaneously receiving state salaries and resources through their PMU affiliation.

Where these two currents overlap is obvious: key CF players historically nurtured, partnered with, or led armed formations that now operate under the IRI banner or within the PMU. But where they diverge is also increasingly visible: CF politicians must keep the state solvent, manage a complex foreign policy, and win elections; IRI hard-liners prize deterrence and ideological signaling, viewing armed action as the central instrument through which U.S. withdrawal and regional Axis cohesion are achieved.

The CF emerged as the dominant political coalition after Muqtada al-Sadr’s dramatic withdrawal from Iraqi politics in August 2022, following deadly clashes in Baghdad’s Green Zone. The CF consolidated power among the remaining Shia political forces, including the State of Law Coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki, the Badr Organization under Hadi al-Amiri, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) led by Qays al-Khazali, and various smaller parties. This coalition successfully formed a government under Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani in October 2022, marking a significant shift in Iraq’s political balance.3

The initial cohesion of the CF was built around shared opposition to Sadrist dominance and a commitment to maintaining Iraq’s strategic relationship with Iran while managing pragmatic relations with the United States. However, this balancing act has proven increasingly difficult as external pressures have intensified and internal contradictions have emerged regarding the role of armed factions within the Iraqi state structure. Prime Minister Sudani, the man whose unenviable task is to find that balance, has prioritized Iraq’s stability and avoided major policy shifts thus far.4

For its part, IRI crystallized as a distinct operational entity in October 2023 following the outbreak of the Gaza conflict. While its constituent groups have operated in Iraq for years as part of the PMU, the Islamic Resistance designation allowed these factions to conduct operations against U.S. and Israeli targets while maintaining the Iraqi government’s plausible deniability. This arrangement initially benefited both the CF, which could distance itself from controversial military operations, and the IRI, which gained operational flexibility.5

The most prominent groups within IRI are Kata’eb Hezbollah, considered the most powerful pro-Iran group in Iraq, and Harakat al-Nujaba, which has served as a key coordinator for resistance activities. Each group maintains distinct relationships both with Iranian handlers and with Iraqi political structures, creating a complex matrix of loyalties that has become increasingly difficult to manage.

Competing Visions on Power and Politics

At the heart of the dispute between the CF and IRI is the attitude toward seeking power. The parties in the CF believe formal participation in politics and electoral success will give them the legitimacy, resources, and security to guarantee their future and relevance to Iraq. The IRI groups prioritize military capabilities and strategic alignment with Iran’s Axis of Resistance as an alternative to formal political power. Thus, the CF members, being part of government, seek stability and portray themselves as statespeople, while IRI groups believe it is legitimate to act in contravention to government wishes and are critical of the politicians for lacking principles. 

The policy of the CF parties has been to encourage the IRI to enter formal politics. This is based on experiences with the Sadrists, Badr, and AAH, who retain armed wings but became core components of government and no longer seek to undermine it. Thus far, the IRI factions have resisted the pressure to normalize and for their brigades in the PMU to be fully integrated.

The decision by major CF components to run separately in the November 2025 parliamentary elections reflects the competition within the CF and does not present the IRI groups with an attractive proposition to ally themselves with any particular party. This fragmentation potentially benefits opposition forces, including a possible return by Muqtada al-Sadr’s movement, while weakening the ability of the CF to maintain governmental control.

The proposal by CF parties that IRI groups should be integrated into electoral politics through affiliated political parties has created additional complications, as parties such as Badr and AAH do not want powerful new parties that compete for the same voter base. The success or failure of parties with armed wings in the upcoming elections will provide important indicators of public support for IRI activities and the broader Iranian alignment.6 

The electoral prospects of the CF have been complicated by its association with controversial militia activities and its perceived subservience to external pressures.7 Public frustration with economic conditions and political instability may favor candidates who can distance themselves from both militia violence and foreign interference. 

Institutional Control and the PMU Law Controversy

A recent significant source of tension between the CF and IRI has centered on the proposed Popular Mobilization Units Authority Law, which has been debated in the Iraqi parliament since March 2024. The legislation, designed to provide a clearer legal framework for the role of the PMU within Iraq’s security architecture, has exposed fundamental disagreements about the balance between state control and militia autonomy.8

Sudani has supported the law as a means of integrating armed groups more fully into state institutions, potentially reducing their independence while providing legal legitimacy for their continued existence. This approach reflects the broader CF strategy of managing American pressure for militia disarmament while maintaining the military capabilities that underpin Shia political power in Iraq.9

However, IRI groups have viewed the proposed legislation with suspicion, fearing that increased state oversight would compromise their operational independence and ability to pursue Iran’s regional objectives. The law would establish clearer command hierarchies, financial oversight mechanisms, and operational constraints that IRI leaders see as incompatible with their role as part of Iran’s Axis of Resistance.10

American opposition to the PMU law has added another layer of complexity to these tensions. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned in July 2025 that the law would “institutionalize Iranian influence and armed terrorist groups undermining Iraq’s sovereignty.” Rubio’s intervention created a diplomatic crisis that has exposed the vulnerability of CF to external pressure. The U.S. threat of sanctions and potential military action has forced the Iraqi government to delay the law’s passage, creating frustration among CF leaders and PMU commanders, who view the delay as capitulation to American demands. The CF could push for the PMU law again while it has a majority in parliament before the November elections, but the Sudani government would like to defer a vote until a new government is formed next year.11

Command Structure and Operational Autonomy

The relationship between formal PMU command structures and the operational independence of IRI groups has become increasingly strained as these organizations have pursued military activities beyond the scope of their official Iraqi government mandate. While technically under Sudani’s command—since the prime minister is commander-in-chief of the armed forces—IRI groups have conducted independent operations against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria, as well as launched attacks against Israel, in direct contravention of Sudani’s orders.

This operational independence has created significant problems for the CF, which faces pressure from both the United States and Iraqi public opinion to control military activities within Iraqi territory. The inability of the CF to prevent or convincingly disavow IRI group operations has undermined its credibility as a governing coalition and exposed the limitations of Iraqi state authority over powerful armed factions.12

The February 2024 temporary truce between IRI groups and U.S. forces, brokered through the CF, demonstrated both the potential for political management of these tensions and the fragility of such arrangements. The agreement, which followed lethal attacks on U.S. personnel in Jordan, showed that IRI groups remained responsive to political pressure but only within limits that preserved their core operational capabilities and strategic objectives.13

Banners for Iraqi PMU groups, including Kata’eb Sayyid al-Shuhada, on a road on June 20, 2017, in the northwestern Iraqi town of Ba’aj, near the Iraq-Syria border. Source: Martyn Aim/Getty Images

Economic Resources and State Patronage

Control over Iraq’s substantial oil revenues and state budget has emerged as a crucial battleground between the CF and IRI, with both sides seeking to maximize their access to economic resources while denying such access to potential rivals. The annual budget of the PMU of $3.6 billion provides significant economic leverage, but the distribution of these resources has become a source of increasing friction.14

A July 2025 incident at Baghdad’s Agriculture Ministry, in which Kata’eb Hezbollah fighters clashed with Iraqi police over the appointment of a new director, exemplified these economic tensions. The confrontation, which resulted in the death of a police officer and the arrest of fourteen fighters, was fundamentally about control over patronage networks and resource distribution within government ministries. Sudani dismissed the commanders of two Kata’eb Hezbollah brigades in the PMU following the incident, marking an unprecedented escalation in the government’s willingness to challenge militia autonomy.15

The establishment of the PMU-linked General Foundation for Contracting in 2023 has created additional tensions, as this commercial entity has gained preferential access to government contracts and land acquisitions. Critics within the CF argue that such arrangements undermine state authority and create parallel economic structures that serve militia interests rather than broader national objectives.

Regional Policy and External Relations

Perhaps the most complex source of friction between the CF and IRI groups concerns Iraq’s regional policy and management of relationships with external powers, particularly the United States and Iran. The CF has attempted to maintain a delicate balance between accommodating American security concerns while preserving Iraq’s strategic relationship with Iran, but this approach has faced increasing challenges from IRI groups committed to Iran’s regional agenda.

The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in December 2024 created a significant test of this relationship, as IRI groups initially called for Iraqi government support for military intervention to prop up the Syrian government. However, the pragmatic decision by the CF to accept the new Syrian reality and engage with the post-Assad government in Damascus created tensions with groups that had heavily invested in supporting Assad’s forces.16

Similarly, the ongoing conflict between Iran and Israel has placed enormous strain on the relationship between the CF and IRI groups, as the latter have sought to expand operations against Israeli targets while the former has attempted to avoid drawing Iraq into a broader regional war. Efforts by the CF to moderate IRI group activities have been complicated by these groups’ direct reporting relationships to Iranian commanders, which often supersede their formal subordination to Iraqi government authority.

Internal Dynamics and Leadership Struggles

The CF itself has experienced significant internal fragmentation over the past eighteen months, with constituent parties increasingly pursuing independent electoral and political strategies. The decision by major CF components to run separately in the November 2025 parliamentary elections reflects deeper disagreements about how to manage their internal relationships and with IRI groups, and respond to external pressures.

Former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition (a member of the CF) has adopted an increasingly hard-line position, criticizing what it sees as excessive concessions to American pressure and calling for stronger support for IRI activities. This stance has put Maliki at odds with Sudani’s more pragmatic approach, creating internal tensions that have weakened the ability of the CF to present a unified position on militia-related issues. 

The Badr Organization has attempted to maintain its position as both a CF political party and a significant armed faction, but this dual role has become increasingly difficult to sustain as pressure mounts for clearer distinctions between political and military activities. AAH has similarly struggled to balance its political ambitions with its military commitments, leading to internal debates about the organization’s priorities and strategic direction. AAH is frequently critical of the IRI groups and their activities, having competed with them over resources and territory in the past.

Within the IRI network, leadership tensions have emerged over strategy, resource allocation, and relationships with both Iranian handlers and Iraqi political structures. The traditional dominance of Kata’eb Hezbollah within the IRI hierarchy has been challenged by other groups seeking greater autonomy and recognition, creating internal competition that has complicated efforts to maintain unified positions. Harakat al-Nujaba, in particular, seems prepared to disagree with Kata’eb Hezbollah, which reinforces the idea that the IRI is not homogenous or on the same page with policies.

Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi’s emergence as Kata’eb Hezbollah’s leader following the 2020 American assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (the nom du guerre of Jafaar Mohammed Ali Al Ibrahim, a PMU leader) has coincided with the group’s increasingly confrontational approach toward the Iraqi government. Hamidawi’s explicit calls in August 2025 for CF leaders to “take custody” of Sudani’s decision-making powers represented an unprecedented challenge to the governmental authority of the CF.17

Several PMU groups want to force the head of the PMU, Falih al-Fayyadh, to retire, as he has reached the mandatory age of retirement. There is intense competition for his position as well as other senior positions in the PMU hierarchy; debates over the draft PMU Authority Law reflect this competition. AAH, in particular, is keen to have more influence over the PMU, and given that it is a key party in the CF, believes that doing so will keep the IRI groups in check.

The relationship between IRI group leaders and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commanders has also evolved, with some evidence suggesting that Iran has granted greater operational autonomy to Iraqi groups as Tehran faces its own regional challenges. This increased independence would create new possibilities for friction with Iraqi political structures, while potentially reducing the ability of the CF to moderate IRI group activities through diplomatic channels with Iran.

American Pressure and Policy Evolution

The new administration of Donald Trump has significantly escalated American pressure on both the CF and IRI, with the new administration adopting a more confrontational approach than its predecessor. The reinstatement of “maximum pressure” policies targeting Iranian-backed groups has created new challenges for the CF balancing strategy.

Rubio’s explicit threats regarding the PMU law—and broader U.S. demands for militia disarmament—have forced the CF to choose between accommodating American demands and maintaining its informal alliance with IRI groups. The Trump administration’s opposition to the passage of the PMU law is an overt attempt to influence Iraqi politics and undercut the government as it acceded to the pressure. This intervention is detrimental to the Iraqi state’s attempt to shield itself from foreign influence—including from Iran. Washington may see this episode as a justified and effective use of American influence. But the reality is that the PMU law will eventually pass because it is a necessity to better organize a permanent institution of the Iraqi security forces.

The U.S. designation of additional IRI-affiliated organizations as terrorist entities has further complicated the CF position, as it must navigate relationships with groups that face direct American sanctions and potential military targeting.18 Congressional pressure for ending U.S. security assistance to Iraq unless Baghdad takes action against Iranian-backed militias has created additional leverage for American demands. The threat to suspend the approximately $3.5 billion in annual U.S. aid to Iraq represents a significant economic pressure point that has influenced CF calculations about the costs and benefits of continued IRI group accommodation.19

A more constructive policy would be to support a stronger government in Baghdad that can check the influence of other actors.

The Trump administration is most likely to increase pressure on the Iraqi government to tackle the power of the IRI groups in a head-on confrontation. However, a more constructive policy would entail supporting a stronger government in Baghdad that can build up the necessary domestic support to check the influence of other actors. Baghdad is currently forced into reactive measures as it deals with sanctions, IRI overreach, and regional tensions. The current U.S. policy of pressure and confrontation is likely to undercut Sudani and lead to the emergence of a more hard-line government in Baghdad or, as has happened in the past, bring in a more U.S.-friendly prime minister who ends up being ineffective.

Iranian Strategic Adjustments

Iran’s regional position has been significantly weakened over the past eighteen months due to the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, the degradation of Hezbollah’s capabilities in Lebanon, and the ongoing pressures from Israeli military operations. These setbacks have affected Tehran’s ability to support its Iraqi proxies while simultaneously increasing the strategic importance of maintaining influence in Iraq as one of the few remaining reliable components of the Axis of Resistance.

When IRGC Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani has visited Baghdad this year, he has focused on addressing tensions between Iranian interests and the realities of Iraqi politics, but these efforts have had limited success in resolving fundamental contradictions between IRI group objectives and CF political requirements. Iran’s reported willingness to allow some IRI groups to consider disarmament in the face of American pressure represents a significant shift in Tehran’s approach, though the practical implementation of such policies remains unclear.20

The Clash at the Agriculture Ministry

On July 27, 2025, a clash at Baghdad’s Agriculture Ministry represented a watershed moment in the deteriorating relationship between the CF and IRI groups. The incident, which began as a dispute over the appointment of a new ministry director, escalated into armed confrontation between Kata’eb Hezbollah fighters and Iraqi security forces, resulting in casualties and arrests that marked an unprecedented breakdown in the informal arrangements that had previously managed such tensions.

In the wake of the clashes, Sudani dismissed the commanders of the 45th and 46th PMU Brigades, both affiliated with Kata’eb Hezbollah, representing the most direct challenge to IRI group autonomy since the formation of his government. The move was widely interpreted as a test of the government’s authority and willingness to enforce state control over armed factions, even at the risk of confrontation with powerful militia organizations.21

Kata’eb Hezbollah rejected the results of an investigation by Sudani and called them “falsification and an exaggerated abuse of power,” demonstrating the group’s unwillingness to accept accountability to Iraqi government authority. The organization’s characterization of the government’s actions as serving American interests highlighted the fundamental disagreement over the proper relationship between state institutions and IRI activities.22

Hawks in the region and in the United States emphasized the significance of the confrontation as a signal that the Iraqi government needs to escalate its response to the IRI. But the reality is that the incident suggests that a successful state strategy will be incremental and deliberate, even cautious, because the armed groups remain strong and wield significant spoiler potential. Despite a push for more action against the IRI from the U.S. the government, Baghdad cannot afford to be reckless. Instead, it would benefit from focusing on a long-term goal of building up the state and its institutions to prevent outside influence and sub-state actors from undermining it.

The Parliamentary Crisis

The chaotic parliamentary session of August 5, 2025, when the body attempted to vote on the PMU Authority law, exemplified the broader political crisis surrounding militia integration. The session, which began with 169 lawmakers but was subsequently canceled due to reported lack of quorum, involved physical altercations between CF representatives and members of Sunni parties, demonstrating the deep polarization surrounding these issues.

Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani alleged that his deputy violated parliamentary procedures by opening the session without authorization—a case in point highlighting the internal divisions of the CF and its inability to manage the legislative process effectively in the face of external pressure and internal resistance.

Subsequently, Kata’eb Hezbollah’s leader made their call for CF politicians to assume direct control over Sudani’s decision-making, representing an extraordinary challenge to democratic governance and constitutional authority. This demand reflected the IRI groups’ frustration with the perceived capitulation of the CF to American pressure, and the willingness to compromise IRI interests for political survival.23

Governance, Stability, and International Dynamics

The inability of the CF to enforce discipline over IRI groups without risking political fragmentation or violent confrontation has created a situation where state authority remains contested and incomplete. This dynamic has undermined public confidence in government institutions and created opportunities for continued instability and external manipulation.

The precedent set by IRI group defiance of government authority has broader implications for Iraq’s institutional development, potentially encouraging other armed actors to challenge state control. The normalization of militia autonomy within state structures creates long-term risks for democratic consolidation and effective governance.

Additionally, the friction between the CF and IRI groups has created significant challenges for U.S.–Iraq bilateral relations, as Washington has found it difficult to distinguish between moderate political forces and militant proxies within the Iraqi government. The Biden administration’s negotiations regarding the future of U.S. military presence in Iraq were complicated by the uncertainty surrounding Baghdad’s ability to control armed factions operating within its territory.24 The Trump administration’s return to more confrontational policies has raised the stakes for both the CF and the IRI, with the possibility of direct U.S. military action against militia targets creating new pressures for political resolution. The historical precedent of targeted killings, including the 2020 assassination of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, provides a sobering reminder of the potential consequences of continued escalation.

For Iran, the growing friction between its Iraqi allies represents both a challenge to its regional influence and an opportunity to test new approaches to proxy management. The possibility that IRI groups might face disarmament or integration into Iraqi state structures threatens to reduce Tehran’s ability to project power in the region while potentially creating new models for managing relationships with local partners. Iran’s response to these challenges has included both diplomatic efforts to mediate between the CF and IRI, and strategic adjustments that grant greater operational autonomy to Iraqi allies. However, Tehran’s weakened regional position following setbacks in Syria and Lebanon has reduced its leverage in managing these internal Iraqi dynamics.

Future Trajectories and Scenarios

It is possible to trace three broad scenarios that may emerge in Iraq from the current tensions.

Scenario 1: Managed Integration

The optimistic scenario involves a negotiated resolution that achieves partial integration of IRI groups into state structures while preserving some degree of operational autonomy. This outcome would require significant compromises from all parties, including American acceptance of continued Iranian influence within Iraqi institutions and IRI group acceptance of meaningful constraints on their activities.

Such an arrangement would likely involve the passage of a modified PMU law that provides clearer oversight mechanisms while preserving some operational flexibility for IRI activities. The success of this approach would depend on the ability of the CF to maintain internal unity and manage external pressures effectively.

Scenario 2: Violent Fragmentation

A pessimistic scenario involves the breakdown of political accommodation and a return to violent confrontation between government forces and IRI groups. This outcome could be triggered by additional incidents similar to the Agriculture Ministry clash, particularly if either side perceives existential threats to their core interests.

Violent fragmentation would likely involve broader intra-Shia conflict, potentially drawing in other armed actors and creating opportunities for extremist groups to exploit the resulting chaos. The precedent of the August 2022 clashes in Baghdad provides a concerning example of how quickly political tensions can escalate into deadly violence.

Scenario 3: External Intervention

The possibility of direct U.S. or Israeli military action against IRI group targets could fundamentally alter the dynamics of this relationship, potentially forcing the CF to definitively choose between accommodation and confrontation. Such intervention could either strengthen the CF position by eliminating troublesome rivals or weaken it by exposing its inability to protect allied forces.

External intervention would likely provoke significant resistance and could lead to broader regional escalation involving Iran and other regional powers. The CF response to such scenarios would largely determine Iraq’s future trajectory and its relationships with major international actors.25

Resolving Fundamental Contradictions

The tensions that have emerged over the past eighteen months reflect fundamental contradictions within Iraq’s post-2003 political system, particularly the difficult balance between democratic governance and accommodation of powerful armed actors with external loyalties.

The CF attempts to maintain power while managing competing pressures from the United States, Iran, and domestic constituencies have proven increasingly unsustainable, leading to internal fragmentation and declining effectiveness. The IRI commitment to operational autonomy and regional objectives has created irreconcilable conflicts with the requirements of effective state governance and international legitimacy.

As Iraq looks toward the future, this central tension remains the single greatest obstacle to its stability. The friction is not simply between politicians and militants, but between the very concepts of a state and a cause. Until the actors who dominate Iraqi politics are forced to choose between being statespeople or revolutionaries, the country will remain trapped in a perilous cycle of internal conflict, vulnerable to external pressures and regional turmoil.

The competing visions for state identity within Shia politics belie the narrative that all Shia parties are united and inherently anti-state.26 The CF has recently gained the upper hand as it has subdued the activity of the IRI but it is more likely the IRI acquiesced to pressure rather than a permanent change of strategy. The question is whether the IRI can be properly integrated into the PMU—and potentially enter formal politics.

The international community’s response to these developments will play a crucial role in determining whether Iraq can achieve sustainable political accommodation or will continue to experience the cycles of crisis and temporary resolution that have characterized its post-2003 experience. Foreign powers, particularly the United States, should be careful not to be seen as interfering in this process, and instead encourage the Iraqi government that continued stability and better regional ties will be rewarded with further support. Much also rests on the Iran–U.S. negotiations—if they succeed, then the IRI will face further pressure to not undermine stability in Iraq.

This report is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.

Header Image Caption: Iraqi police cadets take part in a rehearsal of a police cadet ceremony at the Iraq National Police College on November 26, 2024, in Baghdad, Iraq. Source: Henry Nicholls—WPA Pool/Getty Images

Notes

  1. “Shiite Coordination Framework Cracks Wide Open Ahead of Iraq 2025 Vote,” Shafaq News, April 30, 2025, https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Shiite-Coordination-Framework-cracks-wide-open-ahead-of-Iraq-2025-Vote.
  2. Renad Mansour, Hayder Al-Shakeri, and Haid Haid, “The Shape-Shifting ’Axis of Resistance’: How Iran and Its Networks Adapt to External Pressures,” Chatham House Chatham House, March 6, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/2025-03-06-shape-shifting-axis-resistance-mansour-shakeri-haid.pdf.
  3. Haley Bobseine, “Iraq’s Crisis of Elite, Consensus-Based Politics Turns Deadly: The Coordination Framework,” Middle East Institute, September 26, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iraqs-crisis-elite-consensus-based-politics-turns-deadly-coordination-framework.
  4. “Iraq’s Prime Minister Seeks Closer Ties with Us While Keeping Armed Groups at Bay,” Associated Press, July 29, 2025, https://newsroom.ap.org/editorial-photos-videos/detail?itemid=a1c90cae191249369309f4fc1df574a2&mediatype=video.
  5. “Profiles: Iran’s Militia Allies in Iraq,” Wilson Center, February 2, 2024, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/profiles-irans-militia-allies-iraq.
  6. Burcu Ozcelik and Tamer Badawi, “Why Did Iraq’s Militias Sit Out the Iran–Israel War and Why It Matters,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), August 14, 2025, https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/why-did-iraqs-militias-sit-out-iran-israel-war-and-why-it-matters.
  7. “Al‑Sudani, the Coordination Framework, and the PMF: Navigating between Allies and Pressure,” Shafaq News, August 11, 2025, https://shafaq.com/en/Report/Al-Sudani-the-Coordination-Framework-and-the-PMF-Navigating-between-allies-and-pressure. (The PMU is also known as the PMF, or Popular Mobilization Forces.)
  8. Mat Nashed, “Will Iraq Integrate the Popular Mobilization Forces into the State?,” Al Jazeera, August 18, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2025/8/18/will-iraq-integrate-the-pmf-into-state-insitutions.
  9. Cathrin Schaer, “Iran or the US? How a New Law Is Testing Iraq’s Independence,” Deutsche Welle, November 4, 2025, https://www.dw.com/en/iran-or-the-us-how-a-new-law-is-testing-iraqs-independence/a-73773047.
  10. Adam Hussein, “Dissolving the PMF, Again,” Jummar Media, February 20, 2025, https://jummar.media/en/7808.
  11. “Baghdad Rescinds PMU Legislation as US Forces Redeploy to Iraqi Kurdistan,” Amwaj Media, August 28, 2025, https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/baghdad-rescinds-pmu-legislation-as-us-forces-redeploy-to-iraqi-kurdistan.
  12. Marsin Alshamary and Hamzeh Hadad, “Iraq’s Search for Security and Sovereignty after Assad’s Collapse,” Brookings, January 21, 2025, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/iraqs-search-for-security-and-sovereignty-after-assads-collapse/.
  13. Ahmed Rasheed, “Iran-Backed Militias in Iraq Ready to Disarm to Avert Trump Wrath,” Reuters, April 7, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-backed-militias-iraq-ready-disarm-avert-trump-wrath-2025-04-07/.
  14. Harith Hasan and Alfadhel Ahmad, “A Turn to Patronage and Protection,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 14, 2025, https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/diwan/2025/04/a-turn-to-patronage-and-protection?lang=en.
  15. “Iraqi Police Clash with Paramilitary Fighters Who Stormed Government Building,” Reuters, July 27, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraqi-police-clash-with-paramilitary-fighters-who-stormed-government-building-2025-07-27/.
  16. Giorgio Cafiero, “Pragmatism Shapes Iraq’s Position Toward Post-Assad Syria,” Arab Center Washington DC, July 1, 2025, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/pragmatism-shapes-iraqs-position-toward-post-assad-syria/.
  17. Dana Taib Menmy, “As Iraq Heads for Elections, PM Sudani Faces Mounting Pressure from Iran-Backed Militias and Rivals,” New Arab, August 8, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/iraqi-pm-sudani-under-pressure-iranian-backed-militas.
  18. Elizabeth Hagedorn, “US Lists 4 Iran-Backed Iraqi Militias as Foreign Terrorist Organizations,” Al-Monitor, September 17, 2025, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2025/09/us-lists-4-iran-backed-iraqi-militias-foreign-terrorist-organizations.
  19. Sajad Jiyad, “A Better U.S. Mission in Iraq: Fight ISIS, Invest in the State,” The Century Foundation, September 16, 2024, https://tcf.org/content/report/a-better-u-s-mission-in-iraq-fight-isis-invest-in-the-state/.
  20. “Iran’s Quds Force Chief Reportedly Visits Iraq Amid Internal Tensions,” BBC Monitoring, July 29, 2025, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/b0004boo.
  21. “Iraqi Prime Minister Removes Paramilitary Commanders After Deadly Clash with Police,” Associated Press, August 9, 2025, https://apnews.com/article/iraq-kataib-hezbollah-pmf-karkh-9055097ec559a23677a36d1f8a9fa80a
  22. “Kataib Hezbollah Rejects Baghdad Clash Probe, Accuses Government of Targeting PMF,” Shafaq News, August 10, 2025, https://shafaq.com/en/Iraq/Kataib-Hezbollah-rejects-Baghdad-clash-probe-accuses-government-of-targeting-PMF.
  23. Dana Taib Menmy, “As Iraq Heads for Elections, PM Sudani Faces Mounting Pressure from Iran-Backed Militias and Rivals,” New Arab, August 8, 2025, https://www.newarab.com/news/iraqi-pm-sudani-under-pressure-iranian-backed-militas.
  24. Jared Szuba, “US Resumes Talks with Iraq over Future of Troop Presence,” Al-Monitor, July 22, 2024, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2024/07/us-resumes-talks-iraq-over-future-troop-presence.
  25. Renad Mansour, “Iraq’s Fragile Stability Is Threatened by a Shifting Middle Eastern Order,” Chatham House, June 25, 2025, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/iraqs-fragile-stability-threatened-shifting-middle-eastern-order.
  26. Ali Al-Mawlawi, “Iraqi Shia Factions Are Supposedly ’Anti-state.’ But State Power Is What They Want,” The Century Foundation, October 23, 2023, https://tcf.org/content/report/iraqi-shia-factions-are-supposedly-anti-state-but-state-power-is-what-they-want/.