Lebanon has grappled for years with how to manage its Syrian refugee population. This year, though, Lebanon finally adopted an official plan for refugee returns. Now, the Lebanese government needs to follow through, while ensuring the returns it is encouraging are actually sustainable.

Lebanon’s adoption of an internationally supported returns plan is a major step forward. The return of Syrian refugees has been a central preoccupation of Lebanese politics in recent years, and a main point of friction between the country’s officials and its international partners.1 All this time, though, Lebanese officials have never developed a real, actionable plan—mostly, they have put forward half-baked proposals for forced returns, which have gone nowhere.

In June, the government of Lebanese prime minister Nawaf Salam approved a plan that incorporates many of the better policy options currently available to Lebanon, and that, moreover, commits to respecting international law and displaced Syrians’ rights and dignity. The plan has promise, even as it faces real challenges: international support for humanitarian assistance is decreasing in both Lebanon and Syria; Syria, to which these refugees are meant to return, is a wreck; and in Lebanon, leading personalities and political factions object to the principles and guardrails that must be part of any sensible, internationally supportable refugee policy.

The Salam government now has to execute its returns plan, and justify the plan domestically, while remaining focused on returns that are really sustainable. Despite how precarious Syrian refugees’ lives are in Lebanon, many of them are still wary about returning to a country that remains unstable and economically stricken. If Syrian refugees in Lebanon are pushed to go back prematurely and if they cannot reestablish themselves in Syria, that won’t just be disastrous for those refugees and for Syria. It will also be a major blow to Lebanon, which both needs returns to succeed to encourage other Syrians to go home and—given the porousness of the Lebanese-Syrian border—is much more exposed than Syria’s other neighbors to new migration, or reverse migration, from Syria.2

This report covers Lebanon’s new returns plan and, given the challenges the plan faces, its realistic prospects. The report is based on more than thirty interviews with Lebanese and Syrian officials, humanitarians, donor country representatives, and others; many spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly. The report also builds on “Cross-Border Shuffle: Refugee Movement Between Lebanon and Syria after Assad,” a March 2025 Century International report on cross-border population movements between Lebanon and Syria since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s dictatorship and Syrian refugees’ decision-making calculus on return.3 The two reports are part of “Bridging the Gap on Syrian Refugee Return,” a Century International project supported by the Kingdom of Norway.

It will not be easy for Lebanon to produce substantial returns, given the present condition of Syria and a litany of other obstacles. Yet the Salam government, with this new plan, has committed to an approach on returns that is responsible, and that ought to produce some results.

Lebanon’s Refugee Dilemma

Lebanon’s government launched its returns program on July 1. Lebanese government ministers emphasize that this is the first official plan on refugees and returns that Lebanon has approved since 2014, and this time has international support.

The Salam government took office, importantly, in a new and changed regional context. The current government was confirmed in February 2025, two months after the Assad government collapsed in neighboring Syria—a massive political upheaval that opened up new possibilities for refugee returns to Syria, and for Lebanese–Syrian relations broadly.

Before Assad’s fall, Syrian refugees’ return had been a main theme of Lebanese politics for years. The issue’s prominence was due in part to populist, anti-Syrian demagoguery by leading Lebanese politicians. Yet the material reality of hosting this huge number of refugees also contributed to the prominence of the issue—the sheer size of this additional population that Lebanon has accommodated for more than a decade, and the attendant burden on the country.

Lebanon hosts an estimated 1.4 million Syrian refugees, 200,000 Palestinian refugees, and 27,000 Palestinian residents of Syria. Lebanon’s total population is 5.7 million people; it is the country with the most refugees per capita worldwide. Of those 1.4 million Syrians, slightly over 700,000 are officially registered as refugees. The influx of Syrian refugees to Lebanon since 2011 has stressed the country’s infrastructure, services and public finances.4 Tensions between refugees and host communities have also worsened in recent years, as anti-Syrian sentiment has intensified.

When rebels ousted the government of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December, many in Lebanon greeted it as the moment, finally, for displaced Syrians in Lebanon to return to their country. The reality has been more mixed, however.

The real population of Syrians in Lebanon and the number of returns to Syria since December are difficult to quantify because of the large volume of irregular movement across Lebanon’s long, relatively porous border with Syria.

The numbers of refugee returns to Syria and new arrivals to Lebanon since December have been roughly even.

It appears, though, that the numbers of refugee returns to Syria and new arrivals to Lebanon since December have been roughly even. Some Syrians have returned from Lebanon to Syria—likely around 100,000. UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, believes that nearly 200,000 Syrians have crossed from Lebanon into Syria since December. The agency has generally estimated, however, that half of those Syrians either transited Lebanon or returned to Syria only temporarily before crossing back into Lebanon. And in parallel, more than 100,000 Syrians have fled to Lebanon since December, escaping intercommunal violence and reprisal attacks.5

Syrian refugees who have remained in Lebanon have not done so because life in Lebanon is easy or comfortable. Among Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the more than 100,000 Syrians who have fled to Lebanon since December are especially vulnerable. Yet even more long-term, better established Syrian refugees face serious hardship. Almost nine-tenths of Syrians in Lebanon live in poverty. More than 80 percent of Syrians lack legal residency, putting them at risk of arrest and deportation, and more than 90 percent of families have at least one member lacking residency. Syrians regularly face discrimination and harassment. During Israel’s late 2024 military escalation in Lebanon, Syrians were mostly barred from accessing collective shelters; afterward, dozens of municipalities prevented displaced Syrians from returning.

Last November, the author met with Syrians—who had been displaced inside Lebanon by Israeli attacks—in a muddy camp in Lebanon’s northern Akkar governorate. “If one of the children goes outside, afterward you want to throw out their clothes” because they get soaked in dirty water, a woman originally from Homs said. A man said two children had died the previous year after falling into a nearby river.6

Aid for Syrians in Lebanon is also decreasing, due to severe funding shortfalls. UNHCR has announced it will end its support for Syrians’ health care, including both primary health care and emergency hospitalization. UNHCR and the World Food Programme (WFP), meanwhile, have substantially reduced the number of Syrians receiving cash assistance.

Yet these Syrians have had to weigh the difficulties they face in Lebanon against conditions back in Syria, as well as the cost and complications of return. And while they no longer face some of the safety fears that previously kept them from returning, they now have other worries, including concerns about access to shelter, services and livelihoods back in Syria, as well as general uncertainty about the country’s future.

“If there’s stability, if our homes are restored, if there’s a good president, then we’ll all go back,” a Dera’a woman in the Beqaa Valley of Lebanon told the author in January. “No one will stay here.”7

People visit a market in the city of Homs, Syria on January 22, 2025. Syria’s economy is in shambles. Source: Spencer Platt/Getty Images

The Salam Government’s Returns Plan

The Salam government’s returns plan ought to be able to help some of these Syrian refugees return from Lebanon.

Salam’s government has attempted to navigate the contentious politics of this issue in Lebanon without contravening international law, or proposing something totally unworkable. The government committed in its ministerial program to “resolve the issue of displaced Syrians [in Lebanon], a matter with existential implications for Lebanon if their return to their country is not achieved.” Minister of Social Affairs Haneen Sayed asserted to Lebanon’s international partners in May that “the return of displaced Syrians is a national sovereign priority.” Yet she also said that Lebanon “aims to implement [return] in a safe, dignified, informed, and sustainable manner in line with international principles.”

The government began work on its returns plan in March, when it formed an interministerial committee on returns led by Deputy Prime Minister Tarek Mitri.8 On June 16, Mitri presented the committee’s plan to Lebanon’s cabinet, which provided its approval. The government launched the returns program at the beginning of July. On July 24, Sayed reiterated to international officials and donor country representatives that the government is committed to its returns plan, which it will implement in collaboration with the country’s partners and “within frameworks that uphold national sovereignty and human dignity.”

The Lebanese government’s returns plan has not been published in full, but officials have described it, and it has circulated among humanitarians. The plan, in fact, has two parts. The first part is the two-page policy document that Lebanon’s cabinet approved in June, and which mainly provides a set of guiding principles and priorities for the government’s returns program.9 The second part of the plan is represented in an exchange of letters between the Lebanese government and UNHCR, which spell out the plan’s implementation in more practical, operational terms.10

The government’s two-page policy document spells out principles that include a rejection of Syrians’ resettlement in Lebanon; commitments to work toward refugees’ “swift, effective” return, and to cooperate with the Syrian government, UN agencies, and international donors to guarantee support for Syrians’ “safe, sustainable” return; and promises to respect international humanitarian law, with resort to Lebanese law in individual cases, as appropriate. The policy document’s second page describes the plan’s execution, which involves, centrally, Lebanon’s Ministry of Social Affairs and its General Security Directorate, as well as UNHCR.

On July 1, Lebanon’s General Security announced a set of waivers intended to facilitate returns.11 The three-month waivers—valid until September 30—permit Syrians and Palestinian residents of Syria who entered Lebanon illegally or overstayed their legal residency to return to Syria through official border crossings without incurring any fees, fines, or bans on future reentry to Lebanon. The same day, UNHCR launched its communications campaign informing Syrian refugees of return procedures and available support.

According to the government’s returns program, Syrians interested in returning first contact UNHCR.12 After UNHCR interviews them to confirm the voluntariness of their return, it registers them as returnees and issues them repatriation forms. These registered returnees’ files with UNHCR are closed, and they lose their refugee status. UNHCR in Lebanon updates that country’s General Security and UNHCR in Syria to ensure follow-up and support for returnees in Syria. If returnees lack necessary official documents, including education and civil documents, UNHCR refers them to partners for legal assistance. Lebanese officials emphasize that returnees whose cases have been closed who subsequently cross back into Lebanon illegally will be treated as irregular migrants, not refugees.13

Syrian refugees who choose to participate in Lebanon’s returns program receive cash grants of $100 per person provided by UNHCR in Lebanon, and may be eligible for reintegration grants of $400 per family from UNHCR in Syria.

Refugees can choose either “organized” or “self-organized” return. Returnees who prefer organized returns can take buses provided by IOM, the UN migration agency, from designated returns centers to the Syrian border. Returnees who opt for self-organized returns arrange their own transportation, which may allow them more flexibility in moving their possessions. UNHCR and IOM launched the first organized return on July 29. So far, though, almost all registered returnees have said they prefer self-organized return. 

Returns under the Lebanese government’s plan are open to all Syrian refugees known to UNHCR. This includes both Syrian refugees officially registered by UNHCR before May 2015, when the Lebanese government ordered the agency to stop registering refugees; and Syrians subsequently recorded by UNHCR but not officially registered as refugees.14

It remains to be seen whether Lebanese authorities, at the end of the summer, will adopt a harsher approach on refugees and returns.

UNHCR reported on August 5 that nearly 72,000 people had registered interest in returns under the government’s program. Officials and humanitarians following the returns file expected an uptick in returns over the summer, when children are out of school and dry weather makes it easier for families to move and to repair their homes in Syria. Capt. Elie Aoun of Lebanon’s General Security told an audience in July that the plan’s three-month window for waivers was chosen so it coincided with the summer, between Lebanon and Syria’s school years.15 Aoun also said the government settled on a three-month time frame because the government thought a more open-ended program would not spur people to register.16

It remains to be seen whether Lebanese authorities, at the end of the summer, will adopt a harsher approach on refugees and returns. In General Security’s July 1 announcement, the agency said that, at the end of the three-month period, it would step up enforcement of relevant laws and regulations against “all non-Lebanese residents [in the country] illegally.” “At the end of those three months, [Syrians] will be treated like any other foreigner,” General Security media head Gen. Bechara Abou Hamad told the author. “No more of this ‘refugee’ business.”17

International Support for Lebanon’s Plan

Lebanon’s international partners are prepared to help the country’s government execute its returns plan and facilitate returns by at least one group of Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

UNHCR has committed to partnering with the Salam government on the latter’s returns plan. On June 19, UNHCR head Filippo Grandi visited Lebanon and discussed the plan with Prime Minister Salam, Deputy Prime Minister Mitri, and Minister of Social Affairs Sayed. Speaking afterward, Grandi “commended” the government for adopting the plan, which he said UNHCR “will support in every way [it] can.”

UNHCR, for its part, had engaged in its own returns planning since December. In February, UNHCR introduced a new “operational framework” for the voluntary return of Syrian refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), according to which the agency would begin to facilitate voluntary returns.18 In March and April, UNHCR and partners introduced both regional and Lebanon-specific returns plans.19 UNHCR also introduced the “Syria Is Home” web platform, an informational resource for refugees considering return. Now, the Lebanese government and UN have included a standalone returns chapter in the 2025 Lebanon Response Plan, the governing framework for UN-coordinated assistance to Lebanon.20

The Lebanese government’s plan incorporates most—but not all—of the returns-related measures that UNHCR and partners developed after Assad’s fall in December. Notably, the plan does not include “go-and-see” visits, which would have permitted Syrian refugees to travel to Syria to assess conditions in their home areas, then come back to Lebanon to plan for return. UNHCR and General Security had discussed go-and-see visits and preliminarily developed visit procedures and informational materials. Ultimately, though, Lebanese authorities said the visits would be too complicated, and UNHCR assessed that—as time had passed since December and many Syrians had already returned temporarily—formal go-and-see visits had become less relevant.21 Syrian refugees had also expressed reservations to UNHCR about the practicalities of go-and-see visits.22

The Lebanese government’s returns plan targets a subset of Syrians in Lebanon. Ivo Freijsen, the outgoing UNHCR representative in Lebanon, told the author that long-term Syrian refugees in Lebanon— that is, excluding new arrivals since December 2024—can be roughly categorized into several groups in terms of their readiness and ability to return. The first group, he said, includes Syrians willing and able to return on their own initiative, many of whom have already left or are leaving now. A second group includes Syrians who are willing to return, but who need support to overcome material obstacles such as the cost of transportation and initial reintegration in Syria. A third group includes Syrians who would also like to return in the future, but for whom conditions in Syria currently present insurmountable challenges, and who may need to wait for the restoration of essential services and economic activity in their areas of return. Many of these people, moreover, know that their homes in Syria have been destroyed, or are occupied by others. And a fourth group would like to stay and work in Lebanon, perhaps as part of the sort of regularized labor scheme that Lebanese officials have recently suggested (more on which below).

The Lebanese government’s plan is aimed at the second group: Syrians who are ready to return, but who require assistance with transportation and reintegration. “We have the current [second] group, who needs a bit of assistance, but who are more confident about a successful, or not overly onerous, return,” Freijsen said. “They believe they can find some work, have a house or apartment—often damaged—to go back to, or perhaps a supportive large family, along with some basic services in their area of return. That’s the current group we can work with.”23

Freijsen emphasized, however, that donor support is “essential.” The EU will be providing support for Lebanon’s returns plan as part of a broader, forthcoming aid package, he said, but “additional interest and support are critical.”24

Genuinely Sustainable Returns

Since December, UNHCR has grounded its returns planning in its assessment that returns are happening, with or without international support. Yet Syrian refugees who have returned thus far—from Lebanon and elsewhere—have mostly returned on their own, in an unplanned fashion, with little assistance. “People are coming back to almost nothing,” said Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, the UNHCR representative in Syria. “Just out of hope. For how long is that sustainable? I don’t know.”25

“Many Syrians are already choosing to return,” Filippo Grandi said in March. The challenge, then, is “how to make these returns sustainable.”

UNHCR has consistently emphasized the importance of returns that are actually sustainable. The alternative—premature, unsustainable returns—entails a number of risks. If refugees returning to Syria struggle to reestablish themselves, they may resort to dangerous coping mechanisms. “After fourteen years of working in Syria, we have an idea of how people will cope,” said one Damascus-based humanitarian. “Taking children out of schools, and putting them into labor. Early child marriage. And the first thing families sacrifice is food.”26 Syrians who return prematurely could also be vulnerable to recruitment by armed actors, ranging from criminal gangs to organizations like the Islamic State. “If people are returning to poverty, with no livelihoods, then there’s a fear of polarization into armed groups,” said another humanitarian. “It’s something we’ve seen in other contexts, and there’s a lack of security out there.”27

Returnees unable to reintegrate could also be displaced again—forced to move elsewhere inside Syria, or to head back to countries like Lebanon. “People are back now,” said a Damascus-based researcher. “But in a few months, or a year’s time, if they cannot establish themselves, or don’t find the means to a livelihood, they could leave again. That’s a concern.”28 This is a risk of which Lebanon should be especially conscious, given the relative ease with which Syrians can cross into Lebanon across the two countries’ porous border.

There is recent precedent for such re-displacement. Notably, Israel’s military escalation in Lebanon between September and November 2024 displaced more than 300,000 Syrians from Lebanon to Syria. The UN referred to these population movements at the time as “returns under adverse circumstances” or “returns under duress”—and, unsurprisingly, they proved largely unsustainable. After a ceasefire in Lebanon was announced on November 27, most of those Syrians are believed to have crossed back. Many Syrians who crossed into Syria as part of that 2024 influx were not known to UNHCR, but of those who were, almost half returned to Lebanon within three months following the ceasefire.

If returnees cannot successfully reintegrate in their areas of return, they will not just stay put and suffer in place—many will move. “You want people to survive for more than a few months, without a relapse,” Freijsen said. “People need something to go back to, genuine pull factors.”29

Populist Domestic Politics

There may be limited patience in Lebanon for talk of “sustainable” returns, of course. The Salam government has introduced its returns plan in a fraught political context in which leading Lebanese personalities and political factions have demanded Syrians’ immediate, forced return.

Even before the Assad government collapsed in December, Lebanese politicians had argued that Syrian refugees in the country were in fact economic migrants and should not enjoy international legal protections against refoulement—that is, the return of refugees to persecution or danger. Now that Assad is gone, some Lebanese officials have said there is no longer any reason for Syrian refugees to remain. 

The voluntariness of return has been a flashpoint in Lebanon’s debate on refugee return for some time. International organizations and donor country representatives in Lebanon regularly stress that, according to international law, returns must be voluntary. Many in Lebanon object, saying this international insistence on voluntary return translates, in practice, to Syrians’ indefinite presence in Lebanon, or even their permanent resettlement in the country. Lebanon has—for years, across multiple governments—disputed that returns must be voluntary, if conditions in refugees’ country of origin can be considered safe.30 Lebanese officials typically avoid talking about “voluntary” returns, using alternative formulations such as “safe and dignified.”

This controversy over voluntariness is linked to Lebanese factions’ attacks on the UN, and on UNHCR in particular. Lebanese politicians and activists have associated UNHCR with the idea of voluntary return, and accused the organization of preventing Syrians’ return.

The Salam government’s returns plan does not use the word “voluntary.” Instead, it commits to returns that are “safe and sustainable” and that guarantee Syrians’ dignity and human rights, terms which could be construed as ensuring returns’ voluntariness. The plan also commits to respect for the principles of international humanitarian law, which presumably includes the principle of non-refoulement.

Lebanese politicians have attacked the Salam government and its returns plan as just a repackaging of UNHCR-approved voluntary returns.

Lebanese politicians have, nonetheless, attacked the Salam government and its returns plan as another repackaging of UNHCR-approved voluntary returns. In a major speech before the plan’s announcement, Free Patriotic Movement leader Gebran Bassil accused the government, and specifically Sayed, the social affairs minister, of conceding the UNHCR arguments on voluntariness. Syrians’ return should be decided by “national security,” Bassil argued, not Syrians’ “feelings.” He said Lebanon now faced “occupation by an army of displaced Syrians” and demanded all Syrians’ “immediate, unconditional return.”

In an interview with Sayed during the plan’s rollout, Al Jadeed TV host Georges Salibi summarized some Lebanese groups’ objections:

There are reservations, there are critiques, there’s a lot being said, to the effect that this plan is basically fictional—that it’s meant to polish the government’s image. Or that it’s not really effective, or realistic, or serious. So, for example: if [Syrians] want to return, then they return, as they please. If they don’t want to return, then they can stay here in Lebanon. So there’s nothing to make them return. . . . What makes them return? There’s nothing compulsory. There’s a wish.

Of course, Lebanese officials have floated ideas for large-scale forced returns in recent years. Yet these proposals mainly just led to tension between Lebanon and its international partners, as well as more animus towards Syrians in Lebanon—they didn’t lead to a meaningful number of Syrians actually returning. The fact is that UNHCR and other UN agencies will not support mass refoulement; and without international support, Lebanon lacks the resources and capacity to organize some sweeping deportation campaign. 

Prospects for Returns from Lebanon

Lebanon and its partners need to be realistic, however, about how many returns Lebanese authorities can achieve at this stage, even with the best-designed and -implemented plans. Returns will depend in part on factors outside Lebanon’s control.

The Salam government’s plan should be able to produce sustainable returns. It is very possible, though, that the number of returns under the plan could end up on the lower end of government projections. The government and its partners will need to avoid overpromising on how many returns Lebanon can expect in the near term, and also to resist the temptation to press for premature returns.

Sayed, the social affairs minister, has said the government is aiming for between 200,000 and 400,000 returns under its plan by the end of 2025. She has said the government is interested in encouraging returns, in particular, from Lebanon’s so-called “informal tented settlements”—ad hoc refugee camps dispersed across the country.31 Roughly 20 percent of Syrians in Lebanon live in these informal settlements.

Lebanese officials have also said that the Lebanese Ministry of Labor is looking at how it can provide Syrian families’ breadwinners with work permits and legal residencies to enable them to stay and work in Lebanon, while their dependent families return to Syria.32 Even Lebanese who call for Syrians’ immediate return typically say that Lebanon will continue to need between 400,000 and 600,000 Syrian migrant workers in sectors such as construction and agriculture, consistent with patterns of labor migration prior to Syria’s war.

Sayed’s figure of 400,000 returns is based on previous UN estimates of possible returns from Lebanon in 2025, in what the UN considered, at the time, a best-case scenario.33 Those UN estimates followed from a refugee perceptions and intentions survey that UNHCR conducted in regional refugee-hosting countries in January, in which 24 percent of respondents in Lebanon said they intended to return to Syria in the next 12 months, up from less than 2 percent in April 2024.34

Yet returns to Syria from Lebanon could fall short of the government’s 400,000 target—mainly due to Syria’s wobbly trajectory, more than any fault of Lebanon’s government. The best-case scenario that the UN has described for Syria was based on a number of assumptions, after all, including “relative stability” across the country and “no significant armed clashes.”35 “That hasn’t happened,” said one humanitarian. “Syria today is not on a best-case course.”36

Similarly, the UNHCR survey finding in January that 24 percent of Syrians in Lebanon intend to return to Syria in the next twelve months may no longer hold true. The survey was conducted in the afterglow of Assad’s fall in December; refugees’ enthusiasm for return may have since lessened.37 In intentions surveys conducted by the International Rescue Committee, for example, the proportion of Syrian respondents in Lebanon who said they were willing to return declined from 18.2 percent in December 2024 to 9 percent in March 2025.38

Decreasing humanitarian assistance in Lebanon will likely push some Syrian refugees to return. In addition to funding-related aid cuts, Syrians’ access to education in Lebanon is also in jeopardy; many Syrian children have been excluded from public education because of an official Lebanese requirement that they present either legal residency or a UNHCR registration certificate to enroll in schools.

Still, aid cuts will not lead all Syrians to return. UN-provided cash assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon tops out at $145 monthly, for a family of five—nowhere near enough to support a family in Lebanon, which WFP says requires, at minimum, nearly $500 per month. Because of this, many Syrians survive by combining humanitarian assistance with other income, including farm and construction work. Syrians supporting themselves mainly through work in Lebanon may be reluctant to return to much reduced wages, or no jobs at all, back in Syria. The Lebanese government’s returns plan references stepped-up enforcement of labor laws in Lebanon, but it remains to be seen whether Lebanese authorities will follow through; Lebanese employers who prefer to hire irregular Syrian labor may object.

All of these factors figure into Syrian refugees’ complex decision-making calculus on return, which must, necessarily, factor in conditions in both Lebanon and Syria.39 “People forget that refugees are human, with their own risk assessments,” said a humanitarian. “A father, who wants to protect his family, or a mother, who wants to protect her children.”40 Even Syrians living in Lebanon’s tented settlements—in very difficult conditions—need to consider the risk of abandoning paying work and a mostly stable living arrangement in Lebanon; the cost of transporting their family and possessions to Syria; and the difficulty of reestablishing themselves back in a Syria whose future is uncertain.

A young man from Homs living in a camp in Beqaa Valley of Lebanon told the author that in Lebanon, he could at least work and eat. In Syria, his friend chimed in, “we have to eat dirt. We eat weeds.”41

What’s more, these Syrians in Lebanon are in contact with friends and family in Syria.42 They receive updates on conditions in their areas of origin and make decisions on whether to return accordingly. Some have gone to visit family and assess conditions in their home areas. Others know people who returned to Syria, regretted it, and then came back to Lebanon. “Anyone who studies this learns, people talk to each other,” said a Damascus-based researcher. “People who’ve gone back talk to those who haven’t gone yet.”43

Bedouin fighters are seen on the streets of al-Mazraa village in Syria’s southern al-Suwayda governorate on July 18, 2025. Bedouins traveled to the governorate from other parts of the country as fighting flared up again between Bedouins and Druze. Source: Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images

Discouraging Conditions in Syria

The reluctance of many Syrians to return reflects conditions in Syria that are, objectively, not very conducive to return. Syrians in Lebanon could be forgiven for looking at the situation in Syria and deciding that, for the time being, they will wait.

Conditions in Syria have, in some respects, improved since Assad’s ouster in December. Syrians no longer have to fear indefinite conscription into the Syrian military, or detention and disappearance by Assad’s security apparatus. But that doesn’t mean Syria is safe. Some groups of Syrians face new risks of persecution, and the country has now witnessed several episodes of large-scale sectarian violence.44 Other parts of the country continue to suffer from more general lawlessness and crime. Contamination by landmines and unexploded ordnance is widespread. The Islamic State is still active, including, reportedly, in western Syria’s population centers. Large sections of the country remain outside government control, including Syria’s northeast. It is still an open question how those areas will be politically reintegrated into rest of Syria, and whether that can happen in a peaceful, negotiated fashion, or will involve the type of chaotic violence that al-Suwayda governorate saw this July.

Meanwhile, the Syrian economy is in disastrous shape. Steps by the United States and other Western countries to relieve sanctions have led to some optimism, but Syria still needs to climb out of a deep economic hole. The country’s GDP has contracted by more than 50 percent since 2010.45 One in four Syrians now live in extreme poverty, while two-thirds of Syrians live below the lower middle-income poverty line.46 The UN estimates that 16.5 million people across the country need humanitarian assistance, roughly two-thirds of the total population. Over half the country’s population is food insecure.47 Since December, moreover, the country has been experiencing a severe liquidity crisis.48 People can be seen around Damascus crowding ATMs, attempting to withdraw money from their savings.49 “Nothing has changed, in terms of humanitarian needs,” said one humanitarian. “The needs are still there, and getting worse.”50

As Gonzalo Vargas Llosa, the UNHCR Syria representative, put it: “People are coming back. But largely motivated by hope, and love of their country, and because they want to reunite with family. Because there is no economic incentive at all. There is of course the prospect, the potential of an economic incentive, with the lifting of sanctions. But as of today, this prospect and potential has not materialized yet—into job opportunities, for example.”51

Syrians no longer have to fear detention and disappearance by Assad’s security apparatus. But that doesn’t mean Syria is safe.

For many Syrians, the cost of living—including basics such as food and rent—is untenable. “The math doesn’t add up in this country, literally,” said a Damascus-based humanitarian.52 Access to essential services such as electricity, water, education, and health care remains limited.53 Syria is also suffering its most severe drought in decades, imperiling access to food, water, and agricultural livelihoods.

Syrians returning to the country may struggle to find paying work, or earnings comparable to what they can make in places like Lebanon. Markets inside Syria can only absorb limited numbers of new workers.54 Returnees with large extended families can rely on support from relatives, said a humanitarian, but paying work is in limited supply. “Some are daily workers—but water and the drought have hit agriculture,” she said. “Many come back thinking they’ll work as farmhands, but then this season there’s a drought. . . . There’s no work, because there’s no [agricultural] season.”55

A Damascus taxi driver told the author he had seen people return to Syria to visit, then leave again. They wanted to stay, he said, but couldn’t make life in Syria sustainable: “There’s no movement; there’s no work.”56

The return of both refugees and internally displaced people has put additional pressure on communities of return in Syria. UNHCR estimates that nearly 750,000 refugees and almost 1.6 million IDPs have returned home since December. Many are returning to areas where residents were already struggling, and which are not prepared to support new returnees.

One indication of the difficult conditions awaiting returnees was an index of conditions in Syrian communities of return published by IOM in April.57 Of fifty-two districts across the country, only four were judged “mostly conducive” to return. What’s more, the districts that IOM assessed were areas to which a critical mass of displaced people had already returned, from inside and outside the country—not areas so dire that people had not gone back at all.

For now, many people who have returned to Syria are just happy to be back home. “People are still ‘high’—pardon the language—on being together again,” said a humanitarian. “You visit some of these areas, and the living conditions are just horrific, but people still have a big smile because they’re together.”58 Over time, however, humanitarians worry that tensions could appear, either because of competition over scarce resources and livelihoods; or because of social and political differences, as people who spent the preceding fourteen years scattered across Syria and the broader region once more attempt to live together.59

Shrinking Aid in Syria

What’s more, cuts to humanitarian assistance in Lebanon have not been met with a corresponding increase in Syria; quite the opposite, in fact—aid in Syria is also decreasing.

The humanitarian response in Syria, as in Lebanon, is suffering from a grave funding shortfall. At the start of July, the UN humanitarian appeal for Syria was less than 16 percent funded. At the March 2025 Brussels donor conference, international donors pledged $6.3 billion in multi-year assistance for Syria and the broader region—but that was down from $8.2 billion the previous year.

Funding has been declining for years, but much of the current shortfall can be attributed to the United States’ decision to freeze its aid programs across Syria early this year and then cancel hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance. The United States had previously been the largest single country contributor to the Syria response, providing nearly $1.2 billion in fiscal year 2024 and more than $18 billion since 2012. Currently, Washington continues to reimburse some humanitarian partners for completed programming that meets certain criteria, but the amount of money it releases by the end of the year is likely to be a fraction of the amount it spent in 2024.60 U.S. funding cuts have hit nongovernmental organizations in northwest and northeast Syria particularly hard.61 At this year’s Brussels conference, the United States made no new funding pledges. Other Western donors have announced some additional aid commitments, but fully compensating for U.S. cuts seems impossible.62

The result has been decreasing aid for Syrians in Syria—not just in Lebanon. WFP in Syria has reduced the number of people it gives cash assistance to by 40 percent. UNHCR in Syria is expected to shrink by 30 percent, and to shutter almost half of its community centers across the country. Hundreds of health centers are also at risk of closing.

For Syrians returning from Lebanon, UNHCR and partners are currently providing transportation for vulnerable refugees from the border to their areas of return; the aforementioned $400 per family cash grant; limited support for home repairs; legal support, to access civil documents; and some household items.63

Importantly, though, that $400 cash grant is not available to all returnees; because of funding constraints, it is being directed to the returnees most in need.64 According to Gonzalo Vargas Llosa:

“At the moment, we’re having to be extremely selective. But even then, there are many more vulnerable refugees to whom we’re not able to provide these cash grants, even though they are vulnerable, because there are more vulnerable returning refugees than cash available to give them. We’re having to choose the most vulnerable among the most vulnerable; but even then, we can’t reach all those under that category. . . .

“In a context in which people have almost nothing, $400 per family is certainly better than nothing—it allows them, in those initial weeks, to have a little cash in their pockets. But if we had more money, more contributions, that cash grant would ideally be more than $400, which for a family is not a lot. The problem at the moment is that if we double the amount of cash, we have to cut in half the number of people we’re helping. Which is not satisfactory, but that’s what it is at the moment.”65

“The problem is that humanitarian aid funding is limited,” said Ivo Freijsen, the UNHCR representative in Lebanon. “With what we have available we can help during the first phase.” But, he added, it is “often not [enough] for someone’s complete first year back, or for rehabilitating a complete house. It’s enough to patch up a room, or feed a family for a few months.”66

Meanwhile, sanctions relief from Western governments and newly announced support from Arab Gulf states and the World Bank—while welcome—do not address more immediate humanitarian needs. These moves seem likely to benefit Syrians more over the medium and long term. Yet Syrians need help now, for expenses like household essentials or rebuilding their homes.

Adam Abdelmoula, the UN resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator for Syria, continues to advocate for more donor support. “This time is very critical,” Abdelmoula said. “There’s a lot that needs to be done, to improve the humanitarian situation, and so things don’t deteriorate during the transition. There’s a window of opportunity for the international community to act, as a bridge, until the benefits of sanctions relief are felt.”67

Currently, however, Syria is caught in an awkward transitional phase, as outside funds materialize to support public sector spending and longer-term development—but more basic humanitarian needs remain urgent, and international money for aid continues to decrease.

Syrian Government Steps on Returns

Syria’s new government, for its part, has taken steps to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees from Lebanon and elsewhere. For Lebanon, though, Syria is not yet a fully ready partner on enabling returns. The country’s post-Assad political system and state are very much still taking shape.

The new Syrian government is still working to populate state institutions and rebuild state capacity. Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa formed the country’s current transitional government in late March. Ministries have since been returning public sector employees to the office and recruiting new personnel. Hind Kabawat, the Syrian minister of social affairs and labor, only appointed the ministry’s advisor on refugees, Mai Barazi, on June 24.68 Informed Syrians had previously expressed uncertainty to the author about which Syrian government institution was primarily responsible for handling refugees and return.69

Syria’s new leadership, as it attempts to stabilize Syria, faces a monumental challenge. It inherited a bankrupt state and a war-torn, ruined country. The government’s policy vision on key matters—social protection policies, for example—remains unclear, and it is working with extremely limited resources.

Syrian officials have emphasized to foreign interlocutors that all displaced Syrians are welcome in their home country, including those displaced inside and outside the country. They have also said, however, that they are wary of too many returns, too fast, which they believe could overwhelm the state’s capabilities.70

Barazi herself returned to Syria in June, after living for years in the United States. She also stressed that all Syrians are welcome. She said the Syrian government wants any returns to be voluntary and organized, and for returnees to be treated with respect. “When people come back, we want to preserve their safety and security—and their pride,” she said. “We don’t want to see them humiliated any more—those days are long gone. . . . What they’ve been through is enough.”71

For now, the Syrian government appears to be prioritizing the resettlement of the estimated 2 million people in displacement camps in northwestern Syria.72 “We don’t want [any more] camps,” Barazi said. “We don’t want to see Syrians surviving on food baskets, living in tents in the cold weather.”73

Syria’s newly created border authority, for its part, has taken steps to enable returns from Lebanon. This new entity, the Land and Sea Ports General Authority, has both amplified Lebanese authorities’ waivers of financial penalties and travel bans; and rolled out its own measures to facilitate returns, including waivers for customs duties and gratis transportation at crossings. The authority helped facilitate the first organized return convoy from Lebanon on July 29.

Mazen Alloush, the head of public relations for the border authority, said that the number of returnees from Lebanon had increased in the weeks since the authority announced its measures to encourage return. He also pointed to positive indicators such as “the return of complete families, instead of individuals, and increasing percentages of children and women among those arriving, which indicates return is shifting from ‘exploratory’ to stable return.”

“What has distinguished this recent period,” Alloush said, “is a rare intersection of Lebanese and Syrian measures that serve the voluntary return file, without political conditions. It’s something we see as an important development, which can be built on going forward.”74

The Syrian government has discussed forming an interministerial committee on returns along the lines of Lebanon’s similar committee.75 The returns file would presumably involve a number of ministries, including Social Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Local Administration, Interior, and Justice.

As of now, though, the Syrian government has not yet developed a comprehensive returns strategy.76 The government was expected to convene a returns-focused conference of regional host countries in Damascus in June, but the conference was indefinitely postponed.77

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (R) and Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani (L) bid farewell to participants at the Syrian National Dialogue Conference on February 25, 2025, in Damascus. Source: Ali Haj Suleiman/Getty Images

Lebanon and Syria’s Uncertain Bilateral Relations

Any Lebanese–Syrian cooperation on refugee return will be only part of a broader, multidimensional relationship between the two countries. But precisely what form that bilateral relationship will take, post-Assad, remains unclear.

Representatives of the two countries’ new governments have already met several times. Salam visited Damascus in April, where he met Sharaa and Asaad al-Shaibani, the Syrian foreign minister. Kabawat met with Lebanese deputy prime Minister Mitri and her Lebanese minister of social affairs Sayed the following day. Kabawat and Sayed, who knew each other before their time in government, have since remained in contact.78 Still, more advanced bilateral cooperation will likely have to wait until Shaibani, the Syrian foreign minister, visits Lebanon. He had been expected to visit Beirut in June, but his visit was postponed as Israel’s war with Iran was ongoing. That visit has so far not been rescheduled; in the meantime, Lebanon and Syria’s policy dialogue is largely paused.

Top issues in Lebanese–Syrian bilateral relations include refugees and return; border security and demarcation; Syrians held in Lebanese prisons; and Lebanese missing in Syria.

Importantly, Lebanon and Syria’s political priorities do not seem to currently be aligned on refugee return. Returns are just a much more urgent issue in Lebanon’s politics than in Syria’s, where Damascus’s concerns about premature or too-numerous returns run counter to Beirut’s political imperatives.

Lebanese–Syrian relations have also been marred by periodic violence, post-Assad. Since December, Lebanese clan militants and Syrian forces have repeatedly clashed along the border separating Lebanon’s Baalbek-Hermel governorate in northeastern Lebanon and Homs governorate in Syria. After one round of these clashes, Saudi Arabia convened a meeting of Lebanon and Syria’s defense ministers, in which they agreed on a coordination mechanism and various joint committees. Lebanese army representatives have since met repeatedly with Syrian counterparts.79

Syrian authorities blamed those border clashes on Hezbollah. And indeed, some in the new Syrian government and its broader coalition apparently see Lebanon primarily through the lens of Hezbollah.80 These Syrians resent Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria’s war in support of the Assad government and allege the group is now attempting to destabilize post-Assad Syria. When the author crossed the Lebanese–Syrian border in June by car, the Syrian security officer checking passengers’ passport stamps made a joke about the September 2024 death of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, referring to an anti-Hezbollah meme popular on Syrian social media.

Lebanon may have to put in real effort to develop a more positive working relationship with post-Assad Syria. And Lebanese decision-makers will need to take into account that they are dealing with new and different Syrians. The Sharaa government may be prepared to push back on Lebanese policy in ways the Assad government did not. See, for example, how Syria’s new border authority has imposed stringent conditions on entry for Lebanese, something it has justified as a matter of reciprocity. If this new Syrian government takes a tougher line with Lebanon, that position may garner support from a Syrian popular base that associates Lebanon with Hezbollah, the abuse of Syrian refugees, and unpleasant, dehumanizing treatment at the Lebanese border.

Lebanese decision-makers should not assume this new Syrian government will abide inhumane policies targeting Syrians in Lebanon. Going forward, Lebanon will probably need to view the respectful treatment of Syrians in Lebanon as an important part of developing healthy diplomatic relations with its Syrian neighbor.

Building Momentum for Returns

Lebanon has a chance to enable genuinely sustainable returns to Syria. But the Salam government needs to stand behind the principles in its plan, even in the face of populist political attacks; and it needs to be conscious not to push Syrians to prematurely return.

For returns to gain momentum, the Salam government now has to invest in its plan—successful returns will encourage more Syrians in Lebanon to consider going home. Building that momentum will mean extending General Security’s various waivers for returning Syrians beyond September 30. Ending the waivers in September would only discourage Syrians from departing through official channels.

In parallel, Lebanon’s government can continue to urge donor countries to support returns, and to invest in Syria’s recovery more broadly. The only real solution to Syria’s years-long displacement crisis is to make Syria a place where people can actually live again. The flip side of that is that the scale of refugee returns from Lebanon will depend in large part on events in Syria, and whether Syria can achieve stability. So far, indications are mixed.

The Lebanese government will also have to navigate domestic politics on refugees and return, and to manage public expectations about how many returns are realistic in the near term. Really substantial returns will take time, something that is not ideal for a government with less than a year until parliamentary elections. Yet reverting to inhumane and unworkable policy schemes or to populist anti-Syrian incitement won’t produce large-scale returns. It will only lead to human misery and new acrimony with international organizations and donor countries—potentially with the new Syria, as well.

In the meantime, Lebanese policymakers should also develop a plan for how the country will accommodate the Syrians—mostly from religious minority communities—who have fled to Lebanon since December. These Syrians have even more immediate, urgent needs than more long-term refugees, and they seem unlikely to return to Syria in the foreseeable future. They need some legal status, and to be able to move and work inside Lebanon. This latest wave of displacement is still in its early stage; Lebanon has a chance now to handle this new displacement in a more organized, rational way, and to avoid some of the haphazard policy responses that made the country’s post-2012 displacement crisis so difficult to resolve, even now.

The reality is that Lebanon will have to deal with Syria-related displacement for a long time. Yet Lebanon now has an opportunity to address the issue in a humane, responsible fashion, while also making meaningful headway on refugee return.

This report is part of “Bridging the Gap on Syrian Refugee Return,” a Century International project supported by the Kingdom of Norway.

Header Image Caption: People carry baggage around a crater from an Israeli air strike as they make their way across the border from Lebanon into Syria on October 5, 2024 in Masnaa, Lebanon. Source: Carl Court/Getty Images

Notes

  1. Sam Heller, “Adopt a Ministry: How Foreign Aid Threatens Lebanon’s Institutions,” Century International, November 7, 2023, https://tcf.org/content/report/adopt-a-ministry-how-foreign-aid-threatens-lebanons-institutions/.
  2. Sam Heller, “The Ever-shifting Sands of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” L’Orient Today, June 27, 2025, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1466835/the-ever-shifting-sands-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.html.
  3. Sam Heller, “Cross-Border Shuffle: Refugee Movement Between Lebanon and Syria after Assad,” Century International, March 31, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/report/cross-border-shuffle-refugee-movement-between-lebanon-and-syria-after-assad/.
  4. “The Fallout of War: The Regional Consequences of the Conflict in Syria,” World Bank, September 14, 2020, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/entities/publication/6fe38bb4-0168-5f5d-943d-e79ea80b06be.
  5. Sam Heller, “The Ever-shifting Sands of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,” L’Orient Today, June 27, 2025, https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1466835/the-ever-shifting-sands-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.html.
  6. Interview with the author, Akkar, November 2024.
  7. Interview with the author, Beqaa Valley, January 2025.
  8. “Ministry of Social Affairs: Frequently Asked Questions About Syrian Return Plan” (in Arabic), Ministry of Social Affairs, document in possession of the author.
  9. “Ministerial Committee Tasked with Follow-up on Displaced Syrians: Draft Plan for Return of Displaced Syrians” (in Arabic), June 11, 2025, in possession of the author.
  10. Minister of Social Affairs Haneen Sayed, Kulluna Irada event, “Lebanese Government’s ‘Plan for the Return of Displaced Syrians’: Between External Contexts and Internal Challenges” (in Arabic), Beirut, July 17, 2025.
  11. “Resolving Status of Syrian Subjects and Palestinian Refugees in Syria to Depart via Land Centers” (in Arabic), General Directorate for Lebanese General Security, July 1, 2025, https://www.general-security.gov.lb/ar/posts/490.
  12. “UNHCR-Supported Voluntary Repatriation of Syrian Refugees—Lebanon 2025,” UNHCR, July 18, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/117586.
  13. Sayed and Capt. Elie Aoun, General Security, Kulluna Irada event, “Lebanese Government’s ‘Plan for the Return of Displaced Syrians’: Between External Contexts and Internal Challenges” (in Arabic), Beirut, July 17, 2025.
  14. UNHCR representative in Lebanon Ivo Freijsen, interview with the author, Beirut, July 2025.
  15. Aoun, Kulluna Irada event, “Lebanese Government’s ‘Plan for the Return of Displaced Syrians’: Between External Contexts and Internal Challenges” (in Arabic), Beirut, July 17, 2025.
  16. Ibid.
  17. Interview with the author, Beirut, July 2025.
  18. “2025 Operational Framework on Voluntary Return of Syrian Refugees and IDPs,” UNHCR, February 6, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unhcr-operational-framework-voluntary-return-syrian-refugees-and-idps-2025.
  19. “Syria Situation: Regional Interagency Preparedness Plan for Refugee Returns (IAPPR),” Regional Durable Solutions Working Group, March 2025, https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Syria-Situation_Regional-Interagency-Preparedness-Plan-for-Refugee-Returns-IAPPR.pdf; “Lebanon Response Plan: Inter-Sector Coordination Group Meeting,” meeting presentation, April 16, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/115757.
  20. “Lebanon Response Plan 2025: Chapter: Returns,” UNHCR, July 29, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/117795.
  21. Lebanese officials and Freijsen, interviews with the author, Beirut, June and July 2025.
  22. “Lebanon: Community Dialogue on Return and ‘Go and See’ Visits,” UNHCR, May 19, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-community-dialogue-return-and-go-and-see-visits-may-2025.
  23. Interview with the author, Beirut, July 2025.
  24. Interview with the author remotely, July 2025.
  25. Interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  26. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  27. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  28. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  29. Interview with the author, Beirut, July 2025.
  30. For example, see the footnote on page 1 of the concluding statement of the August 2023 meeting of the Arab Ministerial Contact Group on Syria in Cairo, which registers Lebanon’s objection to the statement’s reference to conditions for “voluntary” return. Official Page of Egyptian Foreign Ministry (@MFAEgypt), Facebook post, August 15, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/MFAEgypt/posts/pfbid038Gd2nmAn9J9MXqw7dxQoPjx5Gow3F1QqV5GHiyAXZPVZq2W6shNJ7eMZXixDfpdCl. For more, see Maysa Baroud and Maja Janmyr, “Lebanon’s Refugee Return Agenda: Negotiating Global Protection Norms and Responsibility Sharing,” Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy & International Affairs, May 2024, https://www.aub.edu.lb/ifi/Documents/Lebanon%27s_Refugee_Return_Agenda_Negotiating_Global_Protection_Norms_and_Responsibility_Sharing.pdf.
  31. Sayed, interview; “Ministry of Social Affairs: Frequently Asked Questions About Syrian Return Plan” (in Arabic), Ministry of Social Affairs, document in possession of the author.
  32. Sayed, interview; Kulluna Irada event, “Lebanese Government’s ‘Plan for the Return of Displaced Syrians’: Between External Contexts and Internal Challenges” (in Arabic), Beirut, July 17, 2025; “Ministry of Social Affairs: Frequently Asked Questions About Syrian Return Plan” (in Arabic), Ministry of Social Affairs, document in possession of the author.
  33. “Syria Situation: Regional Interagency Preparedness Plan for Refugee Returns (IAPPR),” Regional Durable Solutions Working Group, March 2025, https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Syria-Situation_Regional-Interagency-Preparedness-Plan-for-Refugee-Returns-IAPPR.pdf
  34. “Flash Regional Survey on Syrian Refugees’ Perceptions and Intentions on Return to Syria,” UNHCR, February 6, 2025, https://data.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/114221.
  35. “Syria Situation: Regional Interagency Preparedness Plan for Refugee Returns (IAPPR),” Regional Durable Solutions Working Group, March 2025, https://www.3rpsyriacrisis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Syria-Situation_Regional-Interagency-Preparedness-Plan-for-Refugee-Returns-IAPPR.pdf
  36. Interview with the author, Beirut, June 2025.
  37. Humanitarians, interviews with the author, Beirut, June and July 2025.
  38. “Ad-Hoc Protection Advocacy Briefing: The Attempted Journey Back to Syria: Returns Challenges and the Growing Protection Crisis for Refugees in Lebanon,” Danish Refugee Council et al., May 2025, in possession of the author.
  39. Sam Heller, “Assad Is Gone—But for Refugees to Return, the World Needs to Invest in Syria’s Peace,” Century International, February 3, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/assad-is-gone-but-for-refugees-to-return-the-world-needs-to-invest-in-syrias-peace/; Heller, “Cross-Border Shuffle: Refugee Movement Between Lebanon and Syria after Assad,” Century International, March 31, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/report/cross-border-shuffle-refugee-movement-between-lebanon-and-syria-after-assad/.
  40. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  41. Interview with the author, Beqaa Valley, January 2025.
  42. Sam Heller, “Cross-Border Shuffle: Refugee Movement Between Lebanon and Syria after Assad,” Century International, March 31, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/report/cross-border-shuffle-refugee-movement-between-lebanon-and-syria-after-assad/.
  43. Interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  44. Aron Lund and Sam Heller, “Will Sectarian Massacres Derail Syria’s Transition?” Century International, March 11, 2025, https://tcf.org/content/commentary/will-sectarian-massacres-derail-syrias-transition/; Maggie Michael, “Syrian Forces Massacred 1,500 Alawites. The Chain of Command Led to Damascus,” Reuters, June 30, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/investigations/syrian-forces-massacred-1500-alawites-chain-command-led-damascus-2025-06-30/.
  45. “Syria Macro-Fiscal Assessment,” World Bank, June 30, 2025, https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/099844407042516353.
  46. Ibid.
  47. Sam Heller, “Syrians Are Going Hungry. Will the West Act?” Century International, June 7, 2021, https://tcf.org/content/report/syrians-going-hungry-will-west-act/.
  48. “Syria Macro-Fiscal Assessment,” World Bank.
  49. Observation by the author, Damascus, June and July 2025.
  50. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  51. Interview with the author remotely, June 2025.
  52. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  53. “Turn on the Light: Why Tackling Energy-Related Challenges in the Nexus of Water and Food in Syria Cannot Wait,” Oxfam, January 29, 2024, https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/turn-on-the-light-why-tackling-energy-related-challenges-in-the-nexus-of-water-621586/.
  54. “Syria: Turbulence and Lack of Investments Impede People’s Ability to Recover,” Norwegian Refugee Council, March 13, 2025, https://www.nrc.no/news/2025/march/syria-turbulence-and-lack-of-investments-impede-peoples-ability-to-recover.
  55. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  56. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  57. “Syrian Arab Republic—Communities of Return Index—Round 1 (15 March-5 April 2025),” IOM, May 12, 2025, https://dtm.iom.int/reports/syrian-arab-republic-communities-return-index-round-1-15-march-05-april-2025.
  58. Interview with the author, Damascus, June 2025.
  59. Humanitarian and researcher, interviews with the author, Damascus, June and July 2025.
  60. Humanitarian, interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  61. Humanitarians, interviews with the author, Damascus, June and July 2025.
  62. Western diplomat and humanitarian, interviews with the author, Beirut and Damascus, June and July 2025.
  63. Vargas Llosa, interview, June 2025; see also “Voluntary Returns of Syrian Refugees and IDPs—Three-month Impact Report (January-March 2025),” UNHCR, April 11, 2025, https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/voluntary-returns-syrian-refugees-and-idps-three-month-impact-report-january-march-2025.
  64. See “Assistance and Financial Support” section of “Syria Is Home” website, https://syriaishome.org/en/faq/.
  65. Interview with the author, remotely, June 2025.
  66. Interview with the author, Beirut, July 2025.
  67. Interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  68. “Decision No. 2416,” Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, June 24, 2025, in possession of the author.
  69. Interviews with the author, Beirut and Damascus, April, June and July 2025.
  70. Humanitarian and Lebanese official, interviews with the author, Beirut, May and June 2025; “President Aoun Emphasizes Necessity of Displaced Syrians Returning, Not Remaining in Lebanon, Asks UN to Organize Return Convoys and Provide Necessary Support” (in Arabic), Presidency of the Lebanese Republic, January 23, 2025, https://web.archive.org/web/20250513063202/https://www.presidency.gov.lb/Arabic/News/Pages/Details.aspx?nid=27397.
  71. Interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  72. Western diplomat and humanitarian, interviews with the author, Beirut and Damascus, June and July 2025.
  73. Interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  74. Interview with the author remotely, July 2025.
  75. Barazi, interview with the author, Damascus, July 2025.
  76. Ibid.
  77. Lebanese official and Western diplomat, interviews with the author, Beirut, June 2025.
  78. Barazi and Sayed, interviews with the author, Damascus and Beirut, July 2025.
  79. Col. Michel Boutros, Lebanese Armed Forces, Kulluna Irada event, “Lebanese Government’s ‘Plan for the Return of Displaced Syrians’: Between External Contexts and Internal Challenges” (in Arabic), Beirut, July 17, 2025.
  80. Analyst and researcher, interviews with the author, Damascus, July 2025.

Tags: , , ,