It is impossible to ignore that it is election season in Iraq. Walking in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad means struggling to avoid falling into a trance as hundreds of faces stare at you from their campaign posters. Candidates visit cafés and even ministers abandon their large entourages to mix with regular people as they court them for votes. Every day, there are dozens of talk shows, campaign events, promises of rewards, and merchandise being handed out somewhere. The price of a vote has crept up to $400—the amount voters are charging party officials who illegally buy their biometric voting cards and vote on their behalf.
Obviously, the political parties see this as a high-stakes election. Yet most voters still feel sidelined. Speak to a taxi driver, street vendor, or a laborer, and they remain committed to not voting. Only the people who directly benefit from the current political order—police officers, civil servants, and party partisans—seem committed to going to the polls.
International interest in Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary elections—the seventh since 2003—is mostly focused on the results’ implications for the changing Middle East order. American policymakers are likely to think about the election outcomes solely from the perspective of their geopolitical mission to sideline Tehran, scrutinizing the new government for anti-Iran pressure points. But it is a mistake to view the elections as a referendum on Shia parties or pro-Iran groups. Average Iraqi citizens are less concerned with geopolitical maneuvering or Iran’s declining regional influence. Instead, they are worried about securing employment and ensuring their families have basic services.
Rather than worrying about whether Iraqis will choose pro-Iran representatives, American policymakers would do well to concern themselves with Iraq’s democratic maturity. After all, Iraq is a geopolitically important country, and its development—more than the ideology of its government—is the true key to making it a more positive influence in an unstable region.
Kitchen Table Issues
For all the relative calm that Iraqis have enjoyed over the past few years, and the transformation that cities like Baghdad have undergone, many citizens are still struggling, and are resentful toward the political elite. Public services remain abysmal despite massive oil wealth. Electricity cuts are so routine that Iraqis barely mention them anymore. One Baghdad resident told a newspaper that he wouldn’t vote because of the underdevelopment of utilities: “What happened with regards to electricity from 2003 until now? Nothing.” The water crisis has become equally acute. According to Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources, 2025 is shaping up to be Iraq’s driest year since 1933, with reserves falling from 21 billion cubic meters to less than half that amount in just one year.
Such is the context in which the Iraqi parliamentary elections are taking place. Apathy, disenfranchisement, and disillusionment are rampant across demographic groups. Youth engagement is especially problematic, as young people remain less likely to vote than older Iraqis. Born into Iraq’s post-2003 instability, the younger generation exhibits deep skepticism toward electoral politics, viewing elections as “recycling seats of power” rather than producing meaningful change.
Despite sustained population growth over the past two decades and millions more youth becoming eligible adults, Iraq’s electoral commission has registered just 21.4 million voters for the November 11 election, which is less than the number of registered voters in the previous election. This fact indicates that around 8 million adults have chosen not to register for the election. Even if around 9 million votes are cast in total, as analysts expect, and the official turnout is recorded at 42 percent, the real rate of participation of eligible adults will be around 30 percent.
A Problem of Nonparticipation
This electoral apathy continues a long-term trend in Iraq. Voter turnout has steadily fallen since 2005, contributing to Iraq’s crisis of democratic legitimacy. The vast majority of citizens—whether through active boycott, systemic exclusion, or mere disengagement—do not participate in the electoral process. Promises without delivery have exhausted the patience of the public.
There’s reason to believe that the country’s political elite actually want this generalized apathy, as it allows them to focus on motivating their own supporters while discouraging the uncommitted public from voting.
There’s reason to believe that the country’s political elite actually want this generalized apathy, as it allows them to focus on motivating their own supporters while discouraging the uncommitted public from voting. Low turnout favors entrenched political parties with mobilizable bases—particularly those with access to state resources, patronage networks, and armed groups. Incumbents can focus on their bases without wasting resources winning over the undecided masses, who can be counted on not to vote anyway.
Thus, it is little surprise that Iraqi public opinion reveals profound skepticism about elections’ capacity to produce meaningful change. Many Iraqis view elections not as genuine democratic contests but as forums for elites to work out power-sharing arrangements; widespread calls for boycotts are a direct result of this perception. Such disillusionment reflects the persistence of the muhassasa system—the mechanism for sectarian power-sharing that has become associated with corruption and patronage rather than effective governance. Despite technical improvements in electoral administration, fundamental issues of accountability and representation remain unaddressed.
The election’s most significant outcome may be less about which parties win seats than whether Iraqi democracy can evolve beyond its current elite-centric model toward more accountable and responsive governance. Major opposition voices like the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr are boycotting the election, which may reduce immediate political tensions, and will probably make forming a government after the election go faster than it has in the past. (After the 2021 election, government formation took a year.) But these boycotts will also potentially undermine the election’s legitimacy and representativeness. Meanwhile, the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has tried to present itself as strengthening the state against ideologically driven “resistance” groups. However, the November 11 elections are unlikely to change the reality of consensus politics in Iraq. Narrow interests and factionalism are still the main currencies by which the elections operate.
Citizens Want Accountability
Iraq’s democratic experiment continues, but its sustainability depends on addressing the fundamental disconnect between political elites and citizens’ aspirations for accountable governance and improved livelihoods.
For democracy to become meaningful rather than performative, Iraq’s next government—whatever emerges from the November vote—must address the basic needs that define citizens’ daily lives. Until employment opportunities expand beyond government patronage, public services function reliably, and corruption faces genuine accountability, Iraqis will remain justified in their skepticism that elections alone can transform their circumstances. The challenge for Iraq’s politicians isn’t just winning votes; it’s also earning the legitimacy that comes from delivering on the most fundamental promise any government can make: ensuring its citizens can survive and, eventually, thrive.
Ultimately, Iraq’s November elections will determine whether the country can build upon its recent stability to address deeper governance challenges, or whether the persistence of elite competition and citizen alienation will perpetuate the cycles of crisis and temporary accommodation that have defined Iraqi politics since 2003. The sad expectation of most Iraqis is that this election will be a redistribution of power among entrenched elites, with the real contest focused on post-election coalition negotiations rather than voter preferences—a reality that has driven many Iraqis to conclude that meaningful change cannot come from the ballot box alone.
This commentary is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.
Header Image Caption: An image published to the X account of the office of Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on October 27, 2025 shows a group of tribal leaders, dignitaries, and academic and cultural elites at the guesthouse of Sheikh Mohammed Abbas al-Araibi in Maysan Governorate, during a campaign visit from the prime minister. Source: X account of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office (@IraqiPMO), https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/1982797537623814407/photo/2
Tags: Iraqi Nationalism, Iraqi politics, iraq elections
Apathy and Skepticism Cloud Iraq’s Upcoming Election
It is impossible to ignore that it is election season in Iraq. Walking in the Karrada neighborhood of Baghdad means struggling to avoid falling into a trance as hundreds of faces stare at you from their campaign posters. Candidates visit cafés and even ministers abandon their large entourages to mix with regular people as they court them for votes. Every day, there are dozens of talk shows, campaign events, promises of rewards, and merchandise being handed out somewhere. The price of a vote has crept up to $400—the amount voters are charging party officials who illegally buy their biometric voting cards and vote on their behalf.
Obviously, the political parties see this as a high-stakes election. Yet most voters still feel sidelined. Speak to a taxi driver, street vendor, or a laborer, and they remain committed to not voting. Only the people who directly benefit from the current political order—police officers, civil servants, and party partisans—seem committed to going to the polls.
International interest in Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary elections—the seventh since 2003—is mostly focused on the results’ implications for the changing Middle East order. American policymakers are likely to think about the election outcomes solely from the perspective of their geopolitical mission to sideline Tehran, scrutinizing the new government for anti-Iran pressure points. But it is a mistake to view the elections as a referendum on Shia parties or pro-Iran groups. Average Iraqi citizens are less concerned with geopolitical maneuvering or Iran’s declining regional influence. Instead, they are worried about securing employment and ensuring their families have basic services.
Rather than worrying about whether Iraqis will choose pro-Iran representatives, American policymakers would do well to concern themselves with Iraq’s democratic maturity. After all, Iraq is a geopolitically important country, and its development—more than the ideology of its government—is the true key to making it a more positive influence in an unstable region.
Kitchen Table Issues
For all the relative calm that Iraqis have enjoyed over the past few years, and the transformation that cities like Baghdad have undergone, many citizens are still struggling, and are resentful toward the political elite. Public services remain abysmal despite massive oil wealth. Electricity cuts are so routine that Iraqis barely mention them anymore. One Baghdad resident told a newspaper that he wouldn’t vote because of the underdevelopment of utilities: “What happened with regards to electricity from 2003 until now? Nothing.” The water crisis has become equally acute. According to Iraq’s Ministry of Water Resources, 2025 is shaping up to be Iraq’s driest year since 1933, with reserves falling from 21 billion cubic meters to less than half that amount in just one year.
Such is the context in which the Iraqi parliamentary elections are taking place. Apathy, disenfranchisement, and disillusionment are rampant across demographic groups. Youth engagement is especially problematic, as young people remain less likely to vote than older Iraqis. Born into Iraq’s post-2003 instability, the younger generation exhibits deep skepticism toward electoral politics, viewing elections as “recycling seats of power” rather than producing meaningful change.
Despite sustained population growth over the past two decades and millions more youth becoming eligible adults, Iraq’s electoral commission has registered just 21.4 million voters for the November 11 election, which is less than the number of registered voters in the previous election. This fact indicates that around 8 million adults have chosen not to register for the election. Even if around 9 million votes are cast in total, as analysts expect, and the official turnout is recorded at 42 percent, the real rate of participation of eligible adults will be around 30 percent.
A Problem of Nonparticipation
This electoral apathy continues a long-term trend in Iraq. Voter turnout has steadily fallen since 2005, contributing to Iraq’s crisis of democratic legitimacy. The vast majority of citizens—whether through active boycott, systemic exclusion, or mere disengagement—do not participate in the electoral process. Promises without delivery have exhausted the patience of the public.
There’s reason to believe that the country’s political elite actually want this generalized apathy, as it allows them to focus on motivating their own supporters while discouraging the uncommitted public from voting. Low turnout favors entrenched political parties with mobilizable bases—particularly those with access to state resources, patronage networks, and armed groups. Incumbents can focus on their bases without wasting resources winning over the undecided masses, who can be counted on not to vote anyway.
Thus, it is little surprise that Iraqi public opinion reveals profound skepticism about elections’ capacity to produce meaningful change. Many Iraqis view elections not as genuine democratic contests but as forums for elites to work out power-sharing arrangements; widespread calls for boycotts are a direct result of this perception. Such disillusionment reflects the persistence of the muhassasa system—the mechanism for sectarian power-sharing that has become associated with corruption and patronage rather than effective governance. Despite technical improvements in electoral administration, fundamental issues of accountability and representation remain unaddressed.
The election’s most significant outcome may be less about which parties win seats than whether Iraqi democracy can evolve beyond its current elite-centric model toward more accountable and responsive governance. Major opposition voices like the followers of Muqtada al-Sadr are boycotting the election, which may reduce immediate political tensions, and will probably make forming a government after the election go faster than it has in the past. (After the 2021 election, government formation took a year.) But these boycotts will also potentially undermine the election’s legitimacy and representativeness. Meanwhile, the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has tried to present itself as strengthening the state against ideologically driven “resistance” groups. However, the November 11 elections are unlikely to change the reality of consensus politics in Iraq. Narrow interests and factionalism are still the main currencies by which the elections operate.
Citizens Want Accountability
Iraq’s democratic experiment continues, but its sustainability depends on addressing the fundamental disconnect between political elites and citizens’ aspirations for accountable governance and improved livelihoods.
For democracy to become meaningful rather than performative, Iraq’s next government—whatever emerges from the November vote—must address the basic needs that define citizens’ daily lives. Until employment opportunities expand beyond government patronage, public services function reliably, and corruption faces genuine accountability, Iraqis will remain justified in their skepticism that elections alone can transform their circumstances. The challenge for Iraq’s politicians isn’t just winning votes; it’s also earning the legitimacy that comes from delivering on the most fundamental promise any government can make: ensuring its citizens can survive and, eventually, thrive.
Ultimately, Iraq’s November elections will determine whether the country can build upon its recent stability to address deeper governance challenges, or whether the persistence of elite competition and citizen alienation will perpetuate the cycles of crisis and temporary accommodation that have defined Iraqi politics since 2003. The sad expectation of most Iraqis is that this election will be a redistribution of power among entrenched elites, with the real contest focused on post-election coalition negotiations rather than voter preferences—a reality that has driven many Iraqis to conclude that meaningful change cannot come from the ballot box alone.
This commentary is part of “Networks of Change: Reviving Governance and Citizenship in the Middle East,” a Century International project supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Open Society Foundations.
Header Image Caption: An image published to the X account of the office of Iraqi prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani on October 27, 2025 shows a group of tribal leaders, dignitaries, and academic and cultural elites at the guesthouse of Sheikh Mohammed Abbas al-Araibi in Maysan Governorate, during a campaign visit from the prime minister. Source: X account of the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Office (@IraqiPMO), https://x.com/IraqiPMO/status/1982797537623814407/photo/2
Tags: Iraqi Nationalism, Iraqi politics, iraq elections