

MILITANCY IN PAKISTAN'S BORDERLANDS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NATION AND
FOR AFGHAN POLICY

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A CENTURY FOUNDATION REPORT

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THE CENTURY FOUNDATION PROJECT ON AFGHANISTAN IN ITS REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL DIMENSIONS

This paper is one of a series commissioned by The Century Foundation as part of its project on Afghanistan in its regional and multilateral dimensions. This initiative is examining ways in which the international community may take greater collective responsibility for effectively assisting Afghanistan's transition from a war-ridden failed state to a fragile but reasonably peaceful one. The program adds an internationalist and multilateral lens to the policy debate on Afghanistan both in the United States and globally, engaging the representatives of governments, international nongovernmental organizations, and the United Nations in the exploration of policy options toward Afghanistan and the other states in the region.

At the center of the project is a task force of American and international figures who have had significant governmental, nongovernmental, or UN experience in the region, co-chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi and Thomas Pickering, respectively former UN special representative for Afghanistan and former U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs.

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INTRODUCTION

The sociopolitical and security situation in the Pukhtun tribal belt and its adjacent areas on the Pakistani side of the border with Afghanistan has been in a constant state of flux since the Afghan Jihad of 1980s.¹ The crisis has worsened increasingly, particularly after the U.S. and NATO forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on New York and Washington. Thousands of Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda members, and their foreign affiliates—such as groups of Uzbeks, Chechens, and Tajiks—came to Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) looking for refuge and bases to continue their fight against the American and NATO forces propping up the post-Bonn government in Afghanistan. The local Pushtuns welcomed them as per the Pushtunwali code.² The Pakistani state has had very little presence in the area, in accordance with an arrangement with various tribes and jirgas of the area since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, so the movement of these forces through a fifteen-hundred mile long rugged border, though expected, could not be obstructed easily, at least on short notice. Small and ill-equipped Frontier Corps, a Pakistani paramilitary force drawn largely from the tribal areas, as well as few hundred Pakistani military soldiers on the border, could neither halt the inflow of these militants nor curb the outflow of Pukhtuns who felt duty-bound, primarily in lieu of ethnic solidarity, to go toward Kabul to rescue their brethren during the U.S.-led campaign. Most of those going toward Kabul from Pakistan, including a contingent led by the notorious Sufi Mohammad of Tehrik-Nifaz-e-Shariati Mohammad (TNSM), came back soon after losing significant numbers of their “volunteers.” In this interlude, many militants moved to various parts of Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province (KPP, previously known as North West Frontier Province, or NWFP, until the name was officially changed in 2010). Movement between FATA and KPP is not regulated in any organized way, and major entry

points of FATA are manned by Frontier Corps soldiers; in any event, criminals and militants very seldom travel through major roads.

Depressed and discouraged by the rapid collapse of Taliban power in Afghanistan in late 2001, Taliban sympathizers and supporters in bordering areas of Pakistan lay low for a couple of years. They revived themselves slowly after 2003–04, when they realized that neither was Pakistan pursuing them with any special zeal, nor was Afghanistan a lost cause, given that the United States was diverting its resources and energies toward Iraq. The Pakistani military's unprecedented presence and movement in FATA proved to be an additional incentive for those who supported the Taliban to "rise from their slumber." From there on, they picked their battles intelligently and cut deals strategically to earn a new lease on life. Consequently, their support networks and organizational strength increased in the tribal territories, and they emerged with a bang under the banner of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007.³

However, the universe of militants in FATA and KPP is far more diverse than commonly believed. Indeed, there are important ideological and historical common threads among the "warriors"—militant groups operating in the region have very different backgrounds, tribal affiliations, and, in some cases, objectives. Even terms such as "Afghan Taliban" and "Pakistani Taliban" are simplistic and insufficient for describing the complex milieu. For instance, a significant number of militants (estimated to be around two thousand) moved to the area from Punjab province after Islamabad's clampdown against sectarian groups, beginning in 2002 and gaining some momentum after two assassination attempts on General Pervez Musharraf in late 2003 and early 2004. They are now widely known as "Punjabi Taliban." The working relationship between members of this diverse assemblage of militants and TTP and al Qaeda is deep. Many professional criminals involved in smuggling, the drug trade, and carjacking also moved to FATA in these years. A full understanding of the situation in the region requires knowledge of the unique histories of all these militant groups, their social roots, their funding sources, and their ideological outlook (issues that are beyond the scope of this report).

Map 1. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)



Note: Inset shows FATA in the context of Pakistan and neighboring countries.

Source: Used with permission from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., and the Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan.

In terms of political developments related to the security situation in the troubled frontier, Pakistan's prolonged transition from Musharraf's rule (1999–2008) to a democratic dispensation proved to be a distraction for the state apparatus, opening up more avenues for extremist forces to plan and implement their expansionist vision. The lack of popular governance, especially in the 2005–08 phase, made it difficult for the government to marshal popular opinion against growing religious militancy. A weakened and threatened judiciary (2007–08) further diminished the potential of the state as well as society for addressing the overall deterioration of law and order in the KPP. The mobilization of lawyers across the country (known as the Lawyers' Movement) helped the judiciary regain its strength through the restoration of the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in March 2009, but the law enforcement apparatus of the country is still largely unaccountable to the public, as well as to the government itself in some cases.

The devastating floods in July and August 2010, which displaced hundreds of thousands of people in KPP and destroyed major infrastructure (including dozens of bridges and major connecting roads), have raised further serious challenges for the provincial as well as federal government. Recent important military successes in the Swat Valley and parts of FATA (especially South Waziristan) need consolidation, but the army is now tasked with relief and rescue operations throughout the country, and especially in the difficult terrain of KPP and FATA, which means that military operations in certain areas have to be put on hold, at least for the time being. This challenging scenario for the state also provides militants with an opportunity to regain lost areas, benefitting from the state's focus on recovery and relief. However, through rehabilitation and reconstruction, the state also can build a new Pakistan where Taliban are denied space to exist, multiply, and maneuver.

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

FROM EARLY TO MODERN TIMES

Pukhtun tribes straddling the Durand Line, which divides Pakistan from Afghanistan along an arbitrary course, are known historically for their fierce independence, tribal ethos, warrior nature, and entrenched skepticism of all things non-Pukhtun—be they ideas, cultures, or people.⁴ History has recorded that almost all invaders, warriors, and proselytizers from Central Asia, Turkey, and Afghanistan used the Khyber Pass (which lies in Khyber Agency of FATA today) to enter into the Indian sub-continent. Interestingly, the Pukhtun gateway into this part of South Asia was accessible to all and sundry. However, no outsider could settle down successfully in the area or control it effectively for long. Geography played its part in this scheme of things, but the character and nature of tribal culture in this region also was a potent factor.

When the British annexed these areas in 1848, they sought to insulate their empire's "settled areas" from Russia's Great Game machinations in Afghanistan and from recurrent tribal raids. They achieved this by balancing the use (and misuse) of economic subsidies and force to control strategic roads and passes with the recognition of the tribesmen's autonomy in their affairs. The British did attain a measure of stability in this area for a while, but their rule never went unchallenged: sixty-two military expeditions occurred between 1849 and 1889 alone. British anxiety about Russian expansion into Central Asia and potential Russian-Afghanistan collaboration against the British compelled them to wage war on Afghanistan twice: in 1839–42 (when the British had to face terrible consequences) and in 1878–79 (when the British attained their goals). In both cases, the Pukhtun tribal belt was caught in between. Consequently, the British decided to use the tribal belt as a buffer zone between "troublesome" Afghanistan (partly under Russian influence) and British India. The tribes living in today's FATA were the real

source of concern and, at times, serious worry for the British administrators. Pukhtun history books celebrate this reputation, while British historical narrative notes Britain's successes in stabilizing, and even modernizing, some parts of this region.

To establish their writ, between 1871 and 1876 the British introduced a series of laws, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), prescribing special procedures for the tribal areas, very distinct from the criminal and civil laws that were in force elsewhere in British India. These regulations were based on the idea of collective territorial responsibility (including collective punishment) and provided for dispute resolution to take place through the traditional *jirga* (council of elders), but even this arrangement proved to be insufficient. A few tribes cooperated with the British for a "reasonable" sum of money, also leading to internal tribal rivalries, but overall the difference in the level of British control over "settled areas," where British codified rules and regulations were more effective due to a better educated population and vibrant local political activity, and in their control over the FATA region remained significant.

Consequently, the British issued new Frontier Crimes Regulations in 1901, expanding the scope and range of earlier regulations and awarding wider powers, including judicial authority, to administrative officials in the tribal belt. The Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province was created as a new administrative unit by carving out parts of the then-Punjab province and adding certain tribal principalities to it. The province, as it was constituted at the time, was named the North-West Frontier Province and included five "settled" districts (Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Hazara, Kohat, and Peshawar) and five tribal agencies (Dir-Swat-Chitral as one, Khyber, Kurrum, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan), and was placed under the administrative authority of a chief commissioner reporting directly to the governor-general of India.

The history of the KPP cannot be understood fully without a reference to Ghaffar Khan of Charsadda, also known as Bacha Khan. He often was called "Frontier Gandhi," as he was a close associate of India's renowned leader,

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. A believer in nonviolence, Ghaffar Khan was an ardent supporter of the idea of a united, independent, and secular India, and to achieve this goal, he founded a political movement known as *Khudai Khidmatgar* (Servants of God), also commonly referred to as the *Surkh Posh* (Red Shirts), during the 1920s. It remained a powerful force in the Pukhtun-dominated region before the partition of British India, and even afterward; currently, the leading politician of the KPP and president of the Awami National Party (ANP), Asfandyar Wali, is Bacha Khan's grandson. For many decades after 1947, the supporters and followers of Bacha Khan were touted as pro-India (and by default anti-Pakistan) due to their pre-partition closeness to renowned Indian leaders (and the Indian National Congress). A few hyper-nationalists in Pakistan still feel this way, despite innumerable sacrifices by Bacha Khan's followers while courageously challenging the Taliban.

CHANGES SINCE PAKISTAN'S INDEPENDENCE IN 1947

Since its delineation, the Durand Line has been viewed with great contempt and resentment by Pukhtun on both sides, as in many cases the line divided their kith and kin. Predictably, even after Pakistan's emergence in 1947, this line became a major source of a tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Within months of Pakistan's emergence, FATA's tribesmen through a *jirga* (the Bannu tribal *jirga* in January 1948) decision acceded to Pakistan—but not before obtaining certain concessions about their status within the new Pakistani state. About thirty tribes pledged allegiance to Pakistan by signing instruments of accession to make the arrangement legally binding. To the tribal agencies of Khyber, Kurram, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan later were added Mohmand Agency (in 1951) and Bajaur and Orakzai (in 1973). During his visit to this borderland in April 1948, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Pakistan's founder and first governor general, publicly stated his desire not to interfere with tribal autonomy, yet to integrate FATA into Pakistan. Agreeing to continue with British-era subsidies, privileges, and treaties, for instance, he said he did not

want the tribesmen to be dependent on them. However, Jinnah's vision of these tribesmen becoming "self-respecting citizens having the opportunity of developing" has not yet materialized. The government of Pakistan, however, revised some of these agreements with the tribal chiefs in 1951–52, acquiring greater control and authority in the tribal areas in lieu of more financial support to selected tribal *Maliks* (local leaders).

However, as per the original agreement, electricity was provided free of cost and no taxes were collected from FATA. Given its scarce economic resources, Pakistan always shied away from investing in infrastructure in the area. FATA tribesmen on the other hand responded positively whenever their assistance was needed by the Pakistani state. For instance, in 1948, bands of FATA tribesmen offered their services in the disputed Kashmir region, where Pakistan and India were trying to gain an upper hand militarily. On other occasions, some tribes of FATA remained difficult to handle, and in early 1960s, Pakistan's air force had to resort to bombing in the Bajaur area, which at the time came under the Khyber Agency.

FATA always remained critical for Pakistan, given the tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Interestingly, Afghanistan was the only country that challenged Pakistan's admission as a member of the United Nations in 1947, claiming parts of FATA and even KPP. The Afghan side coined (though never clearly defined) the idea of Pashtunistan—an independent country constituting the Pashtun dominated areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and according to some in the old Afghan ruling family, constituting the whole of Afghanistan and Pashtun areas of Pakistan. It was never a popular idea in the region, but it was potent enough to create trouble in the minds of Pakistani leaders. Soviet and Indian support for Afghanistan's claims on Pashtun areas of Pakistan meanwhile increased Pakistan's insecurity.⁵

No less a figure than Afghanistan's prime minister, Sardar Muhammad Daud Khan, who held the post from 1953 to 1963, forcefully championed Afghan royal claims to a greater Pashtunistan. The president of Pakistan,

Iskander Mirza, visited Kabul in 1956 to ease the tense relations, and the visit was reciprocated by Afghanistan's King Zahir Shah in 1958, leading to a tentative arrangement for transit facilities for Afghan imports; but Daud did not relent on the Pashtunistan campaign. Ayub Khan, who became military ruler of Pakistan in 1958, also tried to improve relations with Afghanistan in 1959–60; during a conversation with Sardar Naim, then foreign minister of Afghanistan, Khan recorded in his autobiography that he parried the Afghan claims by noting, "if the old conquests were to be our guide, then Pakistan should have more interests in the future of Pathans living in Afghanistan."⁶

Relations between the two countries deteriorated in 1961, as Daud funneled support to militias across the border and then followed up with an incursion by Afghan troops in Bajaur in 1962, which Pakistani forces repulsed. The king ousted Daud the next year, opening the door to a revival of relations when an accord was reached through the Shah of Iran's good offices. Ayub Khan visited Kabul twice in 1964, and then again in 1966, and relations stabilized.

The idea of Pashtunistan lurked in the minds of both Pakistani and Afghan leaders well into the 1970s at least. Daud's return to power in Afghanistan in 1973—in a coup overthrowing the monarchy and specifically his cousin, Zahir Shah—reignited Pakistan's concerns. The Daud government again started propagating the Pashtunistan idea in Pakistan's tribal lands, stirring a crisis and leading to a worsening of Pakistani-Afghan relations. Kabul trained many young Pukhtun and Baluch men to destabilize Pakistan in the contested areas, according to a Pakistani politician who remained in exile in Afghanistan from 1970 to 1989.⁷ Pakistani authorities responded by secretly supporting and financing two religious-minded Afghan young men who could challenge the increasingly left-leaning Afghan government—Gulbadin Hekmatyar and Ahmed Shah Masud. Nothing significant happened at the time, but Pakistan's smart selection paid dividends later.

THE AFGHAN JIHAD (1979–89) AND TALIBAN RULE (1994–2001)

The region came into the international limelight when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to prop up its embattled communist regime. The Afghan “freedom struggle” (later renamed as Afghan Jihad) was planned, organized, and launched from Pakistan (benefiting from significant Western support), with FATA acting as the base camp. Religious radicals from many Muslim states around the globe soon were invited to fight the “infidel” Soviets, and for the purpose of hosting and training them, FATA as well as parts of KPP became the launching pad. FATA geography served as a good cover for training camps for the fighters (known as mujahideen) and the warrior traditions of the Pukhtuns came in handy. Many KPP districts, including those bordering FATA (especially Dir, Dera Ismail Khan, Charsadda, Kohat, and Bannu), became part of the supply line for supporting Afghan and Arab fighters. Many Arabs, such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden, established their offices in Peshawar, the capital of KPP, to make necessary arrangements for the training of these mujahideen. Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies spearheaded this effort on the ground, and the United States and some European countries provided weapons and financial support for the project. Major financial support from Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf countries also was forthcoming. Here again, historical narratives in Pakistan and the West were slightly different. Within Pakistan, this was sold as a war of survival to hold back expanding communism, and notions of jihad (especially in terms of an armed struggle) became en vogue. In the process, Pakistan channeled funds and weapons to many Afghan groups of its own choice—those that were deemed more friendly. For the West, the consequent religious radicalization of the area was an unintended consequence of a necessary military campaign.

A madrassa (seminary) network also popped up quite quickly to cater to the education and religious needs of approximately three million Afghan refugees that poured into FATA and KPP between 1979 and 1989. The

elements in the region benefited from this jihad bonanza and in the process the Saudi brand of religion (generally known as Salafism and Wahhabism) gained strength—as Saudis ensured that their sponsored madrassas followed the curriculum that they proposed, and in some cases the U.S. Agency for International Development financed the production of school textbooks that glorified a narrow interpretation of jihad.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the linkages and networks in the region strengthened further, and many students of madrassas (called Taliban) moved from FATA and KPP (especially from Deobandi Madrassas run by the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam party) to Afghanistan to participate in the civil war for the control of the country. The political rise of the Taliban in 1995–96, caused by indigenous Afghan factors as well as helped by official Pakistani support, also empowered FATA tribesmen who had played a role in the Afghan Jihad. Thousands of Arab and Central Asian fighters who had moved to FATA in 1980s shuttled between Kabul, Kandahar, and Jalalabad in Afghanistan and FATA. The rapid success of the Afghan Taliban also inspired the Dawar tribe of North Waziristan in Pakistan, which raised its local Taliban force in Mirali in 1998–99.⁸ This was soon followed by the local Taliban’s emergence in Orakzai Agency of FATA. Hence, it can be argued that even before the September 11 attacks, a purely Pakistani component of Taliban was raising its ugly head.

POST–SEPTEMBER 11 SCENARIO: DEALS WITH MILITANTS AND CONSEQUENCES

To dislodge the Taliban government that had hosted al Qaeda, the U.S.-led international coalition began its military campaign in Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks. Pakistan was fully on board with the understanding that the non-Pukhtun Northern Alliance (which Ahmed

Shah Masoud had led in fighting the Taliban since 1994) would not be allowed to have a free run at Kabul. India and Iran had been very supportive of the Northern Alliance and hence the prospect of its rise was seen as worrisome by the Musharraf-led military regime of Pakistan. However, after September 11, Pakistan was in no position to ensure that its likes and dislikes in Afghanistan were considered favorably by anyone. Still, Pakistan was given that understanding, and when it was not fulfilled, Pakistan decided that it would have to look after its own interests more “carefully.”⁹ To Pakistan’s dismay, the Northern Alliance had marched into Kabul around mid–November 2001 after the Taliban fled in the aftermath of an effective U.S. air campaign. In the meantime, many Taliban and foreign fighters (including Arabs aligned with al Qaeda) started shifting to the FATA area. The U.S. Special Forces operation in Afghanistan’s Tora Bora mountains (bordering Pakistan) in late 2001 failed to nab or kill Osama Bin Laden and, according to a senior Pakistan army commander, Pakistan was not taken into confidence about the operation.¹⁰ However, American journalist Ron Suskind maintains that the United States had cut a deal with President Pervez Musharraf sometime in November 2001 according to which Pakistan would seal off the passages to Pakistan from the Tora Bora region in Afghanistan and, in return, the United States would provide Pakistan nearly a billion dollars in new economic aid.¹¹ The only verifiable truth here is that border remained porous.

Pakistan’s military launched Operation *Meezan* (Balance) in 2002, entering FATA for the first time since the country’s independence in 1947.¹² Roughly 25,000 military and paramilitary troops were deployed to FATA at the time. The second phase of deployment and military action, reportedly undertaken after intense U.S. pressure, began in March 2004, when Pakistan’s army launched the Kalusha operation near the Wana area in South Waziristan.¹³ It was meant to be a surgical operation targeting militant hideouts, but turned out to be an utter failure, as militants responded swiftly and strongly. This was an unexpected blow to the security forces, which were not expecting tough

resistance. Pakistan's army responded with indiscriminate bombing, unintentionally helping the militant cause with the resultant high civilian casualties. Contrary to standard principles of warfare, it was at this juncture that a peace deal with militants was envisioned and implemented by the military leadership based in Peshawar. Pakistan's army was in a weak situation on the ground, and it was an inappropriate time to opt for a negotiated deal—but Musharraf was convinced by Lieutenant General Safdar Hussain, the then corps commander in Peshawar, to move in this direction.

In this context, it is useful to study the various “peace deals” that Pakistan negotiated with militants in FATA under President Musharraf during the 2004–08 timeframe. Apparently, the purpose of these deals was to limit the conflict zone from expanding, and avoid a head-on collision with the militants. These objectives were far from being achieved in reality, and in fact these “deals” proved to be counterproductive. The details of the various agreements in Waziristan make this point clear.

SHAKAI AGREEMENT (SOUTH WAZIRISTAN AGENCY)

The signing of peace agreements with militants started with the Shakai Agreement in early 2004. It was signed with the notorious but charismatic militant leader Nek Muhammad and his militant commanders at Shakai, South Waziristan, on April 24, 2004.¹⁴ Nek Mohammad, a Waziri tribesman, was known in the region for his bravery. He was believed to have provided sanctuary to Uzbek militant leader Tahir Yuldashev during the confrontation with Pakistan's army.¹⁵ The agreement's ten signatories from the militants' side were Muhammad Mirajuddin, Maulana Abdul Malik, Maulana Akhtar Gul, Muhammad Abbas, Nek Mohammad, Haji Sharif, Baitullah Mehsud, Noor Islam, Muhammad Javed, and Muhammad Alam (alias Abdullah). Two names are especially noteworthy—Noor Islam and Baitullah Mehsud—as both later emerged as leading militant leaders of the Pakistani Taliban movement. Two representatives of the area in the National Assembly of Pakistan, known for

their pro-Taliban leanings, acted as mediators in this deal: Maulana Merajuddin Qureshi and Maulana Abdul Malik Wazir. The crucial clauses of the “confidential” agreement are quite instructive (although some claim that the agreement was verbal and not written):

1. The government will release prisoners taken before and during the recent operations in the area—around 160 militants were released under this clause.
2. The government will pay compensation for the *shuhada* (martyred/injured persons) during the operation and for the collateral damage caused during the military operation.
3. The government will not take action against Nek Muhammad and other wanted individuals.
4. The government will allow foreign mujahideen (foreign fighters) to live peacefully in Waziristan.
5. Mujahideen-e-Waziristan (fighters from Waziristan) will not resort to any action against the land and government of Pakistan, and will not resort to any action against Afghanistan.¹⁶

According to Rahimullah Yusufzai, a leading Pakistani journalist, the agreement was described by both sides as “a reconciliation between estranged brothers.”¹⁷ Yusufzai also maintained that General Barno (commander of the Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan during 2003–05) called Corps Commander Peshawar Safdar Hussain to congratulate and thank him for formulating a policy that would isolate al Qaeda by draining it of its local support in South Waziristan. The arrangement did work for a few weeks (roughly seven weeks), in the sense that there was no flare-up of violence, but soon differences arose as to the interpretation of a clause dealing with the registration of foreign militants. The government believed that foreign militants were

to be handed over to state authorities, whereas the militants argued that there was no specific agreement on this point. When pushed, the militants asked for more time to deliver on this aspect, but clearly they were just trying to gain time. After they missed a couple of deadlines, military operations were re-launched on June 11, 2004.¹⁸ Nek Mohammad was killed by a Hellfire missile launched from a U.S. Predator drone on June 19, 2004¹⁹—indicating that U.S.-Pakistan cooperation was working reasonably well. Both militaries, especially their special forces, had been conducting joint training exercises in the KPP area also.²⁰

The negative consequences of the deal outweighed its utility. Nek Mohammad became a hero in the eyes of the local population, and although he was killed after he backed out of the deal, he created a new model of defiance for young radicals of the area. There have been many fighters in the recent history of FATA, but hardly anyone had challenged Pakistan's military, and in this sense Nek Mohammad had set a new pattern. Secondly, Pakistan's army faced immense obstacles to re-arresting the militants who had been released as part of the arrangement; they went back to their business. At the end of the day, in the eyes of the local population, the militants achieved greater importance than the traditional tribal leaders, since Pakistan's government had accorded them an elevated status by engaging them in negotiations directly.

SRAROGHA PEACE DEAL (SOUTH WAZIRISTAN)

In 2005, the militancy—which was transforming into an insurgency—expanded from the Wazir tribe of South Waziristan to the Mehsud tribe in the agency. Abdullah Mehsud and Baitullah Mehsud emerged as major militant leaders during these years. Pakistan tried to broker another peace deal to bring calm in the Mehsud territories, and consequently, a deal was inked between Baitullah Mehsud and the government of Pakistan on February 7, 2005, at Srarogha, South Waziristan.²¹ Learning lessons from the previous deal, a written agreement was signed, though not publicly disseminated. The terms included:

1. Militants (under Baitullah Mehsud) will neither harbor nor support any foreign fighter in the area.
2. Militants will neither attack any government functionary nor damage government property. They will not create any hindrance to development activities.
3. The government will not take action against Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters for their previous activities. Future involvement in any kind of terrorist or criminal activities will be dealt with under the prevailing laws in FATA. Violators of this arrangement will be handed over to the government.
4. Baitullah Mehsud pledged that if any “culprit” (not from his group) was found in his area, then the Mehsud tribe would hand him over to government authorities in FATA.
5. All issues not covered under this agreement will be resolved with mutual consultation between the political administration and the Mehsud tribe.²²

The agreement was signed by Baitullah Mehsud and several members of his group: Malik Inayatullah Khan, Malik Qayyum Sher, and Malik Sher Bahadar Shamankhel. Reportedly, Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahman, the leader of his own faction of Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, helped bring the two sides to the negotiating table.²³

There were major lacunae in this “deal.” Interestingly, no clause was inserted in the agreement regarding cross-border infiltration or attacks in Afghanistan, and no demand about the surrender of “foreign militants” was made. Serious controversies also arose regarding the issue of financial payments to the militants during peace negotiations. The BBC confirmed such reports, but some sources claimed that money was meant as compensation for property damage in South Waziristan during the military campaign.²⁴ In any case, the arrangement clearly strengthened militants’ influence and status in the area, as they practically won freedom to expand their activities.

Two issues are relevant here. First, Wazir-Mehsud tribal rivalry in the area is entrenched, and Pakistan's army possibly was attempting to widen that gulf by being soft on one tribe—to pit Mehsuds against Waziris. It was a dangerous gamble, and it failed: the government of Pakistan failed to realize that, for both Waziris and Mehsuds, Pakistan's army was an “outside force” against whom both tribes were expected to join hands in the end. Second, Baitullah Mehsud and Haji Omar, who were the main signatories of the deal, continued publicly to say that they were committed to continue to wage their jihad against the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan, and these statements were reported in mainstream Pakistani media.²⁵

The deal was scrapped unilaterally by Baitullah Mehsud on August 18, 2007, in reaction to increased movement and patrolling in the area by the Pakistani army. As proved later, the deal enabled him to become much more powerful, and he trashed the deal a few months before he launched TTP. According to a credible intelligence source, the first serious operation against Baitullah was launched in early 2008, but abandoned midway.²⁶ Interestingly, Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah (the terrorist that was leading militants in the Swat Valley in 2008–09) were even declared “patriotic” in a special briefing conducted by a security organization for media in late 2008. It happened after Indian media talked about surgical strikes in Pakistan in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008. Leading Pakistani journalists attending the briefing in Islamabad were told that, “We have no big issues with the militants in FATA. We have only some misunderstandings with Baitullah Mehsud and Fazlullah. These misunderstandings could be removed through dialogue.”²⁷ Most probably the announcement was a ploy meant to warn India that Pakistan could reconcile with all militants who then could join hands to fight India, but it also explains the critical nature of India-Pakistan rivalry in the region. The bluff worked for a while before Mehsud restarted his terror campaign against Pakistani security forces operating in FATA and in urban centers, targeting

ordinary people. Mehsud was finally eliminated in August 2009 by a U.S. drone strike—after Pakistani authorities repeatedly requested that the United States help eliminate him.

MIRAHSHAH PEACE ACCORD (NORTH WAZIRISTAN)

In 2006, the revolt spread to the Uthmanzai Wazirs of North Waziristan, as they started attacking security forces and their convoys regularly.²⁸ Pakistan's army conducted various limited operations in the area, but an insurgency-like situation was fast developing. The two previous "peace deals" had set a precedent: whoever challenges the government's writ derives more leverage during negotiations. Predictably, the Musharraf government cut another deal, this time with the militants of North Waziristan on September 5, 2006. There were certainly some improvements in the way the arrangement was negotiated and signed. For instance, civilian administrators were involved in the process, and a detailed agreement was drafted before the "signing ceremony." The sixteen-clause agreement included important points for both sides. First, the Uthmani Wazirs (including local Taliban, religious leaders, and tribal elders) committed that:

1. There will be no attacks on law enforcement agencies and government property.
2. No parallel administrative set-up will be introduced, and the writ of the government will be respected. In case of any dispute about the implementation of the agreement, the local administration will be consulted to resolve the issue.
3. There will be no cross-border movement to support militancy in Afghanistan. There will be no restriction on border crossing, however, for the purposes of trade/business and meeting relatives according to the local norms.
4. Similarly, there will be no support for militant activity in surrounding agencies of FATA.

5. All foreigners residing in North Waziristan will be asked either to leave Pakistan or to remain peaceful and abide by this agreement.
6. All captured government vehicles, equipment, and weapons will be returned.

In return, the government's promises included:

1. All militants and civilians of the area arrested during the recent military operation will be released and will not be arrested again on the previous charges.
2. The government will resume providing financial resources to local maliks.
3. The government will remove all newly established checkpoints on roads and will also post Levies and Khasadars (tribal policemen) on the old checkpoints as in the past.
4. The government will return all vehicles and other items, such as weapons, and so on, captured during the operation.
5. The government will pay compensation for all collateral damages to the affected families.
6. According to tribal traditions, there will be no restrictions on carrying weapons, except heavy weapons.
7. Implementation of the agreement will start after all military action is stopped and after the withdrawal of Pakistan's army from checkpoints to its barracks. However, the government has the right to take action if any group violates the agreement.²⁹

On the militant side, the agreement was signed by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, Maulana Sadiq Noor, and Maulana Abdul Khaliq. Some analysts believe that Mullah Omar, Afghanistan's Taliban leader, endorsed the accord and persuaded the local militants to sign.³⁰

Similar to the Srarogha arrangement, some financial compensation was included in the deal, thus strengthening the militants' influence. Though the

agreement was more intrusive about the issue of “foreigners” (meaning al Qaeda and Central Asian militants), around one hundred mid-level Taliban and Arab fighters were released from Pakistani custody, according to a 2006 International Crisis Group report.³¹ This was a self-defeating proposition under any circumstances. Despite the agreement’s clear mention of the supremacy of government authority in the area, the militants’ flag (al-Rayah) was hoisted at the stadium where the deal was signed. *The News*, a leading English-language newspaper in Pakistan, said in its September 7, 2006, editorial: “[T]he government has all but caved in to the demands of the militants. More ominously, the agreement seems to be a tacit acknowledgment by the government of the growing power and authority of the local Taliban.”³²

Militants upheld their end of the bargain for a few months after the deal was signed, but then returned to their old policies regarding collaboration with foreign militants and supporting cross-border movement. In the words of a Pakistani writer, these deals in fact provided “much-needed respite to the militants, enabling them to re-group and re-organise themselves.”³³ The roughly ten month old “peace deal” finally collapsed in July 2007.³⁴ If anything, militants expanded their support networks during the months of “peace”; even during the relative calm in North Waziristan, militants continued to support some Taliban factions in South Waziristan and parts of Afghanistan.

Brigadier Asad Munir (now retired), who is counted among the progressive elements serving in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), insightfully acknowledges that: “A focused strategy to deal with terrorists was never followed. In September 2006 the government concluded another peace deal with the Taliban of North Waziristan. Because of this deal, foreign militants started operating openly. The only option for the locals was to accept Taliban rule.”³⁵

The various accords discussed here were geared initially toward reducing losses for the military, which was not accustomed to the terrain,

lacked weapons needed in the area, and initially was insufficiently motivated to take on militants. The U.S. presence in Afghanistan from the beginning was highly unpopular in the Pukhtun areas of both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and it was an uphill task for Pakistan's army to go against the flow of public opinion in FATA. This fact is often ignored in Western discourse on the subject. In comparison, it is widely recognized that Pakistan all along wanted to remain friendly with at least some Taliban groups that, in time of need, could help it confront the specter of rising Indian influence in Afghanistan. "Peace deals" were, in part, a product of such factors and fears.

Another detail often overlooked is Pakistan's efforts in countering Arab and Central Asian fighters and terrorists in the tribal belt. Pakistan achieved many successes in this regard, as compared to its performance against the Pakistani Taliban. In fact, the rise of TTP was a by-product of Pakistan's campaign against al Qaeda, as Pakistani militants and extremists in FATA were galvanized and mobilized after Pakistan's military presence and operations there. Pakistani security forces often complain that their plight goes unappreciated in Western capitals. It indeed deserves recognition that the Pakistani military's casualties from the fight against the Taliban and al Qaeda outstripped the combined losses of U.S. and NATO contributors by a huge margin.³⁶

Where Pakistan fared poorly was in its failure to understand the true nature of Taliban ideology and emerging radicalization trends in FATA. The Taliban were bound to move into KPP and beyond if unchecked, as many Pakistani writers and journalists warned—warnings that went unheeded by the state.³⁷ To be fair, learning lessons from mistakes is a process, and thus Pakistan's limitations in regard to the 2004 peace deal are understandable. However, once the consequences of that faulty arrangement were exposed in the shape of heightened militancy and expansionist Taliban tendencies, President Musharraf should have adopted tougher and smarter tactics in FATA. Perhaps his personal political ambitions and dependence on approval within

the military infrastructure stood in the way. Last but not least, in the overall context, the extensive use of force, both by Pakistan and the United States (including drone attacks), has proved to be a problematic policy in FATA.

Despite these limitations, delays, and weaknesses, Pakistan's security forces cleared the South Waziristan Agency in late 2009 quite swiftly. In the process of tackling militants effectively in Swat and South Waziristan, the army lost dozens of its officers and hundreds of its soldiers. Attacks against army and ISI offices, besides police infrastructure, also have increased significantly throughout Pakistan since 2009.³⁸

INSIDE KHYBER PUKHTUNKHWA PROVINCE

THE MMA FIASCO (2002–07)

To understand the security scenario in Khyber Pukhtunkwa Province (KPP) today, it is critical to analyze the politics of Muttihada Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) from 2002 to 2007. MMA is a coalition formed in 2002 of five religious political parties: the Deobandi-dominated Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), Bareilvi-oriented Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan, the traditionally Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) founded by Abul Ala Maududi, the Shiite Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan, and the Wahhabi-inspired Jamiat Ahle Hadith. Voters swept the MMA government out of office in 2008. Corruption, nepotism, and incompetence were rampant under MMA rule—problems that the religious leaders and politicians in the MMA promised to eliminate.³⁹ Instead of addressing these problems, however, MMA policies restricted civil liberties, slowed progressive legal reforms, and undermined religious tolerance. Women's rights were set back, as was madrassa reform, which was to include teaching science and registering foreign students.⁴⁰ The MMA government instead moved to "Islamize" the public education system in the province, and even banned music on public transportation.

The most significant development, however, was the provincial assembly's passage in July 2005 of the "Hisba Bill," which amounted to strict imposition of Sharia, or Islamic law, as understood and interpreted by the MMA's leaders.⁴¹ Despite major objections by opposition parties and even by the federal government in Islamabad, MMA leadership in the KPP went ahead with the controversial Sharia project. The most onerous provision of the law created new institutions in KPP in which clerics associated with the MMA religious alliance could be given government jobs equivalent to judgeships. The new position of *mohtisib* (ombudsman) was given the task of investigating public corruption and monitoring individuals' moral behavior. Vigilante action, such as the blackening of billboards in Peshawar that featured female models, created an environment of fear in the province.

Though the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared various aspects of the law unconstitutional, the MMA government was able to defy that ruling indirectly by renaming provisions of the law and changing procedural rules, allowing it to bypass checks and balances.

President Musharraf ignored some of the MMA's excesses because he needed its votes to support his efforts to compel the national legislature to allow him to serve both as army chief and president. This behind-the-scenes alliance with Musharraf inspired critics to call the MMA government a "Mullah-Military Alliance." According to Afrasiyab Khattak, former chair of Pakistan's Human Rights Commission and current peace envoy of the KPP government, the MMA's "phenomenal rise in October 2002 elections was not just coincidental, but a part of the political plans of the military. Without the threat of religious extremism, the military would have lost its utility for Western powers."⁴²

The MMA's unwillingness to foster support for counterterrorism during the Musharraf presidency, especially between 2004 and 2007, allowed the Taliban to establish networks in the KPP.⁴³ The KPP government did not listen to political and social groups that favored strong action against extremism. As the Taliban groups strengthened, they attacked military and government infrastructure in

FATA. But in the KPP, the Taliban did not directly confront the government initially, instead focusing on ideological targets, such as girls' schools, ancient Buddhist shrines, women's rights activists, video and music shops, and barber-shops (which shave beards against Islamist wishes).⁴⁴

The MMA government did not adopt defensive measures to monitor the movement of militants from FATA to KPP. On the contrary, the militants and the Islamist political parties in Pakistan certainly share some ideas and social support. Component parties of MMA, especially Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (both the Sami and Fazlur factions), run madrassas that provide recruits for militant training camps in FATA. Analyzing the situation in 2009, journalist Talat Farooq argued that:

After 9/11 the Taliban and Al-Qaeda elements, supported by their Pakistani sympathizers, crossed over into FATA as a result of Musharraf's two-faced policy that strengthened the Pakistani Taliban. This particular policy was never criticized by either the religious or the conservative parties . . . with the result that the militants have grown in power with the help of local criminals, drug mafia, arms dealers and foreign "hands" that have joined them along the way.⁴⁵

THE SWAT CRISIS: LOCAL ROOTS AND STATE FAILURE

The Swat district historically was both more developed and more integrated into regional and national politics than the FATA. Literacy rates, population density, and levels of industrial activity were also higher. There have been no restrictions on political party development, and Swat is more closely linked with mainstream Khyber Pukhtunkhwa Province in geographical and political terms than are such hotbeds of militancy as the two Waziristan Agencies in FATA. Tribal structures are also weaker than in FATA, while Swat has more of a feudal landholding structure—partly as a result of its history as a Princely State until 1969—and this difference effectively was manipulated by extremists. Some relevant historical facts are worth assessing:

- *Demand for Justice.* The rise of militancy in Swat can be dated to the creation in June 1989 of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM—the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law) by Sufi Muhammad. This movement aimed to replace customary tribal law with Sharia law. The demand had popular support not only for its religious dimension but also because it held out hope for social justice in a society, which, though relatively prosperous, was marked by vast inequalities. This led the TNSM to step up its efforts.
- *The 1994–95 Crisis.* In 1994–95, TNSM waged a small-scale insurgency that was in many ways a dress rehearsal for the situation that developed in the 2007–09 timeframe. It was marked by the Pakistani state employing a “carrot-and-stick” approach, including the promise to introduce Sharia law. The insurgency-like situation was also an example of “blowback” effects from the Afghanistan conflict, since there is evidence that the TNSM movement was infiltrated by Afghan war veterans (from FATA) and received financial sponsorship from drug barons in the tribal belt. The insurgents’ aim was to enforce their interpretation of Islamic values and to break the state’s connection with the local population through attacks on government symbols—police stations, schools, and public offices. The government of the time (the democratically elected government led by Benazir Bhutto) finally made a compromise with TNSM to resolve the situation—a decision that set a bad precedent.

The post-2006 insurgency in Swat was led by Fazlullah, son-in-law of Sufi Muhammad, who used a controversial FM radio station to propagate his demands. This insurgency has been much more ruthless than that of the 1990s, but similarly sought to challenge the writ of the state through targeted attacks on government installations. The army took limited action in Swat in 2008, but this did not prevent the Taliban from conducting a low-intensity insurgency from the security of the thickly forested mountains between Swat and Nihag

Dara in Upper Dir District. Peace agreements were signed between the KPP government and Fazlullah's militants first in 2008 and then in 2009, but both collapsed within few months.

The Taliban subsequently gained ground, and by early 2009, formed a parallel government in large parts of the Swat Valley. Ruthless suppression of all dissent and brutal targeting of known opponents cowed the local populace into submission. As in FATA, government schools and government infrastructure were targeted. Government-run polio vaccine campaigns were another target on the pretext that vaccination is a Western ploy to decrease the population's growth. The 2009 deal was brokered through the offices of Sufi Muhammad, who had been released from prison in 2008. The deal stipulated that Taliban military activities and parallel administrative systems were to be wound up in return for an agreement to enforce Sharia in the region. The Taliban's violation of the agreement and movement of militants into neighboring Buner and Dir districts formed the backdrop to the military operation ordered by the government on May 7, 2008. Hundreds of TNSM as well as TTP militants were killed and arrested during the military offensive, and a major humanitarian crisis also erupted due to the massive fighting in the area. About three million people from Swat, Buner, and the Dir area were displaced initially, but largely were resettled by early 2010, with major financial support of the United States (a detail that should have been better projected in Pakistan, but was not).

The progressive and nationalist Awami National Party (ANP) that had formed the provincial government in alliance with the Pakistan People's Party after their success in the February 2008 elections was expected to move swiftly against Swat militants—but quite surprisingly, they opted to start negotiations with the TNSM leadership soon after they took over. There are many interpretations about this decision. On the ground, ANP leaders were facing an assassination campaign by the TTP in FATA and by the TNSM's allies in the Swat Valley.⁴⁶ ANP workers and legislators were targeted systematically, forcing many to disappear from the public arena altogether.⁴⁷ Such threats and

attacks continue today.⁴⁸ Ameer Haider Khan Hoti, the ANP's chief minister of the KPP government, explained: "Our policy is political dialogue. That will eventually be the way out."⁴⁹ Sufi Mohammad, however, changed his tone (despite an "understanding" with the ANP government) when he saw that thousands came to hear his speech in the Swat Valley. There, he unequivocally said that democracy is un-Islamic.⁵⁰ He also declared that women should leave their homes only for Haj in Mecca and should not leave even for medical treatment.⁵¹

The severe public backlash against these statements altered the political dynamic in Pakistan and, together with mounting U.S. pressure, convinced the government of President Asif Ali Zardari and the Pakistani army finally to tackle the TNSM. Operation Rah-e-Raast (The Right Path) pushed the TNSM out of Swat and has largely eliminated its ability to regain control over the area.⁵² Massive flood devastation in July and August 2010 has damaged some of the army's efforts in rebuilding the area, and militants can attempt to regain the sympathies of local Swatis by coming to help them. However, the government and military have considerably more resources at their disposal than the militants to take the lead in the rehabilitation and reconstruction work. However, in the absence of economic opportunities and development, the frustrated younger generation of the province (especially in districts bordering FATA) is susceptible to radicalization and joining militant groups.

CONCLUSION

As evident from the brief history of deal-making in the FATA area and the Swat region in recent years, the Pakistani army plays a central role in decisions about the security issues in the tribal areas. Clearly, Pakistan's military leadership distinguishes between obvious threats, such as those in the TTP, and the looming danger of well-armed religious radicals in other networks,

such as militants affiliated with the Haqqani network. Pakistan deserves credit for conducting increasingly aggressive operations against militants in FATA, especially since the beginning of 2009, but the scope of Pakistan's targets are still limited to anti-government fighters, generally grouped under the TTP umbrella.

This approach, however, is inadequate for securing FATA over the long term. Militant leaders such as Gul Bahadur, Mullah Nazir, and Siraj Haqqani, though not attacking Pakistani forces directly at the moment, may prove to be no different than TTP leaders, some of whom were friendly toward the Pakistani government earlier. In fact, Gul Bahadar has shown such tendencies in the recent past. Moreover, alliances among militant groups are constantly shifting, a reflection of tribal traditions and opportunism. Outsiders watching these shifts and the Pakistani government's handling of them have been unable to discern a consistent pattern that would explain Pakistani policy. But here, regional politics must be taken into account, especially the continuing rivalry between India and Pakistan. At every stage of the lengthy conflict that has destroyed Afghanistan, Pakistan has sought to limit Indian influence in Afghanistan. It is also widely believed in Pakistan that India is deeply involved in supporting insurgency in its restive Baluchistan province.

Indeed, India's growing influence and investment in Afghanistan are disturbing to Pakistan's national security apparatus. Ultimately, the dynamics of Afghan politics will determine Afghanistan's fate, but a collaborative Indian-Pakistani effort to stabilize the country potentially can work wonders. As General Stanley McChrystal, the former top U.S. and NATO commander in Afghanistan, warned in a report in 2009: "While Indian activities largely benefit the Afghan people, increasing Indian influence in Afghanistan is likely to exacerbate regional tensions and encourage Pakistani countermeasures."⁵³ That is exactly what has been happening lately.

General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, Pakistan's chief of army staff, in a rare press briefing on the subject in early 2010, rejected the perception that Pakistan

did not want to take on the militants in North Waziristan. He argued that: “There is already one army division deployed there and we have taken action whenever required,” and he further maintained that it was important that the military consolidate its hold in South Waziristan and other tribal regions before starting another army offensive.⁵⁴ When questioned about the “strategic depth” theory, he replied that “a peaceful and friendly Afghanistan can provide Pakistan a strategic depth.”⁵⁵ In a closed door event organized by a think tank in Washington, D.C., in early 2010, Kayani again argued that he has to proceed in a step-by-step fashion in FATA, according to Pakistan’s security situation, and cannot follow any timeline provided from elsewhere (specifically, the United States).

Distinguishing irreconcilable militant elements from those who can be co-opted will be crucial. As seen in Swat, many ordinary people joined or supported extremist elements when they felt that they were at the total mercy of such groups. Empowering local leaders to help the disgruntled elements re-imagine their future can reignite hope among the people. Hopelessness and frustration among Pukhtuns must be treated through better governance and security before the state realistically can expect to engage reconcilable opposition groups. The Pukhtuns’ history is rife with internal conflicts and brutal tribal rivalries, but they would not have survived as an ethnic group if they were incapable of resolving their internal feuds through negotiations. Reconciliation with forces that are seen as outsiders or occupiers, however, is a very different endeavor—especially in the Afghan context. Contrary to the general belief in policy circles in the United States, those Taliban leaders who are living or hiding in Pakistan have limited control over the decision-making among Taliban operating on the ground in Afghanistan. Mismanagement and corruption in President Hamid Karzai’s government, increases in drug production, and investment in the Afghan army at the cost of supporting Afghan police are also factors that have influenced the course of that country’s Taliban insurgency. The Western “nation-building” project in Afghanistan has largely failed, and a major overhaul of policy is needed. Anyone who believes that the Taliban will

sign a surrender document or will compromise their basic goals (achieving a dominant role in society and establishing an authoritarian state) is living in a fool's paradise.

In the case of Pakistan, its counterinsurgency operations⁵⁶ will have to be complemented by substantive political reform in FATA, as already promised in 2009 by the democratic leadership of the country. Implementation of political reform would allow secular political parties to compete in elections there, thus increasing political participation and accelerating reform of the draconian colonial-era laws. These goals indeed sound long term, but it is logical as well as realistic to aim for fundamental changes in policy, which always require a comparatively longer time to take effect. In places where problems have been allowed to fester for decades, no short-term solutions are viable.

In the coming months, militants operating from parts of North Waziristan, Kurram Agency, and Orakzai Agency can create immense problems for the country as TTP, and al Qaeda affiliates, especially Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, as well as Punjabi militant groups will try to discredit the government further at a time when its popularity is low due to the flood crisis and economic distress. Orakzai Agency provides a unique junction to militants, as it is a place to which militants can move easily from Tirah, Darra Adam Khel, Kurram, and North Waziristan. Most of the terrorists, including Central Asians, who fled from South Waziristan have taken refuge in this agency also. They want an area under their control, where they can reorganize, regroup, train, establish and streamline a system of provision of supplies and logistics—and there is no better location for them than Orakzai. The Pakistan army claimed victory in Orakzai Agency recently,⁵⁷ but holding the area effectively, returning the displaced, and building trust with the people through reconstruction efforts will take time and resources. Sustaining this success theoretically will pave the way for operation in North Waziristan, also—which is a must—as TTP gets significant logistical help from militants hiding in this area.

NOTES

1. Some sections of this report draw from the two other research papers by the author: "Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency," New America Foundation, April 19, 2010, and "An Assessment of Peace Agreements with Militants in Waziristan (2004–08)," The Afghanistan-Pakistan Theatre, Foundation for Defense of Democracies, May 2010.
2. Pukhtunwali is an ancient and chivalrous "code of honor" associated with Pukhtuns. It is a social, cultural, and quasi-legal code, guiding, governing, and shaping both individual and communal conduct. One of its primary features is *Nanawatay* (Sanctuary): protection given to a person who requests it against one's enemies. Any visitor to the area in a difficult situation can ask for sanctuary after telling locals that he or she meant no harm to the people of the area. That person is protected at all costs and under any circumstances.
3. For details, see Hassan Abbas, "A Profile of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 2 (January 2008): 1–4.
4. This section benefits from Hasan Faqeer, *North West Frontier Province (NWFP) Provincial Handbook: A Guide to the People and the Province*, ed. Nick Dowling and Amy Frumin (Arlington, Va.: IDS International Government Services, June 2009).
5. William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers* (New York: Praeger, 1972), 124.
6. Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends, Not Masters: A Political Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 175–76.
7. Iqbal Khattak, "Kabul Trained Baloch, Pushtoon Youth in 1970s: Ex-ANP Leader," *Daily Times* (Pakistan), February 15, 2010.
8. Asad Munir, "How FATA Was Won by the Taliban," *Express Tribune* (Pakistan), June 21, 2010.
9. Interview with a former Commander XI Corps, Rawalpindi, July 2009.
10. Ibid.
11. Ron Suskind, *The One Percent Doctrine: Deep Inside America's Pursuit of Its Enemies since 9/11* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 58.
12. Tariq Mahmud Ashraf, "Pakistan's Frontier Corps and the War against Terrorism: Part Two," *Terrorism Monitor* 6, no. 16 (August 11, 2008).
13. Ismail Khan, "Four Soldiers Die in Wana Attack," *Dawn* (Pakistan), January 10, 2004. Also see Shabana Fayyaz, "Towards a Durable Peace in Afghanistan," Brief no. 10, Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Bradford, April 23, 2007.
14. Ibid.
15. Justin Huggler, "Rebel Tribal Leader Is Killed in Pakistan," *Independent* (United Kingdom), June 19, 2004.
16. Shabana Fayyaz, "Towards a Durable Peace in Afghanistan."
17. Rahimullah Yusufzai, "All Quiet on the North Western Front," *Newsline* (Pakistan), May 2004.

18. Ismail Khan and Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Airstrikes Launched in Shakai," *Dawn*, June 12, 2004.
19. "Nek Mohammad," *Frontline*, PBS, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/mohammed.html>.
20. Amir Mir, "War and Peace in Waziristan," *Asia Times*, May 4, 2005.
21. Shamim Shahid, "Baitullah, Supporters Lay Down Arms," *The Nation*, February 9, 2005.
22. Personal interview with an official of the FATA Secretariat, Peshawar, July 18, 2009.
23. Mir, "War and Peace in Waziristan."
24. "Pakistan Pays Tribe al Qaeda Debt," BBC News, February 9, 2005.
25. For Baitullah Mehsud's statement, see Haroon Rashid, "Pakistan Taleban Vow More Violence," BBC News, January 29, 2007.
26. Interview with a senior Pakistani government official in Islamabad, August 3, 2010.
27. "Army Official Called Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah 'Patriots,'" *Paktribune.com*, December 1, 2008, <http://www.paktribune.com/news/index.shtml?208513>; also see, Hamid Mir, "Army Official Called Baitullah Mehsud, Fazlullah Patriots," *The News* (Pakistan), December 1, 2008.
28. Zulfiqar Ghumman, "Taliban Killed 150 Pro-government Maliks," *Daily Times*, April 18, 2006.
29. For details, see, Ismail Khan, "Why the Waziristan Deal Is Such a Hard Sell" *Dawn*, 14 October 2006; Muhammad Amir Rana, "Pitfalls in Miramshah Peace Deal," *Dawn*, September 30, 2006.
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32. "Back to Square One?" Editorial, *The News*, Sept. 7, 2006.
33. Sayed G. B. Shah Bokhari, "How Peace Deals Help Only Militants," *The News*, July 31, 2008.
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35. Asad Munir, "How FATA Was Won by the Taliban," *Express Tribune*, June 21, 2010.
36. Data comparison from Iraq Coalition Casualty Report, <http://icasualties.org>, and Human Security Report Project, Pakistan Conflict Monitor, <http://www.pakistanconflict-monitor.org>.
37. For instance, columnists and writers such as Pervez Hoodbhoy, Rahimullah Yusufzai, Amir Rana, and Ismail Khan regularly projected such scenarios in *Daily Times*, *The News*, and *Dawn*—Pakistan's three leading English-language newspapers.

38. "Pakistan: The Taliban Strategy behind Targeting the ISI," STRATFOR, November 13, 2009.

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40. For instance, according to official records (2006), out of an estimated total of 4,680 madrasas in KPP, only 1,077 were registered—the rest either refused to register or ignored government instructions to register. See Akhtar Amin, "Only 22% of NWFP Madrassas Registered," *Daily Times*, March 24, 2006.

41. For details, see "Text of Hisba Bill," *Dawn*, July 16, 2005, <http://www.dawn.com/2005/07/16/nat18.htm>.

42. Quoted in "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants." Also see, "Pakistan: The Mullah and the Military," Asia Report no. 49, International Crisis Group, March 20, 2003.

43. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "VIEW: Counter-terrorism: The Missing Links," *Daily Times*, March 4, 2007.

44. For instance, see references in Hassan Abbas, "From FATA to the NWFP: The Taliban Spread Their Grip in Pakistan," *CTC Sentinel* 1, no. 10 (September 2008): 3–5.

45. Talat Farooq, "Politicians and Rah-e-Raast," *The News*, July 13, 2009.

46. For instance, see "Asfandyar Condemns ANP Leader's Killing," *Daily Times*, February 7, 2008; "Taliban Abduct ANP Leader in Hangu," *Daily Times*, December 26, 2008; "ANP Legislator Killed in Bomb Attack," *Daily Times*, February 12, 2009; "Swat Taliban Summon Politicians to Sharia Court," *Daily Times*, January 26, 2009.

47. According to a 2008 STRATFOR analysis: "There appears to be a trend in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province of attacking members of the ANP, one of the only groups that poses a viable threat to radical Islamists' control in the area." See "Pakistan: A Suicide Bombing and a Potential U.S. Ally," STRATFOR, October 2, 2008.

48. "3-member TTP Squad Formed to Kill ANP Leaders," *Daily Times*, December 20, 2009.

49. "Hardtalk," *Daily Times*, February 2, 2009.

50. "Hardtalk," *Daily Times*, March 19, 2009.

51. To watch the interview on Geo TV, visit <http://www.pakhtun.com/index.php/about-pashtuns/current-issues/sufi-muhammad-interview>.

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53. Tim Sullivan, "Indo-Pakistan Proxy War Heats Up in Afghanistan," Associated Press, April 24, 2010.

54. Zahid Hussain, "Kayani Spells Out Terms for Regional Stability," *Dawn*, February 2, 2010.

55. Ibid.

56. For a detailed and impressive study of the subject, see Sameer Lalvani, "Pakistani Capabilities for a Counterinsurgency Campaign: A Net Assessment," New America Foundation, September 2009.

57. "Army Declares Victory in Orakzai," *Dawn*, September 7, 2010.

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